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Executive Summary 
Introduction 
Most climate change mitigation scenarios analysed to date by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), for efforts consistent with the goals of the Paris 
Agreement (keeping global average temperature rise “well below 2°C” over pre-
industrial), rely on presumed deployment of so-called “negative emissions 
technologies” (NETs) at very large (global) scales within a small number of decades.  
Negative emission technologies are composite technology systems or interventions 
which, on a full lifecycle basis, achieve net removal of one or more greenhouse gases 
from the atmosphere. Because of its long atmospheric lifetime, carbon dioxide (CO₂) 
has a dominant role in human-caused long-term global warming, so NETs typically 
focus exclusively on carbon dioxide removal (CDR). Example NET concepts include: 
Afforestation/Reforestation (AR), Bio-Energy with Carbon Capture and Storage 
(BECCS), Direct Air Carbon Capture and Storage (DACCS), and Enhanced Soil 
Carbon storage (SCS). 
ie-nets is a two-year research project, funded by the Environmental Protection Agency 
of Ireland (EPA) Research Programme 2014-2020 (grant number 2016-CCRP-
MS.36). The project is building Irish research capacity and contributing to national 
policy in this emerging area.  
The overarching objective is to provide a detailed and rigorous assessment of the 
scale and speed of negative emissions technology deployment that is required by 
currently envisaged decarbonisation pathways (globally and nationally), consistent 
with the Paris agreement goals.   
This report, the first interim deliverable from the project, presents a comprehensive 
review of the existing literature on the potential forms of negative emissions technology 
(NET), with a particular focus on technology options suitable for deployment in Ireland. 
This executive summary presents an overview and key results from the full review. 
Literature Review aims and structure  
The review focuses on the global NETs literature most relevant to Ireland, and on the 
existing Irish literature on land-use, bioenergy and conventional, fossil-fuel, carbon 
capture and storage (FFCCS) most applicable to the domestic development of 
substantive negative emissions to enable climate mitigation aligned with Paris 
ambition. The aim is to give a preliminary evaluation of the feasibility, timescale, 
capacity (both stock and flow) and indicative costs (capital and recurrent) of negative 
emissions technology deployment, both globally and specifically in Ireland.  
As Ireland’s climate policy is necessarily aligned with Ireland’s ratification of the Paris 
Agreement the research emphasis is on examining deep decarbonisation pathways 
for the EU and Ireland, with and without NETs, that are aligned with meeting the 1.5ºC 
and “well below 2ºC” Paris temperature limits to global warming. In terms of total future 
emissions the global carbon budgets for these two temperature goals are very similar 
so they are frequently stated in this report simply as “well below 2ºC” or abbreviated 
as “WB2C”. 
Climate action policy involving NETs to achieve a low-carbon transition will require 
political decision-making based on knowledge of: the IPCC-assessed and more recent 
peer reviewed climate science; governance of the remaining global carbon budget; a 
global overview of NETs and CCS; scenario modelling of future alternatives (with an 
understanding of underlying assumptions); risk and uncertainty assessment; and 
possible mechanisms to effect deep decarbonisation, including the development of 
NETs. This review is organised as follows: 
Chapters 1 to 6 survey global literature relating negative emissions technologies 
to climate science, multi-lateral management of the remaining WB2C global 
carbon budget, and decision-making and mechanisms to achieve low carbon 
transition from current high emissions, highlighting both the costs of action and 
of inaction (the consequences of exceeding carbon budgets).   
 
Chapters 7 to 9 review material specific to the Irish context: 
• Chapter 7 gives an overview of Ireland’s distinctive emissions profile, 
national climate policy and the recently published National Mitigation Plan, 
existing climate-energy-economy modelling, and current EPA emission 
projections relative to possible mitigation pathways;  
• Chapter 8 gives an estimation of Ireland’s possible remaining national 
carbon quota in terms of an equitable share of the global carbon budget;  
• Chapter 9 presents Irish NETs-relevant literature particularly on bioenergy, 
forestry and soils in the context of global literature and provides a 
preliminary assessment of potential NETs capacity in Ireland. 
Key Findings 
Allocating the Global Carbon Budget (GCB) 
In 2015, the Parties to the Paris Agreement agreed to limit global warming to ‘well 
below 2ºC’ and pursue efforts toward a lower limit of 1.5ºC above pre-industrial levels. 
Climate change will inequitably affect less developed nations, who have the lowest 
historic emissions. Due to the cumulative effect of CO₂ emitted into the atmosphere, 
delayed mitigation action will subsequently require substantially steeper nett 
decarbonisation pathways (WB2C).  
The global carbon budget is the nett amount of CO₂ that can still be emitted without 
exceeding the WB2C temperature limit. At the end of 2017, it is estimated to be only 
~800 (500-1100) GtCO₂. Annual global emissions are over 40 GtCO₂, including fossil 
fuel and land-use. If emissions continue at this rate, this total budget will be exhausted 
within 20 years. National carbon quotas derived from the global carbon budget may 
be a useful tool for resource sharing of the remaining carbon budget.  
There are two main approaches to allocating the global carbon budget amongst 
nations: 
• Inertia (grandfathering) quotas based on current national emissions or GDP 
share 
• Equity quotas based on population share 
Previously, as a partial outcome of the Kyoto Protocol, multi-lateral management of 
the global carbon budget has focussed on “top down” effort sharing frameworks. The 
Paris Agreement takes a “bottom up” approach using the Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) specified voluntarily by participating parties. Developed nation 
Parties have committed to acting first and fastest to undertake “economy-wide 
absolute emission reduction” (UNFCCC, 2015). However, the voluntary NDCs are 
currently collectively inadequate to meet the temperature goal.  
Nett global CO₂ emissions need to be close to zero by mid-century for WB2C, requiring 
nett energy decarbonisation on average of 4% to 8% yr-1 as of 2015 (with the range 
reflecting continuing scientific uncertainty in the response of the earth system to 
anthropogenic forcing). Removing carbon from the atmosphere through negative 
emissions technologies (NETs) may ease the required mitigation rate of gross 
emissions if NETs can be rapidly developed and deployed at scale. The vast majority 
of integrated assessment model (IAM) scenarios compatible with WB2C assume large 
additional amounts of CO₂ removal through NETs being delivered at a rapidly 
increasing scale to at least the year 2100.  
NETs Options 
Removing CO₂ from the atmosphere through NETs can be achieved by biological or 
chemical capture. The captured CO₂ can be stored terrestrially in biomass and/or soils 
or geologically. Different capture methods vary in efficiency and resource requirement, 
and different storage options vary in long term security and technical availability.  
We review the literature for six NETs options with potential relevance to Ireland: 
• Soil Carbon Storage (SCS) 
• Biochar (BC) 
• Enhanced Weathering (EW) 
• Afforestation/Reforestation (AR) 
• Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) 
• Direct Air Capture with Storage (DACCS) 
Considerations for NETs include relative carbon removal capacity, cost, readiness, 
vulnerability to re-release of captured carbon, vulnerability to future climate change, 
biodiversity risk, energy penalty and land pressure (Table 1). 
 
  
Table 1: A simplified schematic to summarise the main policy relevant 
considerations for utilising NET options in Ireland. High uncertainty indicated by * 
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Climate Mitigation Modelling Options 
Modelling future climate-energy-economy outcomes of potential choices through time 
can assist decision-makers. There are a multitude of complex IAMs and energy 
system modelling options. A summary of some models used with descriptions and 
considerations can be seen in Table 2. 
Table 2: An overview of model options used in climate mitigation research 
Model Description 
Benefit-cost analysis 
Employs socioeconomic, physical climate, damage 
function and discounting modules to estimate mitigation 
pathways providing a notionally “optimal” balance of 
benefits over costs. The results, including estimates of a 
social cost of carbon (SC-CO₂), tend to vary considerably.  
Cost effectiveness 
analysis 
Used in economic climate mitigation modelling, assumes 
that a target will be met with high certainty. Analysis then 
identifies the least notional cost pathway among 
alternatives that all meet that specific target constraint. 
Within a cost-effectiveness framework, near-term policies 
need to be aligned with a high probability of meeting a 
climate target, otherwise they cannot be judged to be cost-
effective.  
Energy system models 
Detailed models of energy systems, including primary 
sources, conversion processes and final uses, allowing 
identification of alternative configurations (including 
evolution over time) that meet given energy use 
requirements and other constraints (such as GHG 
emissions). They typically incorporate cost-effectiveness 
modelling to rank or select among alternative 
configurations and transformation pathways that meet the 
given constraints. 
Multi-level perspective 
models 
Accounts for decision-making, carbon lock-ins and cultural 
path dependence. May result in more policy relevant 
analysis, especially if stringent mitigation carbon quotas 
are not reflected effectively in near-term policy 
Life cycle assessment 
(LCA) 
Consider all greenhouse gas emissions associated with a 
defined system (e.g. bioenergy crop production system), 
particularly to assess the GHG intensity per unit energy 
output. 
Decision-making and risk assessment  
WB2C targets imply absolute limits on future use of fossil fuels and on fossil fuelled 
economies. Decision-making within a risk assessment framework, given the WB2C 
global carbon budget, means restrictive management measures (e.g. equitable carbon 
quotas) are now advisable. In decision analysis, due to the plausible probability of 
severe climate impacts on global systems the difficulty of how to meet WB2C emission 
paths is secondary to the physical requirement of meeting the quota. Despite the 
scientific certainty that absolute reductions in emissions are required for effective 
climate change mitigation, uncertainty avoidance and short-termism among decision-
makers in public and corporate governance are common. Policies that lead to inaction, 
delayed action, or insufficient action may result in politically unfeasible pathways, 
stranded assets, higher costs, or, ultimately, impacts that overwhelm feasible 
adaptation (locally or globally). 
Achieving deep decarbonisation: role of NETs 
Effective governance needs to enable climate change mitigation and prevent rebound 
effects. Regulation and carbon taxes continue to be strongly resisted by many actors 
in global, regional and national governance. Carbon markets and market-based 
carbon pricing (flexible mechanisms) are increasingly used globally, but their 
effectiveness in achieving verifiable mitigation is strongly contested. Carbon 
accounting, particularly in land use, is complex and often contested or questionable. 
Policy dependence on negative emissions requires policy statements committing to 
defined and quantified investment time-steps in research, institutional design, legal 
enabling and pilot project delivery. In the likely scenario that NETs are required to stay 
within a WB2C global carbon budget, CCS is an essential technology development 
priority because land-based NETs, targeting biogenic storage (SCS, AR, BC), have 
limited long-term value due to saturation and impermanence. Strong Monitoring, 
Reporting and Verification (MRV) is an additional consideration for NETs, and may be 
a significant cost for these NET options. Developing effective NETs at the speed and 
scale necessary to meet a WB2C carbon budget, even allowing for target overshoot, 
may have profound social, environmental and economic implications, especially due 
to competition with traditional agriculture and biodiversity. 
Potential for Ireland  
Annual CO₂ emissions for Ireland are now over 40 MtCO₂ yr-1. Current projections 
predict continued rising emissions to 2035, indicating failed decoupling from economic 
growth may continue to outweigh any incremental improvements in carbon intensity. 
In Chapter 8, five models are considered to estimate Ireland’s carbon quota from the 
WB2C aligned global carbon budget (Figure 1). The models consider different 
weightings of inertia and equity. The remaining nett carbon equity quota for Ireland is 
estimated to be less than 600 MtCO₂ as of end 2017, which will be exhausted in less 
than 15 years at the current annual rate of emissions. And even a maximum inertia 
carbon quota of 1000 MtCO₂ will still be exhausted before 2040. Meeting Ireland’s 
CO₂ quota would require an exponential reduction rate in nett annual emissions of 
over -4% yr-1 for inertia to over -7% yr-1 for equity. Current projections estimate CO₂ 
emissions instead increasing at rates of +0.5% yr-1 to +1.3% yr-1 and indicative figures 
from 2016 show annual Irish emissions increased by 3.5% yr-1 over 2015. Ireland’s 
current emission projections therefore imply either tacit commitment to very rapid, 
large-scale, deployment of NETs, or quantitatively inadequate mitigation policy 
(relative to the committed Paris Agreement temperature goals). 
 
 
Figure 1: Estimates of Ireland’s carbon quota (proportion of the global carbon 
budget) based on four distinct models (M1-M4) with varying weightings of inertia 
and equity. Percentage labels: Indicative annual emissions reduction rates 
required. 
 
The most immediately deployable NETs options for Ireland are afforestation and soil 
carbon management. These are technologically mature and entail relatively low costs. 
However, these rely on impermanent land sequestration that may saturate within 20 
years and will require continued MRV resources thereafter to retain the stored carbon.  
Enhanced weathering may also be a theoretically feasible near-term option for Ireland, 
as it is technologically ready. However, it requires significant energy input, and would 
only yield nett negative emissions if energy for mining, grinding and transport becomes 
available from very low carbon sources.  
Fossil Fuel with Carbon Capture and Storage (FFCCS) has been preliminarily 
investigated for Ireland, with promising storage potential understood from the Kinsale 
gas field. On this basis, Ireland could potentially deploy BECCS in future provided land 
area was available for bioenergy crops. As well as the significant undertaking of 
developing CCS infrastructure in Ireland, BECCS would also require major expansion 
of reliable bioenergy production and integrated greenhouse gas accounting 
mechanisms in place for biomass productions systems and energy use. Direct Air 
Capture with CCS may also be an option for Ireland, but is currently technologically 
immature, requires very low carbon energy inputs, and appears prohibitively 
expensive.  
Assuming all policy, cost and socio-economic barriers to deploying NETs in Ireland 
were overcome, a preliminary assessment of theoretical NETs capacity in Ireland is 
estimated, on the basis of a notional land resource of up to 550,000 ha (16% of 
agricultural land) being available to terrestrial NETs (Figure 2). This exercise finds the 
highest individual NETs capacities could be achieved from development of BECCS 
and DACCS; lower capacities are from afforestation, enhanced weathering and soil 
carbon management, including biochar, which are time-limited primarily due to the 
saturation effect.  
 
 
Figure 2: Estimated total cumulative CO₂ removal capacity of NET options in Ireland 
up to 2100, based on land area availability of 550,000 ha where relevant, and 
DACCS potentially being deployed to the same CO₂ removal capacity as BECCS. 
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Preliminary Conclusions 
The most viable preliminary strategy that emerges for deploying NETs in Ireland, 
consistent with an explicitly Paris-aligned CO₂ nett emissions pathway, appears to be 
to maximise AR capture and storage now (at least up until 2035, with minimal harvest) 
while supporting the development of BECCS, with the view to allocating AR harvest 
biomass (beyond 2035) to BECCS when CCS costs are lowered and Irish soil carbon 
and forestry stock have saturated. However, if BECCS does not become ready or 
remains infeasibly expensive, the use of AR is limited by saturation and will only 
remove carbon up until a certain time limit (c. 20 years), after which no additional 
significant removals can be assumed. Additionally, carbon removed by AR is stored 
as biomass and soil carbon which is vulnerable to re-release and will require continued 
maintenance, monitoring and protection.  
Hence, while this work informs policy discussions about the potential capacity for 
NETs in Ireland, the limitations imposed by permanence and saturation render NET 
options that are currently available (AR and SCS) high risk. Technological uncertainty 
and high costs render alternative options (BECCS and DACCS) presently unavailable 
at significant scale, and are therefore high risk to depend upon. Furthermore, Irish NET 
capacities estimated herein fall well short of the implied requirements of the emissions 
gap between estimated Irish CO₂ quotas and currently projected gross Irish CO₂ 
emissions.  
Therefore, while our results indicate that NETs in Ireland may have significant carbon 
removal capacity and contribute towards achieving future net emission targets, the 
highest priority and emphasis of Irish climate mitigation actions must continue 
to be immediate, significant and sustained gross emission reductions. 
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Abbreviations and Acronyms 
AD: Anaerobic Digestion of biomass and bioliquid to produce biogas. 
AR: Afforestation and Reforestation: Land-based CDR aiming to increase the carbon 
stock in forest trees and soils. 
AR5: The Fifth Assessment Report by the IPCC, published 2013 to 2014, composed 
of three working group reports and a synthesis report, with summaries for policy-
makers (SPMs) 
atmCO₂: Concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere in parts per million 
ALCA: Attributional Life Cycle Analysis 
BAU: Business As Usual. 
BC: Biochar, made by pyrolysis of biomass producing energy and recalcitrant carbon 
for addition to soils. 
BCA: Benefit Cost Analysis. Also called CBA. Optimises future mitigation and damage 
costs and benefits. Usually stated as a Net Present Value, as for the SC-CO₂. 
BECCS: BioEnergy with Carbon Capture and Storage. Burning biomass in large 
electricity generating stations (possibly also using the waste heat) and also 
capturing the CO₂ to produce energy with nett negative lifecycle emissions. 
CBDR+RC: “Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”. A 
key phrase in the UNFCCC concerning equitable climate policy action. 
CBA: Cost Benefit Analysis. Also called BCA. 
CBT: Carbon Border Tax 
CCAC: Climate Change Advisory Committee, an expert advisory group set up under 
Ireland’s Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act (2015) 
CCS: Carbon Capture and Storage. Methods that achieve capture of CO₂ from flue 
gases or from the atmosphere, followed by transportation by pipeline and then 
injection into geologically secure storage. 
CDM: Clean Development Mechanism. The largest system of carbon permit emissions 
trading defined by the Kyoto Protocol, aiming to enable global mitigation at lower 
cost. 
CDR: Carbon Dioxide Removal. Managed removal of CO₂ from the atmosphere to 
secure geological sinks by CCS and to less permanent sequestration in land 
sinks. 
CEA: Cost Effectiveness Analysis. Assumes a target is met (implying infinite cost for 
failure). 
CER: Certified Emission Reductions, certificates of emission reductions related to 
Kyoto CDM projects. 
CLCA: Consequential Life Cycle Analysis 
CO₂: Carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas targeted by climate mitigation policy 
due to the millennial scale global warming due to cumulative CO₂ emissions. 
CO₂e: Carbon dioxide equivalent. Use to include CO₂ and all GHGs (including 
methane and nitrous oxide) in emissions totals. GWP100 is generally the 
conversion metric. 
CoP: UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (next is Nov 2015, Paris)  
DAFM: Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine 
DACCS: Direct Air Capture with Carbon Capture and Storage. CDR by extraction of 
CO₂ from air using alkali media, followed by transport and storage. 
DCCAE: Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment 
DECLG: Department of Environment, Community and Local Government 
DECC: UK’s Department of Energy and Climate Change  
DICE: A climate-economy BCA model.  
EPA: Ireland’s Environmental Protection Agency 
ERU: Emissions Reduction Units, related to Kyoto’s Joint Implementation programme. 
ESM: Energy System Model or Earth System Model 
ESOM: Energy System Optimisation Model 
ESR: Effort Sharing Regulation of the European Union describing national targets for 
non-ETS emissions reduction by 2020 and as proposed for 2030. 
ETS: Emissions Trading Scheme of the European Union covering large GHGs 
emitters with EU targets for aggregate EU ETS emission reduction. 
EW: Enhanced Weathering using crushed ultrabasic silicate rock for CDR. 
FFCCS: Fossil Fuel with Carbon Capture and Storage 
FUND: A climate-economy BCA model. 
GHG: Greenhouse Gas. A trace gas in the atmosphere that contributes to absorbing 
and retaining reflected solar energy (the greenhouse effect), keeping the Earth’s 
surface warmer than it would otherwise be. 
GGR: Greenhouse Gas Removal (typically synonymous with CDR or NET).  
GMST: Global Mean Surface Temperature (as averaged from observations). 
GWP: Global Warming Potential. A factor to compare different GHGs relative to the 
time-integrated radiative forcing of CO₂ over a period. In UNFCCC accounting 
GWP100 is for a 100-year comparison. GWP and other metrics produce very 
different comparison values depending on time horizon and gas properties. 
HANPP: Human Appropriation of Net Primary Production. The proportion of NPP used 
by humans for food and energy production. 
IAM: Integrated Assessment Models. Analytical models combining climate models 
with global, regional or national modelling of economic growth, energy-use and 
technologies. Used to develop scenarios informing policy options.  
IEA: International Energy Agency  
IPCC:  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  
LCA: Lifecycle Cost Analysis 
MMV: Measurement, Monitoring and Verification 
MRV: Measurement, Reporting and Verification 
Nett: Here used to describe total emissions minus total removals  
N₂O: Nitrous oxide, a potent GHG with a GWP100 of 298 compared to CO₂ =1. 
NETs: Negative Emissions Technologies. Methods that on a lifecycle basis achieve 
greenhouse gas removal (GGR) from the atmosphere. 
NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation 
NMP: National Mitigation Plan. Ireland’s mitigation policy statement.  
Non-ETS: Non-traded national domestic emissions (transport, agriculture and 
buildings, limited by the EU 2020 target of a 20% reduction relative to 1990.  
NPP: Climate Action and Low-Carbon Development National Policy Position. This is 
the Government’s current mitigation policy outline guiding the NMP. 
NPP: Net Primary Production of biomass by photosynthesis (globally, nationally or by 
area). 
OA: Ocean Alkalinisation. The addition of crushed basic rock to enable CDR. 
ppm: parts per million 
PAGE: A climate-economy BCA model. 
PRG: Perennial Rhizomatous Grasses, such as Miscanthus 
RES-E:EU 2020 Renewable energy penetration target for Electricity (for Ireland) 
RES-H: EU 2020 Renewable energy penetration target for Heat (for Ireland) 
RES-T: EU 2020 Renewable energy penetration target for Transport (for Ireland) 
RDD&D: Research, Development, Deployment and Diffusion, 
RF: Radiative Forcing. A measure of the heat trapping (energy imbalance) effect of 
atmospheric greenhouse gases or other climate pollutants; measured in Wm-2. 
SC-CO₂: Social Cost of Carbon Dioxide (also called the Social Cost of Carbon, SCC). 
A Net Present Value produced using BCA methods. 
SCS: Soil Carbon Sequestration. Increasing carbon stocks in soils through improved 
land use management and the use of different crops or grasses. 
SEAI:Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland  
SOC: Soil Organic Carbon 
SPM: Summary for Policy-Makers, particularly the SPMs from the IPCC Assessment 
Reports. 
SRF: Short Rotation Forestry, such as willow coppice. 
SSP: Shared Socioeconomic Pathway: part of a modelling framework to facilitate the 
integrated analysis of future climate impacts, vulnerabilities, adaptation, and 
mitigation. The framework is built around a matrix that combines climate forcing 
on one axis (as represented by the Representative Forcing Pathways) and socio-
economic conditions on the other. Together, these two axes describe situations 
in which mitigation, adaptation and residual climate damage can be evaluated. 
tC: tonnes of carbon (1 tC is equivalent to 3.67 tCO₂ in the atmosphere). 
TCRE: Transient Climate Response to cumulative carbon emissions. 
tCO₂: tonnes of carbon dioxide.  
UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
WB2C: “Well Below 2ºC”. Used as an abbreviation for the Paris Agreement 
temperature goal of limiting global warming relative to pre-industrial GMST. In 
terms of cumulative carbon emissions, a WB2C limit is typically interpreted as 
ensuring a 66% probability of not exceeding a 2ºC rise, and is quantitatively 
similar to the budget for ensuing a 50% probability of not exceeding 1.5ºC. 
WG: IPCC Working Group. The IPCC has three Working Groups: WG1 reporting on 
the physical science of climate change; WG2 reporting on the observed and 
future impacts of climate change, and possible adaptation actions; and, WG3 on 
mitigation examples and options. 
WMGHGs: Well Mixed Greenhouse Gases: carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH₄), 
nitrous oxide (N₂O) and ozone. These GHGs rapidly disperse through the 
troposphere once emitted 
WTO: World Trade Organisation 
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1 Climate and policy context for Negative Emissions 
Technologies 
Summary 
• The Paris temperature target, “well below 2ºC” (WB2C) corresponds to a remaining 
global carbon budget of future cumulative net CO₂ emissions. As of 2018 the WB2C 
global carbon budget is about ~800 (500-1100) GtCO₂. Annual global CO₂ emissions 
are over 40 GtCO₂ yr-1, rapidly depleting the budget. 
• The linear relation between cumulative CO₂ emissions and warming can inform policy 
aiming to limit to WB2C. Delay in achieving stringent mitigation effort increasingly 
steepens the required global nett decarbonisation pathway. 
• NETs can theoretically extend the possibility of some continuing gross CO₂ emissions 
(globally or nationally), while still meeting the Paris temperature targets within a 2100 
time limit but only if developed with sufficient speed and to sufficient scale. 
• NETs employ biological (plant and algal) and chemical (alkali media) pathways of 
carbon dioxide removal (CDR) from the atmosphere, using land management and/or 
technological methods to store carbon in the biosphere or geosphere. 
• Biogenic NETs, namely afforestation and reforestation (AR), ecosystem restoration, 
and soil carbon sequestration (SCS) including biochar (BC), increase total plant and 
soil carbon stocks. Sustainable harvest of plant stocks can be used to produce 
biochar (by pyrolysis of biomass) for addition to soils, or to produce biomass for 
burning in energy production that is equipped for bioenergy with carbon capture and 
storage (BECCS). Biogenic algal and ocean fertilisation NETs methods are also 
possible. 
• Chemical NETs: Direct air capture (DAC) captures CO₂ from air passing over alkaline 
media, for storage using CCS. Alternatively, rocks containing alkali reactive minerals 
(such as olivine) can be ground into finer pieces or particles to enable spontaneous 
CO₂ removal to solid carbon products through enhanced weathering (EW). 
• The radiative forcing effects of different GHGs are not easily equated with simplified 
metrics such as the GWP100 factors used in UNFCCC emission accountings to 
compare with CO₂. In particular, such metrics cannot be directly applied to cumulative 
GHG stocks (such as CO₂ global budgets or national quotas) as opposed to flows 
(annual emission rates). Policies and NDCs could be better aligned with best 
available science if they differentiated appropriately between GHGs. 
• The natural sequestration available in land and ocean sinks is likely to decrease in 
future, and may be subject to increased probability of reversals given continued 
global warming due to future cumulative CO₂ emissions (until nett CO₂ flow is zero). 
• CO₂ emissions are strongly related to fossil fuel use for energy. Methane emissions 
from wetlands and livestock agriculture are also increasing rapidly. 
• The effectiveness of NETs in mitigation is potentially limited by large continuing 
emissions and carbon cycle limits including land-carbon saturation, leakage of stored 
carbon, and passing tipping points in the global climate system. 
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1.1 Introduction 
Through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the UNFCCC, the 
world’s nations accept that rapid global warming is now occurring, caused by humanity’s 
burning of fossil fuels and land-use choices, resulting in escalating, negative climate change 
impacts to human and natural systems (IPCC, 2014). Based on overwhelming observational 
and modelling evidence, from multiple sources in climate science, bioscience and ecology, 
the IPCC is categorical in its scientific advice to policy-makers:  
Continued emissions of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and 
changes in all components of the climate system. Limiting climate change 
will require substantial and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas 
emissions. (IPCC AR5 WG1, 2013, p. 19 SPM). 
In signing and ratifying the Paris Agreement, the nations of the world are now collectively 
committed to policy action “in accordance with best available science” and “on the basis of 
equity”, that will achieve a global decarbonisation pathway aligned with limiting global mean 
surface temperature to “well below 2ºC above pre-industrial levels” and that “pursue efforts 
to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C” (UNFCCC, 2015).  Scientifically, these targets 
translate to absolute carbon budget limits on future global nett CO₂ emissions. However, if 
continued at current rates, global CO₂ emissions will rapidly exhaust such a budget and 
even with radical emission reductions the Paris goals may rapidly become unattainable 
unless substantial ‘negative emissions technologies’, NETs, are also developed to be 
available at increasingly substantial scale starting in the very near-term. Some modelled 
estimates suggest the potential requirement for annual carbon dioxide removal (CDR) of 
billions of tonnes from the atmosphere to permanent geological storage or to less-permanent 
soil or forestry sequestration.  
Political global agreement on stated target temperature limits to warming has now clarified 
the meaning of the ‘level’ described in the phrasing the original UNFCCC objective, to 
stabilise “greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC, 1992 Article 2). 
The evident serious impacts already being seen at 1ºC of warming (Yan et al., 2016) – 
including heat waves of increasing duration and intensity (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017), 
accelerating ice loss from the cryosphere (Ch. 4 IPCC AR5 WG1, 2013, pp. 319–320) and 
escalating global coral bleaching due to El Ninos boosted by ocean warming (Hughes et al., 
2017) – are confirming past projections for impacts on human and natural systems stated in 
the “Reasons for Concern” from the IPCC Third Assessment Report (Ch. 19.6 IPCC AR5 
WG2, 2014, pp. 1066–1079). As reported in AR5, further research updating the “Reasons 
for Concern” has revised temperature thresholds downwards, meaning that serious system 
impacts are likely to occur before reaching 2ºC warming. Furthermore, Article 4 of the Paris 
Agreement states: 
In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out in Article 2, 
Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon 
as possible, recognizing that peaking will take longer for developing country 
Parties, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with 
3 
 
best available science, so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the 
second half of this century on the basis of equity, and in the context of 
sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty. (UNFCCC, 2015 
Article 4) 
Reported global CO₂ emissions ‘flat lined’ in 2014 to 2016, largely due to economic 
conditions in China, but then rose by 2% in 2017 (Quéré et al., 2017) so may or may not be 
close to an ultimate peak. However, for a chance of 2ºC developed nations, particularly, will 
need to now make rapid reductions toward nett zero CO₂ emissions. The cumulative 
radiative forcing effect of CO₂ places severe limits on future global emissions if temperature 
targets are to be met. Continuing global emissions at the current historic high of about 
40 GtCO₂ yr-1 implies that increasingly steep decarbonisation rates will be needed to meet 
the politically agreed temperature targets (Matthews et al., 2017) unless unfeasible amounts 
of negative emissions are included.  
1.1.1 The possible role of negative emissions in mitigation pathways 
Scenario modelling of possible global transformation pathways shows that extending limited 
future use of fossil fuels while enabling a 50% chance of limiting to 1.5ºC, or to well below 
2ºC (at least a 66% chance) will very likely require substantial amounts of negative 
emissions, starting even well before 2050 (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, p. Ch. 6). Even though 
CCS and especially BECCS are unproven at the supposed scales, Integrated Assessment 
Model global scenarios limiting to “well below 2ºC” include large numbers of FFCCS plants 
to reduce emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processes, and BECCS generating plants 
to enable dispatchable electricity production with negative emissions (Peters and Geden, 
2017). Planned large-scale carbon dioxide removal in land use and by more technologically 
complex NETs is assumed in IPCC climate-energy economic modelling but assessments 
focused on their potential, trade-offs and limitations in specific countries such as Ireland are 
missing (Fuss et al., 2014a). Global policies relying on these scenarios therefore tacitly 
assume large scale, early deployment of NETs, but NETs are technologically unproven and 
are not referenced in Nationally Determined Contributions, the pledges of the Parties to the 
Paris Agreement, so policy needs to move from targets to implementation of commensurate 
climate action, with or without NETs (Knopf et al., 2017). Therefore, Ireland and the EU, and 
all other nations, will quickly need to articulate a policy viewpoint of their own on negative 
emissions that will align ‘ratcheted-up’ mitigation action with quantitative pathway options 
meeting the Paris Agreement  (Rogelj et al., 2016a), including the extent to which negative 
emissions are being relied on within likely estimates of national carbon quotas equitably 
derived from the global carbon budget (Gignac and Matthews, 2015).  
Over the past decade the recognition that negative emissions may be required to meet 
climate stabilisation targets has spurred a very rapidly expanding research literature (Minx 
et al., 2017) examining the global potential for negative emissions technologies to remove 
CO₂ from the atmosphere and then store it, either in geologically secure reservoirs or, less  
dependably, in land-based sequestration in forests or soils (IPCC AR5 WG1, 2013). 
However, other than afforestation and unintended ocean fertilisation due to pollution, NETs 
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remain largely undeveloped, or difficult to monitor as in soils. Carbon capture and storage, 
essential to BECCS and DACCS, is a working technology but low carbon prices and risk 
allocation for long term storage continues to limit deployment levels, especially compared to 
the large amounts of CO₂ storage being included in modelled low-CO₂ concentration 
scenarios – up to 4000 plants by 2030 compared to only tens planned by 2020 (Peters et 
al., 2017, p. 121).  
1.1.2 Types and implications of Negative Emission Technologies (NETs) 
Defined by basic pathway process, NETs can be classed as biogenic (plant or algal) or 
chemical based on alkali CO₂-reactive media (Lenton, 2014). Biogenic methods can be 
plant-based including Afforestation/Reforestation (AR) or BioEnergy with Carbon Capture 
and Storage (BECCS), burning biomass in power stations for energy and capturing and 
storing the exhaust CO₂, or algal-based methods, such as algal-BECCS and ocean 
fertilisation. Chemical alkali-based methods, include Direct Air Capture (passing air over 
alkali media), and Enhanced Weathering, grinding up basic and ultra-basic silicate rocks for 
spreading on land or ocean to absorb CO₂. In practical terms, NETs range between changes 
in land use practices (requiring relatively low technology and landscape-wide adoption in 
farming and forestry to achieve increased, long term, carbon storage in biomass and soils) 
to more highly engineered methods and facilities, including large power plants for BECCS 
and distributed units as in DACCS (Smith et al, 2015). Figure 1.1 shows NETs types, 
pathways and stages. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Negative emission technology types, pathways and stages. (Adapted from 
Deich, (2015). 
Comprehensive assessment is urgently needed to examine NETs technical potential but 
also the social, economic, governance and engineering constraints to delivering carbon 
dioxide removal in reality (Lenton, 2014, p. 73). As Fuss et al. (2014a) set out, national-level 
research to establish the real-world feasibility for NETs – in the context of global climate 
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action and sustainable development goals – is now critically important to examine and trial 
the technical potential, land-use implications, socio-political acceptability, and likely costs 
for negative emissions. Balancing the implications of climate action and inaction, for current 
generations and future ones, policy decisions to enable investment to investigate, deploy 
and achieve substantive negative emissions may have to begin now, in parallel with deep 
decarbonisation of ongoing fossil fuel and land use GHG emissions (Hansen et al., 2016). 
1.2 Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions 
Despite the complexity of Earth’s climate system, many decades of climate science have 
arrived at understanding a surprisingly straightforward emergent property for the specific 
role of CO₂: global temperature rise is approximately linearly related to total cumulative 
anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide, such that every additional unit of CO₂ emitted 
to the atmosphere produces a corresponding increment of warming (IPCC, 2013, p. 1033). 
Human extraction and burning of fossil fuels takes carbon out of geologically secure stocks 
in the geosphere and adds it to the atmosphere and biosphere; deforestation and soil 
degradation also cause emissions due to nett loss of stored carbon. Unless NETs can be 
developed to achieve substantial CO₂ removal then a large proportion of the atmospheric 
CO₂ addition remains in the atmosphere, causing energy imbalance, and therefore global 
warming with ongoing climate change that is essentially irreversible on human timescales 
(IPCC, 2013, WG1 Ch. 12). Limiting CO₂ emissions quickly has a beneficial effect in limiting 
temperature change within ten years (Ricke and Caldeira, 2014) and limiting total future 
emissions will correspondingly avoid a related amount of global warming and potentially 
avoid tipping points toward non-linear change in the climate system such as ice sheet melt 
in Greenland and West Antarctica (Clark et al., 2016). 
The Global Carbon Budget, a cooperative effort of the international climate science 
community (Le Quéré et al., 2016 is the eleventh annual publication) summarises emissions 
since 1750, giving an in-depth annual update of human-caused emissions as they perturb 
the stocks and flows in the natural carbon cycle. Note that the annual global carbon budget, 
of fluxes between geologic, land, ocean and atmospheric carbon stocks, needs to be 
distinguished from the cumulative global carbon budget corresponding to limiting global 
warming to a specified temperature. For fossil fuel updates the Global Carbon Budget relies 
on data from the annual BP Statistical Review of World Energy (BP, 2016).  
UNFCCC inventory data is reported for the territorial usage of each major type of fossil fuel 
(coal, oil and gas) and territorial land-use carbon flows.  Each new Global Carbon Budget 
assessment assembles observed data for the global carbon budget in the previous year and 
gives a projection of fossil fuel emissions for the current year.  The anthropogenic emission 
sources and their sinks necessarily satisfy the following balance equation as given by the 
assessment: 
EFF + ELUC = GATM + SOCEAN + SLAND 
The annual added increment of carbon dioxide from fossil fuels and cement EFF and from 
land-use change ELUC are emitted to the atmosphere, where about 45% remains as the 
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amount GATM added each year to past atmospheric CO₂ accumulation.  The remaining 55% 
is absorbed from the atmosphere, approximately evenly, by the ocean and land sinks, 
SOCEAN and SLAND respectively.  If global nett negative emissions were achieved then the 
overall flows would be reversed: carbon dioxide removal from GATM to store CO₂ in land 
sequestration and in geological storage would result in incremental degassing from the 
ocean and land sinks back into the atmosphere, such that the full amount of previous 
emissions (not just the amount retained in GATM) needs to be removed to cancel the warming 
effect. 
On average for 2006 to 2015, fossil fuels use and other industrial processes emitted 9.3 ± 
0.5 GtC yr-1, land-use change contributed 1.0 ±0.5 GtC yr-1. In total, these emissions 
resulted in an annual increase in accumulated atmospheric carbon of 4.5 ±0.1 GtC yr-1 
(adding more than 2 ppm yr-1 to the atmospheric concentration of CO₂).  Decadal flow 
averages are provided from 1960.  Cumulative emissions of CO₂ from fossil fuel and land-
use sources are totalled up to the current year since 1750, the nominal start of 
industrialisation, and since 1870 (the IPCC reference year relevant to available data on 
global temperatures). 
Prior to industrialisation the human perturbation of the Earth’s carbon cycle is believed to 
have been generally small, other than significant land-use change such as deforestation. 
(Land-use change in GHG accounting is taken to mean a substantive change in long term 
land-use classification and does not include temporary changes in stocks or flows such as 
clear-cutting of forestry that will be replanted.) Since industrialisation began in the late 18th 
century, atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, especially CO₂, have steadily 
increased due to human-caused emissions from fossil fuels and land use change –  in the 
case of CO₂, from about 277 parts per million in 1750 to 399 ppm in 2015 (Le Quéré et al., 
2016).  From 1870 up to 2016, the cumulative total of CO₂ emissions released by humanity 
has been 565 ± 55 GtC (2,075 ± 205 GtCO₂), about 75% from burning fossil fuels and 25% 
from land-use change. Greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere today exceeds 
levels from the last 800,000 years. From 1750 to 2011, 375 Gt of carbon has been released 
from fossil fuel combustion and cement production, with 9.5 GtC released in 2011 alone (Le 
Quéré et al., 2016). A further 180 GtC has been released from land use change. Of this, 
240 GtC has accumulated in the atmosphere, with the remaining re-absorbed by the ocean 
and terrestrial systems. The human caused perturbation has increased CO₂, CH₄ and N₂O 
concentration by 40%, 150% and 20% respectively, from 1750 to 2011.  
1.3 Impact of GHG emissions on climate and natural systems  
1.3.1 Recorded and current impacts 
The IPCC show ongoing increases of the global mean surface temperature (GMST) since 
the late 19th century, including warming of the troposphere and cooling of the stratosphere 
since the mid-20th century, and warming of the upper ocean since 1971 (IPCC AR5 WG1, 
2013). The radiative energy flux of the earth has become imbalanced, with more solar 
energy entering than leaving, since at least 1970 and notable changes in wind circulation 
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patterns can be seen. Changes have also been observed in precipitation and sea surface 
salinity. In ice extent, there has been significantly decreased Arctic and slightly increased 
Antarctic sea ice extent and glacier size and snow cover extent have been decreasing. 
Global mean sea level has risen by 0.19m from 1901-2010. Globally there has been an 
increase in frequency and strength of extreme weather events. Heat waves and heavy 
precipitation events have been more frequent, droughts have been worse and lasted longer 
and floods have been larger. Oceanic uptake of carbon has resulted in acidification, with 
significant ecological consequences. Oceanic oxygen concentration has decreased. 
The change in climate observed is driven by increased radiative forcing due to 
anthropogenic activity: increased greenhouse gas concentrations due to fossil fuel burning 
and land use changes causing warming, and increased aerosol pollution, which in aggregate 
causes a lesser, offsetting cooling effect. Climate change influence on water, 
biogeochemical and carbon cycles may cause positive or negative feedback effects on 
increasing global mean temperature. 
1.3.2 Future disruption to climate and natural systems from anthropogenic GHG 
additions 
Near term changes in climate projected are sensitive to aerosol emissions, especially at a 
regional scale and in relation to the hydrological cycle. The global mean surface temperature 
is projected to increase by 0.3-0.7ºC from 2016-2035. Consequently, increased duration, 
intensity and spatial extent of heat waves is likely. Other near-term projected changes 
include higher mean zonal precipitation in high and mid latitudes, increased heavy 
precipitation events, changes in atmospheric circulation patterns, increased ocean 
temperatures and an ice free Arctic Ocean. 
Long term climate changes projected include continued rising of globally mean 
temperatures, the extent of which depends strongly on future GHG emission pathways. With 
increased GMST, precipitation will increase generally with more frequent and intense 
extreme precipitation events, decreased Arctic sea ice is expected, with possible decrease 
in Antarctic sea ice also, permafrost will decrease, snow cover area will reduce, and ocean 
temperatures will warm. The ocean will continue to uptake CO₂, positive feedback from loss 
of carbon from frozen soils will occur, nutrient shortage will limit terrestrial CO₂ sinks, ocean 
oxygen content will continue to decrease, and global mean sea level will rise. Monsoons are 
likely to increase. 
WG2 of the IPCC observed risks of altered hydrological cycles affecting resource availability, 
altered behavioural patterns or biodiversity, negative impacts on crop yields, increased 
climate extremes, increased vulnerability due to conflict. Potential future risks include 
intensified competition due to reduced renewable surface and groundwater resources, 
increased extinction risk of species, irreversible change in composition of ecosystems, 
submergence and flooding from sea level rise, marine ecosystem degradation from ocean 
acidification, disrupted crop production and undermined food security and stability, negative 
human health impacts, increased displacement of people, increased conflict risk and slowing 
economic growth. 
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1.4 The Paris Agreement 
Within the 2015 Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) parties agree to hold the ‘increase in the 
global average temperature to well below 2ºC above pre-industrial levels and pursuing 
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5ºC’. The parties agree to reach global peak 
emissions as soon as possible, preserve and enhance greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs, 
use voluntary international cooperation to reach national mitigation targets, enhance global 
adaptive capacity, minimise loss and damage, provide financial assistance from developed 
parties for developing parties, share technology, build capacity, enhance climate change 
education and public awareness, develop an enhanced transparency framework for action 
and support, periodically take stock of the implementation of the agreement and establish 
an implementation mechanism. Mechanisms for implementation involve developing 
voluntary Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), taking stock every 5 years and 
developing more ambitious new targets to peak GHG emissions as soon as possible and 
achieve net-zero carbon in the second half of the century. 
1.5 The global carbon budget for “well below 2ºC” 
A global carbon budget is the ‘finite quantity of carbon that can be burned associated with a 
chosen ‘safe’ temperature change threshold’ (MacDougall et al., 2015). The approximately 
linear response of long-term global warming to cumulative carbon emissions enables an 
estimated likely (66%) chance of constraining warming to below 2ºC if the total global carbon 
budget does not exceed 1000 GtC (3670 GtCO₂) from the year c. 1870 onwards (Summary 
for Policy-Makers, IPCC AR5 WG1, 2013, p. 27). Le Quéré et al. (2016) estimate cumulative 
emission from 1870-2016 are 565 ±55 GtC (2075 ±205 Gt CO₂), with 75% from fossil fuel 
and industry, and 25% from land use change. The estimated carbon budget is 590–
1240 GtCO₂ from 2015 onwards while current CO₂ emissions are about 40 GtCO₂ yr-1; from 
2017, ~800 GtCO₂ remains in the carbon budget (Rogelj et al., 2016c). Rogelj et al. describe 
how, due to uncertainties in climate sensitivity, non-CO₂ emissions and future emission 
pathways, different  types of climate model give carbon budget values or ranges, either: up 
to the time when the temperature target level is exceeded as Threshold Exceedance 
Budgets (TEBs, derived from complex climate models; or, as Threshold Avoidance Budgets 
(TABs) for avoiding the temperature target level of warming based on scenarios run on 
simple climate models, allowing for radiative forcing by non-CO₂ emissions; see Table 1.1 
below (AR 5 Synthesis Report IPCC, 2014 Table 2.2).  
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Table 1.1: Cumulative CO₂ emission ranges from 1870 and 2011 in GtCO₂ consistent 
with limiting warming to less than stated temperature limits at different levels of 
probability (reproduced from IPCC 2014 AR 5 Synthesis Report Table 2.2) 
 
The carbon budget is a robust and simple concept that can be used to inform emission 
pathways to meet the 2ºC target (MacDougall et al., 2015). In providing stated carbon budget 
ranges, it effectively links climate response, economics and equity. It also incentivises 
decoupling of economic growth and fossil fuel burning, aiding the design of a low carbon 
global economy (Messner et al., 2010).  While intuitively appealing, calculating the carbon 
budget is complex so it is impossible to assign a unique or precise budget to a given 
temperature target (Anderson and Peters, 2016). The carbon budget is sensitive, and may 
fluctuate in response to additional factors such as non-CO₂ climate forcing and permafrost 
melting (MacDougall et al., 2015). Hence while effective in facilitating policy making and 
developing emission pathways, there are inconsistencies in the budget ranges quoted for 
1.5ºC  and 2ºC temperature limits (Peters, 2016). As discussed further in Chapter 2, 
distributing the carbon budget through time to reach and maintain zero nett emissions is 
likely to require agreed multilateral allocation among nations and through time that will need 
to be managed in a fair and transparent way (Messner et al., 2010). Knutti et al. (2017) 
provide a thorough review of climate sensitivity estimates. 
1.5.1 Climate sensitivity and velocity in relation to the global carbon budget 
The equilibrium climate sensitivity, ECS (defined by the longer-term surface temperature 
response to a doubled atmCO₂ concentration) continues to have a wide scientific uncertainty 
range due to the multiplicity of variables in the climate system. This has been considered as 
a reason to delay mitigation action but in fact it is of little relevance to near-term climate 
policy as even if ECS values were to be at the lower end of the range this would only 
postpone exceeding 2ºC by about 10 years if emissions continue at current levels (Rogelj 
et al., 2014a). Lower ECS values, estimated based on historical temperature and weather 
observations for the past hundred years, fail to account for multi-century, climate system 
responses that only contribute 1 to 7% of current warming but ultimately dominate warming 
toward the long-term equilibrium calculated for doubled CO₂ (Proistosescu and Huybers, 
2017). This finding shifts the ECS values significantly upward to a range of 2.2ºC to 6.1ºC 
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(5-95% confidence interval), and increases the risk assessment. Continued unrestricted 
burning of fossil fuels could easily result in atmCO₂ concentrations well beyond 550 ppm, 
potentially reaching two doublings of CO₂ above pre-industrial implying far greater eventual 
warming than the commonly stated climate sensitivity range for a single doubling.  
Both the global carbon budget (the total amount of future CO₂ emissions) and climate 
velocity (the speed of global and local change due to continued high annual emission rates) 
are relevant in policy to enable societal low carbon transition pathways and the required 
adaptation of vulnerable human and natural systems (IPCC AR5 WG2, 2014, pp. 924–927 
Ch. 16.6). As is being seen now in the accelerating global bleaching of coral reefs, high 
‘climate change velocities’, (rates of current global warming) are causing mounting stress 
for natural systems that is likely to exceed the adaptation limits of many ecosystems 
(LoPresti et al., 2015). Of greater relevance to near-term climate policy are the transient 
climate response (TCR) at the exact time of doubled CO₂ and the transient climate response 
to cumulative carbon emissions (TCRE), likely between 0.8ºC and 2.5ºC per 1000 GtC 
(3,670 GtCO₂), the basis for the probabilistic carbon budgets (IPCC AR5 WG1, 2013, p. Ch. 
12 see p. 1113 for details on TCRE and carbon budgets). 
1.6 Current global GHG emissions totals, sectors and trends 
Annual carbon emissions increased at a faster rate from 2000-2011 than from 1990-1999, 
with atmospheric concentration of CO₂ increasing at a rate of 2 ppm yr-1 from 2002-2011. 
After plateauing in the early 2000s methane concentration has begun to increase again 
since 2004, and nitrous oxide concentration has increased steadily over the last 3 decades. 
Annual GHG emissions are now at the highest level in human history reaching 49 
(±4.5) GtCO₂e yr-1 in 2010, a rise of +80% from 1970’s level of 27 (±3.2) GtCO₂e yr-1 (IPCC 
2014). About 78% of the increase to 2010 came from burning of fossil fuels and from 
industrial processes, leading to 32 GtCO₂ yr-1, or 69% of emissions in 2010. Land-use 
related emissions in 2010 totalled 12 GtCO₂e (from agriculture, deforestation and land-use 
change). Cumulative past CO₂ emissions from human-caused land-use change were larger 
than those from fossil fuels until 1970, but, by 2010, fossil fuel cumulative emissions (over 
1340 ±110 GtCO₂e) were close to double those from past land-use change 680 
(±300) GtCO₂. Despite the clear evidence of a need for immediate action to reduce future 
costs, and the useful metric of a carbon budget, emission pathways are not deviating from 
business-as-usual scenario and annual emissions have continued to grow.  
Jarvis et al. (2012) point to the remarkably consistent growth in human energy use and 
(related CO₂ emissions) suggesting that the key mechanism to explain this phenomenon is 
a strong feedback relationship between climate and society, and find that current policies 
would have to be significantly strengthened for effective, rapid mitigation to be aligned with 
“well below 2ºC” emission pathways. Urging that these emission trends be reversed before 
the rapidly decreasing climate budget is used up, Friedlingstein et al. (2014) show that the 
recent and current context of “lower than anticipated carbon intensity improvements of 
emerging economies and higher global gross domestic product growth” is challenging the 
feasibility of deep decarbonisation. For the years 2014-2016, reported global CO₂ emissions 
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plateaued, at least briefly, though at the highest level in human history at about 40 GtCO₂ 
yr-1 (IEA, 2017). This recent levelling off of emissions appears to be more connected to an 
economic slowdown in China, reducing demand for steel and coal, rather than being an 
effect of climate policy (Peters et al., 2017). In general, there is an ongoing, growing 
deviation occurring between climate-target based emission scenarios and actual emission 
trends (Anderson and Peters, 2016).  
Additionally, global methane emissions are now growing again rapidly causing an increasing 
proportion of anthropogenic energy imbalance and climate change. The increase in 
atmospheric methane concentrations is most likely due to mainly biogenic causes – 
increased tropical wetland emissions and increased agricultural ruminant livestock and rice 
production – though likely also include increased fugitive emissions from coal mining and 
unconventional (‘fracked’) oil and gas production (Saunois et al., 2016).   
1.7 Mitigation pathways and modelled scenarios 
Most of the scenario literature on achieving stringent emission targets suggests global nett 
zero CO₂ emissions would be reached between 2060 and 2075 but near-term delay results 
in a requirement for earlier nett zero emissions, potentially requiring negative emissions to 
enable less stringent gross emissions reductions (Rogelj et al., 2015b; Rozenberg et al., 
2015). 
1.7.1 Delayed action limits future mitigation options 
IAM pathways show that the more action is delayed, the higher the cost and the lower the 
achievability of options (Gambhir et al., 2015). Stocker (2013) projects that, under an 
assumed economic constraint of maximum emission reduction rates of -5% yr-1, the 2ºC 
target will become unachievable by 2027, with increasingly severe (and likely unachievable) 
mitigation required as action is delayed; and the 1.5ºC target is already unachievable and 
we will pass a 2.5ºC warming limit as early as 2040. Huntingford et al. (Huntingford et al., 
2012) also highlight the concerns of narrowing emission pathways options as time of inaction 
lengthens, with the position in 2020 determining flexibility for 2050 targets. Van Vuuren et 
al. (2015) also note concerns of fewer pathway options with delayed action, as well as 
increasing dependence on under-developed technologies. Rogelj et al. (2015b) also note 
that mitigation efforts such as reducing emissions and increasing energy efficiency need to 
be rapidly scaled up as the window to achieve 1.5ºC closes. 
1.7.2 Differentiating between long-lived and short-lived climate pollutants 
Human caused climate pollutants include greenhouse gases that cause warming and 
aerosol particles, such as black carbon, that also causes warming, and sulphate emissions 
that cause cooling by reflecting sunlight (Samset et al., 2018). The major anthropogenic 
GHGs producing significant current radiative forcing to change the global energy balance 
are the “well mixed greenhouse gases” (WMGHGs) – carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH₄), 
nitrous oxide (N₂O) and ozone – that rapidly disperse through the troposphere once emitted. 
Net anthropogenic effective radiative forcing (ERF) is currently about 2.3 ±1.2 Wm-2 
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including 2.8 ±0.5 Wm-2 from the WMGHGs (IPCC AR5 WG1, 2013, p. Ch. 8). Different 
greenhouse gases have atmospheric lifetimes and different radiative forcing properties that 
affect the magnitude and longevity of their resulting temperature effect. Immediate, focused 
reduction of short term non-GHGs may provide some flexibility in meeting the carbon budget 
by reducing the rate of warming earlier but CO₂ reductions are needed to limit long term 
warming (Montzka et al., 2011). Rogelj et al. (2015b) considers the role of short lifetime 
climate pollutant (SLCP) GHGs, such as methane, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), black-
carbon and sulphates, in calculating the carbon budget and meeting the 2ºC target. The 
release of these GHGs are related, technologically and economically, to CO₂ release and 
therefore not straightforward to fully decouple and target reductions of short term GHG 
mitigation. However, they estimate that the CO₂ budget could be up to 25% larger if stringent 
methane mitigation was employed. Solomon et al. (2013a) considers using focused 
reduction of SLCPs to ‘trim the peak’ on an emission pathway and buy time. However, even 
with effective mitigation of methane, CO₂ emissions would still need to peak within the next 
two decades and better metrics or separate targets for different GHGs need to reflect that 
different forcing agents have different strengths and lifetimes, rather than a single trading 
basket summarising forcing agents into notional “CO₂ equivalent” values (Solomon et al., 
2013b). 
1.8 Implications for Policy and Governance 
A carbon budget and temperature limit are useful metrics to inform policy and decision 
makers for long term climate mitigation, but have limitations in their usefulness for short term 
actions (Tavoni and Van Vuuren, 2015). Chapter 5 and 6 of this literature review assesses 
decision-making and governance in climate change action in more detail. 
1.8.1 Action under uncertainty 
To address climate change in terms of risk assessment, global policy makers are advised 
to use the precautionary principle, whereby scientific uncertainty does not excuse inaction.  
Gollier et al. (2000) suggest that prevention effort occurs when prudence is larger than twice 
the risk aversion. Hence it is possible to implement immediate reductions under scientific 
uncertainty; and more uncertainty around future risk should induce stronger immediate 
prevention measures in society. 
1.8.2 Need for a long-term perspective 
Huntingford et al. (2012) highlight the need for a very long-term perspective when writing 
climate policies, rather than focusing on near-future 2020 or 2050 targets, policies should 
consider as far ahead as 2500. Van Vuuren et al. (2015) concur with this view, emphasising 
that policies developed in the next few years will have significant long term implications. 
Similarly, Luderer et al. (2016) question the political feasibility of future emission pathways, 
because (due to current weak policy climate) effective long term mitigation pathways would 
be characterised by fast, aggressive transformations of the energy system, higher costs and 
carbon prices and stronger traditional economic impacts. Pye et al. (2017) also suggest that 
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a focus on 2030 could blindside the climate challenge. At a national level in the UK, 
ambitious targets focused on the short term fall short of achieving net zero by 2100. Hence 
there is a need for longer-term pathways to be considered in mitigation policy. 
1.8.3 Equity 
Sharing the carbon budget amongst nations in an equitable way is a significant challenge 
for multi-lateral management due to the historical disparity in per capita emissions and the 
finite nature of the carbon budget (Gignac and Matthews, 2015). Some countries are on low-
carbon development trajectories and may not use all of their equitable carbon allocation, 
however this has implications for quality of life (Lamb, 2016). Global energy use per person 
since 1971 has increased slowly with the developed nations showing very high energy use 
compared with much lower energy use in the developing nations.  An apparent long-term 
stability in highly inequitable energy use is evident, with the exception of China (Lamb, 
2016). 
The contraction and convergence method is a commonly cited approach for the international 
community to meet the climate targets. The method is described by (Gignac and Matthews, 
2015) as ‘national or regional per capita emissions are first allowed to increase or decrease 
for some period of time until they converge to a point of equal per capita emissions across 
all regions at a given year.’  
Sharing the carbon budget equitably is a daunting task that requires the integration of human 
values and scientific understanding. The recent voluntary pledges (NDCs) by the EU, US 
and China currently would not allow for additional emissions from any other countries if 2ºC 
is to be achieved, implying the expectation that other nations will have to accept 7-14 times 
lower per capita emissions. One proposal to counteract this inequality is a significant 
diplomatic effort to make new technologies quickly and widely available in the near future 
(Peters et al., 2015). 
1.9  Conclusion 
Negative emissions technology to remove CO₂ from the atmosphere, intending to reverse 
effects of past and continuing extraction of fossil carbon from geologically secure reservoirs, 
must achieve a comparable level of permanence to fossil stocks, i.e., storage on “timescales 
larger than tens of thousands of years” (IPCC AR5 WG1, 2013, p. 470). Shorter-term 
sequestration of carbon in land stocks, forests (biomass) and soils is non-permanent and 
likely to return carbon to the atmosphere (especially with continued global warming 
increasing rates of soil respiration and fire), such that warming is only delayed rather than 
avoided (IPCC AR5 WG1, 2013, p. 470). Restoring all feasible land carbon could only 
reduce atmCO₂ by 40-70 ppm by 2100 with another ~25% in potential drawdown resulting 
from the CO₂ fertilisation effect (Becken and Mackey, 2017, p. 73). Protecting and adding to 
existing carbon stocks in the terrestrial biosphere is an important mitigation action but in 
general it should be regarded only as replenishing past losses from forests and soils and 
should not be counted as an offset against past or continuing carbon emissions from burning 
fossil fuels extracted from geologic reservoirs (Becken and Mackey, 2017, p. 73). 
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Temporarily overshooting global carbon budgets aligned with Paris temperature targets yet 
still avoiding or minimizing the duration of temperature overshoot would depend critically on 
removing the excess carbon from the atmosphere to return to the stated budget limits within 
tight time constraints, and certainly by 2100 (MacDougall et al., 2015). Tokarska and Zickfeld 
(2015) use an Earth System Model to investigate the effect of achieving global negative 
emissions following different levels of temperature overshoot beyond 2ºC, finding that 
committed sea level rise takes several centuries to slow and reverse. In this modelling, 
removing CO₂ from the atmosphere to storage results in outgassing of CO₂ to the 
atmosphere, confirming the IPCC assessed evidence that for every tonne of CO₂ previously 
emitted in excess of any given budget, a full tonne (at least) will have to be extracted and 
stored in future to counteract the warming effect (see Fig. 6.40 IPCC AR5 WG1, 2013). This 
assumes, of course, that critical positive feedbacks have not been already triggered by the 
temperature overshoot (crossing so called “tipping points”). 
Many authors consider the most prudent and plausible decarbonisation pathway to be an 
“immediate significant and sustained global mitigation, with a probable reliance on net 
negative emissions in the longer term” (Peters et al 2016). In ESM modelling, Jones et al. 
(2016) considers immediate NET deployment prominent in pathway options finding that the 
effectiveness of NETs may be dampened by the weakening and even potential reversal of 
natural sinks even under low emission pathways. Hence the perturbation to the carbon cycle 
from various pathways must be properly accounted for to predict how effective NETs, or any 
other pathway will be (C. D. Jones et al., 2016). Anderson and Peters (2016)  point out that 
an over-reliance on NETs that may not succeed could lock society into a high emissions 
pathway. This is a criticism of many emission scenarios that they depend on technology that 
is either not yet proven at large scale or not sufficiently developed beyond theoretical study. 
They conclude by suggesting the following uncomfortable, but plausible, rationale for this 
over-reliance on NETs in scenario literature:  
The promise of future and cost-optimal negative-emission technologies is 
more politically appealing than the prospect of developing policies to deliver 
rapid and deep mitigation now. (Anderson and Peters, 2016) 
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2 Options for multilateral management of Paris-aligned 
remaining global carbon budgets 
Summary 
• Plausible emission pathways aligned with “well below 2ºC” (WB2C), meeting the 
corresponding global carbon budget, depend on early peaking of global CO₂ 
emissions followed by substantial and sustained emission reductions.  
• To allow any substantial fossil fuel use after mid-century in WB2C pathways 
Integrated Assessment Models include large amounts of carbon dioxide removals 
(CDR), especially large scale BECCS combining energy production and negative 
emissions.  
• Nett CO₂ emissions need to be close to zero by mid-century for WB2C pathways, 
requiring nett energy decarbonisation of average 4% yr-1 to 8% yr-1, implying that 
NETs will need to start delivering significant CDR well before 2050 to permit 
continuing fossil fuel use. 
• Multi-lateral management has typically focussed on “top down” effort sharing 
frameworks such as the mixed outcome of the Kyoto Protocol and its carbon market 
mechanisms (applied only to wealthier nations). 
• A “bottom up” approach of asking for voluntary Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs) to mitigation effort enabled the Paris Agreement. Existing NDCs globally fall 
far short of limiting to WB2C, so substantial, near-term “ratcheting up” of effort will be 
required in early revisions of NDCs.  
• Wealthier nations, in accord with historic responsibility and capacity, have agreed to 
act first to undertake “economy-wide absolute emission reduction”. 
• Effort-sharing principles, may allocate mitigation effort by resource-sharing of 
remaining global carbon budget among nations into national carbon quotas, or by 
cost-sharing of mitigation effort based on responsibility (historic emissions) and 
capacity (wealth).  
• Resource-sharing can be on the basis of inertia quotas, ‘grandfathered’ (inequitably) 
based on current national emissions or GDP share of the global totals; or on equity 
quotas, based on global population share.  
• Particularly for high per capita emitting parties/nations, there is significant moral 
hazard in policy over-reliance on negative emissions being available in future given 
currently large uncertainties in their potential and long-term reliability at scale. 
• Rebound effects across governance boundaries and through time can greatly reduce 
mitigation effectiveness unless overall caps on absolute emissions aligned with 
carbon budget limits are enforced within boundaries and on trade across boundaries. 
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2.1 Multilateral management of GHG emissions and NETs 
2.1.1 Inequitable climate impacts and equitable mitigation responses 
At Paris in 2015, and since entering into force on 4 November 2016, Ireland and all parties 
to the Agreement have now committed to a joint obligation to peak and then cut global 
greenhouse gas emissions in line with limiting global temperature rise to “well below 2ºC” 
over pre-industrial levels and to “pursuing efforts” to limit the increase at 1.5ºC (UNFCCC, 
2017). Global climate policy as embodied in UNFCCC negotiations and the Paris Agreement 
has adopted these goals because any lesser response is likely to risk far more severe 
damages (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, p. 290). This requires effective multilateral management 
to achieve early peaking of global emissions, followed by rapid, deep and sustained 
decarbonisation – as opposed to continuing to allow the possibility of unabated burning of 
all accessible fossil fuels, an extremely dangerous climate policy (Pierrehumbert, 2013, p. 
14119). However, such multilateral management requires some global system of 
international institutions, agreements or inter-related markets, capable of actually delivering 
year-on-year progress toward climate stabilisation to limit the projected, accelerating trend 
of increasing damages due to exceeding global planetary limits, including climate change 
(IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, pp. 318–19; Rockström et al., 2009).  
Althor et al. (2016) show that most wealthy (highly climate polluting) nations are among 
those least vulnerable to climate change impacts, whereas many much poorer, low emitting 
nations are among the most acutely vulnerable; so, excepting strong efforts to the contrary, 
this inequity between “free riders” and “forced riders” is likely to worsen significantly by 2030 
and beyond. This implies that richer nations with well above average per-capita emissions 
have a primary responsibility to lead decarbonisation effort within agreed or unilateral burden 
(and benefit) sharing allocations (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, p. Ch. 4). In general equilibrium 
economic modelling of cumulative global GDP for emission pathways within a 2ºC carbon 
budget, Matsumoto et al. (2016) find climate impacts on global socio-economic well-being 
(as measured by GDP) are minimised through peaking emissions before 2020 followed by 
earlier, deeper emission reductions enabling more moderate decreases later simply 
because shallow emission paths are less difficult to achieve than steeper ones. 
Nonetheless, climate policy has had very limited success in curtailing emissions (Helm, 
2008), which currently remain on a trajectory toward 3 to 5ºC or more of global warming. In 
the opinion of Anderson and Bows (2012), such temperature increases would lead to a level 
of climate change impacts on societies and economies that may be incompatible not just 
with continuing economic growth, but with basic material security or even organised human 
society as we currently understand it. 
Even if achieved, the initial pledges made in signing the Paris Agreement, the Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs), indicate a current trajectory toward about 3ºC warming, 
so substantially greater mitigation effort will be required, with minimum delay, to avoid using 
up the carbon budget for “well below 2ºC” (Rogelj et al., 2016a). Anderson’s (2015) “candid 
assessment” concludes that delayed mitigation over recent decades now dictates that 
meeting a 2ºC carbon budget requires radical emission reductions by wealthy high-
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emissions nations starting immediately. Identifying five clusters of nations by average life 
expectancy and per capita carbon emissions, Lamb et al. (2014) show that no nations in the 
wealthy, high-consumption cluster globally are within “Goldemberg’s Corner” – living over 
70 years on average with less than 1tC cap-1 yr-1 (= 3.7 tCO₂ cap-1 yr-1) – but example 
nations from the other four socio-economic clusters identified are represented, indicating 
that there are different low-carbon pathways to enable high welfare and low climate pollution.  
2.1.2 Negative emissions: extending the carbon budget and moral hazard 
Negative emissions could possibly play a socio-economic role by potentially increasing the 
gross emissions budget, easing the rate of reduction needed in the use of fossil fuels, if 
significant amounts of carbon can be stored nearly indefinitely on land and in secure 
geological reservoirs, but this remains unlikely unless doubts over technical feasibility, 
tipping point risks, cost, actual potential and ethical acceptability can be addressed (Field 
and Mach, 2017). Even if NETs could be successfully scaled up to an effective size, it is 
very unclear whether the cumulative socioeconomic impacts of that deployment would be 
significantly less that the alternative impacts of simply targeting equivalent reductions in 
cumulative positive emissions in the first place. Indeed, it can be argued that the apparent 
attraction lies not so much in a good-faith desire to reduce actual socioeconomic impacts, 
but rather in a perceived opportunity to defer politically or socially unpalatable choices for 
as long as possible (colloquially: “kicking the can down the road”). Field and Mach (2017) 
emphasise the need for ‘rightsizing’ the planned use of NETs relative to these risks, 
advocating the need for balanced and transparent approaches in mitigation planning. 
Anderson and Peters (2016) argue there is a serious moral hazard in climate policy that 
accepts quantitatively inadequate near-term effort by depending on potential future 
mitigation (through NETs) that may never materialise. Such an approach unfairly and 
inequitably loads the risk of failure onto more vulnerable, lower emitters in the first instance, 
and then onto the generality of future generations. To avoid this, prudent and precautionary 
mitigation action should assume minimal future negative emissions, and become more 
lenient only later (if at all) when the potential is much more certain. This is the approach of 
the “roadmap” mitigation plan, set out by Röckstrom et al. (2017), which envisages a halving 
of total global emissions every decade henceforward. Both existing and new policies and 
actions (including NETs) can be best compared in climate action terms on a carbon budget 
accounting basis, by their increased or decreased commitment to future cumulative 
emissions (Davis and Socolow, 2014). In IAM modelling, an end-period constraint (i.e. 2100) 
on atmospheric CO₂ concentration (~450 ppm) in combination with allowing large negative 
emissions globally can result in large temperature overshoots around mid-century due to 
fossil fuel emissions that are only offset subsequently (if ever) by managed increases in 
terrestrial carbon stocks or geological stores (Blanford et al., 2014, p. 388). Such ‘pollute 
now, clean up later’ pathways including negative emissions highlight the potential for wishful 
thinking and moral hazard pointed to by Anderson and Peters (2016). In modelled, 
feasibility-cost scenarios of energy system transformation, Krey  (2014a) find that 
technological feasibility is more difficult and overall costs are much higher without significant 
FFCCS and bioenergy, particularly for non-electricity sectors. 
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Nonetheless, even if the global amount of carbon removals delivered by NETs is at the high 
end of plausibility, above 10 GtCO₂ yr-1 by 2100, then very substantial and sustained cuts in 
fossil fuel use and in deforestation are still needed from now onward. However, as is shown 
in the IPCC WG3 pathways (IPCC 2014 AR5 WG3 Ch. 6) and in roadmaps for Paris-aligned 
decarbonisation (Rockström et al., 2017), the cuts are just not quite as big or as early as 
they would otherwise need to be. Therefore, the IPCC’s AR5 assessment and more recent 
science clearly show that Paris-aligned climate action mandates a need for deep 
decarbonisation without delay, even as NETs are being researched, piloted and, if viable 
technically, economically and politically, then deployed quickly at scale  (Rogelj et al., 
2016c). The IPCC modelling for low concentration pathways has large uncertainties but 
research clearly shows that deep decarbonisation and carbon dioxide removal necessarily 
have to be jointly-planned as complementary within climate action that actually adds up to 
carbon quota pathways that will achieve climate stabilisation at the lowest possible level of 
warming (Kriegler et al., 2013). 
Further sections in this chapter outline multilateral carbon management literature by: types 
of multilateral carbon management; the carbon budget science suggesting average global 
rates of decarbonisation; the basic justification for equitable action suggesting the need for 
burden and benefit sharing; equitable allocation principles as trialled and as proposed by 
literature; current NDC’s relative to science-based average and equitable-based allocations; 
and the implications of this comparison for regional and national carbon quotas which will in 
future need to at least consider NETs (and FFCCS). Based on this chapter’s review of 
multilateral allocation literature, Chapter 8 will produce an explicit outline formulation of an 
appropriate range of Irish carbon budgets and compatible emission pathway scenarios. 
2.2 ‘Top-down’, ‘bottom-up’, or both? 
2.2.1 Carbon management, policy and rebound effects 
As the IPCC describes, international cooperation for planned decarbonisation – within 
global, regional or national governance boundaries – requires some combination of ‘top 
down’ management, involving defined targets (or, more precisely, quotas) with enforced 
monitoring and penalties for non-compliance, and ‘bottom up’ actions, comprising 
contributions that are independently pledged by nations, sectors or individuals, possibly 
working within their own definitions of climate action that may or may not be linked with 
others (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014). However, making the distinction less useful, individual 
mitigation agreements and activities very often encompass both top-down and bottom-up 
elements, covering a range of different levels of cooperation over means or ends, and 
different degrees of centralised authority (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014).  
In practice, all effective climate policy is inevitably both top-down and bottom-up, and, as 
discussed by Kirby (2013), both are necessary. It is the super-wicked problem (Lazarus, 
2008) of how to coordinate the political will, societal license and sustained effort to enable a 
complementary mix of them that achieves global as well as local decarbonisation that has 
proven greatly more difficult.  However, as long understood in business research, effective 
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change programmes are result-driven rather than activity-driven (Schaffer and Thomson, 
1992), so that within a collective of managers (such as nation states, perhaps) acting 
‘bottom-up’ within their own governance area, all nonetheless meet defined and monitored 
(i.e. top-down) pathway objectives consistent with an overall goal (Kaplan and Norton, 
2005). It is the need to meet critical system goals that drives necessary response activities, 
rather than undertaking activities that may well not add up to meeting the goal.  
Alcott (2010) re-examines the common formulation I=PAT relating environmental impact to 
population, affluence and technology, identifying the mutual feedbacks between the ‘right 
side factors’, such that effort to limit one can increase others. Policy which accepts and 
targets top-down caps on impacts (e.g. total CO₂ quotas) on the left-side of the IPAT relation, 
by rationing polluting substances and/or collecting carbon taxes to internalise future costs in 
current prices, can potentially provide long-term certainty for society. This system approach 
is both appropriately results-driven, and, as importantly, essential because individually or 
locally targeting one ‘right side factor’, P, A and T inevitably results in rebound effects in the 
other factors or elsewhere, in the absence of a system cap. 
Notwithstanding system management logic and the strongly evidenced, physical imperative 
to cut future cumulative global emissions to limit damages, caps are unpopular, so 
predominantly ‘bottom up’ approaches have been generally preferred to top down 
management in global, regional and national climate policy. Since it began in 1992 UNFCCC 
process has been based on a bottom-up approach to decision making that is intended to be 
collegial and diplomatic to ensure progress proceeds by consensus.  
2.2.2 The Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement in carbon management 
The need for wealthier nations with large emissions to act first and fastest was recognised 
by all nations from the UNFCCC’s outset, so the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework 
Convention (UNFCCC, 1997) was intended to set-up ongoing binding commitments by 
developing nations to multiyear periods of emissions reduction. On 11 December 1997 the 
Kyoto Protocol (KP) was adopted and came into force as of 16 February 2005 committing 
37 industrialised countries and the EU as a bloc to cut annual emissions by an average of -
5% relative to levels in 1990 by a ‘first commitment period’ of 2008 to 2012 (UNFCCC, 1997). 
Four individual greenhouse gases are targeted by the KP, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous 
oxide and sulphur hexafluoride; and two groups of GHGs, the hydrofluorocarbons and the 
perfluorocarbons. Flexibility in compliance was allowed through the Protocol’s three new 
emissions trading mechanisms – the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint 
Implementation (JI), and  for international emissions trading (IET) – that enable signatories 
to pay for emission reductions achieved outside their territorial boundaries, often in 
developing nations (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, p. 1021). Such emissions trading markets are 
supposed to be strictly monitored to ensure ‘additionality’; that is, it should be demonstrated 
that the emissions putatively avoided would have definitely occurred otherwise (see further 
discussion in Chapter 6). Non-ratification of Kyoto by the United States and withdrawal by 
Canada further compromised the Protocol’s perceived effectiveness in limiting global 
emissions. Following years of UNFCCC talks, the Doha Amendment extended the Kyoto 
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Protocol process but it was not ratified by a sufficient number of nations to enter into force 
for a second commitment period.  
The effectiveness of the KP continues to be questioned. Quantitatively, nine of the 36 
participating countries exceeded their KP targets (by small amounts) and overall the 
aggregate commitment was exceeded by 2.4 GtCO₂e yr-1 though Shishlov et al. (2016) 
claim that much of this was due to accounting “hot-air” including carbon leakage. Helm 
(2008) concludes that the Protocol had little real effect on global emissions and much of the 
EU reduction would likely have occurred in any case due to the move from coal to gas for 
electricity and heating, globalisation moving emissions intensive industries to developing 
countries, and higher oil prices in the 2000s. Aichele and Felbermayr (2013) find the Kyoto 
Protocol probably reduced emissions relative to the counterfactual of no-KP. The failure to 
secure agreement on a top-down regime of emission reductions at the 2009 Copenhagen 
CoP even led some (Rayner, 2010; Rayner and Prins, 2010; Victor and Kennel, 2014) to 
advocate for a ‘reframing’ of climate policy away from mitigating CO₂ emission reductions 
on the basis of political difficulty despite the physical imperative to limit cumulative CO₂ to 
limit future global warming.  
Collectively the experience of Kyoto and Copenhagen led the UNFCCC to move toward a 
bottom-up approach of attracting pledges from almost all countries, “intended nationally 
determined contributions”, which became non-binding NDCs with ratification of the Paris 
Agreement, thereafter to be the subject of a global stocktaking every 5 years from 2023 
(Schleussner et al., 2016). Unfortunately, the chosen parameters and assumptions 
underlying NDCs vary widely by nation and are open to ambiguous interpretation creating 
significant uncertainty in the implied global carbon budget and related global warming 
commitment implied by their sum total (Schleussner et al., 2016). Rogelj et al. (2017, p. 6) 
show these uncertainties seriously affect projections of feasibility and costs. These 
uncertainties could be significantly eased by making deeper near-term reductions thereby 
avoiding additional reliance on uncertain amounts of future carbon dioxide removal. The 
undoubted political achievement of the Paris Agreement was certainly facilitated by the 
bottom up INDCs signifying commitment from nations, but to determine the next NDCs, the 
UNFCCC’s “facilitative dialogue” among Parties and the IPCC’s Special Report on Global 
Warming of 1.5°C, both due in 2018, will continue to confront the political preference for (as 
yet insufficient) bottom-up actions (and inactions) with the top down physical reality of 
escalating emissions commitment to the damaging climate impacts projected by science as 
the Paris temperature targets are breached, transiently or otherwise (Schellnhuber et al., 
2016). The level of negative emissions implied by current NDCs within a Paris-aligned 
carbon quota will inevitably need to be identified and addressed in the upcoming UNFCCC 
facilitative dialogue in 2018 to take stock of collective efforts toward the ‘global stocktake’ 
set for 2023 for “updating and enhancing” NDC pledges (Article 14 UNFCCC, 2015). 
Davis et al. (2013) point out that reaching the level of zero net CO₂ emissions required for 
climate stabilisation will be far from easy and requires a “fundamental and disruptive 
overhaul of the global energy system” through “an integrated and aggressive set of policies 
and programs”. In the meantime however, without effective or commensurate mitigation 
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globally, the physics of the Earth’s climate continues to impose a particularly top-down, 
climate change response to anthropogenic emissions-driven global warming, with serious 
global consequences already underway (IPCC AR5 WG2, 2014 TS Part A). These 
consequences will continue to unfold for hundreds, and even thousands of years (Clark et 
al., 2016; IPCC AR5 WG1, 2013, p. Ch. 12). Increasing surface temperature (even 
transiently) also adds to risks of passing tipping points to more abrupt and irreversible 
system change(IPCC AR5 WG1, 2013, p. Ch. 12 p. 1114-1119; Lenton et al., 2008).  
2.3 The Paris Agreement: “Best available science”  
Even if the Paris Agreement fails to explicitly acknowledge a carbon budget framing to the 
temperature target, the physical science linearly relating cumulative CO₂ emissions to global 
warming enables quantitative climate policy assessment – on the basis of the remaining 
global carbon budget – to underpin policy analysis of multilateral management of global and 
regional climate policy (Frame et al., 2014). Climate science is now able to ascribe an 
associated, remaining global carbon budget confidence range for a specified probability of 
limiting global warming to a stated climate policy temperature goal (Matthews et al., 2009). 
Parallel assumptions are needed for non-CO₂ contributions to radiative forcing and 
reductions to the carbon budget (Peters, 2016) particularly due to methane from fossil fuel 
(extraction and leakage/fugitive emissions) and from land use (rice production and ruminant 
agriculture). Using the carbon quota range, science can indicate an average exponential or 
linear global nett decarbonisation pathway based on a stated quantitative combination of 
carbon budget, amount of temperature overshoot and negative emissions.  
Science cannot be prescriptive, that is for politics, but the carbon budget framing provides 
an indicative global pathway that is useful as a world average rate for comparison with 
proposed global and regional or national pathways. Stocker (2013) finds that, if global 
emissions peak in 2017, and net negative emissions (on a global basis) cannot be reliably 
assumed to occur, then an exponential rate of global decarbonisation averaging at least 
2.5% yr-1 is needed in every year onward, even to limit to an even (50%) chance of eventual 
2ºC warming. The Paris Agreement goal of limiting warming to “well below 2ºC” above pre-
industrial is ambiguous but is commonly being interpreted in recent climate science literature 
(Peters, 2016; Rogelj et al., 2016a) as requiring at least a 66% chance of avoiding 2ºC, so 
even more rapid emission reductions are needed to align action with the smaller carbon 
quotas for the Paris targets. Peaking global emissions and starting rapid decarbonisation as 
soon as possible enable feasible transition pathways to low carbon economies. Failure to 
meet and sustain this (already substantial) global mitigation rate necessarily implies reliance 
instead on rapidly increasing future rates of gross emissions reduction and/or rapidly 
increasing amounts of negative emissions (IPCC AR5 WG1, 2013, p. 1113).  
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Figure 2.1:  Relationship between probability of staying below 2ºC and the median 
temperature increase. (2016). Blue line indicates relationship for a range of future 
emission scenarios. Red line assumes IPCC-assessed statistical relationship. 
This interpretation of “well below 2ºC” as meaning “at least a 66% chance of avoiding 2ºC” 
is possibly due to the convenience of having an IPCC AR5 stated carbon budget for this 
probability and also the perceived feasibility of meaningful probabilities of avoiding 1.5ºC, 
see Figure 2.1. This analysis investigating the ambiguity inherent in the Paris temperature 
target, finds the “at least 66% chance of avoiding 2ºC” budget to be approximately equivalent 
to a 50% chance of avoiding 1.6ºC, and so little different from the Paris goal of “pursuing 
efforts” to limit to 1.5ºC; though there are still large inconsistencies in the budgets due to 
model variations, definitional issues and non-CO₂ emissions. Peters (Peters, 2016) gives 
the remaining budget for a 66% likelihood of avoiding 2ºC as 850 ± 450 GtCO₂ (as of the 
end of 2015), the large confidence range being due to uncertainties in the temperature 
response of the climate system, the amount of future non-CO₂ emissions, and uncertainties 
in measuring past emissions. However, with higher emissions, high-end “fat-tail” risks 
(Wagner and Weitzman, 2015) and possible triggering of climate system tipping points, risk-
appropriate climate policy determines a need for a precautionary approach while 
accelerating investments in all mitigation measures without delay (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, 
p. 172). Rockström et al. (2017) show that even if negative emissions are to play a significant 
future role in feasibly reducing nett global emissions to zero then deep decarbonisation of 
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source emissions from the current very high emission levels will still nonetheless need to be 
achieved for a “well below 2ºC pathway: 
Only deep emission reductions during 2020–2030 can enable [reliance on] 
BECCS to be scaled back or abandoned, while efforts to increase energy 
efficiency and DACCS continue”. Rockström et al. (2017) 
As Stocker (2013) and the best available science makes clear, to avoid “closing doors” to 
emission pathways aligned with the Paris temperature targets, definite choices and follow-
through decarbonisation actions need to be made (much) sooner rather than later. 
2.4 The Paris Agreement: “On the basis of equity”  
Effort-sharing of mitigation among nations is ultimately critical to halting global warming. As 
acknowledged from the original United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(1992) effort needs to be differentially shared to ensure equitable climate action as 
exemplified in the key phrase in Article 4: “common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities” (CBDR+RC). The UNFCCC Paris Agreement’s main stated target of 
limiting global surface warming to “well below 2ºC” combined with the science-defined range 
for the associated remaining global carbon budget (described in Chapter 1) gives a well-
evidenced basis to assess and inform climate mitigation policy, to guide nations toward 
making the required societally transformations become politically possible, globally enabled 
and technically achievable (Knopf et al., 2017). ‘Equitable burden-sharing’ has been and 
continues to be a  major point of contention within the UNFCCC that persists today, largely 
due to conflicting national- and vested self-interest, resolution of which continues to requires 
a consensus on the meaning of fairness (Meinshausen et al., 2015, pp. 3–4). Despite the 
globally agreed importance of CBDR+RC, enabling equity principles in international 
agreements that ensure burden sharing has been contentious and is complicated by relative 
changes in national income and emissions over time, especially related to rapidly developing 
nations such as China (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, p. 1021). 
As discussed in IPCC WG3 Ch. 3 (2014), effective global climate mitigation policy will require 
sustained collective action based on (sometimes conflicting) ethical judgements of justice 
(what is ‘due’ to people) and value (what is good or beneficial) regarding rights and 
responsibility in distributive equity (see p. 219). Economic valuations may provide some 
guidance in decision-making about value (though not justice and rights) but economic 
methods inevitably implicitly embody value judgements affecting equity (pp. 223-225). 
Geoengineering, especially solar radiation management, but also negative emissions 
technologies, has been questioned on ethical grounds. For example, large-scale land-use 
change to enable BECCS could have negative outcomes on the well-being of local 
populations, on global food security or on biodiversity (IPCC 2014 WG3 Ch. 3). Examining 
the literature on climate resilient pathways that could best reduce climate damages, IPCC 
WG2 Chapter 20 (2014) identifies climate change as a direct threat to sustainable 
development, and mitigation as critically important to moderating impacts on human and 
natural systems.  
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The strong relationship of equity and sustainable development to climate mitigation trade-
offs and benefits are detailed in the IPCC WG3 Ch. 4 assessment (2014). Equity 
encompasses both distributive equity (social justice in burden and benefit sharing) and 
procedural equity (enabling participation and fair consideration in decision-making), while 
sustainable development depends on the concept of equity between, as well as within, 
human generations (2014). Underpinning the Paris Agreement’s references to the need for 
climate action to be undertaken on the basis of equity (Preamble and Articles 2, 4 and 14 in 
UNFCCC, 2015) there are three key justifications (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, pp. 294–295): 
first, that burden sharing morally requires allocation according to ethical principles of justice 
and value; second, within international law, that countries have the legal duty to act equitably 
in mitigating climate change; and third, positively, that effective climate mitigation must 
needs be collective so cooperation largely depends on motivating others by showing fair 
effort based on relative responsibility and capacity. In practice though, path dependency in 
governance and political economy, affected by powerful vested interests and norms of 
societal behaviour based on GHG intensive consumption, continue to hinder decision-
making to enable coordinated climate mitigation action (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, pp. 294–
295).   
As described in the previous section, to be acting on the basis of equity, regions or nations 
with high per capita emissions (or wealth, giving capacity to act) will, at a minimum, need to 
show in future Paris Agreement stocktaking how they are achieving an effective 
decarbonisation rate (possibly including stated negative emissions) that is much more rapid 
than the average global rate derived from the well below 2ºC global carbon budget. For any 
temperature target, delays in achieving rapid global mitigation (including CDR delivery, if 
such a contribution is assumed) have a very serious steepening effect on the required 
decarbonisation rate. If delay continues, the subsequent decarbonisation rate can rapidly 
become first politically and economically unfeasible, and then physically impossible to 
achieve (Stocker, 2013).  Mitigation delay, in itself, therefore inequitably transfers costs or 
impacts to the future – cutting off transformation pathways, reducing societal choices and 
lowering resilience to climate impacts (den Elzen et al., 2010; Friedlingstein et al., 2014). 
2.5 Mitigation burden-sharing: allocating the global carbon budget 
2.5.1 Resource-sharing and cost-sharing allocation principles 
Principles of equitable burden-sharing in international climate policy are fully discussed in 
IPCC WG3 4.6.2 (2014), and include: responsibility, often based on present or historic total 
emissions; capacity, or ability to pay for or to deliver mitigation; equality, as in access to 
current and future rights to emit GHGs; and the right to development in meeting basic needs, 
particularly in poorer countries. These principles are just as applicable to consideration of 
NETs within global, regional or national mitigation planning. ‘Resource-sharing’ (sharing the 
‘resource’ of the global carbon budget) and ‘effort-sharing’ (sharing the costs of mitigation), 
are complementary classes of burden sharing frameworks, respectively addressing the 
‘tragedy of the commons’ and free-rider aspects of the climate policy collective action 
problem (2014). Given a bounded global carbon budget aligned with a stabilisation 
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temperature target, an equal per capita approach is the most obviously “equitable” allocation 
principle. However, for countries with emissions high above the global average this may 
impose extreme immediate reductions. Accordingly, transitional emission rights, allocated 
in a way reflecting de facto current emissions, have also been proposed. Per capita emission 
frameworks can also extend to historic as well as future national cumulative emissions, 
differing proposals varying by initial date, population, and basic survival vs. “luxury” 
emissions and emission paths. ‘Effort-sharing’ frameworks aim at fairly sharing the costs of 
mitigation aligned with a stated target pathway or atmospheric CO₂ concentration.  
The question then becomes, what is fair and who will pay? The proposed answers are 
generally set in proportion to differing stated interpretations of responsibility and capacity. 
Climate policy architectures based on alternative allocation frameworks are usefully 
tabulated in IPCC WG3 Table 13.2 (2014, p. 1022). A quantitative comparison of regional 
mitigation costs according to different allocation principles is attempted in IPCC WG3 6.3.6.6 
(2014; see also Pan 2014). A requirement for continuing overall economic growth is 
stipulated as a constraint in most modelling so technology deployment (including NETs and 
CCS) that can, in principle, achieve absolute decoupling of emissions from economic 
growth, is critical to projected mitigation costs. In the idealised case of a global carbon price 
the projected relative regional costs proved to be highly unequal – for example, OECD costs 
are about a fifth of ‘Middle East and Africa’ – implying the need for very large economic 
transfers from richer nations to support mitigation and adaptation in poorer ones (see Figure 
6.27). Exploring the IPCC WG3 database of scenarios (IIASA 2014), Tavoni and van Vuuren 
(2015) find that regional carbon quotas directly show the regional CO₂ contribution to 
warming, therefore a regional scenario quota indicates the level of regional climate policy 
effort. However, if real-world, actual policies do not follow “first best” ideals (rational-actor, 
whole-economy optimal changes) then costs are inevitably greater than modelled (van 
Vuuren 2015).  
Inevitably, as Schuppert, and Seidel (2015) illustrate in examining the German Advisory 
Council on Global Change proposal (WBGU, 2009), all such allocation frameworks are open 
to critique, and, above all, their adoption is subject to political and societal will in the context 
of varied current political economies and path dependent inertias across an inequitable 
world (Knight et al., 2017). At present, the disparate Paris NDCs are very far from expressing 
a clear “well below 2ºC” carbon quota allocation framework. Despite this lack of clarity, if 
followed through, then they would nonetheless indicate some significant collective intent. 
This would still need to be swiftly intensified, especially by the major absolute emitters: 
China, USA, EU and Japan (Jiang et al., 2017).  
2.5.2 Resource-sharing according to inertia and equity 
Raupach et al. (2014) analyse multilateral resource-sharing of a global fossil fuel CO₂ 
budget (exclusive land use CO₂ emissions) for a 50% chance of exceeding +2ºC warming 
(estimated as 1400 GtCO₂ from 2013 onwards) on a range between two end-point metrics: 
‘inertia’ (also known as ‘grandfathering’), meaning sharing the remaining global budget 
based the current national fractions of current emissions; and, ‘equity’, per capita sharing of 
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the budget based on national population. The analysis takes into account: likely changes in 
national population (not a large factor); the possible inclusion of GDP into the sharing 
principle (producing moderate but not large adjustments in allocations); and responsibility 
for historic emissions, which does not change the overall rate but greatly shifts the remaining 
share of emissions to developing nations and requiring far more effort of developed nations 
that harnessed large amounts of fossil fuel energy. Delaying mitigation has by far the highest 
effect on the rates required.  
In the Raupach et al. (2014) analysis, under ‘inertia’, poorer developing nations would likely 
have insufficient access to energy for needed development, and under ‘equity’, richer 
developed nations would face very high decarbonisation rates (regarded as “unfeasible”, 
politically, economically and/or technically). A ‘blended’ allocation, half-way between inertia 
and equity, is also given as a ‘contraction and convergence’ principle, and charts are given 
showing the regional carbon quotas and mitigation rates for all three options (see Figure 
2.2). However, even with this global carbon budget that is larger than a Paris-aligned 
“WB2C” one, average global decarbonisation rates are already high at over 5% yr-1, starting 
from 2013 onwards. Alternatively, with a 10-year delay in peaking global emissions, the 
required subsequent global mitigation rate increases to 9% yr-1. Interestingly, using 
consumption, rather than territorially based accounting does not change country shares 
significantly as the consequent decreases in the exporting nations’ emissions are offset by 
the persistence of growth in their manufacturing emissions. As Raupach et al. (2014) point 
out, accounting for negative emissions in mitigation planning is mathematically 
straightforward at every scale (from global to sub-national sectors).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: The share of an available global carbon budget allocated to 10 regions under 
three sharing principles based on equation (2), with sharing index w = 0, 0.5 and 1. 
Shares are calculated using equation (2) with emissions (fi) averaged over last five years 
of data, and population (pi) averaged over a five-year period centred on the time at which 
world population reaches nine billion. Reproduced from Raupach et al. (2014). 
Anderson and Bows (2011) analyse remaining 2ºC quotas (based on varying probabilities 
of avoiding 2ºC increase) on the simple equitable allocation principle of dividing it between 
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(Kyoto Protocol) Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 nations using conservative assumptions. For a 
“37% chance of not exceeding 2ºC” the equitable remaining carbon budget for Annex 1 
nations is already exhausted now or will be within the next 10 years unless radical emissions 
reductions at far greater rates than current politically contemplated begin immediately. In 
contrast to many studies it concludes: “There is now little to no chance of maintaining the 
rise in global mean surface temperature at below 2ºC, despite repeated high-level 
statements to the contrary”.  
To meet the “likely 2ºC scenarios” in the IPCC WG3 database, Pan et al. (2014b) base a 
very different analysis on the moral principle of equal per capita cumulative emissions 
(EPCCE), allocating every person globally an immediate, equal emission right per year 
(Figure 2.3). This means that developed nations have already exhausted their emissions 
budgets under this scheme requiring financial and technical transfers to developing nations, 
through mechanisms like the Green Climate Fund, to enable their mitigation efforts, avoiding 
high GHG development pathways. Presumably, in the developed nations, planning a faster 
pathway to net zero CO₂ emissions and achieving negative emissions would lower the 
requirement to make such transfers. 
 
  
Figure 2.3: Schematic indication of Non-Annex I and Annex I country per capita emission 
pathways (from Pan et al. 2014). 
Sargl et al. (2016a) examine the use of the Regensburg Formula to enable contraction and 
convergence bringing all countries to equal per capita emissions by a stated future year and 
within a carbon budget.  In the Regensburg model, unlike EPCCE, all nations’ annual 
emissions proceed nearly linearly toward the target, so developing nations which start out 
below the target per capita emissions are awarded a lower cumulative emissions quota than 
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in other convergence formulae. This, combined with ignoring historical responsibility for 
emissions, gives more future emissions to the richer developed nations. As Sargl et al. 
(2016) state, “the Regensburg Model is the most favourable option for industrialized 
countries”, however, by the same token, they conclude that a Regensburg pathway can also 
be considered the minimum equitable effort if the principle of converging per capita 
emissions is accepted. 
 
Figure 2.4: Schematic indication of country per capita emissions pathways (taken from 
Sargl et al. (2016a). 
For “well below 2ºC” pathways, however defined, the need for multilateral planning, 
governance and mechanisms to ensure emissions quota allocation urgently needs to 
overcome resistance to it otherwise societal options to reach the 2ºC goal will quickly narrow 
(2016). Raupach et al. (2014) conclude by highlighting the contrast between the imperative 
of reducing emissions to prevent climate impacts on global human and ecological systems 
and the inertia in carbon-intensive human socioeconomic systems, as follows:  
For the emergence of long-term, cooperative solutions to anthropogenic 
climate change one essential element is an ability to perceive the consistent 
global consequences of local actions, given great differences in national 
economies and histories. The social capital that underpins cooperative 
governance of the commons takes time to evolve, but the biophysical 
realities of climate change demand solutions within decades. This is why 
the development of new perspectives on the sharing challenge is vital. 
(2014). 
2.5.3 Cost-sharing according to responsibility and capacity 
The Climate Equity Reference Framework (CERF) takes the UNFCCC principle of “common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR+RC) as a basis for a 
more comprehensive, cost-sharing allocation of mitigation effort toward achieving the Paris 
29 
 
temperature targets (Holz et al., 2017). The CERF “fair shares” method focuses on near-
term costs and emissions only to 2030, making it difficult to compare with the Raupach and 
Regensberg methods (except by heuristically extrapolating the CERF allocation emission 
paths beyond 2030). In the CERF method, responsibility is based on cumulative emissions 
since a selected start year (from high based on an 1850 start, to low based on 1990). 
Capacity is based on national GDP normalised in terms of purchasing power parity, while 
also progressively allowing for differences in wealth within nations by exempting per capita 
income below a certain level – typically set at the global poverty line of about $16 per day 
(Holz et al., 2017). A “luxury” threshold above which all per capita income counts as capacity 
to pay for mitigation may also be specified.  
In the online CERF tool (EcoEquity and SEI, 2017), users set outline parameters. One of 
three mitigation objectives are chosen: “strong” (>66% probability of limiting to 2ºC); weak” 
(between a 33% and a 50% probability of limiting to 2ºC); and, “G8” (having much less than 
33% chance of limiting to 2ºC). Also selected are: the starting year for cumulative emissions 
responsibility (1850, 1950 or 1990); development threshold; and one of three methods of 
estimating domestic emissions reductions.  
2.6 Paris pledges (NDCs) relative to Paris targets and equitable 
allocation 
Even if the NDC pledges made at Paris are achieved and continued after 2030, global 
warming of 3ºC appears likely because total emissions would far exceed the global carbon 
budget for even relatively low probabilities of avoiding 2ºC (Knutti et al., 2016). Meinshausen 
et al. (2015) explore an alternative ‘diversity aware leadership’ approach to allocation 
involving leadership by a major economy such as the EU, USA or China, to achieve a target 
considered to be fair by all other countries. This framework fuses the need for leadership 
(as an essential for successful negotiation) with the need for perceived fairness – the 
avoidance of relative gains or losses in bargaining. In an illustrative default case, they find 
a ‘likely’ 66% chance of limiting to of 2ºC would require: 2025 targets of 67% below 1990 
levels for the EU28, and 54% below 2005 for the USA; and a 2030 target of 32% below 2010 
for China.  To give some estimate of the level of ambition that 2ºC aligned climate leadership 
(and ‘followership’) actually requires, note that for the EU (and USA before it announced its 
intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement) these targets are more than double current 
NDC pledges. Increasing ambition in this way would require some significant combination 
of additional domestic mitigation effort, negative emissions and/or increased international 
mitigation support.  Based on a framework embodying six equity principles, Pan et al. (Pan 
et al., 2017) similarly find that the EU and USA lack equitable ambition in their NDCs for a 
“well below 2ºC” target and only India, if it met its most ambitious pathway, would be aligning 
action with any serious aspiration for a 1.5ºC limit.  
To identify cost-optimal, Paris-aligned mitigation pathways, Robiou du Pont et al. (2016) 
assess the IPCC WG3 scenarios with at least a 66% chance of limiting to 2ºC according to 
five IPCC-defined allocation approaches. For the national/regional level, the EU’s NDC is 
aligned with three of the approaches, India and the USA with two and China’s with only one.  
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The claimed cost-optimal feasibility of 2ºC pathways in this study contrasts markedly with 
the higher urgency of mitigation indicated by Rockström et al. (2017) and moral hazard in 
over-confident reliance on future achievement of negative emissions (Anderson and Peters, 
2016). In the absence of top-down enforcement of carbon management, bottom-up NDC 
contributions are likely to be more optimal for individual nations or blocs that may be 
incentivised to free ride for protection against other free-riders.  
2.7 Chapter Conclusions: multilateral management of the remaining 
WB2C global carbon budget 
In summary, under the Paris agreement framework, the current, combined, Nationally 
Determined Contributions fall well short of the ambition required by the stated temperature 
goals (Peters et al., 2017) and will need to be dramatically strengthened in the course of the 
planned “facilitative dialogue” in 2018 and then the first five-yearly stocktaking scheduled for 
2023 (Rogelj et al., 2016a). None of the NDCs of the major emitters is aligned with either 
“inertia” or the “equity” resource-sharing allocations of mitigation effort. Research finds that 
the EU and USA in particular would need to effect far more ambitious targets to be action 
on the basis of equity. Given the announced by the USA of its intention to withdraw from the 
Paris Agreement, this research will need to be updated.   
Any consideration of simply including pledges to achieve negative emissions in NDCs must 
be tempered by the significant doubts about NETS development identified by Fuss et al. 
(2014a) setting out major research challenges on: physical constraints on BECCS, climate 
system responses to negative emissions, costs and financing, and barriers in governance 
and acceptability. As Peters et al. (Peters et al., 2017) point out, fair and ambitious NDCs 
need to include “a companion set of pledges on technology research and innovation” 
(including NETs and CCS) or else show how their NDC pledges fulfilling the Paris 
Agreement can deliver a “well below 2ºC aligned pathway” without them.  
To inform low-carbon transition policy Chapter 8 looks at the range for an equitable quota 
for future CO₂ emissions in Ireland based on the principles and models discussed in this 
chapter for multilateral management of the remaining cumulative global carbon budget 
associated with the Paris temperature targets.  
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3 Negative Emissions Technologies 
Summary 
• NETs can be categorised by: method of CO₂ capture, biogenic or chemical; pathway 
method; and storage type and permanence – land or geological.  
• Factors in ranking the mitigation potential of NETs include: readiness, technology 
complexity, difficulty of additionality assessment, land use impacts. These factors 
may interact creating effects that need to be recognised in policy plans. 
• NETs focused on land storage of carbon are less costly and readier to deploy than 
using geological or ocean storage. Ongoing management needs to prevent current 
loss of land carbon and secure additional land-based CDR. 
• Biogenic NETs (afforestation, biochar, soil carbon sequestration, and ecological 
restoration) rely on increasing net primary productivity and increasing the land 
ecosystem uptake of atmospheric carbon.  
• Maximising forest and soil carbon uptake provides a small carbon store relative to 
ongoing fossil fuel emissions.  
• CCS: For carbon capture and storage, CDR permanence in geology is likely high. 
Despite large potential storage volumes and tested technology, CCS has not been 
deployed to date at large scale for long-term CO₂ storage.  
• BECCS: The technical potential of BioEnergy with CCS to produce substantial energy 
with negative emissions has led to large scale inclusion in IAM scenarios delivering 
ambitious mitigation. BECCS at some level appears technically achievable but IAM 
projections for very large scale bioenergy inputs to BECCS appear quantitatively 
unrealistic. 
• BC: Biochar mitigation potential may be significant but reviews show significant 
inconsistencies in data. Biochar CDR Effectiveness increases with higher pyrolysis 
temperatures, which may reduce its soil enhancement characteristics. 
• AR: Afforestation and reforestation have global potential for significant additional 
CDR but land use requirements may compete with other land uses and harvest (for 
bioenergy or otherwise) would limit nett increases in forestry carbon stock. 
• DAC: Direct air capture technology requires geological storage (CCS), is energy 
intensive and is currently assessed as much more expensive than other NETs; but it 
has minimal land use requirement, offers very large theoretical capacity, and costs 
can be expected to fall significantly with large scale deployment experience. It may 
be essential to negate emissions from sectors such as aviation currently regarded as 
otherwise very difficult to decarbonise.  
• EW: Enhanced weathering is expensive, having large energy, transport and 
application costs, especially due to the small grain size of crushed basic silicate rocks 
required to maximise CDR. 
• Significant knowledge gaps are apparent across all NETs, CCS and in the mitigation 
policy potential for NETs, particularly at nation-level scale.  
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3.1 Introduction 
NETs are a complex area of research and development, operating in a contentious context. 
There will likely be many trade-offs and compromises in implementing and deploying NETs. 
NETs are characterised by several environmental, economic and social limits which 
complicates policy development. Research to address knowledge gaps is required but given 
the time lag for NET to be effective, uncertainties cannot be used to justify inaction. The 
following sections will discuss in more detail the potential, limitations, knowledge gaps, 
future research and deployment of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), Bioenergy with 
Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS), Biochar (BC), Afforestation and Reforestation (AR), 
Direct Air Capture (DAC) and Enhanced Weathering (EW) in the context of achieving global 
negative emissions. 
3.2 Carbon Capture and Storage 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The research literature on Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) has grown substantially in 
recent years. 94% of publications related to CCS have been published since 2005 (Karimi 
and Khalilpour, 2015). The literature is closely coupled with international law and 
collaboration networks (Karimi and Khalilpour, 2015). The increased interest in CCS in 
recent years is due to its potential in climate mitigation, most notably in its potential as an 
enabling capability for negative emissions. There is a strong dependence on this type of 
technology for most of the IPCC’s 2ºC IAM scenarios, which informed the Paris Agreement 
commitment to limit temperature rise to “well below 2ºC” over pre-industrial. However, the 
feasibility and potential of CCS is complex, with many necessary considerations to be made 
about the technology, and its social, economic and political limitations. 
CCS may be a critical component of a transition strategy to a low carbon economy,  but 
many barriers exist to its widespread use (Karimi et al., 2016). Some criticisms of CCS are: 
the technology is insufficiently developed to be so heavily relied upon as it is untested at a 
large scale; non-climate risks to the environment or human health due to CO₂ leakage; large 
costs associated with capture and storage; and the concern that CCS-reliance will be 
misused as a concept to justify continued fossil fuel burning and business as usual, reducing 
incentive for reducing fossil fuel burning and increased use of renewable energy. There are 
also many complications to policy and decision-making around the implementation of CCS. 
3.2.2 Potential 
The burning of fossil fuels may not stop completely in time for the 2ºC temperature targets 
based on the current use of renewable sources being too marginal. Therefore it has been 
argued that one of the most effective and realistic pathways for rapid climate mitigation is 
large scale CCS and increased energy efficiency (Wennersten et al., 2015). Promising 
results have been reported by Matter et al. (Matter et al., 2016) with the success of CO₂ 
injected into basaltic lavas in Iceland and mineralised into a stable form removing the 
leakage risk. In this “Carbfix” project, residual CO₂ from a geothermal power plant was 
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dissolved in water and injected into basaltic lavas (Gale et al., 2011). Results show 95% of 
the CO₂ was mineralised in just 2 years. Hence it is possible to store CO₂ in a way that is 
safe for both the environment and human health. Nonetheless, much the more commonly 
cited and proposed applications of CCS are based not on geothermal (or other low-carbon) 
energy sources but on fossil fuel (FFCCS3); and not on storage via mineralisation but on 
direct injection of CO₂ into deep, porous, rock strata, sealed by overlying non-porous strata. 
Limited scale working examples of these techniques can be seen in Canada and Norway 
today. 
3.2.3 Limitations 
While the direct global warming impact of fossil fuel power plants might be reduced by ~82% 
with FFCCS, other environmental hazards such as increased air pollution increase (Cuéllar-
Franca and Azapagic, 2015). This highlights the risks of taking a non-comprehensive 
approach to climate change mitigation. When considering the feasibility and potential of 
CCS, all potential impacts must be fully considered and measured, not just the factors 
relevant to emission pathways and temperature targets. A fully integrated approach must be 
adopted that takes full account of all the implications for the environment and human health 
associated with FFCCS deployment. 
3.2.3.1 Immature technology 
While CCS has been successfully deployed at a local scale with working examples in 
Canada, Iceland and Norway, many critiques highlight that large scale deployment and 
operation of CCS has not yet been achieved and it is imprudent to rely so heavily on a 
relatively untested technology for achieving future emission pathways. Galiegue and Laude 
(Galiegue and Laude, 2017) however, considers that a focus on large scale deployment 
impedes a sustainable transition and narrows the vision for deployment, and actually 
operating CCS at a smaller scale is a fundamental step towards large scale implementation 
and should be encouraged.  
3.2.3.2 Storage Sites 
There are risks associated with the storage sites used for CCS, most particularly around 
potential leakage or seismic activity. Whether or not the CO₂ injected into porous rock strata 
is retained underground is governed by ‘the complex relationships between reservoir depth, 
reservoir temperature and pressure, and the state and density of stored CO₂ (Miocic, 2016). 
Storage site selection will be one of the key features of successfully operating CCS 
(Thronicker et al., 2016).  Benson (Benson, 2005) notes the importance of carefully 
assessing any potential for seismic or volcanic activity when selecting potential storage 
 
                                            
3 Throughout this review FFCCS is used to denote the use of CCS to abate CO₂ emissions from 
direct fossil fuel combustion, but also potentially applying to CO₂ production in more general 
industrial processes, such as cement manufacture. 
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sites. Seismic activity can also be induced by CO₂ injection, and therefore care must be 
taken in monitoring and modelling a storage site (Verdon and Stork, 2016). The type of 
storage site will likely be a greater limit on CCS deployment than the amount of storage 
space (Selosse and Ricci, 2017). Features that need to be considered when selecting a 
suitable storage site include capacity, suitability for injection of CO₂ and its ability to confine 
the CO₂ for long time periods and not leak. Failed storage sites have significant environment 
and health and safety implications (Guen et al., 2017). In an assessment by Miocic et al. 
(Miocic et al., 2016), existing storage sites generally retained CO₂ well, with a minority 
having CO₂ leakages through fault lines. Careful storage site selection, testing, modelling 
and monitoring must be a high priority and suitably resourced in any deployment plans for 
CCS. 
3.2.3.3 Energy 
Another significant impediment is the energy required for CCS reduces the overall energy 
efficiency of the plant. Energy is required for the capture process (including post-capture 
CO₂ compression), for the pipeline transport process (dependent on the pipeline length) and 
for the injection process into the storage reservoir, with the capture process generally 
assessed as being the heaviest demand (Herzog and Dan Golomb, 2004). The input of 
resources to sustain FFCCS has been estimated at up to 40% higher per kilowatt hour than 
non-CCS fossil fuel electricity generation (Krüger, 2017). FFCCS plants have lower 
operational efficiency and current costs are only suggestive (Hammond and Spargo, 2014).  
3.2.3.4 Cost 
CCS currently lacks an effective business case and incentives for the cost of applying it. 
Presently it is simply cheaper to emit CO₂ without CCS (Wennersten et al., 2015). The type 
of capture technology employed, and associated cost, will depend on the type of power plant 
and fuel burned (Leung et al., 2014). Selosse and Ricci (Selosse and Ricci, 2017) find that 
the cost of transport is also an important limit on CCS. Reynolds and Buendia (2017) note 
the absorption properties of organic rich shales and the usability of CO₂ to enhance oil 
recovery. Currently enhanced oil recovery (EOR) is the most mature storage option because 
the economic benefit of more oil incentivises CCS injection (Leung et al., 2014). However, 
the EOR process requires a significant proportion of the injected CO₂ to be immediately re-
released (with the recovered oil) rather than stored, and, of course, also leads to additional 
indirect CO₂ production (from combustion of the additional oil). Given that the majority of oil 
combustion is in transport applications, where CO₂ capture is not technically feasible, the 
nett lifecycle effect of FFCCS coupled with EOR is almost certainly increased, rather than 
reduced, CO₂ release to atmosphere. Accordingly, while EOR might conceivably contribute 
financial support for the development of CCS technology in the short term, it cannot provide 
a basis for sustained, large scale, CO₂ emissions reduction. Large variability in cost 
estimates of CCS, up to a factor of 5, exists in the literature (Akbilgic et al., 2015). This 
impedes deployment as there is no clear consistent message on cost estimates needed for 
effective policy making. 
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Akbilgic et al. (2015) identify the main drivers of cost estimates as the increased cost of 
producing electricity, the decreased efficiency and the significant capital cost associated 
with power plants with CCS. As a result of this, CCS is currently heavily dependent on 
government funding or enhanced oil recovery revenue (Kuch, 2017).  
3.2.3.5 Public Perception 
Public awareness, acceptance and support for CCS will be a crucial factor in its effective, 
rapid deployment, most particularly in driving of political will and not impeding establishment 
of local projects (Wennersten et al., 2015).  
There has been an increasing body of research on public perception of CCS (L’Orange 
Seigo et al., 2014b). Buhr and Wibeck (2014) assess the intention behind communication 
on CCS and whether the objective is to increase dialogue or convince. They identify varying 
assumptions about public involvement, ability to understand complexity, interest and the 
value of public opinion. Broecks et al. (2016) suggest that the primary purpose of CCS 
(climate protection) is less persuasive than arguments for energy production and economic 
growth. This complicates the communication and public engagement challenge. One 
important driver of public perception is risk perception (e.g. leakage, explosions, and seismic 
activity). Nation-specific cultures influence public acceptance due to factors such as 
institutional strength, tolerance of uncertainty, societal roles (Karimi et al., 2016). L’Orange 
Seigo et al. (2014) identify the biggest barrier to achieving public acceptance as low 
awareness, with their results finding only 28% of Europeans had heard of CCS. L'Orange 
Seigo, Dohle, and Siegrist (2014) identify a knowledge gap on the social context of 
deployment, rather than risk perception. They argue that the key need for progression is 
pursuing acceptance locally at a project level, rather than overall societal acceptance.  
3.2.3.6 Business as usual incentive? 
Another concern about CCS is that it will be used to justify the continued burning of fossil 
fuels and de-incentivise or distract from other climate mitigation actions such as increasing 
renewable energy and energy efficiency while decreasing energy demand. It is possible the 
idea of non-binding commitments to future deployment of CCS might be used as an excuse 
for inaction. Azar et al. (2006) proposed that CCS with fossil fuels could meet the (then) 
global targets at half the cost. Krüger (2017) highlights that CCS promises to somehow 
‘solve the climate problem independent of drawn-out political disputes and without changing 
production and consumption patterns’, and suggests that many consider that the large-scale 
deployment of CCS may be a more realistic option than changing the structure of production 
and consumption patterns (Krüger 2017).  Hammond and Spargo (2014) also highlight that 
CCS permits the continued burning of fossil fuels while reducing emissions. 
3.2.4 Knowledge Gaps, Future Research and Deployment 
Martínez Arranz (2016) considers CCS to have been hyped up with high expectations and 
commitments, when in reality it is typified by low outcomes and slow progress to date. In 
order for CCS to be effective it must be deployed imminently on a large scale. However, 
progress has been slow with many barriers to implementation. Hence adequate 
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contingencies must be in place and continued support for alternative technologies and 
pathways must be maintained. Marshall (2016) discusses FFCCS in an Australian context. 
He describes FFCCS as ‘fantasy technology’ used to justify continued coal use and assuage 
political anxiety and discomfort, and also highlights the reality of the situation with no large-
scale testing, uncertainty on how to monitor leaks and no major ongoing investment from 
coal companies. It is therefore imperative that other climate mitigation options be developed 
and implemented along with ongoing deployment of FFCCS, and that FFCCS is not used to 
distract from or undermine the development and implementation of other mitigation 
technologies and actions.  
Bioenergy complements CCS development by coupling the two in BECCS. BECCS provides 
notionally “carbon neutral” energy and takes CO₂ out of the atmosphere (Azar et al., 2006). 
Muratori et al. (2017) proposes the focus be moved away from role of CCS in fossil fuels, 
and towards scenarios of CCS with biofuels (BECCS) in energy production. 
3.2.4.1 Deployment 
In order for CCS to be fully implemented, community support,  reduced risks, robust policies 
and a favourable CCS market are needed (de Coninck and Benson, 2014). However, CCS 
struggles in a context of weak government climate action, low carbon prices, public 
uncertainty and high costs (de Coninck and Benson, 2014). Currently CCS deployment 
progress remains slow, while it continues to be a central component of emission scenarios. 
CCS requires significant regulation and market support for successful implementation (Scott 
et al., 2013). 
In 2005 the IPCC released a technical report and summary for policy makers on CCS 
technology (Metz and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2005). This report 
considers the potential, current status, geography of source and storage, cost, risks, 
leakage, regulation, implications and knowledge gaps and summarises the technical 
perspective on sources, capture, transport, storage, uses. 
Future climate governance will be determined by decisions about continued use of fossil 
fuels. The controversy around CCS could, in itself, cause problems and challenges in the 
area of international climate policy (Krüger, 2017). 
3.2.4.1.1 Europe and UK 
At a European level, the European CCS project network4 is an example of how knowledge 
sharing helps create policy for effective deployment and enable development (Kapetaki et 
al., 2016). EU policy provides generous funding for CCS without cost-cutting breakthroughs. 
The development of this policy context was the result of strategically framing CCS with 
strong supporters and weak alternative options, as well as actively targeting  policy 
discourses  (Martínez Arranz, 2015) 
 
                                            
4 http://www.ccsnetwork.eu/  
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In the UK a recent competition worth 1 billion GBP for research and development in CCS 
was cancelled, with future funds being allocated to research cost-reduction of CCS. A recent 
report on the role of FFCCS in a lowest cost decarbonisation of the UK was released (BEIS 
UK, 2016a). This report found FFCCS is absolutely essential for least cost solution. It 
highlights the need for early decisions due to long lead times. Recommended actions 
included: to establish an FFCCS delivery company to provide power stations, transport and 
storage infrastructure; set up economic regulation; incentivise FFCCS; and use FFCCS 
certificates and FFCCS obligations in the private sector. It proposes that FFCCS can 
compensate for limited emissions reduction in harder to decarbonise sectors. With FFCCS 
being an important component of least cost emission scenarios for the UK, concern exists 
around any delay in FFCCS deployment, such as that imposed by cancelling the research 
and development competition. ETI ESME modelling suggests that a ten year delay could 
cost the UK up to 2 billion GBP yr-1 from 2020 onwards (UKCCS Research Centre, 2017). 
Future projections of the use of FFCCS in the UK have been reduced from 14% by 2035 to 
just 2% of total electricity generation (BEIS UK, 2016b). 
Hence while implementation is complicated with many challenges to delivering robust 
policies, examples of developing action plans can be seen emerging at a regional, national 
and local level. These proposals are typified by calls for knowledge sharing, market 
incentives and least-cost solutions. 
 
3.2.5 Conclusion: CCS 
CCS is at an operational but limited scale of development, but is heavily relied upon in future 
scenarios to climate change. Significant risks, uncertainty and cost exist around the capture, 
transport and storage of CO₂. However, working examples have been demonstrated in 
Norway, Canada and Iceland. Hence large-scale deployment may be possible. To achieve 
the scale necessary, barriers such as cost, public perception, and technology and policy 
development need to be overcome.  
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3.3 BECCS 
3.3.1 Introduction 
While many mitigation options can decrease gross emissions, BECCS offers the potential 
to actually decrease the atmospheric CO₂ levels (Mohan, 2016). Selosse and Ricci (Selosse 
and Ricci, 2014) define BECCS as ‘a process in which CO₂ originating from biomass is 
captured and stored in geological formations’ (Figure 3.1). The majority of 2ºC IAM scenarios 
heavily rely on BECCS to deliver the global warming target (Vaughan and Gough, 2016). 
Literature on bioenergy is characterised into two strands by Creutzig et al. (Creutzig et al., 
2015). One highlights the significant contribution potential toward mitigating emissions and 
displacing fossil fuels; the other focuses on the risks and uncertainties of large-scale 
deployment of bioenergy crops and potential associated emissions. There is now a large 
amount of literature available that is specific to BECCS. Main themes in the literature include 
its feasibility, uncertainties, deployment and technological development.  
 
Figure 3.1: Schematic of BECCS: burning biomass for heat and/or energy, capturing CO₂ 
(potentially pre- or post-combustion) and storing it underground (Image reproduced from: 
globalccsinstitute.com). 
3.3.2 Potential 
BECCS is currently considered the negative emissions technology with the most immediate 
potential to reduce emissions (Quader and Ahmed, 2017). Potential biomass resources are 
significant when the many diverse forms are considered (Milne and Field, 2012). Evidence 
suggests that well managed biomass does not necessarily require CCS to be carbon 
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negative, dependant on harvest frequency, nutrient turnover and previous land use (Milne 
and Field, 2012). However, most research finds BECCS to be the most viable option to 
utilise biomass to produce low carbon energy products and enable negative emissions 
(Selosse and Ricci, 2014). It is suggested that it offers an economically and environmentally 
viable option to achieve emission targets (Selosse and Ricci, 2014). One estimate is that 
BECCS could globally achieve negative emissions of 10.4 GtCO₂e yr-1 by 2050 (Koornneef 
et al., 2012). 
A key attraction of NETs in general, and BECCS in particular, is their potential role in 
offsetting difficult to mitigate sectors (Rhodes and Keith, 2008). Another strength is that CCS 
deployment in general (the parallel deployment of both FFCCS and BECCS) reduces the 
overall bioenergy requirement (within any given climate mitigation scenario) thereby 
reducing pressure on food crop prices, relative to cases where CCS is not available (Muratori 
et al., 2016). In practice, CCS is mostly being used or proposed to date with coal power 
plants, arguably risking a continued fossil fuel lock-in. Large scale BECCS could be feasible 
and offers a way to develop CCS while also progressively decoupling from fossil fuels and 
avoiding continued lock-in (Vergragt et al., 2011). Muratori et al. (Muratori et al., 2017) 
argues that cost effective mitigation scenarios require strong deployment of both FFCCS 
and BECCS, but with BECCS progressively becoming the more dominant CCS application. 
3.3.3 Limitations 
Fuss et al. (Fuss et al., 2014b) draws attention to the realistic physical constraints on BECCS 
imposed by biodiversity, food security and long term storage options. 
3.3.3.1 Biodiversity and Food security 
The implications for biodiversity and food security from wide-scale biomass production is a 
major theme of the literature on BECCS (Selosse and Ricci, 2014). Simply, the capacity and 
earth system impacts of BECCS is still not comprehensively studied. At the large scale 
required to be effective, BECCS systems would impose trade-offs with food production and 
biodiversity, and have impacts on forest extent, biogeochemical cycles and biogeophysical 
properties (Boysen et al., 2016). Biomass production may damage native ecosystems, 
disrupt ecosystem services and reduce biodiversity (Rhodes and Keith, 2008). Hence the 
ecological cost of BECCS must be fully considered when assessing its regional or local 
feasibility. For example, Pang et al. (2017) found in a case study example in China, biofuel 
production is ecologically unsustainable, despite high negative emission values achieved. 
Additional environmental trade-offs exist specific to CCS (Oreggioni et al., 2017), as 
discussed in Section 3.2. 
There are major land use implications of deploying wide scale BECCS. Research finds that 
BECCS with first generation bioenergy feedstocks will not meet scenario targets even with 
irrigation and fertilisers, though second generation feedstocks might work with fertiliser and 
highly efficient CCS. Unless major technological advancement occurs, scenarios may 
underestimate how much bioenergy resource (and therefore land) is actually needed to 
achieve mitigation modelled by BECCS  (Kato and Yamagata, 2014). This pressure on land 
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area appears likely to contribute to an inevitable conflict with food production and 
biodiversity. 
3.3.3.2 International management 
Another issue for BECCS from a global perspective is that of ‘biomass justice’. The majority 
of  the ‘available’ land under consideration is in developing countries (Rhodes and Keith, 
2008). Additionally, while climate change mitigation is an international issue, nation-specific 
strategies need to be developed. Research is required at a more local level for effective 
deployment of BECCS in the specific context of any given country’s opportunity, and 
mechanisms for international collaboration and effort sharing need to be developed. For 
example, South Korea has abundant biomass in its existing forestry (64% land cover) but 
limited geologically suitable options for storing CO₂ due to volcanic and seismic activity. 
Lack of literature on geographically explicit BECCS applications is arguably limiting policy 
design (Kraxner et al., 2014). 
3.3.3.3 Technology 
The technology maturity of BECCS is another potential limitation (Selosse and Ricci 2014). 
As previously discussed, there are many technological considerations and requirements for 
the future success of CCS. From a cost perspective, energy from BECCS is even more 
expensive than energy from FFCCS (Akgul et al., 2014). Additionally, the combustion 
chemistry of co-firing biomass with fossil fuels is complex with potential concerns around 
toxic emissions (Akgul et al., 2014). There are also supply chain barriers in the development 
of biomass resource and processing facilities (Akgul et al., 2014). In addition, herbaceous 
biofuel plants have a relatively high potassium content compared to wood. This forms 
corrosive potassium chloride in boilers during burning (Milne and Field, 2012). Amine 
scrubbing captures CO₂ from flue gas but is expensive (Milne and Field, 2012). 
3.3.3.4 Prediction and accounting complications 
Deployment of BECCS at the scale assumed in IAMs is highly uncertain due to the limited 
deployment of CCS technology to date and potential biomass land requirements. Vaughan 
and Gough (Vaughan and Gough, 2016) find the assumptions about BECCS are realistic 
for CCS, but unrealistic for the scale of bioenergy deployment, and governance and societal 
support for BECCS. They argue that the greatest area of uncertainty is biomass production. 
Another problem is carbon accounting systems that omit emissions from land conversion 
and burning of biomass, making the assumption that burning biomass is unconditionally 
carbon neutral (Searchinger et al., 2009). Assumption of carbon neutrality of bioenergy is a 
dangerous over-simplification when calculating the benefit of BECCS, especially with long-
rotation woody biomass (Oreggioni et al., 2017). It is imperative that the CO₂ released from 
the supply chain is fully quantified (Mac Dowell and Fajardy, 2017). Mohan (Mohan, 2016) 
highlights the major need for international life cycle accounting measures for BECCS. 
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3.3.4 Knowledge Gaps, Future Research and Deployment 
3.3.4.1 Knowledge Gaps 
There are many unknowns about the cost of connecting bio-processing to infrastructure with 
CO₂ storage sites and global bioenergy scenarios are quite contentious, hence it would be 
prudent not to exaggerate BECCS potential (Gough and Upham, 2011). Edmonds (2013) 
considers alternative strategies in the context of land use and energy policy and suggests 
that there are feasible mitigation pathways that do not require BECCS.  
Some of the literature warns that the unproven potential of BECCS may become a 
dangerous distraction and could double the cumulative global CO₂ emissions (Fuss et al., 
2014a), leading to overshoot of the temperature limit (Vaughan and Gough, 2016). There 
are also impacts on trade patterns to consider that depend on the capacity of BECCS to 
permit continued use of, or displace, fossil fuels (Muratori et al., 2016). Biomass plantations 
will only be sufficient if coupled with simultaneous emissions reduction measures, therefore 
potential to abate business as usual pathways is limited (Boysen et al., 2016). 
BECCS offers significant potential but also serious risks. The impact of BECCS systems 
have mostly been considered from a regional perspective in the literature, but will ultimately 
be highly dependent on local factors (Creutzig et al., 2015). Some key barriers to BECCS 
identified by (Quader and Ahmed, 2017) include the suitability of land use for BECCS, 
carbon cycle response to negative emissions, cost estimation and socio-institutional 
barriers. These corroborate the concerns of socioeconomic challenges and climate system 
uncertainties identified by (Kraxner et al., 2015). They also highlight uncertainty in achieving 
the scale necessary on time, technological issues and feedstock potential. Additionally, 
Rhodes and Keith (Rhodes and Keith, 2008) discuss the limited availability and cost of 
conversion technologies, as well as the aforementioned scale of biomass production, 
environmental, social and economic concerns. Muratori et al. (Muratori et al., 2016) 
highlights that the viability and economic implications of deploying BECCS at scale is poorly 
understood. Kemper (Kemper, 2015) notes the following contributing issues: little 
experience with large-scale BECCS demonstration plants, gaps in climate policies and 
accounting frameworks, missing financial instruments, unclear public acceptance and 
complex sustainability issues  
BECCS could lead to affordable carbon negative electricity by co-firing fossil fuels and 
biomass. In the UK, the carbon price needs to reach 120-175 GBP tCO₂-1 to incentivise 
transition to carbon negative energy. Increasing biomass availability reduces cost of 
electricity generation but may be limited by land availability (Akgul et al., 2014). Co-firing 
with fossil fuels has been argued to be the best short term option for BECCS as biomass 
facilities are inefficient today due to their small size (Milne and Field, 2012). 
Working examples and research innovations in BECCS have recently been demonstrated. 
For example, in Brazil, CO₂ is captured and stored when fermenting biomass to ethanol (and 
combusting biomass for electricity). This could supply a substantial amount of transport and 
electricity energy at relatively small cost increase and significantly lower emissions (Moreira 
et al. 2016). There is also ongoing research to improve the efficiency of energy generation 
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with BECCS. Bui, Fajardy, and Mac Dowell (Bui et al., 2017) present a heat recovery 
approach that significantly increases the energy efficiency of a BECCS plant by 38% higher 
heat value. Hetland et al. (Hetland et al., 2016) consider which approach is better, to co-fire 
biomass in existing large coal plants with CCS or building multiple smaller biopower units. 
The amount of CO₂ captured per tonne biomass is the same, but co-firing enables more 
efficient energy production. Mathisen et al. (2011) presents a case study in Norway 
combining a gas power station with CCS and supplementing power by burning biomass in 
a separate small plant to run capture, but conclude the resultant system is very expensive. 
Many market niches in industry are also being identified for deployment of BECCS 
(Möllersten et al., 2003). 
Predicting the deployment and potential of BECCS is complicated by high uncertainty in 
technology, politics and climate effects (Creutzig et al., 2015). However the literature is clear 
that uncertainty should not deter development of beneficial options (Creutzig et al., 2015). 
Selosse and Ricci (2014) predict the use of CCS on fossil fuels in rapidly developing 
countries, with industrialised countries using BECCS and developing countries using a 
varied approach. All BECCS systems currently involve fossil fuels at some point in the 
production system. BECCS deployment is complicated due to the wide range of potential 
biomass material, conversion technologies (thermal and chemical) and capture and storage 
options. Co-firing is the most attractive short term option (Quader and Ahmed, 2017). Future 
deployment options require case-specific cost benefit analyses (Hetland et al., 2016). In 
Europe, using BECCS in the power sector may allow significantly lower levels of 
decarbonisation in the building and transport sector. The EU energy system may cost 14% 
more if it was decarbonised by 2050 (Rodriguez et al., 2016). 
BECCS cannot be deployed in isolation, research and policies must address links to natural 
systems (Kemper, 2015). Tokimatsu, Yasuoka, and Nishio (2017) find the 2ºC target is 
achievable with significant forested land use. (Luckow et al., 2010) highlight that using 
diverse flexible biomass sources reduces the pressure for risky wide-scale deployment. For 
example, they propose the use of agricultural and forest residue biomass in the first half of 
the century, with dedicated biomass crops in the second half. 
Recognition of BECCS in emissions trading is required to facilitate its deployment (Carbo et 
al., 2011). BECCS can help achieve temperature targets and may be cheaper, provided a 
temporal overshoot (in radiative forcing, and, potentially, global temperature) is tolerated. 
However, the cost benefit is lost if temporal overshoot is not allowed. (Azar et al., 2013). 
BECCS would require subsidies to be deployed, contributing to climate mitigation being a 
net burden on tax revenues (Muratori et al., 2016). Competition from other renewables like 
solar and wind may limit the use of biomass and hence the mitigating capacity of negative 
emissions from BECCS (Mac Dowell and Fajardy, 2017). Fridahl (2017) finds that, while 
87% of IAMs presume use of BECCS to achieve 2ºC mitigation scenarios, BECCS has very 
low priority compared to other technologies amongst UNCCC delegates. Edström and 
Öberg (2013) find that a lack of awareness limits funding for developing BECCS and suggest 
that the next step is to set up small scale units to increase awareness in industry and policy. 
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3.3.5 Conclusion: BECCS 
In conclusion, BECCS is a heavily relied upon NET in most IAM 2ºC scenarios. BECCS has 
the potential to produce energy and achieve net negative emissions, but there are still many 
barriers to deploying BECCS at the scale required to meet the IAM assumptions. These 
barriers include trade-offs with biodiversity and food security, international management, 
technological limitations and the misleading assumption (specifically embodied in current 
EU policy) that all bioenergy is unconditionally carbon neutral. Ongoing research innovations 
continue to progress BECCS towards achievability at a large scale and BECCS will likely 
begin as co-firing with fossil fuels in the short term. Scaling up BECCS capacity will require 
careful consideration of implications for natural systems, recognition in emissions trading 
schemes and increased awareness amongst international leaders. 
3.4 Biochar (BC) 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Most arable agriculture soils have become a carbon source, losing their organic carbon, 
while also releasing methane and nitrous oxides (Stavi and Lal, 2013). One option to change 
soils from a carbon source to a carbon sink, and reduce methane and nitrous oxide 
emissions, is through applications of biochar. Biochar is defined by (Rasul et al., 2016) as a 
‘pyrolysis technique that converts biomass in absence or limited oxygen and controlled 
conditions of temperature and pressure to a carbon rich compound’. Biochar is considered 
to have significant negative emissions potential, possibly with fewer disadvantages than 
other NETs (Smith, 2016). As well as its climate change mitigation capacity, biochar is also 
considered a potential benefit to global food security (Idowu, 2017) due to improved soil 
fertility and water holding capacity as well as a possible stimulation of yields. 
(Minx et al., 2017) have pointed out that although research on biochar has made a large 
contribution to the recent literature on NETs it is primarily of a technical nature and has not 
made a significant contribution to policy-focussed work. A comprehensive systematic review 
of biochar literature by Gurwick et al. (2013) considers the topic in more detail. Potential 
climate change mitigation is the focus of most studies. The climate change mitigation 
capacity of biochar is dependent on the assumption that the biochar can persist long term 
(>1000s years). Gurwick et al. (2013) found several gaps in the literature attempting to justify 
biochar claims, most notably in the understanding of biochar’s influence on ecosystem 
processes, biochar decomposition rates and variation in residence times. They conclude 
that current (2013) data is insufficient to determine the effect of biochar on whole-system 
GHG budgets. The literature studies are characterised by diverse environmental conditions, 
feedstocks, and study designs.  
3.4.2 Potential 
(Verheijen et al., 2013) have estimated that global sequestration potential of biochar could 
be from 71-130 GtCO₂ over 100 years. Stavi (2013) estimates that applying biochar on 
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degraded and deforested lands and agroforestry systems alone (1.75 billion ha globally) 
could sequester 2-109 GtC (18-400GtCO₂). 
Biochar increases carbon sequestration, and also increases soil fertility (Lorenz and Lal, 
2014) and nutrient and water availability, as well as supressing diseases and improving soil 
quality (Rasul et al., 2016; Subedi et al., 2017). Biochar is particularly beneficial for tropical 
soils where degraded soil quality threatens agricultural productivity and sustainability 
(Agegnehu et al., 2016). Its co-production in waste water treatment increases sustainability 
(Miller-Robbie et al., 2015). Biochar is argued to be superior in carbon sequestration and 
reducing GHG emissions than alternatives such as hydrochar or dried biomass 
(Schimmelpfennig et al., 2014) and is considered one of the most feasible options to mitigate 
the climate impact of agriculture (Stavi and Lal, 2013). 
3.4.2.1 Biochar and Bioenergy Crops 
Biochar may be most effectively deployed in multi-functional bioenergy systems, increasing 
the systems potential to achieve net negative emissions (Ubando et al., 2014; Woolf et al., 
2014) by being co-produced during the burning biomass to make energy (Z. Wang et al., 
2014). Biochar applications can also improve bioenergy crop productivity on marginal lands 
(Koide et al., 2015). Land use change emissions from establishing bioenergy crops might 
be offset by applying biochar, due to sequestration and increased yield reducing land area 
requirements (Kauffman et al., 2014), although this has not been consistently found to be 
the case (McClean et al., 2016). 
3.4.2.2 Biochar and soil emissions 
Biochar could potentially reduce soil emissions of N₂O associated with agricultural activity. 
Black carbon interacts with the nitrogen cycle and biochar potentially could reduce NOx 
emissions (Cayuela et al., 2013). This has been proven in the laboratory, although limited 
field studies have demonstrated contradictory results. (Nelissen et al., 2014) tested seven 
different biochars and found reduced N₂O and NO emissions. Additionally (Mukherjee et al., 
2014) found N₂O significantly decreased by 92% in degraded soils but CO₂ and CH₄ 
emissions were not significantly altered. Similarly, Fidel, Laird, and Parkin (2017) found 
biochar mitigated N₂O, but didn’t significantly alter CO₂ emissions. Shen et al. (Shen et al., 
2014) showed that adding straw biochar to rice paddies reduces its gross climate impact 
(contributions from both N₂O and CH₄, aggregated via GWP-100 equivalence factors). 
Whereas Xiang et al.  (Xiang et al., 2015) found biochar had only a slight negative effect on 
N₂O emissions, but this effect was increased when coupled with optimal fertiliser use. 
Brassard, Godbout, and Raghavan (2016) considered 76 types of biochar from 40 studies 
and found biochar with low N were best at mitigating N₂O emissions. (Schimmelpfennig et 
al., 2014) demonstrated that NH₃ emission reduction only occurs if biochar is neutral or 
slightly acidic. Biochar’s capacity to reduce N₂O emissions is therefore dependent on many 
factors, and the priority for effectiveness should be an appropriate ratio with N fertiliser (Feng 
and Zhu, 2017). The mechanism for influencing N₂O flux is poorly understood and appears 
to be biochar and soil specific (Lan et al., 2017).  
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(Han et al., 2016) found biochar reduced CH₄ emissions under ambient temperatures, and 
even more so under elevated temperatures and CO₂. (Jeffery et al., 2016) found a 
relationship with flooding and pH in the capacity of biochar to decrease CH₄ emissions. 
Trade-offs may exist, as (Singla and Inubushi, 2014) found biochar increased CH₄ 
emissions, but lowered N₂O emissions, possibly due to the effect of more carbon available 
to microbial communities.  
Preliminary research does suggest biochar may be used to reduce nitrous oxide and 
methane emissions from soil in certain contexts but results are variable, and limited by a 
lack of long term field studies but the mechanisms involved require further research.  
3.4.3 Limitations 
There are several limitations with biochar (Jeffery et al., 2015) and inconsistencies exist in 
the literature about how beneficial biochar really is (Butnan et al., 2016). Biochar could have 
negative impacts on air quality, climate and biogeochemical cycles (Lorenz and Lal, 2014; 
Ravi et al., 2016). Dependant on feedstock and pyrolysis conditions, biochar may also 
contain detrimental levels of toxic compounds or heavy metals (Subedi et al., 2017). In 
addition, many accounting estimates ignore the warming effect of reduced albedo reflection 
due to darker soil colour from biochar (Verheijen et al., 2013). Furthermore, the 
environmental benefit of biomass pyrolysis to make biochar is partly undermined by the need 
to use fossil fuels to ignite the relatively inflammable material, particularly at a small-scale 
(J. R. Jones et al., 2016). 
3.4.3.1 Trade-Offs in Biochar production 
Studies are emerging that consider the qualities and strengths of different types of biochar 
(Butnan et al., 2016). Feedstock type and process conditions cause variation in the 
characteristics and effectiveness of biochar (Subedi et al., 2016) with varying pH, nutrients, 
respiratory activity and capacity to trap CO₂ (Fornes et al., 2015). Trade-offs between carbon 
sequestration capacity and nutrient benefit affect choice of pyrolysis method and feedstock 
material during biochar production (Crombie et al., 2015). A trade off also exists between 
the amount of biochar required (burn material at lower temperatures) and long term stability 
of carbon (Saez de Bikuna Salinas et al., 2016). Biochar requires burning at over 360ºC to 
become resistant to decomposition (Mimmo et al., 2014) and the higher the pyrolysis 
temperatures, the more carbon is sequestered (Brassard et al., 2016) 
3.4.3.2 Effectiveness of Biochar Application 
The effect of biochar applications on yields and climate mitigation will be crop and site 
specific. It will be most beneficial to improved soil quality and yield in tropical weathered 
soils and soils of poor quality, and least effective in inherently fertile soils that make up most 
agricultural soils today (Lorenz and Lal, 2014). The yield benefit is also higher in acidic sandy 
soils (Subedi et al., 2017). In tropical degraded soils, adding biochar increased maize yields, 
but only mitigated GHG emissions under certain conditions, with some cases of increased 
aggregate GHG emissions in the short term (Agegnehu et al., 2016). Another field study 
found the opposite, where biochar enhances carbon sequestration but had no significant 
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effect on yield (Keith et al., 2016). Additionally, for sequestration to be effective relative to 
CO₂ persistence in the atmosphere, carbon must persist in soil on a time scale of hundreds 
to thousands of years; the chances of this can be improved if the biochar carbon reaches 
deeper soil layers. More studies into mechanisms for surface applied biochar to be 
translocated to deeper soils are needed (Lorenz and Lal, 2014). 
3.4.4 Knowledge Gaps, Future Research and Deployment 
Payment to farmers is a necessary mechanism to implement climate mitigation and 
ecosystem support services (Stavi and Lal, 2013). Biochar is more beneficial in low carbon 
soils than high carbon soils. Yield and stability should be prioritised in deployment (Yadav 
et al., 2017). Widespread use of biochar in agriculture faces many barriers. Residence time 
might be a lot shorter than previously estimated, financial incentives are not yet in place and 
uncertainty exists around the full effect on crop yields (Bach et al., 2016).  
3.4.4.1 Knowledge gaps 
Biochar literature is characterised by considerable knowledge gaps and is still addressed at 
a superficial level. A review by Tammeorg et al. (Tammeorg et al., 2016) summarises our 
current understanding and future research priorities focused in the areas of: “soil biodiversity 
and ecotoxicology, soil organic matter and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, soil physical 
properties, nutrient cycles and crop production, and soil remediation”. Future research 
priorities need to address specific mechanisms, their trade-offs and long-term interactions 
as well as: 
… functional redundancy within soil microbial communities, bioavailability 
of biochar’s contaminants to soil biota, soil organic matter stability, GHG 
emissions, soil formation, soil hydrology, nutrient cycling due to microbial 
priming as well as altered rhizosphere ecology, and soil pH buffering 
capacity. (Tammeorg et al., 2016) 
Other knowledge gaps highlighted in the biochar literature include: 
• Economic and life cycle assessments at a site specific basis (Stavi, 2013).  
• Further investigation into claims that benefits of biochar has been overestimated. (R. 
Fidel et al., 2017).  
• More long term field scale studies to develop production and quality standards 
(Subedi et al., 2017).  
• Better understanding of the underlying mechanisms of GHG emissions from biochar 
amended soils (R. B. Fidel, Laird, and Parkin 2017) (Brassard et al., 2016) (Jeffery 
et al., 2015).  
• Investigation of the environmental impact of large-scale biochar applications(Ravi et 
al., 2016). 
• Investigation of the effect of soil temperature on biochar amendments (Grunwald et 
al., 2017), especially under future climate change scenarios.  
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3.4.5 Conclusion: Biochar 
Biochar production and application may have significant if limited CO₂ removal potential of 
0.7 GtCe yr-1 (2.6 GtCO₂ yr-1) globally (Smith, 2016), and could help achieve negative 
emissions in the future. Biochar can sequester CO₂ into a stable solid form that may be 
stored long term if the soil is managed correctly, and may also reduce the emissions of other 
GHG in the soils it is applied to, under certain criteria. Biochar has also demonstrable co-
benefits such as increased crop yields and improved soil quality. However variable results 
challenge the overall effectiveness of biochar with trade-offs during production to consider 
between biochar quality and quantity. Uncertainty also exists in biochar applications 
regarding the specific mechanisms of biochar interactions with soil GHG emissions, the 
long-term storage of surface applied biochar and potential negative environmental impacts. 
Further research is needed to fully support biochar claims, develop and deploy biochar 
effectively, and address the knowledge gaps. 
  
3.5 Afforestation/Reforestation 
3.5.1 Introduction 
The land-use sector can be used to reduce emissions and increase carbon uptake, but is 
currently responsible for 17-32% of global GHG emissions. This is primarily due to direct 
emissions from agricultural soils and livestock, as well as indirect agricultural emissions and 
land use change. Estimating the global emissions from conversion of land to agriculture has 
the highest uncertainty (6 ±3 GtCO₂e yr-1), contributing to such a wide total range (Bellarby 
et al., 2008). Forestry can be used to change the land-use sectors from a source to a sink 
in two ways: reducing emissions by avoiding deforestation and increasing carbon uptake 
(CO₂ removal) by afforestation. Afforestation is defined as the planting of trees on lands 
which historically have not contained forest cover (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014). Currently there 
are both decreasing deforestation rates and increased afforestation. Total European forest 
area has increased by 25% since 1950 (Fuchs et al., 2013). However, European forests 
have emitted 3.1 GtC since 1750 despite considerable afforestation, because of wood 
extraction (Naudts et al., 2016). The optimum use of forestry for mitigation differs between 
regions. It is argued that the priority should be to reduce deforestation in Latin America, the 
Caribbean, Middle East and Africa and increase afforestation in OECD-1990, EIT and Asia 
(Smith et al., 2014). Land carbon stocks can be increased by afforestation that enables 
sequestration in soils and in biomass (vegetation and litter). Afforestation could change the 
overall land-use sector from a net source to a net sink by the mid-century and is argued to 
provide a cost efficient strategy for removing carbon from the atmosphere (Humpenöder et 
al., 2014).  
Advantages of afforestation are that it can be deployed immediately, provides co-benefits 
and ecosystem services and it is generally unlikely that public acceptance will be an issue 
(Humpenöder et al., 2014). However, despite being immediately deployable, it takes time 
for forests to establish and maximise carbon uptake, storage of carbon in the soil is limited 
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by factors such as the soil saturation point – maximum restoration of the land carbon buffer 
is estimated to be 187 GtC (Mackey et al., 2013), equivalent to less than 20 years of fossil 
fuel and cement emissions – and storage of carbon in forest biomass is vulnerable to future 
harvesting. 
3.5.2 Potential 
Future scenarios have suggested a maximum estimate of 2580 Mha afforestation globally, 
sequestering 860 GtCO₂ to the end of the century but with serious impacts on food prices 
(Kreidenweis et al., 2016). These modelled scenarios indicate that confining afforestation to 
the tropics and enabling freer international agricultural trade could achieve 60% of the 
maximum cumulative sequestration while greatly limiting impacts on food security. In 2030, 
at a carbon price up to 100 USD tCO₂-1, estimates from forestry sector studies on mitigation 
potential range from 0.2-13.8 GtCO₂ yr-1. This wide range is partly due to the different range 
of options considered in the studies (Smith et al., 2014). Based on a range of IAMs, 
afforestation could cumulatively remove 200-700 GtCO₂ by 2100 (Tavoni and Socolow, 
2013). These studies indicate that afforestation has significant climate change mitigation 
potential through sequestration of CO₂ into soil and biomass. However, the wide range in 
estimates of annual rates and total cumulative sequestration of CO₂ also highlight significant 
uncertainty about the likely maximum mitigation potential of afforestation. 
3.5.2.1 Afforestation and Sequestration 
Afforestation removes CO₂ from the atmosphere, adding to the biomass stock and the solid 
carbon stock. Neither of these two stocks are as stable and permanent as geological storage 
of fossil fuels (Mackey et al., 2013). CO₂ sequestered into biomass is vulnerable to be re-
released through decomposition, forest fires and harvesting, including combustion to meet 
increased bioenergy demands. The soil carbon stock may be somewhat more stable than 
the biomass, provided the carbon added to the soil can stabilise and that the soil is not 
disturbed. 
3.5.2.2 Soil Organic Carbon (SOC) stock 
Average carbon sequestration rate in soil (assessed to a depth of 100cm) after 41 years 
from forest establishment on agricultural soil is 0.65 MgC ha-1 yr-1 and 0.24 MgC ha-1 yr-1 
under arboreal and shrub forestry respectively (Ulery et al., 1995). Converting cropland to 
forest could increase global SOC by 1.9% yr-1 (Han et al., 2017). The impact of afforestation 
on SOC stock depends on many factors, including climate, former land-use, forest age, 
forest type, soil type (clay content), nitrogen deposition and management practices.  
Ecosystem simulation modelling by Mitchell et al. (2012) also shows the carbon storage 
changes associated with land use change, including afforestation replacing agricultural use 
which can have a short-term climatic warming effect. Time is also a very important 
component with land use change to forestry characterised by an initial loss of SOC followed 
by a recovery phase of varying length. Bárcena et al. (Bárcena et al., 2014) found that 
“afforestation in Northern Europe had a positive effect on SOC stocks approximately 3 
decades after land-use change, with the exception of afforestation on grasslands” but 
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changes are small within a 30 year perspective. This is due to the effects of previous land 
use, soil type and SOC content. Grasslands tend to have higher levels of soil C than other 
land use types such as croplands, heathlands and barren lands. These SOC rich soils tend 
to maintain the same carbon levels after afforestation and not become sinks. In contrast, 
afforestation from cropland (SOC-depleted) had a significantly positive SOC effect, and 
coarse soils and volcanic soils were most prone to gain SOC after afforestation in Europe 
(Bárcena et al., 2014).  Afforestation increases the biomass carbon stock when converted 
from grassland, but decreases the SOC (Burrascano et al., 2016). Additionally (Han et al., 
2017) found afforested arable land had significantly higher SOC, especially in the top soil 
due to higher rates of litter and root production and protection of organic matter by 
stabilistation and protection of matter associated with mineral particles. Compared to 
agricultural land use, afforestation leads to long term stability of soils and increased carbon 
stabilization in soil aggregates due to decreased soil erosion and reduced disturbance.  
3.5.3 Limitations 
3.5.3.1 Albedo and evapotranspiration 
CO₂ mitigation from land use change to forestry might be counteracted by changes in 
albedo, evapotranspiration, and aerodynamic surface roughness length (Burrascano et al., 
2016), undermining the mitigation potential of afforestation (Jones et al., 2012; Vuuren et 
al., 2013). The albedo effect is especially significant in boreal zones where albedo changes 
have been shown to offset the consequences of CO₂ removal. By restricting afforestation to 
non-boreal areas, potential carbon removal will be lowered by 8% (Kreidenweis et al., 2016). 
Tree species also matters, as broadleaf trees have less negative effect on albedo than 
needle leaf trees (Littleton et al., 2016). Additionally, afforestation could have region-specific 
effects on flooding and fire regimes. 
3.5.3.2 Land area 
On a land area basis, afforestation is estimated to require over five times the land area as 
BECCS to achieve similar levels of carbon removal (Humpenöder et al., 2014), despite the 
advantage of having lower cost than BECCS (Smith et al., 2015). 2800 Mha of afforestation 
could remove 703 GtCO₂, compared to only 500 Mha of BECCS removing 591 GtCO₂ 
(Humpenöder et al., 2014). Humpenöder et al. (2014) reports that these modelled results 
are highly sensitive to carbon prices, and lower afforestation costs are dependent on long 
crediting periods. Carbon removal rates due to afforestation will decline as less land is 
available and forests mature. One proposal to counter this considers harvesting the trees 
and burying the wood to protect the biomass carbon, and then replant the forest and 
increase the mitigation capacity of afforestation, however this study calls for further 
investigation as it does not consider the effects of ‘nutrient loss, disturbance to the forest 
floor, biodiversity, cost, lifetime of stored wood, and unintended consequences’  (Zeng et 
al., 2013). 
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3.5.3.3 Food Prices 
Maximising afforestation, to 2580 Mha globally and to sequester 860 GtCO₂, could increase 
global food prices four fold by 2100 due to competition for land (Kreidenweis et al., 2016). 
This food price impact can be reduced if afforestation is restricted to areas where it will be 
most effective (Kreidenweis et al., 2016). More research and development is required for 
yield increasing technology for food to accommodate the land requirements of afforestation 
significant enough to be effective at climate mitigation (Kreidenweis et al., 2016). Given the 
very low resource and land-use efficiency of livestock production in terms of GHG emissions 
per unit protein produced and per hectare (Nijdam et al., 2012), Herrero et al. (2016, p. 5) 
estimate that reduced meat consumption could result in spared land available for up to 
4.6 GtCO₂e yr-1 of CDR if afforestation of pasture land is assumed, though the spared land 
could also be used to be produce larger amounts of food or for biomass production for 
bioenergy.  
3.5.3.4 Biodiversity 
Another trade-off exists between afforestation and biodiversity. For example, total carbon 
storage is larger in forests than in grasslands but grasslands support more endangered 
species (Burrascano et al., 2016). Plantation forestry aimed at maximising carbon stocks 
through longer rotation length may be better for biodiversity than bioenergy forestry, but that 
effect may be offset by increased stocking rates and reduced thinnings to maximise carbon 
(Pawson et al., 2013). 
3.5.3.5 Management 
There is uncertainty about future climate change impact on soil carbon stocks and forests 
(Smith et al., 2014). Different types of planted forest exist depending on the purpose each 
is established and managed for e.g. production of forest products (bioenergy) or for carbon 
sequestration in carbon forestry. Pawson et al. (Pawson et al., 2013) estimate that 4% of 
global forests are plantations, and these have an important role of offsetting the need to 
extract resources from natural forests. Forest management will have to adapt in response 
to climate change, this will involve changes in species, rotation length, thinning, pruning, 
extracting bioenergy feedstock and large-scale afforestation. In light of afforestation efforts, 
plantation forest specific vulnerabilities to future climate change need to be considered. 
Naudts et al. (Naudts et al., 2016) argues that not all forest management strategies 
contribute to climate change mitigation. By putting more unmanaged forestry into production 
(extracting wood and possible conversion to more productive species), albedo is being 
lowered and carbon released. In Europe there are now significantly more conifers and less 
unmanaged forest land compared with 1750 (Naudts et al. 2016). Globally, wood extraction 
occurs in 64 to 72% of the forest area (Naudts et al. 2016). Carbon stock in living biomass, 
coarse woody debris, litter and soil was assessed (via simulation) to be 24%, 43%, 8% and 
6% lower respectively in managed compared to unmanaged forests (Naudts et al., 2016). 
Therefore forest management needs to be accounted for in climate mitigation pathways that 
rely to any significant extent on carbon stocks and sinks in forestry. It is uncertain whether 
we can design a forest management strategy that can both mitigate climate change by 
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increasing forest carbon stocks while also sustaining wood and bioenergy production and 
general ecosystem services (Naudts et al., 2016). Nabuurs et al. (2013) argue that distinct 
warnings of carbon saturation in Europe’s forest biomass sink can already be detected due 
to forests coming into a dynamic equilibrium with forest management including a downward 
trend in afforestation area expansions (reduced from 500,000 ha yr-1 between 2005 to 2010 
from 700,000 ha yr-1 previously), decreasing stem volume increment (annual growth), and 
increasing natural disturbances, storms and drying that may be boosted by climate change. 
3.5.3.5.1 Bioenergy Demand 
Recent EU-level targets by the European Commission aim to achieve 20% primary energy 
from renewable resources, 42% of which is expected to come from biomass (European 
Commission, 2013). The management of plantation forest to meet bioenergy demands and 
the implications for climate mitigation potential of afforestation efforts must be carefully 
considered. Forest biomass combustion is currently accounted as “carbon neutral” in the 
energy sector, assuming that the carbon accounting occurs in the land use sector, but this 
does not account for possible soil C loss from harvesting practices, or the plant growth and 
ongoing carbon sequestration that would occur in the absence of bioenergy production 
(Hudiburg et al., 2011). “Broad-scale bioenergy production may have important 
environmental and economic implications, which may not necessarily result in major 
greenhouse gas emission savings” (Burrascano et al., 2016). Policies must be designed so 
that established forests are not cut down again and release the carbon stored (Kreidenweis 
et al., 2016) 
3.5.3.6 Policy coherence and governance 
The question remains whether afforestation, under its aforementioned limitations, can 
effectively mitigate climate change significantly. Haim, White, and Alig (Haim et al., 2016) 
found that afforestation efforts were typified by problems with leakage, in some cases over 
100%. This is due to the effect of intensification of agriculture on the remaining land that 
could offset the carbon sequestered by the afforested agricultural land. There is therefore a 
need for region specific GHG mitigation policies that considers implications of policy on other 
regions’ activities and accounts for the carbon market. 
Littleton, Vaughan, and Joshi (Littleton et al., 2016) considered a range of global 
afforestation scenarios and found significant limitations from albedo effects and propose that 
afforestation’s “importance to future efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change is likely 
to be minor”. Elberg Nielsen, Plantinga, and Alig (Elberg Nielsen et al., 2014) estimate that, 
in the USA, if carbon emissions were priced at 50 USD tCO₂-1, an additional 200 MtCO₂ yr-
1 would be sequestered through afforestation. Nabuurs et al. (Nabuurs et al., 2013, p. 795) 
conclude that continued afforestation in Europe delivers mitigation gains but is only one part 
of a spatially-diversified set of forest management policies that conserve and increase forest 
carbon stocks within an integrated land use strategy coherent with whole-economy climate 
policies. 
There are also issues of policy coherence, as a carbon management focus policy direction 
may detract from or contradict other policies, such as biodiversity, as discussed by 
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(Burrascano et al., 2016). For example grasslands are good for carbon storage, particularly 
SOC, and biodiversity but are often targeted land areas by afforestation policy because 
combined biomass, litter, deadwood and soil in forestry will store more C (175 tC ha-1 
compared to 126 tC ha-1 for grassland (Burrascano et al., 2016). Policies reflect the limited 
attention paid to the conflicts between carbon management and biodiversity conservation. 
There is also an inherent incoherence in the continuation of deforestation while attempting 
to increase of afforestation. Kreidenweis et al. (Kreidenweis et al., 2016) points out that 
deforestation must cease before afforestation can be seriously considered as a means to 
mitigate climate change. 
3.5.4 Knowledge gaps and Future Research 
Some knowledge gaps identified in the literature to be addressed by future research include 
• The need for more novel studies that investigate the SOC dynamics and storage 
mechanisms of afforested soil (Han et al., 2017) 
• Addressing the uncertainty (40-100+%) in the C storage of forested lands (Lehtonen 
and Heikkinen, 2015; Scharlemann et al., 2014) 
• Investigate unknowns in land use change and disturbance, dynamics of plant 
communities and historical data (Menichetti et al., 2017) 
3.5.5 Conclusion: Afforestation/Reforestation 
In conclusion, afforestation is an option to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere that 
is already ongoing, not pending any technological developments and is argued to be more 
cost effective than other NETs  (see estimates of mean cost from Smith et al., 2015, 
US$87/tCeq for afforestation and reforestation, compared to US$132/tCeq for BECCS, 
US$1600-2080/tCeq for DAC and US$1104/tCeq for EW). The effectiveness of afforestation 
for climate change mitigation depends on the stability and protection of the CO₂ sequestered 
into the soil and biomass stocks. While afforestation rates increase, scaling up this mitigation 
strategy will incur trade-offs with food prices and biodiversity, and mitigation potential may 
be offset by albedo effects and combusting biomass to meet future bioenergy demand. 
Future policy should employ methodologically comparable, full life cycle assessments of the 
greenhouse gas profile of a managed plantation, and should be designed coherently with 
other environmental policies such as biodiversity. Knowledge gaps that could be addressed 
by future research include understanding the mechanisms of carbon storage and reducing 
uncertainty about the forest carbon stock and land use change effects. 
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3.6 Direct Air Capture 
3.6.1 Introduction 
Direct air capture can be defined as “an industrial process that captures CO₂ from ambient 
air, producing a pure CO₂ stream for use or disposal” (Ishimoto et al., 2017; Keith, 2009).  
The concept of using DAC for climate mitigation was first introduced by Lackner in 1999 
(Sanz-Pérez et al., 2016). DAC works by passing air over a material that absorbs CO₂. There 
are three main operating mediums: aqueous solutions of strong bases, amine adsorbents, 
and inorganic solid sorbents (Broehm et al., 2015). The resultant stream of CO₂ can be 
stored in geological formations via CCS or, in carbon utilisation, use in industry, usually 
offering far less, if any, long term sequestration. The key difference between DACCS and 
other applications of CCS is that DAC removes CO₂ directly from the atmosphere, instead 
of from flue gases from the burning of fossil fuels or biomass. This presents the challenge 
of extracting CO₂ from much lower concentrations in ambient air, compared to the relatively 
more mature technology of extracting it from flue gases. 
3.6.2 Potential 
Advantages of DAC are many. It has fewer social concerns and negative side effects than 
other NETs (Ishimoto et al., 2017), such as the land area conflicts and emissions accounting 
issues with BECCS and afforestation. The location of DAC is flexible because it extracts 
CO₂ from ambient air, and therefore can be located conveniently near consumers or storage 
facilities for the resulting CO₂ product (Broehm et al., 2015). Like other NETs, DAC 
combined with CCS can also offset emissions from all sectors, can remove past emissions, 
and potentially allows continued burning of fossil fuels that decouples near-term mitigation 
efforts from replacing or retrofitting existing infrastructure (Yousefi-Sahzabi et al., 2014). 
However, to achieve this, very large rates of removal would be required and currently no 
large scale working examples exist (Broehm et al., 2015) therefore any such near-term 
mitigation policy commitment to continued high fossil fuel use within a “well below 2ºC” 
pathway, based on DACCS, relies on very large investment in DACs, significant carbon 
price rises and still risks non-delivery of significant CDR (Larkin et al., 2017). 
3.6.3 Limitations 
The main limitation is cost of implementation, scalability and energy requirements. There is 
a significant cost for the energy and materials required to move large quantities of air in DAC 
(Yousefi-Sahzabi et al., 2014). Deployment is not helped by the very large range of cost 
estimates (Ishimoto et al., 2017). How to calculate the cost is debated and varies with 
estimates ranging from 100 USD tCO₂-1 to 550 USD tCO₂-1 if DAC was implemented within 
the next 25 years, and fall significantly in the longer term to 40-140  USD tCO₂-1 (Broehm et 
al., 2015). Some estimations of cost are as low as 30 USD tCO₂-1 if scaled up and mass 
produced (Yousefi-Sahzabi et al., 2014). While other estimates are as high as 568 USD 
tCO₂-1 (Smith et al., 2015). There are also major uncertainties about capital cost of plant 
design and materials, with estimates ranging from 300 million to 3 billion USD for a system 
that captures 1 MtCO₂ yr-1 (Broehm et al., 2015). Therefore, the current costs of DAC are 
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highly uncertain and may prove to be prohibitively high compared to other mitigation options 
such as BECCS (Ranjan and Herzog, 2011). Nonetheless, some speculate that it may still 
have a significant role in long term climate mitigation (Kriegler et al., 2013) if costs could be 
reduced by innovation (Ishimoto et al., 2017; Sanz-Pérez et al., 2016; T. Wang et al., 2014). 
However, these studies indicate that DAC is currently an immature technology that is 
currently far from enabling CDR at large scale. 
3.6.3.1 Energy inputs 
High energy demand is another factor that may limit the potential of DAC (Ishimoto et al., 
2017). Unlike BECCS, DAC does not have an energy output, and actually requires 
substantial energy to operate, entailing a net energy cost. There is significant variation in 
amount and quality of input energy needed for different types of proposed DAC system 
(Broehm et al., 2015). It is estimated that DAC will likely require 6-10 GJ tCO₂-1 thermal 
energy and 1.1-1.9 GJ tCO₂-1 of electrical energy (Broehm et al., 2015). This high energy 
requirement is because capture from atmosphere requires 1.8-3.6 times more energy than 
technology to separate CO₂ from flue gas, due to the much lower concentrations of CO₂ 
(Broehm et al., 2015), so, thermodynamically, DAC compares unfavourably with CO₂ 
capture from point sources (Pritchard et al., 2015). DAC therefore needs a dedicated source 
of very low carbon energy, as using conventional (unabated) fossil fuel power would 
potentially release more CO₂ than would be removed in the DAC process (Ranjan and 
Herzog, 2011). Additional energy would also be needed for CO₂ compression (to ~150bar), 
and transport and injection into a storage site. 
3.6.3.2 Water 
Another limiting factor is water use because DAC could have a potentially very large water 
requirement of up to 50 tH2O tCO₂-1 captured, with an average estimate for capture of 5-13 
tH2O tCO₂-1 (Broehm et al., 2015). 
3.6.4 Conclusion: DAC 
In conclusion, DAC offers the in-principle possibility to directly remove CO₂ from the 
atmosphere. However, given its cost and technical limitations, it would be a risky policy 
decision to rely heavily on future DAC availability at this stage (Ranjan and Herzog, 2011). 
It is possible that new materials emerging may make DAC more feasible (Sanz-Pérez et al., 
2016). However, Pritchard et al. (Pritchard et al., 2015) warns that it is inappropriate to be 
distracted by DAC when point sources of GHG emissions have not yet been substantially or 
completely decarbonised. An over-optimistic expectation of DAC could reduce policy 
motivation for other mitigation options. Pilot scale DAC deployment to better characterise 
the possible technology options and costs could be beneficial, but, on the basis of current 
knowledge, it appears that overall mitigation pathway planning should not assume or rely on 
large scale DACCS availability (see overview of DAC and DACCS in NRC (US), 2015, pp. 
67–74).  
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3.7 Enhanced Weathering 
3.7.1 Introduction 
Enhanced weathering (EW) is defined as the “application of crushed silicates to the 
landscape to accelerate their chemical breakdown to release base cations and form 
bicarbonate that ultimately sequester CO₂” (Beerling et al., 2016). Hartmann et al. (2013) 
provides a detailed overview of chemical weathering as a climate change mitigation strategy. 
Calcium and magnesium-bearing silicate rocks react with and sequester CO₂ in air. This 
already happens naturally but can be accelerated through increasing the mineral surface 
area by crushing rock, and applying it to soils to concurrently increase soil C sequestration 
(Beerling, 2017; Hartmann et al., 2013). This can be deployed by applying the crushed 
materials to agricultural soils, open oceans and coastal zones (Meysman and Montserrat, 
2017). During dissolution of silicate minerals, dissolved CO₂ will convert to bicarbonate, 
increasing soil and eventually ocean alkalinity, combatting soil and ocean acidification 
(Hartmann et al., 2013).  
3.7.2 Potential 
The material with the most potential is one rich in cations, has a fast dissolution rate and is 
abundantly available, such as olivine in mafic and ultramafic rocks (Hartmann et al., 2013) 
(Meysman and Montserrat, 2017). Moosdorf, Renforth, and Hartmann (Moosdorf et al., 
2014) estimates that 0.5-1 tCO₂ can be sequestered per 1t of rock, with an energy cost 
ranging from 1.6-9.9 GJ tCO₂.-1 Modelling by Taylor et al. (Taylor et al., 2015) projects that 
EW could lower atmospheric CO₂ by 30-300 ppm by 2100 if applied at a rate of 1 to 5 kg m-
2 yr-1 to 2000 Mha of tropical areas. EW has the most potential in the tropics (Hartmann et 
al., 2013) where there is high humidity, temperatures and rainfall (Meysman and Montserrat, 
2017). Globally there is 12 Mkm2 of cropland that could have significant mitigation potential 
if enhanced weathering is deployed, as a co-benefit to food production (Beerling et al., 
2016).  
EW has many potential co-benefits. The alkaline bicarbonate generated ultimately ends up 
in the ocean. This mitigates another major environmental issue of ocean acidification. EW 
can be used on land already producing crops, therefore there is no necessary land conflict 
and it doesn’t compromise food security. It also decreases fertilizer and pesticide use and 
costs (Beerling, 2017). By releasing other nutrients (Si, P and K), EW may increase 
productivity, further removing CO₂ from the atmosphere. For example, crop yields have been 
found to increase by up to 50% in the case of rice under silicon fertilisers (Hartmann et al., 
2013). EW also reduces N₂O loss through pH buffering further benefiting both crop 
production and the global climate (Kantola et al., 2017). 
Globally Smith et al. (2015) estimate that sustained EW could remove about 3.7 MtCO₂ yr-1 
by 2100, requiring a mean estimated energy input of 46 EJ yr-1 with a wide range of potential 
costs giving a mean value of ~300 USD tCO₂-1. 
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3.7.3 Limitations 
Limitations to consider with EW include the effect of pore water saturation, dissolution 
kinetics, plants, soil processes and negative impacts from altering pH levels in natural 
ecosystems. There is also a risk of increased airborne dust and implications for human and 
animal health. While mafic and ultramafic rocks containing suitable minerals such as olivine 
are abundantly available, deploying EW would require significant development of mining 
and transport infrastructure. Transport of such large quantities over potentially long 
distances may significantly undermine the mitigation potential if transport is fossil fuelled 
(Hartmann et al., 2013). There is a high energy requirement and associated CO₂ emissions 
to grind the material to suitable grain sizes (Meysman and Montserrat, 2017). The most 
potential for EW to be effective is in tropical areas. However, these regions are densely 
forested, a landscape that is logistically unavailable to spread rock material. Hence the land 
area is restricted to arable regions, limiting land availability (Meysman and Montserrat, 
2017). Other barriers include cost, social acceptability and the possibility of unknown 
consequences (Taylor et al., 2015). 
3.7.4 Knowledge Gaps and Future Research 
There are still many uncertainties about long term impact EW with a prominent lack of field 
experiments in the literature (Beerling, 2017). There are many unknowns about the 
ecological and biogeochemical impacts of EW at scale (Hartmann et al., 2013). Future 
research needs to consider the ecosystem impacts from released weathering products 
(Meysman and Montserrat, 2017). Another unknown is the effect of adding silicate minerals 
to soil on the organic matter pool. Adding silicate minerals could potentially promote SOC 
loss through decomposition and it is unknown whether the initial increase in microbial activity 
(decomposers) will be counterbalanced by the increase in plant productivity (Dietzen and 
Harrison, 2016). Moosdorf, Renforth, and Hartmann (Moosdorf et al., 2014) identifies future 
research priorities for weathering rates and side effects as well as addressing social 
acceptability and governance. Beerling et al. (Beerling et al., 2016) considers EW to be 
limited by economic cost and energy requirements, suggesting that its role in effective 
mitigation will be in a context contributing to the 2ºC target as part of a portfolio with multiple 
NETs. The CDR report by NRC (2015, pp. 46–56) provides a useful overview of EW and 
current research. 
3.7.5 Conclusion: Enhanced Weathering 
In conclusion, EW has potential to increase removal and sequestration of CO₂ from the 
atmosphere, with many co-benefits for soil quality, productivity and combatting ocean 
acidification. Its potential may be limited by energy requirements, emissions and cost. While 
EW enhances an already occurring natural process, future research must address the 
potential side effects at an ecosystem level of deploying EW at large scale. 
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4 Energy-economy-emission system modelling of climate 
mitigation pathways, with and without negative emissions  
Summary 
• Modelling future climate-energy-economy outcomes of potential choices through time 
can assist decision-makers if models are skilful and projection uncertainties are 
clearly stated. However, modelling outputs need to be used with care as they are 
readily subject to misinterpretation. 
• IAMs and energy system modelling can be extremely complex, resting on historic 
assumptions and on medium and long-term economic projections that often lack 
inherent physical basis to allow predictability (unlike the Earth climate system’s near-
linear warming response to cumulative CO₂ emissions).  
• Benefit-cost analysis combines socioeconomic, physical climate, damage function 
and discounting modules to estimate mitigation pathways providing an ‘optimal’ 
balance of benefits over costs. The results, including estimates of a social cost of 
carbon, are often highly contested, having a very large range of values. 
• Cost effectiveness analysis, as used in economic climate mitigation modelling, 
assumes that a specified climate target will be met with high certainty. Analysis then 
identifies the least-cost pathway among alternatives that all meet that specific target 
constraint. Within a cost-effectiveness framework, near-term policies need to be 
aligned with a high probability of meeting a climate target, otherwise they cannot be 
judged to be cost-effective. 
• Energy system optimisation models can be used to investigate alternative least 
“notional cost”, decarbonisation pathways over the next few decades, but often 
assume a single decision-maker with perfect foresight.  
• ‘Second-best’ and multi-level perspective analysis, accounting for myopic decision-
making, carbon lock-ins and cultural path dependence may enable more realistic, 
policy relevant analysis, especially if stringent mitigation urgency is not otherwise 
being adequately addressed in near-term policy.  
• Life cycle assessment (LCA) and marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) can be 
useful but are typically subject to complex, interacting uncertainties and need to be 
interpreted with care, especially when comparing different studies or in ranking 
options. 
• IPCC AR5 IAM scenarios are arguably unrealistic in assuming globally uniform and 
rising carbon prices, long-term planning and rational decision-making to achieve “cost 
effective” WB2C decarbonisation by 2100. 
• IAMs for energy and land use for WB2C include large amounts of CDR through NETs, 
especially depending on large scale BECCS. Modelled future mitigation costs rise 
steeply if NETs such as BECCS and DACCS do not become available at scale in 
future, within the projected cost and performance levels. 
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4.1 Types of modelling aiming to assist in climate mitigation policy 
decision-making 
This chapter gives an overview of the forms of modelling – socio-economic, energy, land 
and climate – used in integrated assessment and other more focused modelling that can 
inform climate mitigation policy. The usefulness and limitations of different modelling 
approaches are discussed, especially in regard to the costs of action and inaction, and in 
assessing the future role of negative emissions technology. Given the urgency of agreed 
Paris Agreement target-aligned climate mitigation, including the possible need for global nett 
negative CO₂ emissions, achieving the necessary rapid transformation in global, regional 
and national energy systems and land-use management requires difficult choices to be 
made. The academic community has aimed to inform decision-makers by developing 
models to assess the costs and challenges of different future climate mitigation pathways to 
explore the alternatives using a variety of modelling approaches (Sathaye and Shukla, 
2013). All model-makers and users of model output do well to bear in mind the well-known 
observation by  Box (1976) that “all models are wrong but some are useful”. Because the 
future is always unclear, modelling that reflects best understanding of natural and human 
systems can help to explore multiple alternative pathway scenarios through future decades. 
It is best if models are as simple as possible to give useful information and no simpler, the 
main test of usefulness being an ability to match observations and make projections skilfully5 
(Schmidt and Sherwood, 2015). 
Intercomparison between models can also help in confirming model abilities but there is a 
key distinction to be made between modelling of physical systems, such as Earth’s climate, 
that are ‘structurally constant’ (Scher and Koomey, 2011) as they obey physical laws (though 
they can still display tipping points, transitions into new and distinctive dynamic regimes), 
and modelling of human systems such as societies and economic systems that are far more 
structurally inconstant, being more prone to intrinsically unpredictable changes. Depending 
on their focus and intended use, models used in pathway assessment can have very 
different geographic scales from global to local, and different temporal scales from years to 
centuries. The model complexity and fineness of ‘time slicing’ (the time spacing between 
calculation steps) determining the computational time for each scenario run. Multiple runs 
with varying initial state and parameter values are often needed to test the sensitivity of the 
model to varying goals, assumptions and uncertainties. 
Moss et al. (2010 Box 1) gives a concise summary of three main groups of models and 
analytical frameworks in climate change research:  
• Integrated assessment models (IAMs), analysing the potential development of 
human systems, including energy use, economic output and human interaction 
with the climate system and land use. Energy system models (ESMs) of different 
levels of detail are incorporated in IAMs and are also commonly employed in 
 
                                            
5 “Skill” is used here in the technical sense of “forecast accuracy”. 
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national and regional analysis.  
• Physical climate models, ranging from highly complex atmosphere-ocean general 
circulation models (GCMs) to simplified climate models that are commonly 
incorporated into IAMs to project the climate system responses to projected 
human socio-economic activity;  
• Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability (IAV) models using a wide range of methods 
to inform decision-makers about possible and likely risks to human and natural 
systems.  
Global and large-region IAMs have been extensively used in economic assessments of 
climate policy assessments, primarily focused on two main approaches – benefit-cost 
analysis (BCA)6 and cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) – both of which attempt to assess 
the relative economic benefits and costs of climate change mitigation with the objective of 
identifying optimal costing of pollution or recommending optimal policy pathways. Many IAM 
and ESM approaches continue to assume idealised (arguably unrealistic), ‘first-best’ 
conditions: the modelling is set up as if there is only a single decision-maker acting with 
perfect foresight, and within highly efficient markets operating with perfect information. 
Scenario results then give a solution path which is notionally optimal (relative to these 
assumptions), often over several decades, based on economic history, and on technology 
assumptions for future development, supply and demand, also based on experience. This 
is typical of energy system modelling that aims to integrate cost choices over long periods. 
Increasingly though, models attempt to examine more realistic, ‘second-best’ options by 
incorporating ‘landscape effects’, due to path dependent inertia, and ‘lock-in’ effects 
perpetuating GHG-intensive behaviour in policies, institutions and among vested interests 
and society. Second-best policy landscapes are addressed by constraining processes and 
responses and by varying initial conditions in sensitivity analyses. For the five Shared 
Socioeconomic Pathway (SSP) narratives directed toward CEA-IAM modelling for IPCC 
AR6, including second-best, fossil-fuelled and/or highly inequitable alternative futures, a set 
of quantified constraints are being specified for each narrative to give a shared basis of 
group inputs for scenario runs undertaken by each of the IAM models managed by modelling 
teams worldwide (O’Neill et al., 2017).  
4.2 Economic modelling of climate mitigation costs and pathways:  
4.2.1 Limitations of economic climate cost modelling 
The numerical inputs and outputs of economic modelling (like much of economics) can give 
the impression of analysis that is free of normative or political choices; however, many of 
the monetising assumptions, the overlooked (non-monetised) sources of wellbeing, and 
distributive choices made in benefit-cost analyses estimating the ‘costs’ of climate policy 
are, in practice, profoundly normative (Ackerman et al., 2009). By making conservative 
 
                                            
6 Benefit-cost analysis (the term used by the IPCC WG3) is synonymous with cost-benefit analysis 
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assumptions about the possible rates of socio-economic change, these models are often 
biased toward the interests of the present generation and wealthier nations and actors 
thereby potentially continuing existing dominant power structures and perpetuating existing 
high-emissions systems (Ackerman et al., 2009).  
Climate policy costs from IAMs can therefore be described as being highly dependent on 
modelling assumptions: 
The “cost” of climate policy is not an observable market price; rather, it is a 
construct shaped by the modelling apparatus and its explicit and implicit 
assumptions. (2013, p. 156)  
Growth rate assumptions for economies, energy use, population, production and 
consumption have large effects on the modelled (monetary) costs and benefits of mitigation 
action. Many co-benefits and adverse co-impacts within mitigation pathway modelling are 
frequently ignored or commonly given zero value by both BCA and CEA IAMs because they 
can be difficult to quantify (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2014). Failing to include co-benefits may 
seriously underplay the benefits of mitigation action thereby inflating the apparent cost, or 
vice versa for adverse co-impacts. Difficulty in quantification does not, in itself, mandate a 
presumption that these divergences from model outcomes would be negligible. The very 
complexity of IAM process-modelling including contested (frequently value-laden) 
assumptions, omitted benefits of action and uncertainties, raise substantive doubts as to 
model usefulness in guiding climate mitigation decision-making. For example, one detailed 
study of CCS across models found that the projected levels of CCS use could not be 
explained from CCS-specific factors; rather, the model interactions were complex to the 
point of resisting analysis (Koelbl et al., 2014, p. 474). 
The cumulative beneficial value of avoiding very long-term, global negative impacts from 
climate change, air pollution and deforestation are often overlooked. This may yield policy 
inputs that are relatively more palatable for  decision-makers constrained by short (political) 
time and space horizons; but it is potentially to the severe detriment of long-term and 
aggregate human welfare (Scrieciu et al., 2013; Stern, 2016).  Stern argues that IPCC AR5 
report seriously understated the “grossly misleading” limitations of BCA-IAMs which are 
unable to deal with path-dependency of energy (and food) systems or, conversely, do not 
include the scale of learning and speed of technical change needed to cut fossil fuel use, 
preserve biodiversity and stop deforestation. Presenting policy makers with costs of 
mitigation versus a business-as-usual baseline is identified as profoundly unhelpful given 
the plausible potential for high and possibly catastrophic impacts on economic activity (and 
broader qualitative wellbeing) under such supposed “business-as-usual” conditions. 
Dynamic stochastic computable general equilibrium (DSGE) models, which explicitly 
acknowledge uncertainty, and agent-based models (ABMs), that attempt to give a stronger 
role for interacting agents in societies and economies, are advocated by Stern as possible 
advances in modelling. However, these possible improvements in socio-economic modelling 
do not address the major problems identified in defining damage functions and discount 
rates. Keen (2011) argues that all equilibrium modelling is structurally unable to model 
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intrinsic instability in financial systems 
leading to boom and bust, and DGSE is 
a poorly evidenced adjustment that fails 
to address this problem.   
Overall, there is a scientific obligation on 
all modellers to be explicit about the 
caveats, serious shortcomings and 
major assumptions in both BCA and 
CEA IAM modelling. Users of model 
outputs have an attendant obligation to 
be similarly cautious.  Modellers also 
need to correct policy-makers and 
others who misinterpret findings or be 
clear when past advice has been 
ignored. The full costs of inaction as well 
as the benefits of action also need to be 
made clear relative to past or present 
modelling of cost-optimal pathways 
(Luderer et al., 2013). 
 
4.2.2 Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) 
Benefit-cost analysis IAM modelling has 
typically been used to give a global and 
large-region (‘top down’) 
macroeconomic assessment estimating 
a balance between the costs of 
mitigation inaction against the costs of 
action, especially over the very long 
term. The resulting social cost of carbon 
(SC-CO₂) aims to represent a present 
value marginal cost of emitting an 
additional tonne of greenhouse gas 
pollution. In general, BCA-IAMs, such as 
the commonly used DICE7, are not 
constrained or driven by politically 
agreed (science-informed) climate 
change limits, but claim to estimate the 
 
                                            
7 DICE “Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy” created by William Nordhaus. 
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cost of climate damages sufficiently well to enable ‘economically efficient’ choices in climate 
mitigation policy. Therefore, even if BCA-IAM could be assumed to provide an accurate 
costing of climate damages there is potential for technical and ethical conflict between BCA 
climate modelling that can allow emissions to exceed politically agreed (scientifically 
informed) limits on the basis of claimed “economic efficiency’. Each time step in BCA-IAMs 
follows a chain of sub models (often called modules), in order to: approximate the emissions 
of a large scale socio-economic-energy system; estimate the resulting response of Earth’s 
climate system using a physical climate model; calculate the consequent total future 
damages (using highly uncertain damage functions, under contested value systems); and 
finally weight the outcome using a discount rate according to some descriptive and/or 
values-based assessment of how such (uncertain) future costs are taken to be (less) valued 
in the present (as compared, say, to relatively more certain costs of tangible present events 
or actions).  
The SC-CO₂ values8 computed by BCA-IAMs are typically expressed in misleadingly precise 
monetary figures, often without explicit confidence ranges despite the contested value 
systems embodied in them, the inherent structural inconstancy in economic forecasting, and 
very large predictive uncertainties, especially in assuming highly questionable damage 
functions that clearly equate to inadequate accuracy (Ackerman et al., 2009; Pindyck, 2013; 
Scrieciu et al., 2013; Stern, 2016). Unsurprisingly, different BCA-IAMs give an extremely 
wide range of estimates varying from near zero to many hundreds of dollars per tCO₂ (van 
den Bergh and Botzen, 2014) up to essentially infinite values if plausible catastrophic climate 
damages are included, even if they appear to be low probability or, usually more correctly, 
if we do not have any clear idea of their probability (Weitzman, 2009). The inputs and outputs 
for BCA-IAMs are based on average values at large aggregate scales so they are close to 
useless for describing local and short-term costs or outcomes, especially for vulnerable or 
exposed communities. 
4.2.2.1 BCA estimates of the social cost of carbon SC-CO₂ 
Though the results are highly contested, much academic effort has been, and continues to 
be expended in calculating the long-term benefits of acting to mitigate climate change (by 
avoiding damages) balanced against estimated costs to society of reducing emissions to 
avoid damages. Values of SC-CO₂, stated according to the relevant future year and related 
discount rate, are commonly used by the USA and other countries (UK Government, 2017; 
US EPA, 2016, pp. 3–4) as a shadow price to evaluate the carbon costs and benefits of 
alternative climate and energy policy decisions. The ‘social cost of carbon’, SC-CO₂, 
computed by Benefit-Cost Analysis integrated assessment models (BCA-IAMs), is generally 
defined as the net present value estimate of the marginal future damage (up to some time 
horizon), usually globally, due to one additional tonne of carbon dioxide emissions. Despite 
 
                                            
8 Although called the ‘social cost of carbon’, sometimes SCC, this term is used as shorthand for the 
social cost of carbon dioxide, and more usually abbreviated as SC-CO₂ 
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the exact values typically presented (without confidence ranges) the spread in values 
between the three major BC-IAM models, and even between different users of the same 
model, indicates the large degree of disagreement in the underlying assumptions being 
made. The estimates of SC-CO₂ may be open to critique but, as the US courts have found, 
“[w]hile the record shows that there is a range of values, the value of carbon emissions 
reduction is certainly not zero” (US EPA, 2016, p. 2). Similarly, within the models, while likely 
damages for a particular impact may be highly uncertain, the uncertainty range is then tacitly 
known to be large; accordingly, just because the damage cannot be assessed or quantified 
with precision, does not mean it can or should be accounted as zero. So, for SCC values, 
some estimate needs to be made, perhaps best based on expert elicitation (Oppenheimer 
et al., 2016; Pindyck, 2016). 
Using a benefit-cost (BC) analysis – essentially setting a greenhouse gas damage function 
against an abatement cost function within an economic growth model and applying a 
discount rate to weight the result relative to some estimate of future vs current value – has 
been the dominant economic approach to costing and planning climate mitigation since the 
work of Nordhaus that formed the basis of the DICE BC-IAM (1991). These models aim to 
maximise the present value of the aggregate future utility (‘utility’ being a presumed, and 
value-laden, overall measure of wellbeing) for humanity.  The calculation is based on a chain 
of four component modules, incorporating data from observations and modelling to produce 
a social cost of carbon. Each step in this chain of modules is subject to uncertainties and 
contestation.  As Pizer (2017) illustrates (see Figure 4.1), emissions projections from a 
socioeconomic module are input into a physical climate model module to estimate impacts 
(such as CO₂ concentration, temperature rise, sea level rise, crop harvests). These in turn 
are input into a damages module to estimate monetised damages and finally a discounting 
module applies a discount rate to enable final calculation of an SCC value. 
William Nordhaus developed the DICE global model (Nordhaus, 1993) as a series of 
equations representing a simplified economy-climate-damage-discounting model 
subsequently embodied in a spreadsheet model that continues to be widely used by many 
researchers to produce estimates of SCC (see summary by Newbold, 2010). A regional 
variant of the model called RICE examines alternative climate policy approaches by regional 
blocs or individual countries finding that internationally cooperative policies are less costly 
and achieve deeper emissions reductions than non-cooperative ones (Nordhaus and Yang, 
1996). Two other global models similarly widely used in estimating ranges for the SCC are 
FUND (FUND, 2015), developed by Richard Tol, and PAGE, developed by Chris Hope, a 
version of which (PAGE2002) was used in the analysis of climate mitigation pathways for 
the UK Treasury report, the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (Stern, 
2006; Zedillo, 2007).  DICE, FUND and PAGE are all ‘reduced form’ models that lack an 
explicit energy model, instead using exogenously determined emission pathways (Zedillo, 
2007, p. 62), typically still reliant on the now outdated SRES scenarios (WMO/UNEP, 2000).  
In 2010, the USA published estimates of CO₂ mitigation benefits based on SCC estimates 
made using an average of DICE, FUND and PAGE finding, giving a central, current value of 
21 USD tCO₂-1 updated to 37 USD tCO₂-1 in 2013 (US EPA, 2016, pp. 3–4) (a steadily 
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increasing SCC through time is an output from these models). However, critiques indicate 
that even on a partial inclusion of damage costs these are serious underestimates of likely 
US damages: Johnson and Hope (2012) find values 2.6 to 12 times larger based on lower 
discount rates more appropriate to long time horizons and equity weighting to allow for 
relative income levels; and, Ackerman and Stanton (2011) find “worst case” SC-CO₂ values 
of 900 USD tCO₂-1 in 2010, rising to 1,500 USD tCO₂-1 in 2050, using a precautionary 
assessment that costs risks due to the recognised uncertainties in climate response, 
resultant damages, catastrophic risk and discount rates. Nonetheless, as estimated using 
DICE by its originator Nordhaus (2017), the SC-CO₂ has increased from 17 USD tCO₂-1 to 
31 USD tCO₂-1 due to changing assumptions (see Table 4), but still assuming a higher 
interest rate than the Stern Review (2006), and a damage function that (like Stern) assumes 
limited global climate damages even with high end projections of global warming. However, 
as Figure 4.2 indicates, the accuracy of BCA and SC-CO₂ values are highly doubtful due to 
the extreme divergence among damage functions (see comparison of extreme divergence 
among DICE damage functions in Fig. 4 Pezzey and Burke, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Comparing large disparities between alternative DICE damage functions, 
reproduced from Pezzey and Burke (2014). 
The UK also uses a similar framework for SCC values with similar values (UK Government, 
2017). Using the updated PAGE09 model, Hope (2011) gives a central SC-CO₂ value of 100 
USD tCO₂-1 for continued ‘business as usual’ emissions.  In a peer-reviewed NGO study, 
Ackerman and Stanton (2011 see Fig. ES-1) illustrate how a very wide range of SC-CO₂ 
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values, ranging from 28 to 893 USD tCO₂-1, results from variations in discount rate and 
damage functions.  
Precautionary policies to minimise regret generally produce larger SC-CO₂ estimates (Dietz, 
2011). Revesz et al. (2014) argue that the SC-CO₂ is a valuable metric in policy despite the 
wide range of values and deep uncertainty. This may be true in the sense that previous and 
existing policy around the world continues to value CO₂ damages at zero or lower rates than 
the USA and UK. Ireland’s Public Spending Code bases its recommended 2017/18 shadow 
price of 7 EUR tCO₂-1 on the European Climate Exchange futures offers market pricing on 
the EU ETS, with recommended carbon prices for cost benefit analyses of 10 EUR tCO₂-1 
in 2020, 35 EUR tCO₂-1 in 2030, 78 EUR tCO₂-1 in 2020, 100 EUR tCO₂-1 in 2020 (DPER, 
2014). 
However, Van den Bergh and Botzen (2014) describes the BCA IAM-produced SCC values 
as “gross underestimates”, especially when generated using low discount rates and 
calculates a lower bound to SC-CO₂ of 125 USD tCO₂-1 for high impact / low probability 
outcomes where risk aversion is substantially incorporated (2014). As this study and the 
above summary indicates, all SCC estimates must be treated with a high degree of caution, 
particularly because the DICE, FUND and PAGE ‘policy optimising’ BCA IAMs are likely to 
underestimate the SCC by setting discount rates too high and damage risk premiums too 
low (see Ch. 3 IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, p. 247).    
4.2.2.2 BCA component modules  
Given the contestation involved in critiquing SCC estimates it is useful to clearly identify 
which IAM component module (socioeconomic, climate, damage or discounting) is the 
source of the particular uncertainties and questionable assumptions at issue (Pindyck, 2013; 
US NAS et al., 2017; Ch. 3, IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, pp. 245–249). The following discusses 
overall issues, followed by looking at the descriptions and issues with each of the four 
module areas of IAMs.  
The DICE, FUND and PAGE models are benefit cost analysis IAMs (BC-IAMs) that include 
damage and discounting modules to enable SCC calculation but lack detailed energy-
technology modelling. Dietz & Stern (2015, p. 576) provide a seven point summary of the 
equations and functions, By contrast, cost effectiveness IAMs (CEA-IAMs) such as those 
produced for IPCC AR5 WG3 assume that an agreed climate stabilisation target will be met 
and so do not include damage and discounting modules, instead including far more detailed 
energy (supply and demand) and technology processes and, sometimes, also land use 
modelling (Ch. 3 IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, p. 247). The following comments therefore all apply 
to modules of BC-IAMs but only the comments on socioeconomic and climate modules apply 
to the CE-IAMs used for the scenario runs recorded in the IPCC WG3 database. 
4.2.2.2.1 Socioeconomic module assumptions, projections and limitations 
Being based on neoclassical, economic equilibrium growth models, the most common 
socioeconomic assumptions in climate economics are that economic growth will continue at 
an assumed constant average rate into the future, that decision-makers are rational, and 
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that information is uniformly available (Nordhaus, 2017, p. 1518).  Unfortunately, as Keen 
(2011, pp. 251–269) and others have pointed out following the global financial crisis, 
neoclassical equilibrium economics fails to provide dynamic models that effectively 
represent key empirical phenomena such as market crashes or change from growth to 
contraction in depressions. Northrop (2017) gives a simple Kaya-based analysis stressing 
the fully global decoupling required to ensure continued global economic growth and yet cut 
emissions by 4% yr-1 to 8% yr-1, in line with a >66% chance of avoiding 2ºC carbon quota, 
concluding, “Optimism that economic growth can proceed without causing severe climate 
disruption is uninformed by the data. The optimists simply have not done the math.” In a 
long-run, hindcasting experiment with the DICE BC-IAM, Millner and McDermott (2016) use 
US economy data for 1870 to 2010 to test the model’s neoclassical Ramsey growth model, 
finding that it has limited predictive power and suggesting it “could be subject to structural 
errors on the temporal scales relevant to climate policies” (p. 8678).  Four recommendations 
are made by Millner and McDermott: economic assumptions in BC-IAMs should be testable 
if at all possible; BC-IAM components should be tested; policy makers need to consider 
estimates from tested, structurally different IAMs; decision-making needs to explicitly 
acknowledge that economic models (unlike physical climate models) have very limited (and 
highly contested) predictive power and may  thus be fundamentally misleading as guides to 
prudent/effective policy with long term time horizons.   
Pollitt and Mercure (2017) show that the top-down Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
models, used in the socioeconomic modules of both BC- and CE-IAMs, are inherently biased 
against decarbonisation actions by using finance assumptions that “crowd out” low carbon 
investments in modelling because the starting point (including the finance sector) is typically 
treated as already representing an optimal de facto use of resources (p. 10). More 
empirically-based, non-equilibrium models are found to be more empirically realistic. 
Therefore policy-makers need to be aware of the severe limitations endemic in the use of 
CGE, the most common economic modelling method, and the lack of empirically robust 
economic modelling in general. 
Socio-economic modelling and carbon costing also fails to account for raised costs of 
system change due to carbon lock-in – first described in detail by Unruh (2000) – the 
technological, agent and institutional system inertia of economies reliant on existing fossil 
fuelled energy causing physical, economic and socio-political “barriers to diffusion” slowing 
and reducing the assumed effectiveness of mitigation policies and technologies (Seto et al., 
2016). Updating the work of Unruh (2000) in a systematic review, Seto et al. (2016) identify 
and describe three major classes of this type of path dependency (Table 4.1): infrastructural 
and technological, institutional, and behavioural – all of which tend to co-evolve, interact and 
mutually-reinforce to perpetuate the status quo in policy and outcomes. Escaping lock-ins is 
easier if costs of transition are low but, if not, alternative ‘decarbonisation lock-ins’ need to 
be induced and fostered by societal and social change through the cooperation of actors 
across sectors including governmental, non-governmental, public and corporate areas 
where motivation to achieve decarbonisation pathways overlaps. Demonstrating carbon 
lock-in, Bertram et al. (2015) apply nine energy-economy models and find that that near-
term reliance on continued electricity generation from existing coal infrastructure is not a 
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cost-effective global mitigation action. Increasing energy efficiency is found to increase 
energy system flexibility and to lower mitigation costs but it cannot cut reliance on coal 
electricity sufficiently to prevent sub-optimal mitigation with increased costs – suggesting an 
economic imperative for early retirement of coal-fired power stations, a finding that would 
presumably extend to peat-fired generation in nations  where that is occurring, such as 
Ireland and Finland (see also the geographical distribution of fossil fuels unused when 
limiting global warming to 2ºC, McGlade and Ekins, 2015).  
Rebound effects are commonly excluded in IAM and ESM socio-economic modelling of 
mitigation effectiveness, particularly in energy efficiency studies (Section 3.9.5 IPCC AR5 
WG3, 2014). These effects potentially undermine the reliability of model results, even within 
the CGE framework because cost savings being spent at any time on the same kind of 
activity (direct rebound) or on different activities (indirect rebound) may generate additional 
emissions that cancel out the supposed reduction, in whole or in part. In principle, cost 
savings that are retained as invested wealth9 may result in macroeconomic rebound effects 
that may be very large globally and over the long term, even exceeding 100% yr-1 in energy 
use and emissions (Berners-Lee and Clark, 2013; Jarvis et al., 2012; Saunders, 2000). This 
possibility of rebound exceeding 100% (“backfire”, or nett growth in emissions arising from 
efficiency measures) is strongly contested but it is notable that many of the studies rejecting 
large rebound effects, and global macroeconomic rebound in particular, are based on 
regional and short-term studies (as listed in Chakravarty et al., 2013; and in energy 
efficiency, Ryan and Campbell, 2012), as detailed in Herring and Roy (2007).  
Table 4.1: Summary of three types of carbon lock-in and their key characteristics. 
Reproduced from (Seto et al., 2016). 
 
                                            
9 Holmes (1999, p. 3): “An investment can be defined as any act which involves the sacrifice of an 
immediate and certain consumption in exchange for an increase in future consumption.” Note that 
invested global wealth is continuously earning an income largely based on credit at interest offered 
to emission-generating activities so that investment earnings produce emissions, on average, at the 
global per dollar carbon intensity of GDP. In this global sense money and wealth perhaps act as a 
useful proxy for future emissions. 
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4.2.2.2.2 Physical Climate module description and limitations 
Unlike the socioeconomic and damage modules used by economists, the general circulation 
models (GCMs), constructed by climate scientists using physical laws and equations to 
model the Earth’s climate system, have been thoroughly tested and found to be skilful 
through hindcasting against recorded climate data (Cowtan et al., 2015), especially when 
natural variation is allowed for (Risbey et al., 2014). Though significant stochastic variability 
and structural uncertainties/unknowns remain, the proven skilfulness of climate change 
models, being based in physics, is considerably greater than economic models, which 
attempt to deal with socio-economic systems. Given a projected emissions pathway by a 
socioeconomic module, climate models give relatively high confidence projections of future 
temperature rise.  
Nonetheless, the uncertainties in climate modelling are important. These are, 
predominantly, climate sensitivity, tipping points and, as part of climate sensitivity, the near-
term ocean and land sink responses to continued global warming. For benefit-cost analysis, 
a crucial concern is the shape of the probability density function for climate sensitivity, 
particularly in the ‘fat tail’10 (Weitzman, 2009) of the distribution that may be associated with 
events with low (or unknown) probability but very high impact. These include catastrophic 
discontinuous damage to biosphere-level systems greatly increasing mitigation costs to 
insure against disasters that, inter alia, have the potential to undermine effective functioning 
of the global economy itself (Wagner and Zeckhauser, 2016). Freeman et al. (2015) find that 
even the apparent “good news” of the IPCC’s revision of likely equilibrium climate sensitivity 
range from AR4’s 2ºC-4.5ºC (best estimate 3ºC) to AR5’s 1.5ºC-4.5ºC (with no best estimate 
given) is in fact “bad news” because the increased uncertainty regarding future societal well-
being inevitably raises SC-CO₂ estimates. 
Tipping points and tipping elements in Earth’s climate system (Lenton et al., 2008) are often 
omitted from the behaviour of physical climate models, including the simplistic climate 
modules in IAMs, and are commonly mis-characterised  (Kopp et al., 2016). Lenton and 
Ciscar (2013) show that there are multiple climate tipping points and elements that IAMs 
often misleadingly and simplistically assume are only “high impact – low probability”. Current 
global emission trajectories are toward very significant global warming of 4ºC or more yet 
some tipping point thresholds will likely be passed at much lower levels of warming even 
before 2ºC, including the loss of Arctic sea-ice this century and the beginning of slow but 
irreversible ice sheet loss in Greenland and Antarctica. The tipping points and elements 
noted could all be defined as catastrophic changes yet the economic literature generally fails 
to recognise or distinguish them. Assessing the economic effects of crossing tipping points 
Lenton and Ciscar find that assessment of climate impacts need to look at dynamic effects 
over time.  
 
                                            
10 Technically, the tail of a probability density function is said to be ‘fat’ if it approaches zero more 
slowly than exponentially. 
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4.2.2.3 Damage module assumptions and limitations 
Damage functions in BCA-IAMs relate the supposed average fractional loss in global output 
(equated to GDP) to the level of global warming. However, the extreme range of damage 
functions used in IAMs is indicative of the high uncertainty regarding damages. The IPCC 
assessment warns that the reliability of the damage functions in benefit-cost IAMs is low as 
they typically do not include up to date damage estimates, continuing instead to base 
damages on now obsolete emission pathway scenarios developed for AR4 (Ch. 3 IPCC AR5 
WG3, 2014, p. 247). Wilson et al. dismiss the typically simplistic climate impact assumptions 
of BCA-IAMs referring to “the atheoretical and weakly empirical basis of 'damage functions' 
which parameterize the impacts of climate change on the economy” (Wilson et al., 2017, p. 
17).  
Introducing the “Dismal Theorem”, Weitzman (2009) shows that even the possible existence 
of a fat tail in the damage function distribution of plausible outcomes in the climate sensitivity 
probability density function and/or in damage function, exposes the global decision-maker 
in a BCA to potentially unlimited losses. Given that it is likely to be impossible to estimate or 
even constrain the probability of these global-level disastrous outcomes, the qualitative 
climate policy outcome of the Dismal Theorem, outweighing any effect of discount rate 
weighting, is for “a very strong form of a ‘generalized precautionary principle’”. This 
effectively suggests that, within the conventional framing of BCA, it would be worth paying 
an arbitrarily large fraction of current wealth for near-term radical decarbonisation measures 
to insure against such uncertain, but indefinitely large, negative outcomes. Weitzman 
suggests that giving a CBA estimate, including specific, supposedly “optimal”, SC-CO₂ 
values, is inherently misleading given the structural uncertainty involved in the climate 
response. 
Detailed economic climate damage estimates such as Hsiang et al. (2017) giving spatial 
mapping of substantial economic impacts on different sectors (crop yield, crime rates, labour 
rates) for the USA if emissions follow an RCP8.5 (“business as usual”) emissions pathway 
on are now beginning to appear which, as Pizer (2017) comments, does offer the potential 
to greatly improve and refine damage functions used in modelling. However, the 
geographical scope of damages considered will need to be greatly increased to the global 
scale if confidence in the damage functions of global climate policy BCA IAMs is to be 
increased. 
Large or increased uncertainty in the assessed probabilities for climate sensitivity or other 
parameters affecting climate impacts is frequently cited by as a reason to delay or reduce 
mitigation action (Dunlap and Jacques, 2013; Freudenburg and Muselli, 2013; Lahsen, 
2013). However, to the contrary, for the escalating damages related to tipping points and 
ever greater impacts at higher warming, producing a so-called convex damage function 
(Dietz and Stern, 2015), it is mathematically the case that large or increased uncertainty in 
fact increases the expected damage costs of climate change (Lewandowsky et al., 2014b). 
This fact appears to be widely unappreciated by policy-makers and others who may be 
tempted to think otherwise or imply that doubt due to uncertainty is a reasonable argument 
for inaction (Hansson, 2017). For example, increased uncertainty about climate sensitivity 
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results in increased anticipated damages and therefore an increased social cost of carbon 
from unmitigated climate pollution (Lewandowsky et al., 2014a); they summarise as follows: 
Contrary to the claim by some researchers that uncertainty presents a barrier to 
scientifically-informed policy decisions (Allenby and Sarewitz, 2011; Sarewitz, 2004), 
any appeal to scientific uncertainty actually implies a stronger, rather than weaker, 
need to cut greenhouse gas emissions than in the absence of uncertainty (Allenby 
and Sarewitz, 2011, p. 14). 
Howard (2014), in a strongly-referenced report produced for US NGOs, lists omitted or 
poorly quantified damages in BCA-IAMs, providing detailed descriptions of the DICE, PAGE 
and FUND damage functions, and discusses ways to improve damage assessment in IAMs. 
4.2.2.3.1 Discounting module assumptions and limitations 
Two different types of discount rate need to be identified: the welfare discount rate, also 
known as the ‘rate of pure time preference’, a judgment weighting of the well-being of future 
generations relative to the present (though at this point current generations can also 
certainly anticipate significant damages within their own lifetimes); and the goods discount 
rate reflecting an average return on capital investment as “descriptively evidenced by capital 
market rates” (Nordhaus, 2017, p. 1520). The growth-corrected discount rate equals the 
discount rate on goods minus the growth rate on consumption. Dietz (2011), using the PAGE 
model, finds that BCA welfare and SC-CO₂ are indeed critically sensitive to the Dismal 
Theorem, fat tail effects outlined by Weitzman for climate sensitivity but discounting can be 
relevant to BCA values depending on exactly how fat the tail might be. Stern (2016) points 
out that models commonly assume future generations will be far wealthier, ignoring the 
potential for substantial climate damages, and also discount the future as less important 
than the present, contrary to most widely subscribed systems of human ethics (see 
discussions of values and well-being in 3.4 and sustainable development in 4.2.1, IPCC AR5 
WG3, 2014). 
In calculating the social cost of carbon the assumed aim is to maximise the present value of 
aggregated human well-being by minimising the sum of climate action costs and long climate 
pollution damages. This implies a utilitarian ethical philosophy of “the greatest good for the 
greatest number”, or at least the greatest “average good”, with “good” measured narrowly 
as total reported market transactions (GDP/GWP). The welfare discount rate of pure time 
preference used in the SC-CO₂ calculation to weight the value of future generations welfare 
relative to the present, is a source of strong disagreement among economists as to whether 
this should be relatively high, thereby greatly reducing the value placed on the wellbeing of 
future generations, as in the values as high as 3% typically used by Nordhaus in the DICE 
model, or very low as in the Stern Review, which used 0.1%. Ackerman (2007) provides a 
useful and clear guide to the controversy and technical details regarding discount rates used 
by Stern, Nordhaus and others in BCA. 
Roser (2009) differentiates between genuine discounting as weighting of present versus 
future values, giving the time-preference of the current generation, and ‘non-genuine’ 
“discounting as representing opportunity cost”, which determines the means by which utility 
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is transferred forward into the future. In the latter, there is no weighting of relative utility 
between generations, the discounting is just a calculation to decide between options on an 
investment basis. Roser’s main point though (p. 15) is that policies, especially for multi-
generational problems like climate change, should not be judged on the basis of the effects 
on long-term aggregate utility at all, thereby rejecting the entire utilitarian framework 
foundation of calculating a social cost of carbon. Instead, a deontological alternative, 
altogether avoiding a requirement to consider discount rates or any weighing of values, is 
proposed. By passing on a threshold amount of utility (in resources, stable climate, clean air 
etc.) to future generations there is no pressure to ‘maximise’ wellbeing, only to ensure 
sufficient utility for all future generations. Provide that threshold is met, then the present 
generation need not achieve more toward future well-being. On the other hand, if the current 
generation is not passing on such a threshold of sufficient resources then enabling even 
small increases in future utility mandates potentially very large near-term investments in 
future wellbeing. Roser’s discussion, which is careful to show the nuances of the argument, 
usefully unpacks the philosophical and normative choices implicitly being made in climate 
economics; showing that such analyses are not simply “objective”, empirical representations 
in mathematical frameworks, but are, in fact, deeply value-laden. 
4.2.3 Cost-effectiveness Analysis CEA 
Cost effectiveness models, such as the “process-based” IAMs produced for AR5 WG3 
(Wilson et al., 2017) and energy systems modelling, aim to identify optimal and sub-optimal 
scenario pathways that stay within an inviolable emission reduction goal, such as the Paris 
temperature goals, that has been set by others (Koomey, 2013). CEA avoids the difficulties 
of damage estimating and discounting inherent in BCA models. Therefore, CEA 
concentrates effort on only the first two components of economic climate modelling: 
socioeconomic, to forecast emissions according to projected economic, technical and land 
use; and simple climate models to forecast a climate response to the emissions. CEA aims 
to calculate a “least cost” pathway of changes in the socio-economic-energy system through 
time to meet the particular imposed emissions pathway or overall target.  
In CEA modelling, exceeding the externally (politically) specified ‘safe’ target is assumed to 
be unacceptable: in economic terms, the shadow price of exceedance is effectively deemed 
to be infinite (Ackerman et al., 2009, p. 312). A defined carbon budget target (such as “well 
below 2ºC”) or emissions pathway is therefore a definite requirement to be met with certainty 
by the cost effectiveness methodology. An absolute goal is therefore properly regarded as 
a feature of CEA – rather than a “limitation” that fails to consider “economic efficiency”, as 
an IPCC AR5 chapter executive summary incorrectly states (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, p. 154 
Ch. 2). A major problem with asserting policy-relevance for CEA is the fact that if the political 
will and societal commitment to meet the declared goal or pathway does not exist or falters 
then the essential precondition of carrying out CEA (for public policy purposes) becomes 
void, except in stating that the (diverging) policy is, by definition, not cost-effective. This in 
itself is a highly policy-relevant difficulty that may be too easily left unreported or unstated 
by the research community. Logically, where declared international or government policy 
claims a cost-effectiveness focus yet past cost-effectiveness advice has not translated into 
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corresponding policy, as continues to be the case with many CEA-IAM recommendations, 
then the assumed policy relevance of CEA becomes questionable. This is a key assumption 
for cost-effectiveness: if current policies are not aligned with meeting a target then they 
cannot properly claim to be acting cost-effectively11.  
Usually the core socioeconomic modelling approach in CEA modelling is process-based 
(Wilson et al., 2017), involving a  ‘bottom-up’ approach based on large and detailed 
database of processes, technologies and energy supplies, driven by (often) exogenous12 
macroeconomic assumptions about future development pathways and costs. Typically, 
these top down macroeconomic functions use neoclassical general or partial equilibrium 
growth models to provide base economic growth rates and likely total energy requirement 
values used in CEA to interact with the bottom-up technical processes to give large-scale 
global or regional modelling of notional “optimally cost effective” (relative to the model inputs, 
structure and parameters) transformation pathways.  
 
4.3 Integrated assessment models in IPCC AR5 analysis of climate 
mitigation pathways 
4.3.1 Development of IPCC modelling up to AR4 
As detailed at length by the IPCC assessment (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014 Ch. 6) global warming 
outcomes resulting from differing transformation pathways are being explored by research 
teams around the world. Computer models, ‘process-based integrated assessment models’, 
incorporate a socioeconomic module, outputting a GHG emissions profile from projected 
energy and land-use systems over time (commonly up to 2100), and a climate system 
module, outputting the correlated near- and long-term Earth system response (in terms of 
temperature and atmospheric GHG concentrations) to the anthropogenic emissions. 
Climate and mitigation modelling around the world requires commonly defined scenarios – 
 
                                            
11 For example, Ireland’s Climate Action Act requires the Government to have regard to 
“likely future mitigation commitments of the State and the economic imperative for early and 
cost-effective action” (Oireachtas, 2015, Article 4 (7.a.ii)). The Climate Change Advisory 
Council is also given a remit to make recommendations it “considers necessary or 
appropriate, in relation to the most cost-effective manner of achieving” a low carbon 
transition (Oireachtas, 2015, Article 4 (7.a.ii)). Given the strict requirement of cost-
effectiveness to meet a target, now expressly articulated (via the Paris Agreement) as 
aligning mitigation action with “well below 2ºC”, a consistent economic interpretation of these 
injunctions would be to ascribe an infinite cost to failure in order to judge the relative cost-
effectiveness only of alternative policies that all prudently satisfy this target. 
12 Exogenous model assumptions and parameters cannot be changed by modelling outputs, such 
as damage cost, whereas endogenous ones can be so affected.   
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alternative sets of baseline emissions assumptions, initial conditions and target emission 
pathways – to enable intercomparison for cross-checking of results and verification. Shared 
scenario modelling also allows researchers from different (physical/biological science and 
social science) backgrounds to coordinate work in producing new mitigation options toward 
climate stabilisation goals. The collected results of the scenario modelling, are available 
online (IIASA, 2014).  
Moss et al. (2010 see Fig. 1) details the development of physical climate modelling from 
Arrhenius’ estimates of warming in 1896, through to the first General (atmospheric) 
Circulation Model (GCM) in 1969 and the development of resource scenario modelling in 
the 1970s (becoming mainstream in futures modelling in the 1980s and later socio-economic 
modelling). The first strong GCM indications in the 1970s and 1980s that warming would 
soon be discernible from background natural variation are noted, and then Moss gives an 
overview of the development of IPCC modelling scenarios.  
The first generation of IPCC scenarios was called IS92, produced with the First Assessment 
Report in 1992. The third and fourth Assessment Reports (TAR and AR4) used a second 
group of scenarios abbreviated as SRES, from the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, 
which are still being used in the socio-economic module of BCA-IAM models such as DICE 
and PAGE.  However, neither the I92 nor the SRES scenarios included climate change 
mitigation or adaptation measures. The qualitative I92 scenarios outlined possible warming 
outcomes across the range of uncertainties in consumption growth, technology and 
population along different economy-energy pathways. The SRES generation of scenarios 
provided quantitative pathways of plausible GHG and SLCP (Short Lived Climate Pollutant) 
emissions related to narrative storylines sketching out associated future fossil fuel use, 
deforestation and degree of economic convergence in global development (Moss et al., 
2010, pp. 749–750). 
4.3.2 Scenario development for AR5 
Up to AR4, modelling was primarily sequential, proceeding from socioeconomic emission 
projections to climate response and then to impact modelling, with no feedbacks between 
these major components. However, following an expert meeting in 2007, a new, parallel 
approach was decided on, by first building a small set of new “benchmark emissions 
scenarios” called “Representative Concentration Pathways”, RCPs (IPCC, 2008; Figs. 3 & 
4 in Moss et al., 2010).  This simplification increases the speed and reduce the cost of 
computation and so expands the computing time available to model complex feedbacks 
between parallel socio-economic, climate and impact processes, and to carry out repeated 
runs meeting only a limited set of RCP outcomes. 
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Figure 4.3: Approaches to the development of global scenarios: (a) earlier sequential 
approach; (b) proposed parallel approach. Numbers indicate analytical steps (2a and 2b 
proceed concurrently). Arrows indicate transfers of information (solid), selection of RCPs. 
Reproduced from IPCC (2008) 
Each of the four RCPs defines an emission trajectory constrained by a stated combination 
of radiative forcing (RF) and atmospheric GHG concentrations by 2100 that are not 
dependent on the output of the socioeconomic module.  By providing shared initial datasets 
of radiative forcing pathways to both climate modellers and socio-economic IAM process 
modellers can work simultaneously on model experiments and model revisions, as shown 
in Figure 4.3, enabling many more alternatives of socioeconomic scenarios to be undertaken 
to explore alternative solution pathways that can interact with a parallel physical climate 
model, producing ensemble projections, combining to enable integrated assessments (see 
simplified guide to RCPs by Wayne, 2014). Moss et al. (2010) summarises the RF, CO₂e 
concentration and pathway description of the four RCPs (Table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.2: The four Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) adopted as a basis 
for IAM scenario modelling from Moss et al. (2010), Table 1). 
 
 
Rogelj et al. (2012) use historical constraints and temperature projections to compare the 
outputs from older SRES and the newer RCP climate projections in relation to the likelihood 
of reaching different levels of equilibrium warming.  Table 4.3 reproduces a brief summary 
of the comparison. 
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Table 4.3 Comparing newer RCPs with older SRES scenarios. Reproduced from Table 3 
in (Rogelj et al., 2012). 
 
Following development of the RCPs a second phase of scenario development by earth 
system modellers (modelling both the physical climate system and the carbon cycle 
including land use) produced ensemble model runs consistent with the RCPs. In a third 
phase, an expert workshop in 2010 produced a report developing a narrative framework of 
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), each SSP having a descriptive storyline and a 
group of quantified criteria defining the overall type and direction of society. Each narrative 
is assumed to be independent of climate change projections to enable assessment in 
conjunction with climate module outputs to illuminate relationships between two key policy 
dimensions of mitigation and adaptation (IPCC, 2012, pp. 1–2). Ebi et al. (2014) outlines the 
concepts underlying the SSPs, Kriegler, et al. (2012) discusses the need for and use of the 
SSPs, and O’Neill, et al. (2017) gives full details on the most recent iteration of SSPs. As 
shown in Figure 4.4, the five SSP narratives are top-down qualitative descriptions of 
different, quantitatively described, parameter combinations of system inertia and societal 
choices to be used in different models to give policy pathways. These give more realistic 
‘second-best’ projections based on socio- and political- economic alternatives, to avoid 
focusing only on idealised bottom-up projections that ignore infrastructural carbon lock-in 
and path-dependent agent behaviour among vested interests and energy consumers.  
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Figure 4.4: Narratives for shared socioeconomic pathways describing world futures in the 
21st century O'Neill et al. 2017 
4.3.3 Summary of AR5 Database scenarios 
As summarised in Annex II of IPCC WG3, the AR5 Scenario Database contains the data 
output from 1,184 scenario runs from 31 process-based CEA-IAMs spanning a wide range 
of temperature and atmCO₂ outcomes to 2050 and 2100. A full assessment and explanation 
of the transformation pathways shown by the Database modelling is given in Chapter 6 of 
AR5 WG3, with a section specifically covering carbon dioxide removal (Section 6.9.1 in 
IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014).  
The socioeconomic modules mostly have general or partial equilibrium economic coverage 
and feedback, the climate module may be lacking altogether or be restricted to temperature 
change (land use may also be included), and there are varied cost measures providing 
feedback for energy system costs, consumption loss, GDP loss or welfare loss.  
Many mitigation cost metrics, each with uses and limitations, are used in the economic 
analysis in models  (Krey et al., 2014b, pp. 1291–1293), see also IPCC (Section 6.3.6 in 
2014). Emissions price, the marginal cost of reducing emissions by one unit (generally tCO₂, 
or per tCO₂e using GWP-100 equivalence factors), is commonly measured by models but 
these are not actual costs, which comprise all measures achieved at costs lower than the 
emissions price. The emissions price given may be underestimated because of other policy 
measures effectively subsidising mitigation. Discount rates approximating long-run, capital 
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market interest rates (commonly 4%-6%) are used in the AR5 models but they only change 
the timing and speed of mitigation in achieving a set target (which must be met), unlike 
discounting in BCA-IAMs that can strongly affect the stringency of mitigation action. Similarly 
to BCA-IAM discounting though, larger discount rate values in cost-effectiveness modelling 
increases apparent near-term mitigation costs relative to (the notional present value of) 
future mitigation costs. This has the tacit effect that, for notionally "cost optimal" action, 
progressively more effort is deferred as far as possible into the future. 
Two strong (and contested) assumptions underpin the comparability of mitigation cost 
estimations in the AR5 Scenario Database models (Annex II 2014, pp. 1291–1292). First, a 
uniform price of carbon is globally applied by a stated date and then steadily increased 
thereafter in line with increases in calculated marginal emission reduction costs. Second, 
global markets are idealistically assumed to be efficient without lock-in effects or other 
market failures. The scenario studies consistently show that total global costs of mitigation 
rise with passing time and with more stringent (lower atmCO₂) targets. Carbon costs also 
rise if these parameters are adjusted to allow non-uniform carbon pricing and inefficient 
global markets. Low global consumption loss estimates are given by the AR5 model 
scenarios reaching 430-480 ppm CO₂e equating to only a 0.06% annual reduction in GDP 
output averaged to 2100 compared to baseline growth of 2% yr-1 (IPCC, 2014, p. Fig. 
SPM.13 AR5 Synthesis Report). However, given the real-world lock-ins preventing high and 
uniform carbon prices, imperfect markets, and political barriers to equity transfers to ensure 
distributional economic fairness, these are likely to be significant underestimates. Trainer 
(2017) is strongly critical of the AR5 costings, finding that renewable energy sector costs to 
meet strong emission targets are likely to be far higher than assumed suggesting that 
consumption losses would be greater and implying a need for much reduced global energy 
consumption to reduce emissions, consistently with the given emissions pathways.  
In a “first comprehensive analysis” to evaluate the process-based IAMs, as used in the 
modelling and scenarios in the AR5 Database, Wilson et al. (2017) describe a framework 
based on climate model evaluation to assess  their adequacy based on five criteria: 
appropriateness of purpose and design to application; interpretability in simplicity of analysis 
and communication of output; verifiability of model code by third-party review; credibility 
judged by user confidence in quality of output; and, usefulness in giving full ranges of policy 
options and implementation challenges. Unlike the relative structural constancy between 
past and future in the Earth’s climate system, the socioeconomic processes represented in 
IAMs can be structurally inconstant with dynamic and uncertain baselines (Scher and 
Koomey, 2011).  Wilson et al. (2017) briefly notes studies of process-based IAMs in historical 
simulations and examples of tests of generalisable historical patterns for economic growth 
and technology diffusion are given (p. 18-23). Inter-comparison studies of the CEA-IAMs  
(see Table A.II.15 in Krey et al., 2014b Table A.II.14) are increasingly focusing on second-
best and effort-sharing outcomes. However, it is clear from this study that detailed IAM 
intercomparison and hindcast testing is lacking, model complexity may be high requiring 
detailed sensitivity analysis to determine drivers of changes (Koelbl et al., 2014), and, 
notwithstanding their technical detail, there are significant limits to their predictive power due 
to socio-political and financial dynamics. 
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4.3.4 AR5 Database scenarios meeting Paris temperature goals in 2100 with or 
without NETs 
As discussed in detail in Assessing Transformation Pathways, Chapter 6 of IPCC AR5 WG3 
(2014), the AR5 Scenario Database (IIASA, 2014) stores the output from 31 CEA-IAM 
models and 1,184 scenarios most of which were generated in nine intercomparison 
exercises. Of these scenarios, only 116 limit atmospheric concentration to 430-480 ppm 
CO₂e, equivalent to 2.5-3.1 W m-2 radiative forcing, by 2100 (see Fig. 6.32 IPCC AR5 WG3, 
2014) – corresponding to limiting to 2ºC with 66% likelihood.  Of the 76 lowest CO₂ 
trajectories, as discussed by Anderson and Peters (2016 see note 16) only 2 scenarios have 
no negative emissions, 71 have above zero and up to 20 GtCO₂ yr-1, and 3 reach more than 
20 GtCO₂ yr-1. Sorting these 76 for ‘Radiative Forcing Overshoot’, 13 do not overshoot, 25 
overshoot by <0.4W/m2, and 38 overshoot by >0.4W/m2.  
A further 40 scenarios reach the same atmCO₂ threshold but by more challenging pathways, 
following a baseline path and then imposing a uniform and increasing global carbon price 
from 2020 (24 scenarios) or after 2030 (16 scenarios) to drive cost-effective mitigation from 
those points onward (Peters, 2016). In Annex II, as shown in Table A.II.16 (Krey et al., 
2014b), the scenarios for use in the AR5 WG3 report are characterised by: climate target 
(determined by 2100 CO₂e concentrations and radiative forcing or carbon budgets); global 
carbon budget up to 2050 and 2100; overshoot of 2100 CO₂e concentration or radiative 
forcing levels; scale of deployment of carbon dioxide removal or net negative emissions (see 
Figure A.II.9 in Krey, Masera, et al. 2014); and, policy configuration, such as immediate 
mitigation, delayed mitigation, or fragmented participation by countries. 
The two scenario runs that have no negative emissions (both from the Phoenix 2012.4 
model) have already proven to be highly unrealistic. Each show a large drop in global fossil 
fuel emissions between 2010 and 2020 (~35 percentage points relative to peak), modest 
further reduction between 2020 and 2070 (~15 percentage points relative to peak) and then 
abrupt elimination between 2070 and 2080 (~50 percentage points relative to peak) (see 
Figure 4.5). While the specific pathway details could presumably be varied somewhat, these 
serve to illustrate the very high rates of mitigation implied by a “well below 2ºC” limit if 
negative emissions are excluded. 
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Figure 4.5: A screenshot of Phoenix 2012.4 scenario output from the AR5 Scenario 
Database (for illustration only) 
In Figure 4.6, atmCO₂ trajectories are shown as generated for 2010-2100 from data in the 
AR5 Database for the 116 scenarios minimising atmCO₂ in 2100, showing that many of 
them are relying on technological carbon dioxide removal to reduce CO₂ levels rapidly after 
peaking. Given that atmCO₂ is already (in 2017) at ~406ppm (monthly average, seasonally 
adjusted), it is notable that some trajectories peak somewhere below ~410ppm, but some 
overshoot to above 450 ppm. 
 
Figure 4.6: Atmospheric CO₂ AR5 Database pathways ranging from no overshoot to large 
overshoot for the 116 scenario runs with the lowest atmCO₂ in 2100. Chart generated with 
data from IIASA (2014). 
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4.4 Other approaches to climate change mitigation and energy system 
modelling  
Given the BCA and CEA limitations noted above this section describes alternative efforts to 
extend these model-types or develop alternatives, whether complex models or simplified 
calculations.  
4.4.1 Economic and energy decarbonisation pathway modelling extended to include 
equity and policy landscape criteria 
Ackerman et al. (2013) outlines CRED (Climate and Regional Economics of Development), 
an economic climate mitigation model that includes global equity criteria, optimises 
interregional resource flows and estimates mitigation costs (not damages) using empirically 
derived marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) which are exogenous to the model. 
Optimal climate policy output in this model – pooling all savings globally, balancing 
consumption and abatement equitably among nations – results in effective mitigation but 
very large, income-lowering capital transfers from rich nations to developing ones enabling 
them to avoid (or “leapfrog”) carbon intensive development. Constraining pooling of savings 
to 10% or 0% enables climate stabilisation if the time preference discount rate is very low 
(as per the Stern Review’s 0.1%) but with a higher discount rate (1.5% as per Nordhaus) 
climate stabilisation is not achieved without considerable equitable transfers and pooled 
savings.  
4.4.2 Target-consistent carbon pricing 
The social cost of carbon gives an estimate of the present value of future human welfare 
benefits resulting from avoiding emitting an additional tonne of CO₂. As an alternative 
approach Barbier and Burgess (2017) use standard economic depreciation accounting 
methods to model the AR5, “greater than 66% chance of less than 2ºC” global carbon quota 
(1010 GtCO₂ from 2010), as a non-renewable asset in order to calculate the user cost for 
different emissions scenarios.  The ‘resource’ is assumed to be completely exhausted by 
constant subtractions in a finite time, and constant unit total rents are gained from extraction 
and production usage. World interest rates determine global capital allocation. In a BAU 
economic scenario of global emissions growing by 2% yr-1 the quota is exhausted by 2028 
at a cumulative global social cost of US$26 trillion dollars (equivalent to roughly half of world 
annual GDP). Constraining emissions at current levels (no emissions growth) extends the 
budget only to 2031 at a user cost of US$23 trillion. Reducing emissions at 2.6% yr-1 extends 
the budget to 2040. Increasing the emissions mitigation (reduction) rate to 5% yr-1 fully 
avoids exceeding the 66% / 2ºC quota (i.e. with no abrupt exhaustion year “cliff”), with (by 
definition) a user cost of zero. This “radical emission reduction” pathway is therefore 
effectively valued at a US$26 trillion dollars benefit (by 2028) relative to the BAU pathway. 
This model is target specific, unlike BCA-IAMs, in respecting a 2ºC global carbon quota. It 
uses basic economic tools and shows that, according to its specific economic criteria, and 
even without reference to climate damage, strong mitigation policy is adjudged as highly 
economically beneficial.  
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It should be noted that the underlying “counterfactual” scenarios here assumes that, if the 
specified “hard” carbon quota is exhausted, emissions would then be forced to halt abruptly, 
regardless of the (then) economic consequences. While this is clearly socio-politically 
implausible, it arguably represents a correct “rational” assessment of the appropriate trade-
off against the uncertain, but unbounded, economic costs that would be potentially 
associated with exceeding the quota. Accepting the politically agreed “well below 2ºC target 
as a hard limit is also a crucial assumption in the 116 “cost effective” scenarios from the 
CEA-IAM AR5 Scenario Database that meet the “well below 2ºC” radiative forcing level by 
2100. Of course, the tacit implication is that the Barbier and Burgess “optimal”, “well below 
2ºC”, scenario may well imply overall economic contraction (economic “degrowth”) in the 
short-term to invest in demand reduction and energy supply decarbonisation; but that, even 
if so, such “loss” also would be outweighed by the unbounded loss associated with 
exceeding the quota.  
These are essential distinctions from the “orthodox” BCA-IAM climate economics modelling 
which, even while allowing for climate “damages” arising from exceeding any given quota 
(often allowing eventual warming well above 2ºC), still ensures (via non-zero discount rate) 
that damage estimates are necessarily finite (bounded). Likewise, CEA-IAM modelling for 
pathways exceeding “well below 2ºC” could be considered policy-irrelevant because, at 
Paris, nations have accepted that their climate policy actions will be in accord with respecting 
this temperature goal.  Therefore, if nations are not following technology and fuel mix advice 
from near-term CEA-IAM optimal pathways for “well below 2ºC” scenarios then they are not 
acting cost-effectively, such that the modelling is effectively being ignored and is arguably 
of limited policy value. 
4.5 Energy system modelling  
4.5.1 Energy system models: types and uses 
Després et al. (2015) provide a useful typology of the many IAM, energy system, economy-
energy-environment and power (electricity) sector modelling tools in common use worldwide 
to assess system changes over time. The overall projection period can extend to many 
decades, as needed in assessing energy system CO₂ emissions, or be much shorter as for 
electricity generation and grid analysis where time steps on the order of a second are 
needed to assess dynamic grid stability. Individual time step length is determined by the 
analysis period length, computing time needed per time step and the number of repeat runs 
with varied initial conditions to produce a sufficient ensemble of model runs. Simulation 
models start from initial conditions, which can be adjusted for each new run, and then the 
model results of the time step become the input for the next time step; the whole run then 
shows the system evolution and ensembles of many runs show the sensitivity to initial 
conditions. Following a different computational logic, optimisation models attempt to 
optimise for particular criteria at each time step and toward a particular target.  
Energy System Models (ESMs) aim to give a detailed representation of energy system 
processes and development, and energy sources to attempt to identify cost-effective 
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decarbonisation pathways given imposed constraints, such as an emissions pathway to an 
end-date or cumulative emissions target, or reaching 100% renewable electricity or energy. 
“Top-down” energy system models may be devised at global, regional or national levels.  
They are typically driven by exogenous final demand projections, potentially including 
changes in end-use efficiency.  They may qualify the relationship between primary and final 
demand to reflect changes in transformation efficiency. They sometimes include behavioural 
factors such as the elasticity of substitution among technologies, meaning how 
exchangeable they might be. This will then depend on the degree of system inertia due to 
resistance from vested interests, infrastructure lock-in or consumer preferences (Martinsen, 
2011, p. 3328). Bottom-up models aim to optimise energy system balance (particularly 
electricity given the variability of non-biomass renewable energy) through time to plan and 
facilitate cost-optimised decarbonisation pathways (Martinsen 2011). The technology, 
carbon intensity and energy parameters usually rely on empirically derived ‘experience 
curves’, also known as technology learning curves. Modules in a model are referred to as 
“soft-linked” if the user transfers information between them after each iteration, or “hard-
linked” if the feedback of data between them is automated (Martinsen 2011). 
In a review of the feasibility implications of energy decarbonisation scenario modelling Loftus 
et al. (2015) provide a simplified classification of four general approaches to energy system 
assessment (though many approaches are hybrids) as follows: 
• Top–down, scenario-based back-casting methods: starting with a final target these 
methods choose from a preselected set of low-carbon technologies (often 
preferentially excluding some options entirely) to produce scenarios that meet the 
target. For example, Jacobson, & Delucchi (and Delucchi and Jacobson, 2011; 2011) 
only include wind, water and solar and exclude nuclear and biomass energy and CCS. 
• Top–down integrated assessment energy system modelling, here confining the IAM 
term to economy-energy-environment (EEE) modelling focused on energy supply and 
demand scenarios. Linked modules identify energy technology process evolution that 
is achieved at ‘least cost’ given the cost-effectiveness limits set for the model. 
Constraining models by excluding or limiting some options allows the relative costs 
and feasibility of options to be explored.  
• Bottom–up energy systems modelling: often highly detailed, technology-rich, models 
with pre-set economic and total energy use pathways that are then required to meet a 
decarbonisation pathway using the technology learning curves and costs inputs for the 
available technologies and alternative energy mixes and fuel costs. The IEA-developed 
MARKAL and TIMES models are examples of this approach that are often combined 
with a hard- or soft-linked economic model for regional or national use as in the 
IrishTIMES model (see further discussion in Ch. 7). 
• Bottom-up technical or techno-economic assessments: ESMs based on rankings such 
as abatement potential and cos, as used by McKinsey (Nauclér and Enkvist, 2009) in 
producing marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs), or including non-economic 
criteria, as used by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF, 2007), to develop a decarbonisation 
scenario based on actions in order of these rankings. 
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‘Hybrid modelling’ incorporates both top down and bottom up elements as in many 
applications of TIMES and MARKAL that integrate with a top-down economic model. At the 
global scale, the International Energy Agency (IEA) uses a large scale simulation, the World 
Energy Model, to produce its annual World Energy Outlook, and a top-down sectoral 
analysis called Energy Technology Perspectives, based on four soft-linked models for 
energy conversion, industry, transport and buildings (Chiodi et al., 2015b; IEA, 2016). The 
TIMES energy conversion model generator and the MARKAL model it was derived from, are 
used across 70 countries to produce technology-rich models of multi-regional, national and 
local energy systems (Chiodi et al., 2015b, p. 5). These Energy Technology System 
Program Analysis (ETSAP) models conserve energy flows from supply through to 
consumption, using an economic optimising model to find least “notional-cost” solutions 
through time within environmental and technical constraints, based on a large database of 
technologies using technology-specific cost assumptions through time for investment, 
operations and maintenance, fuel and asset costs. Bottom-up, energy system models such 
as MARKAL/TIMES aim to give a sufficiently accurate representation of technologies and 
cost interactions over time to inform energy mix and climate policy choices aimed at 
achieving long term pathways over decades into the future (Chiodi, Giannakidis, et al. 2015). 
Optimal, notional least-cost pathways assume “first best” choices of fuels and technologies 
solely based on their model-derived least-cost at a particular time step or over a period but 
can be constrained to give second-best pathways and to show sensitivity to choices. 
While output from this modelling is typically described as providing “least cost” solution 
pathways to given energy system transformation constraints, it is important to emphasise 
that this is relative only to a database of specific cost estimates. These estimates have 
diverse degrees of empirical foundation and uncertainty, and these uncertainties are then 
generally compounded (amplified) by the application of diverse, uncertain hypotheses 
regarding their evolution over time. These cost projections typically have to extend many 
decades into the future. Accordingly, we here use the term “notional-cost” to mark these 
intrinsic methodological qualifications. 
Apart from uncertainties in the assumptions for technology-specific development, other 
technical limitations of MARKAL/TIMES modelling are in the time resolution of the model 
and in relation to power system operations and planning. Computationally it is difficult to 
evaluate small time increments in long-term modelling. In the particular case of electricity 
systems, technical operation ultimately requires energy balance on high resolution time 
scales (sub-minute) with significant spatial constraints (reflecting spatially distributed supply 
and demand, interacting with constrained transmission and distribution capacities). 
Accordingly, identifying feasible electricity system transformation pathways potentially 
requires specialised modelling at high resolution in time and space (so-called “grid 
integration studies”), especially if large amounts of variable/intermittent renewable energy 
production is introduced to the system. ESMs focus on direct sectoral emissions, and can 
often omit or incorrectly allocate indirect emissions, particularly from fossil fuel imports, that 
– in a UK example analysed through input-output carbon modelling – potentially double the 
marginal abatement cost of energy supply mitigation (Daly et al., 2015). 
84 
 
Additional serious non-technical limitations of energy system models arise from political, 
economic and socio-cultural factors embedded in the macro-economic assumptions and 
‘policy landscape’ that are exogenous to the modelling. The output of ESMs is often tied to 
the exogenous macro-economic assumptions being made and these energy systems model 
outputs provide only very limited interactions with the macro-economy inputs. For example, 
the (exogenous) pathways of economic growth, regulatory costs, and total energy use often 
rely on economic models with their own limitations. In terms of climate justice, the focus on 
‘least-cost’ (even if only uncertain “notional-cost”) elicits the question: ‘least cost for whom?’ 
– Just those in a particular place at the current time, or including costs to others elsewhere 
or future generations? Or, even within some specific time and place envelope, least-cost for 
which societal actors (individuals, social classes, businesses, the state etc.)? Similarly, the 
‘second-best’ policy reality of carbon lock-ins that could increase costs and decrease the 
feasibility of meeting stringent decarbonisation targets are not well represented in bottom-
up ESMs, suggesting practical trade-offs are required between model efficacy and 
confidence (Strachan and Usher, 2012).   
4.5.2 Multi-Level Perspective Models 
Energy system models usually make ‘first best’ assumptions including uniform carbon 
pricing and rational, cost optimal decision-making in a context of perfect information and low 
policy and actor landscape inertia. Geels develops a ‘Multi-Level Perspective’ (MLP) to 
address lock-ins and a theory of socio-technical transitions (Geels, 2010; 2014) in which 
niche technologies can be supported and rapidly grown, in the face of lock-ins, if supported 
by groups of powerful actors (Li and Strachan, 2016 see Section 1.2 for summary of MLP 
approach in sec). In research “inspired” by the MLP and developed from previous work (Li 
et al., 2015), Li and Strachan (2016) use BLUE, a new model featuring both multiple actors 
and alternative policy landscapes, to look at the example of the UK energy system across 
power, heat and transport sectors. They conclude that ‘second-best’, carbon lock-in 
conditions of policy landscape and actor inertia can greatly delay and obstruct 
decarbonisation efforts. In simplified terms, the model scenarios characterise inertia from 
high to low on 2-axes: policy landscape on the basis of increasing CO₂ tax level and lifestyle 
(using increasing public and cycle/pedestrian modes of transport); and sensitivity to carbon 
pricing from small with individual decisions dominating, to large scale social planning to 
optimise societal costs and benefits (Li and Strachan 2016). The scenario outputs indicate 
that achieving a 50% decarbonisation relative to 1990 is a severe challenge even in the 
lowest inertia scenario. Deeper transformation requires combinations of (hypothetically) far 
cheaper low carbon energy, much higher carbon taxes and/or radical reductions in energy 
use with associated lifestyle change. 
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4.6 Modelling low carbon transition in energy systems  
4.6.1 Low-carbon transition energy planning 
A general assessment of the overall drivers and trends of global energy demand and supply 
(including electricity generation) is given in IPCC AR5 WG3 Ch. 5.3.4 (2014) with other key 
sectors briefly summarised in 5.3.5. Global per capita energy use increased by 31% from 
1971 to 2010, with higher increases of 60 to 200% in developing regions though these 
regions still on average have less than half the 1970 per capita energy use of the more 
developed ‘economies in transition’ and OECD nations. Global decarbonisation rates over 
this period were only 0.3% yr-1, six times lower than required to cancel out the 2% annual 
increase in energy use (IPCC 2014 AR5 WG3 Ch.4). Almost all IPCC-assessed scenarios 
project increasing global energy requirements that exceed improvements in energy 
efficiency, making absolute decarbonisation of energy essential to meeting the modelled 
energy requirements (IPCC 2014 AR5 WG3 Ch.4). The assessment states: “The 
relationship between economic growth and energy use is complicated and variable over 
time”, yet Figure 5.7 shows world GDP/capita to be very highly correlated with fossil fuel 
combustion. Given this strong relationship, the evident possibility for serious mitigation 
policy that average energy use might therefore need to fall and total economic growth may 
need to level out or drop in some managed way (“degrowth”) until decarbonised energy 
supply catches up with demand (with serious distributional implications) is outlined by 
Anderson and Bows (2012) but is not mentioned in this part of the IPCC assessment. 
Current and projected global energy supply and its decarbonisation are assessed in detail 
in IPCC AR5 WG3 (2014) Chapter 7 and energy demand (consumption) sectors are 
discussed in Chapters 8 to 11 on industry, transport, buildings, agriculture and forestry.  For 
overall context, Chapter 5, Figure 5.1 summarises global annual GHG emissions for 1970 
to 2010. This shows that the energy supply sector (including extraction, fuel transportation 
and electricity generation) nearly tripled emissions from 6 GtCO₂ to 17 GtCO₂, transport 
emissions more than doubled from 2.8 GtCO₂ to nearly 7 GtCO₂, heat energy emissions for 
buildings grew from 2.5 GtCO₂ to 3.2 GtCO₂, and waste emissions almost doubled from 
0.7 GtCO₂ to 1.4 GtCO₂. Industrial emissions rose only slowly from 5.4 GtCO₂ to 6.0 GtCO₂  
(11%) between 1970 and 2000, but then grew dramatically by a further 46% to 8.8 GtCO₂ 
by 2010 as a result of globalisation including a very rapid growth in carbon intensive exports 
from middle income countries, especially China.  
The low emissions pathways assessed as most cost-effective in energy emissions mitigation 
rely on a wide portfolio of options including energy efficiency improvements and transition 
to low-CO₂ energy: non-bioenergy renewables (hydro, wind, solar, tidal, wave etc.), nuclear 
power, fossil fuel with CCS and bioenergy with and without CCS (Sections 7.5, 7.8.1, 7.11 
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and Figure 7.7 giving comparison of lifecycle emissions and levelised cost of electricity13. 
The assessment summary (p. 516) sees reductions in the carbon intensity of energy supply 
as key in most low global atmCO₂ transformation pathways with nuclear, renewable energy 
and fossil fuel with CCS rising to 80% share of global primary energy in electricity generation 
specifically by 2050, and eliminating all unabated (without CCS) fossil fuel electricity 
generation by 2100.  As noted above though in Section 4.4, most low atmCO₂ IPCC 
transformation pathways currently assume large amounts of BECCS by 2050 and even 
more by 2100 to enable even FFCCS use to continue to 2100, despite the major risks of, 
and challenges to BECCS development that is still in its early stages (see Sections 7.5.5, 
7.9, 11.13 in IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014).  
Edenhofer et al. (2013) survey the economics of renewable energy, reviewing the public 
policy perspective of social objectives justifying renewables, the market failures inhibiting 
optimal deployment, and policies to address these failures. This study includes both 
bioenergy and wind-wave-solar as renewables even though the carbon neutrality and 
benefits of bioenergy depends on sustainability criteria (Edenhofer et al. (2013). Decision-
making in planning low-carbon transition energy systems needs to consider economic, 
technical, societal and environmental concerns as well as meeting a carbon budgeted 
emission pathway within least (estimated) cost.  In 183 studies classified by Strantzali and 
Aravossis (2016), a variety of decision support methods have been described including, life 
cycle analysis (LCA) of impacts, benefit cost analysis (BCA) to evaluate the private and 
external costs, multi-criterion decision-making analysis (MCDA) that enables the inclusion 
of factors that are not easily monetised, and outranking methods that allow a ranking of 
alternatives that are otherwise not comparable.  
All the methods have drawbacks and although LCA and BCA are found to be most common, 
the inherently multi-criteria nature of the low carbon transition suggests that MCDA should 
be used in addition to LCA and BCA to address the full range of issues.  Abdmouleh et al. 
(2015) gives a review of regulatory framework mechanisms being used globally in policies 
to advance renewable energy share (including biomass), identifying successes and failures 
to enable improved energy policy-making.  Funding sources, subsidies and feed-in tariffs, 
electricity pricing and tendering, taxes and tax breaks, legal frameworks, renewable portfolio 
standards, regulation of grid access, support for renewable energy technology and socio-
political support are all discussed. The difficulty of incorporating many smaller, 
decentralised, intermittent renewable electricity generators into a grid developed for 
centralised electricity generation is identified as a primary barrier. Demand side 
management (energy conservation, efficiency and storage) and smart grids are ways to 
 
                                            
13 The ‘levelised cost of energy’ LCOE is used to compare energy supply technologies in terms of a 
long-run cost per energy unit average including a discount rate. An LCOE background, formula, 
simplifications and is given in the IPCC AR5 WG3 Annex II   
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reduce the high cost of relying on new infrastructure to integrate renewables into electricity 
systems.   
Renewable energy resources have large theoretical potential to replace fossil fuels but the 
short-term potential and enabling technologies are critical to decarbonisation prospects (see 
Ellabban et al., 2014 giving a survey of renewable energy sources and outlooks). Kempener, 
et al. (2015) compares IEA-ETSAP energy system models across 26 countries using the 
REmap modelling tool developed as part of a global renewable energy roadmap to examine 
national renewable energy potentials. The REmap tool is found to be useful for policy-
makers in overview comparisons between nations and for scoping renewables options, but 
does it not include the detailed analysis of  trade-offs between technologies, lock-ins and 
pathways that are accounted for in ETSAP modelling, and which provide deeper 
understanding especially for meeting ambitious renewable energy targets within 
infrastructure limits. The dominance of centralised electricity generation is being challenged 
by an increasing share of distributed renewable generation to give a hybrid electricity system 
based on decreasing percentage share of fossil fuel energy and increasing generation from 
renewable energy. (Note that the IEA modelling generally counts bioenergy as 
unconditionally carbon-neutral.)  Shivarama et al. (Shivarama Krishna and Sathish Kumar, 
2015) provide a comprehensive overview of renewable energy integration into hybrid 
systems, covering optimal sizing and configuration of local generation, storage and demand, 
with a summary of energy management  algorithms and controls to ensure reliability and 
grid integration.  Also looking at optimal hybrid system planning, Bahramara et al. (2016) 
reviews the HOMER software developed by the US National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
(NREL) and in use worldwide. 
Modelling the interaction of the UK’s Carbon Plan with land requirements and water 
resources indicates probable conflicts between energy demands and emissions reduction 
and land and water services (Konadu et al., 2015).  The integrated energy-land-water 
analysis by Konadu et al. finds that, out of four low-carbon energy scenarios, only their 
“Higher Renewables, more energy efficiency” pathway meets their “no regrets” 
environmental parameter.  A “Higher CCS, more bioenergy” scenario shows high levels of 
bioenergy crops are found to conflict with food production from land use. 
For climate mitigation, globally, it is clearly essential that the knowledge gained from all of 
this research is passed on by developed to developing nations and that they receive 
assistance in achieving very low carbon development of electricity and energy systems. 
4.6.2 100% wind-wave-solar? 
Researchers have modelled transition to 100% renewable energy systems in different ways. 
One critical distinction is whether bioenergy is included as a renewable (as in Mathiesen et 
al., 2011), or bioenergy is excluded, restricting ‘renewable’ to wind, wave and solar energy 
(citing ecological or other constraints). Pleßmann et al. (2014) models a 100% renewables, 
global electricity supply based on existing sectoral share (between electricity and non-
electricity energy sectors) assuming only solar and onshore wind power complemented by 
energy storage (in batteries, high temperature energy storage with steam turbines, and 
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power to gas) finding it possible with an upper limit notional electricity cost of €142 MWh-1. 
This study does not attempt to anticipate the electrification of the heating and transport 
sectors. In two parts, Jacobson and Delucchi (2011) and Delucchi and Jacobson (2011) 
controversially assert that providing all global energy for all human uses only through use of 
wind, water and solar power is possible at a total present-value cost similar to today. Part I 
describes proposed renewable energy systems and characteristics relative to current and 
projected global energy demand. Part II, providing gross global costings, explores reliable 
balancing of power grids to account for variable and intermittent non-biomass renewables – 
using interconnection of regional grids, greatly-increased hydroelectric supply for base load, 
and storage including: site-specific (pumped, flywheel, compressed air), batteries in electric 
vehicles, and hydrogen production. In a meta-analysis of global and national (OECD 
country) energy modelling studies focusing on high-share renewables in power systems, 
Cochran et al. (2014) find agreement that renewable energy sources can reach a high share 
of national or regional electricity generation and can do on an hourly basis while still ensuring 
grid balance. Studies of 100% renewable energy are highly contested particularly regarding 
consideration in balancing supply with demand at all times across complex systems with 
multiple, variable generation. Though the literature shows energy efficiency to be important, 
a lack of demand-side research is common in energy modelling despite being agreed on as 
critical to high share renewables integration (2014). Critically reviewing global 
decarbonisation scenarios, Loftus et al. (2015) find that those scenarios excluding nuclear 
or CCS from their energy portfolio rely on much faster global energy intensity of GDP 
reductions than others and require three to five times as much additional installed electricity 
generation capacity (50,000 GW) by 2050, reflecting the much lower capacity factors 
(average vs peak capacity) of variable renewable generation sources. 
Pietzcker et al. (2017) evaluates the ability of current process-based IAMs to represent wind 
and solar electricity sector costs and resources on the basis of electricity sector dynamics 
and variable renewable electricity (VRE) criteria.  Using the most recent data to update the 
models and a US$30 tCO₂-1 carbon price (increasing by 5% yr-1) from 2030 expands the 
projected VRE share by 24% to an average model-share of 62% of electricity generation. 
Jacobson, et al. (2015) extends the earlier low-cost, 100% wind-water-sun claim to 
supplying all US energy needs for electricity, heating, cooling, transport and industry, under 
many conditions using a “grid integration model”. In a short comment, Bistline and Blanford 
(2016) dispute Jacobson & Delucchi’s “100% renewables” claim, noting: first, unrealistic 
assumptions of ‘no load loss’ based on very high energy storage availability and 
unconstrained transmission availability; and second, unachievable grid balancing on the 
necessary hourly and all-year basis given the seasonal, diurnal and intermittent nature of 
wind and solar causing renewable energy to have decreasing returns to scale. Overall the 
100% renewables path is seen as resulting in significantly greater costs (for any given 
decarbonisation constraint) than in the IPCC-assessed low-carbon pathways (where, as 
discussed above in this Chapter, the IPCC scenarios rely on significant NETs deployment, 
even though current estimations of costs can only be regarded as guesswork, at best). More 
substantively, Clack et al. (2017) directly contest the Jacobson et al. (2015) “low cost, 100% 
renewable” claim, detailing objections to claimed modelling errors, inappropriate models and 
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implausible assumptions for hydroelectric and variable renewables based on insufficient 
evidence, concluding: “Policy makers should treat with caution any visions of a rapid, 
reliable, and low-cost transition to entire energy systems that relies [sic] almost exclusively 
on wind, solar, and hydroelectric power”. In particular, Clack et al. find that Jacobson, et al. 
do not in fact undertake a “grid integration model”, as claimed, because the grid modelling 
fails to match supply and demand, with margins and reserves for generation failure and 
frequency regulation, that is fully spatially and temporally coordinated across a grid with all 
transmission lines included and that details capacity expansion potential, power flow, distant 
load matching and siting of renewables under likely variability of loads.  
From the above literature, it seems evident that setting a 100% wind-wave-solar only target 
as a basis for modelling is either used as an assumption to provide a comparison to other 
scenarios or else based on a risk assessment that sees involvement of nuclear energy, 
bioenergy and CCS as too high-risk to consider, regardless of cost or technology readiness. 
If there is a real intention to meet the Paris temperature targets (and related global carbon 
budgets) then global society needs to decide on balancing risks, for example of nuclear 
power development relative to 100% renewables. Loftus et al. and Clack et al. agree that a 
priori elimination of options can be counterproductive and costly, particularly in setting out 
possible low-carbon transformation pathway alternatives for societal consideration. Given 
that the risks of exceeding “well below 2ºC” warming are agreed to be unacceptable, and 
given the urgency of the associated global carbon budgets the logical aim should evidently 
be to consider all technologies and measures that will combine to reduce energy-related 
CO₂ emissions to zero as soon as possible. 
4.6.3 Modelling of electricity grids with a high share of intermittent renewables 
In a literature review and proposed typology of long-term energy models and electricity 
sector models, Després, et al. (2015) find that modellers need to combine the advantages 
of these models given the common scenario requirement for increasingly high shares of 
intermittent renewables over time in the electricity sector to meet decarbonisation pathways.  
Long-term energy system models (such as MARKAL and TIMES) give a full overview of an 
energy system but a simplistic representation of electricity grid operation. Such analyses 
can be combined with the grid integration modelling of more detailed electricity sector 
models (2015) that enable fuller assessment of intermittent renewables integration. 
MacDonald et al. (2016) argue that grid extension across the US using high-voltage direct-
current transmission and use of solar and wind could reduce system CO₂ emissions by 80% 
relative to 1990 without increasing the levelised cost of electricity (LCOE), using 2030 as 
the reference year for a cost-minimized electrical power system with a 14% increase in 
electricity demand above a baseline of 2006–2008.  Heuberger et al. (2017) distinguish the 
widely used LCOE and ‘system value’, which accounts for integration cost, renewables siting 
and individual component cost, concluding that integrated electricity and energy system 
assessment is needed for optimal investment. Spiecker and Weber (2014) examine five 
alternative policy scenarios for the European electricity market finding that low carbon 
pathways inevitably results in high costs compared to conventional (unabated) fossil fuel 
generation. Demand development is found to be a major driver in detailed evolution of the 
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scenarios. Renewables often push wholesale prices transiently to zero even though overall 
system costs are increased by these heavily subsidised renewables. Low carbon progress 
is further threatened by low fossil fuel prices unless carbon taxes/fees correct them (2014). 
Spiecker and Weber concludes that Europe-wide coordination of renewables subsidies and 
policies combined with electricity transmission upgrades and interconnection become more 
important over the next decade to integrate intermittent renewables generation.  
Niet et al. (2017) discusses incorporating risk assessment into different kinds of energy and 
electricity system modelling. Based on this literature review energy systems are analysed 
using a financial portfolio analysis, which quantifies risks within the model’s structure based 
on a risk premium (the extra amount that society is willing to pay to minimize risk) and 
endogenously hedges against these risks. Applying this method to a case study for the 
currently fossil fuelled electricity system in Alberta, Canada they show alternative possible 
pathways with earlier or later incorporation of intermittent renewables depending on risk. 
They find that it is essential to analyse jurisdictions separately as they have different 
potential energy sources and grid connectivity but the analysis method can be widely used 
to show the effect of risk premiums on optimal technology mix. 
In an environmental science analysis, Gibon et al. (2017) evaluate the health benefits and 
ecological costs of different forms of low carbon electricity using LCA and impact 
assessment that quantifies environmental costs in terms of a common indicator such as 
ecosystem quality or human health (rather than monetising system damages and 
externalities as economic analysis might more typically do). They conclude that increased 
bioenergy can have significant damaging ecological impacts due to GHG emissions, land 
use change, water toxicity, air pollution and biodiversity loss but other renewables, FF-CCS 
and nuclear have net ecological, air pollution and climate benefits by comparison to 
continued use of unabated fossil fuels. The climate and environmental impacts of high-share 
variable renewables (wind and solar) and FFCCS in Europe are assessed by Berrill et al. 
(2016) in an LCA based on 44 electricity scenarios, including large scale electrification of 
the transport and heat sectors.  Using primarily unabated natural gas in 2050 emits 1400 
MtCO₂e, coal with CCS emits 480 MtCO₂e, and an even mix of wind and solar 120-140 
MtCO₂e (incorporating pumped hydro and battery storage). However, the wind and solar 
infrastructure results in far greater land use impacts than natural gas systems and more 
mineral resource depletion than fossil fuels. Wind power has lower resource needs and 
emissions than solar for given final energy contribution though much depends on physical 
location and the available resource.  
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4.6.4 Grid flexibility and energy storage  
Lund et al.  (Lund et al., 2015) review a wide range of flexibility measures for managing high 
fractional-shares of intermittent renewables on electricity grids using: grid extension through 
interconnection; increasing supply side flexibility (in power station response, curtailment14 
and “combined heat and power”/CHP use); storage (pumped hydro, compressed air, 
hydrogen, batteries, flywheels, superconducting magnetic energy storage, supercapacitors, 
power to gas); and demand side approaches across the household, service and industrial 
sectors. Infrastructure flexibility using super grids, smart grids and microgrids are discussed 
by Lund et al. with attention to the smoothing effects (on intermittency of wind, solar) of 
spatial distribution.  Advanced battery technology, vehicle to grid and renewable power to 
energy service (P2Y) flexibilities are also detailed concluding that the large range of 
renewables, storage and grid management options, with significant expected price 
reductions, gives a “promising” outlook for future integration of high penetration variable 
renewables. Lund et al. also note that using a whole energy system approach incorporating 
transport and heat in modelling with electricity adds opportunities for flexibility as well as 
additional difficulties.   
There are several recent reviews of energy storage (ES) in low carbon transition modelling. 
Mahlia et al. (2014) gives an overview and comparison of the many types of ES in use and/or 
in development.  Aneke and Wang (2016) details real life examples globally including the 
performance of different ES types and discusses the barriers to deployment. Gallo et al. 
(2016) similarly review ES types and examples – including promising Solar-to-Fuel, Power-
to-Liquids and Power-to-Gas, ES technologies – finding that no particular ES is ideal in all 
situations so case based analysis is required. Zerrahn and Schill (2017) review energy 
storage in modelling of electricity systems with high penetration of intermittent renewables 
and use a new, open-source model designed to analyse and evaluate long-term ES needs 
including assessment of the changes in market structure needed to incentivise and 
compensate ES for the delivery of system flexibility. A review by Castillo and Gayme (2014) 
focuses on the ES technologies most suited to reducing the grid balancing uncertainties due 
to the variability of non-dispatchable, intermittent renewable energy sources. With the same 
focus, Yekini Suberu et al. (2014) examines the current state of three ES technologies in 
detail – batteries, pumped hydroelectricity storage, and fuel cells – and, like Gallo et al., 
concludes that the no single ES system is ideal in all circumstances. Zheng et al. (2014) use 
a benefit-cost energy acquisition model of electricity distribution companies to give optimal 
sizing and siting for battery storage thereby mitigating operational risk and reducing the 
required ES capacity.  
Bussar et al. (2014) uses optimisation modelling to identify economically optimal technology 
mix pathways for the future European energy supply system (assuming 100% self-supply) 
 
                                            
14 Using curtailment (curtailing available power production) as a balancing service relies on 
deliberate "over-provisioning" meaning that commercial arrangements need to provide a business 
model that supports it. 
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including high penetration intermittent renewables and ES for flexibility. In this study, short-
term battery ES systems are needed where the potential for (lower cost) pumped hydro, 
most useful for medium-term storage, does not exist; hydrogen storage is useful for long-
term, seasonal storage to collect energy at high generation times and recharge batteries at 
peak load periods. 
4.7 Life Cycle Assessment Modelling 
Attributional life cycle assessments (ALCAs) are commonly undertaken to produce 
comparable quantitative estimates of the lifecycle GHG or CO₂ emissions of products and 
activities by assessing direct, supply-chain emissions. Attributional life cycle assessment 
modelling is used to establish the net inputs and outputs for a bounded system over a 
technology or production life cycle. It is relevant to climate change mitigation in establishing 
the GHG emissions of a technology, product or process, so the outputs are essential inputs 
for technology and land use-rich, process-based IAMs and ESMs. As with all modelling, all 
assumptions, constraints and limitations should be made very clear in ALCA results because 
they are open to misinterpretation, or misapplication, particularly as they are highly sensitive 
to methodological choices. For example, to investigate this sensitivity De Rosa (2017) use 
alternative ALCA methodologies to establish the climate effect of structural timber products 
using 8 LCA scenarios (varying time horizon, land use change effects, climate metrics and 
forest stock inventory completeness) for the same case study. They find a large range of 
nett results for sawn structural timber when all life cycle stages and substitution effects are 
accounted for, from small nett sequestration of 24 kgCO₂e m-3 to significant emissions of 
3220 kgCO₂e m-3.  
ALCA results are highly dependent on the boundary defined for the analysis and its 
appropriateness to the process, policy or sector being studied. A major cause of confusion 
is that the so-called “carbon footprint” value (in mass of CO₂e) at one level of analysis can 
then be used as the emissions factor (the input efficiency or GHG-intensity value measured 
in mass of CO₂e per unit of activity) to calculate the carbon footprint at a higher level of 
analysis. An earlier British Standards Institute document makes this difference clear (see 
definitions British Standards Institution et al., 2008, p. 57), but the more recent revision does 
not. For example, in dairy production it is valid to define carbon footprint in kgCO₂e of a 
single litre of milk CFlitre (as in O’Brien et al., 2014) but this is clearly not a direct indicator or, 
or proxy for, the total “carbon footprint” of a country’s annual dairy production CFtotal (which 
would be given by CFtotal = [CFlitre /Litre] x LitresAnnual), which could be millions of tonnes. 
Increasing total production can easily cancel out some or all efficiency gains at the unit level 
such that total system emissions can even increase. Unpalatable though it may be, capping 
and reducing system emissions may well require cutting production by limiting activities in 
some sectors as well as increasing unit level efficiency. 
A review by Plevin et al. (2014) discusses the limitations and merits of different types of 
LCA, concluding that (even beyond the variability in common ALCA methodologies) policy-
makers are being misled by depending on the values given by ALCAs to evaluate the climate 
change mitigation benefits of one choice relative to another because the method’s 
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simplifications are not reliably predictive of real world consequences. Problems include large 
variations in system boundary definition, use of alternative equivalence metrics for different 
GHGs, omitting non-GHG impacts such as aerosols (like black carbon and sulphates), 
critical baseline choices, missing or non-explicit counterfactuals for inputs, failure to include 
indirect effects (such as indirect land use change), and ignoring the fact that choices are 
often not substitutable, and that indirect and scale effects occur resulting in feedbacks and 
rebound that are not generally captured by ALCA methods.  ALCAs give an average, static 
accounting of flows into and out of the boundary of analysis that does not reflect the full 
emissions effect (or other effects) of decisions on changes in policy on a specific activity.  
ALCAs are useful to attribute emissions of different alternatives, but should not be used to 
imply the outcome of choices without fuller examination. Consequential LCA’s (CLCAs) are 
more qualitative, process-based and dependent on scenarios, but used alongside ALCA’s 
can give greater understanding of dynamic system outcomes to enable more robust 
decision-making. In a literature review of CLCA though, Zamagni et al. (2012) find that CLCA 
methods like ALCAs are inconsistently applied and are best thought of as a modelling 
approach rather than a modelling principle applying defined rules.  Zamagni et al. find CLCA 
to be useful in three particular areas: better formulation of LCA research questions and 
system boundaries; modelling of deeper mechanisms and linkages including markets; and 
a more dynamic, conceptual view of systems.  
Marvuglia et al. (2013) undertakes a survey of different equilibrium model CLCA methods 
and proposes a CLCA method to analyse biogas production, particularly looking at ILUC 
effects.  Using a CLCA and net energy analysis (comparing energy return on energy 
investment) for distributed electricity generation uptake, Jones et al. (2017) find the 
combination of methods enable a deeper understanding of potential near- and long-term 
system change.  As Plevin et al. also describe, CLCA is noted as having four major 
differences from ALCA: identification of wider system changes, double counting is possible 
if CLCAs are added (due to boundary overlaps), CLCAs use marginal rather than average 
data, and CLCAs display far greater uncertainty due to the complex relationships being 
modelled. In practice CLCAs are akin to scaled down versions of process-based IAMs in 
that they include economic modelling and socio-economic processes extending through 
time.   
4.8 Marginal abatement cost curve (MACC) analysis 
Marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) have frequently been provided in climate policy 
analysis, as listed by (Tomaschek, 2015); see (Teagasc, 2012) for an Irish example. MACC 
analysis provides estimates of emissions mitigation potential and costs but Kesicki and 
Strachan (2011) show that, as with ALCAs, their policy application can be misleading and 
biased if not used with care. More sophisticated approaches are generally needed to capture 
dynamic effects. Common shortcomings of MACC studies include absence of non-financial 
costs due to carbon lock-in effects, inadequate motivation or critique of discount rates, static 
market (quasi-equilibrium) representation that fails to give investment insights over time, 
carbon price assumptions are often not explicit and uncertainties are poorly represented.  
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Particularly in the forestry sector, costs have been underestimated due to costs not included 
in MACCs (for monitoring, implementation and organisation), and energy efficiency saving 
potential has often been overestimated because market barrier and adoption costs have 
been excluded.  Including projected cumulative emissions savings over a decade are found 
to improve MACCs from the single year representation that is common.  
Taylor (2012) examines the least (notional-)cost optimisation ‘ranking problem’ in MACCs. 
Where “negative costs” (revenue) are shown, MACCs are in fact mathematically misleading 
in establishing the total “cost” (revenue) or total emission savings (the key information) 
because they show the ratio of mitigation “costs” divided by emission saved.  Confusingly, 
in this case, mitigation options with modest per unit revenue, but high emissions savings 
may therefore be ranked as lower priority than options that avoid far less carbon, but 
generate more “revenue per unit”; see discussion and charts in (Ward, 2014).  The use of 
MACCs is therefore inadequate, in general, to give the economic profitability ranking of 
‘emissions saving’ choices – meaning that policy advice giving these rankings needs to be 
revised. There is also difficulty in interpreting MACC-based choices when there are strong 
feedbacks between MACC categories (as in energy) as these feedbacks are not well 
represented within MACC calculations  (Levihn, 2016). As with LCAs, Levihn recommends 
combining scenario and system approaches. Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte (2014) caution that 
using  MACCs to prioritise the cheapest abatement choices in the near-term can result in 
carbon lock-ins that make long-term costs greater. Far greater attention to long-term 
potential, investment timelines and implementation speed is therefore needed than is 
generally provided by MACCs. Ward (2014) finds the use of MACCs “is entirely 
inappropriate and leads to perverse and incorrect outcomes” including the choice of less 
profitable and higher emissions outcomes, particularly in ranking energy efficiency 
measures because they often feature a large number of “negative-cost” (revenue 
generating) options. MACCs can be used in ranking positive cost measures, but, even then, 
their use is confusing as net relative financial benefits are the aim of MACCs and these are 
not easily interpreted from these curves. Ward concludes (p. 822) that the misleading use 
of MACC in research and policy documents (especially for energy efficiency), is widespread 
but, being fundamentally flawed in mathematical terms, recommends that they should be 
avoided in favour of functions that directly relate net benefit to measures selected.  
4.9 Modelling of negative emissions technologies in process models 
and energy system models 
In principle, negative emissions can be straightforwardly included in modelled scenarios of 
future emissions: they can be simply accounted in modelling and inventories as a negative 
value in tonnes of CO₂ for a particular year. Integrating negative emissions over future 
pathways up to 2100 can thus potentially allow a larger carbon budget of gross emissions, 
and can, depending on timing, act to reverse radiative forcing and/or temperature 
overshoots in the middle of the period (Sargl et al., 2016a). However, in this case, it is very 
important that modelling outputs and policy-relevant projections need to show the time 
evolution of not just the net CO₂ emissions of a system pathway but also the gross emissions 
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from each of fossil fuels, non-CO₂ climate pollutants, and land use, and the role of 
conventional FFCCS (if any), assumed, together with the corresponding gross removals 
(total negative emissions), so that the supposed contribution of NETs (and corresponding 
extension of fossil fuel use) is made very clear to model users (Vuuren and Riahi, 2011).  
As with other mitigation technologies included in modelling, learning curves for NETs 
potential need to be described and quantified so that investment requirements can be 
explicitly identified and policies to enable NETs supported, including integration of 
greenhouse gas removal into emissions accounting, subsidies for early deployment and 
modelling co-development of bioenergy and CCS (Lomax et al., 2015). An IAM analysis by 
Kriegler et al. (2013) finds that inclusion of BECCS and then DACCS become key 
technologies for scenarios with higher carbon price climate policies and more stringent 
mitigation by reducing notional estimated costs (relative to currently assessed alternatives), 
given a model constraint of continued growth in GDP and resultant need for energy; but 
direct sectoral emission reduction (at source and through demand reduction) still provide a 
much greater share of overall mitigation achieved. Given the modelled costs over time, the 
study finds that BECCS, being initially less costly, is likely to be deployed far sooner than 
DAC, but due to likely limits on bioenergy supply BECCS is supplemented by DACCS for 
removal levels above 13-14 GtCO₂ yr-1. However, the study acknowledges that sustainability 
constraints beyond the scope of this modelling may well limit BECCS below the model’s 
effective removal cap of 14-15 GtCO₂ yr-1. In particular, offsetting of (otherwise refractory) 
transport emissions within a 2ºC pathway (450 ppm CO₂e) is far more difficult in the absence 
of negative emissions from BECCS, requiring significant additional energy demand 
reduction; though, surprisingly, the study does not allow for the possible large scale 
electrification of transport.   
If carbon dioxide removal through BECCS and DACCS are not available (at multi-GtCO₂ 
scale) in future then scenarios using an IAM find mitigation costs rise even more steeply 
than they would otherwise, particularly in the second half of the century (Kriegler et al. 2013).  
Similarly, Rogelj et al. (2016) also shows that scenarios including BECCS enable mitigation 
at lower costs because more (comparatively lower cost) fossil fuel energy can be used in 
creating GDP.  Again however, even if CCS is assumed to become available at large scale, 
limiting global warming to well below 2ºC still requires the achievement of near-term, rapid 
reductions in gross emissions.  Also like others, Rogelj et al. (2015a) note that strong 
mitigation of non-CO₂ climate pollutants decreases peak temperature in the physical 
modeling and also increases (somewhat) the available global CO₂ budget.  
It is evident from the descriptions of these economy-energy-environment scenarios, as 
modelled in CEA-IAM’s, that costs, potential and timelines for removal for CO₂ removal via 
BECCS and/or DACCS are highly speculative implying that very limited confidence can be 
ascribed to model results.  Also, key assumptions can be difficult to find in papers, making 
comparability of these CEA-IAM studies difficult. 
As noted in Chapter 3, several biophysical reviews identify ecological constraints (productive 
land, nutrients, water) on nett biological carbon dioxide removal by dedicated bioenergy that 
suggest a far lower estimate of terrestrial biological sequestration rates than those assumed 
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by many of the IPCC WG3 IAM models (Boysen et al., 2017; Smith and Torn, 2013).  
Nutrient loss from repeated bioenergy crops or plantation harvest likely requires 
replacement with fertiliser leading to nitrous oxide GHG emissions that can significantly 
reduce or completely eliminate the putative climate benefit from ongoing bioenergy use 
without CCS (Smith and Torn, 2013, p. 93). Compared to WG3 models that include up to 
and even above carbon dioxide removal of 20 GtCO₂ yr-1, this study suggests that biological 
removal even of as little as an additional 1 GtCO₂ yr-1 would represent a major negative 
disturbance to global land, water, phosphorus and nitrogen stocks and flows. 
Larkin et al. (2017) examine cost-optimising, process-based CEA model scenarios which 
meet a greater than 50% chance of avoiding 2ºC, finding they give insufficient attention to 
the Paris Agreement nations’ collective commitment to equity criteria and show an over-
optimistic dependence on speculative NETs to deliver high levels of CO₂ removal, thereby 
unrealistically expanding the available carbon quota for gross emissions (effectively moving 
the goalposts) and failing to include scenarios requiring high levels of near-term emergency-
level societal response, which are especially necessary if NETs cannot prudently be 
depended on. Combined with inadequate modelling of carbon-lock-ins, including social 
resistance to technology change (especially important for CCS in general and BECCS in 
particular) the IAMs consequently overlook the potential for, and required urgency of, near-
term deep mitigation of gross emissions, particularly in respect to the Paris Agreement 
requirement for action in accord with equity. Assuming the possibility that NETs fail to deliver 
at scale, Larkin et al. (2017) develop alternative emission scenarios with sustained gross 
emission reduction rates of 5% yr-1 to 14% yr-1 for the groups of large emitting nations 
showing that, even with weak equity criteria, the chance of exceeding 2ºC is still imprudently 
high but also that this chance is strongly exacerbated by any and all delay in acting to 
achieve these hitherto uncontemplated rates of decarbonisation. These rates compare to 
the typical global average emission reduction rates of 2% yr-1 to 4% yr-1 given by AR5 IAM 
scenarios, some of which are already unambiguously obsolete (e.g. assuming a peaking of 
global emissions already in 2010). 
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4.10  Chapter Conclusion: Use in guiding climate mitigation policy 
Models can assist or obscure. Models, no matter how complex, are necessarily simplified 
representations of reality that can only provide policy-relevant advice if they produce useful 
approximations of reality (ideally at least tested critically against historic data). As models 
become more complex, feedbacks between variables may lead to emergent properties of 
the model that may or may not reflect the emergent properties in a real-life system, and 
models may become so complex that the model-maker does not fully understand the 
interactions at work. Model-makers need to make sure that the output comes with clear 
explanation of its limitations, detail about the model assumptions and initial conditions, a 
listing of applied constraints and parameters, and, perhaps most important, plain language 
notes on correct interpretation for non-technical readers. Users of model output and the 
media, the public and others should be made fully aware of the need for care and the 
avoidance of interpretations or applications that are not legitimately supported or mandated 
by the actual modelling.  
Despite these important caveats, modelling is an essential tool to explore potential futures. 
Now that the political realm has agreed on specific global temperature goals at Paris, a 
major normative decision has been taken that can guide the continuing use of models to 
outline a solution space to meet those goals with appropriate prudence and risk 
management. 
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5 Public policy decision-making and risk assessment in Paris-
aligned emissions mitigation (with and without NETs)  
Summary 
• Based on ratification of the Paris Agreement, decision-making aligned with 
corresponding global carbon budget range needs to respect absolute limits on future 
use of fossil fuels and constraints on fossil fuelled economies, unless early 
investments ensure negative emissions and CCS become available at scale.  
• In decision analysis (DA), planetary energy imbalance due to anthropogenic carbon 
emissions is a “simple problem”: limiting climate change requires limiting cumulative 
emissions while reducing nett annual CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel burning and 
deforestation to zero. Additionally, decisions limiting annual non-CO₂ emissions from 
agriculture and land use as well would reduce peak warming. 
• Within the politically agreed, global and long-term risk level of “well below 2ºC”, 
decision-making in a risk assessment framework, requires precautionary, restrictive 
management measures (equitable national carbon quotas for example). In DA terms, 
such measures can only be relaxed if there is a “strict societal consensus on 
countervailing purpose or benefits” (Stirling, 2007).  
• Decision-making under ignorance given finite likelihoods of plausibly very serious or 
catastrophic global impacts – from unanticipated effects, unknown tipping points or 
other surprises – increases the requirement for precaution.  
• In risk terms, the very difficult (“wicked problem”) of exactly how to meet WB2C 
emission paths is therefore secondary to the precautionary requirement to limit 
cumulative CO₂ emissions and flows of shorter lived climate pollutants. 
• At local and near-term risk scale, scientific confidence decreases (increasing 
uncertainty) and framing is contested (increasing ambiguity). Local and near-term risk 
assessments are therefore likely to be contrary to the global precautionary one unless 
they fully integrate the global and long-term risks.  
• Carbon lock-in inertia in socio-political economic cultures, processes and institutions 
have been shown to significantly impede climate action and mitigation, causing costly 
delay despite the global and long term imperative.  
• ‘Second-best’ policies resulting in insufficient action, due to failure to overcome lock-
ins or failure to take a medium-term zero emissions goal seriously, are likely to result 
in progressive reliance on politically unfeasible pathways, stranded assets and higher 
costs.  
• Uncertainty avoidance and short-termism in public and corporate governance to limit 
emissions are common, despite the very high scientific certainty that reductions in 
absolute emissions are required for effective climate change mitigation. 
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5.1 Paris-aligned national carbon quotas constrain policy choices 
The Paris Agreement embodies a collective political decision, Decision 1/CP21 of the 
UNFCCC, agreed to and ratified by the Parties, informed by scientific risk assessments, that 
the potential climate impacts on human and ecological systems of not limiting warming to 
“well below 2ºC” (WB2C) over per-industrial are unacceptable. As such, on the basis of this 
decision, nations have apparently accepted this risk assessment as a guiding principle of 
their future national and regional bloc decision-making. Directly related to the Paris 
temperature targets, the “best available science’ has defined a limited and rapidly 
diminishing global carbon budget range of future emissions that seriously constrains global 
and therefore developed nation emission reduction pathways. As acknowledged in the 
preamble to the Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015, p. 3, Note 17), analysis of the Parties’ initial 
NDCs shows that they are collectively wholly inadequate to achieve the target. Very high 
current emissions are making short work of consuming the remaining WB2C carbon budget, 
potentially exhausting it within 20 years even if emissions ‘flat line’ at the current annual 
global level. Given that fossil fuel energy, industrial processes and land use are the primary 
human-caused drivers of global warming and the basis of much of the global economy, then 
all socio-economic policy in all nations now needs to be fully coherent with climate action 
that adds up to achieving substantial and sustained emission reductions aligned with limiting 
cumulative global emissions to the carbon budget range implied by the Paris temperature 
goals.  
Any delay in reducing developed nation emissions implies even more rapid reductions later, 
or passing part or all of the burden to developing nations, or otherwise depending on 
achieving negative emissions at scale in future, over the long-term, to cancel out excess 
near-term emissions (Rogelj et al., 2016a)15. In the context of global carbon management, 
as the Paris Agreement indicates, if developed nations fail to achieve near-term reductions 
from currently high per capita emission levels they thereby tacitly take on the moral hazard 
inherent in depending on increased efforts in future, by others, or through realising net 
negative emissions on a global basis.  
To enable climate action “on the basis of equity” and to show the leadership embodied in 
the Agreement logically requires nations to ‘set out their sums’; specifically in relation to 
CO₂, this should be in the form of an equitable share (“quota”) of the WB2C global CO₂ 
budget, within which detailed emission pathway options to zero net emissions can be 
identified. Paris-target aligned policy implies setting out domestic, sectoral gross emissions; 
finance for defined reductions in future emissions by other Parties, relative to their similarly 
defined share of the WB2C global budget; and financial planning for definite timeline-defined 
achievement of a defined amount of future carbon dioxide removal by NETs – to the extent 
 
                                            
15 Geoengineering through Solar Radiation Management (SRM), such as the speculative proposal 
for continuous injection of particles into the upper atmosphere to reflect solar radiation to produce 
cooling to cancel out some or all global warming, is not considered in this research project. 
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that such removal is required by each Party’s overall mitigation responsibility, based 
(explicitly or implicitly) on their declared Nationally Determined Contributions. The Paris 
Agreement only sets out voluntary mechanisms to coordinate and impel increased ambition 
by the Parties, even though recognising the Paris Agreement targets directly implies that the 
“long-term dominates other short-term considerations” such that all other policies need to 
be aligned with climate change policy (Morgan, 2016, p. 3). However, Morgan suggests that 
the absence of any rapid moves to accelerate a coordinated, international programme of 
carbon management of pricing and regulation following the Paris Agreement “represents a 
collective violation of the precautionary principle. That is, Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Earth 
Summit declaration, which states that lack of absolute certainty is not sufficient reason to 
defer prudential activity.”  
According to Druzin (2017), the stated intention of the US administration under President 
Trump to withdraw from the Paris Agreement seriously threatens to upset the “unique fragile 
nature of a multilateral environmental agreement”. It is clear that the major risk in climate 
policy decision-making is continued inadequate action and inability to coordinate rapid, large 
scale, mitigation, despite decades of increasingly concerning warnings from climate science 
and research.  
As in all other public policy areas, decisions affecting future socioeconomic and 
environmental outcomes must be made in the face of an uncertain future.  Decision-making 
can be aided, but not made by policy scenario analysis and risk assessments that 
characterise the risks being accepted by policy action or inaction, the types of uncertainty 
involved, inherent limits to our understanding, and worst-cases that may require early 
precautionary measures (Hallegatte et al., 2016). 
It is increasingly scientifically accepted that we live in the Anthropocene epoch (Waters et 
al., 2016) that is clearly discernible due to accelerating and globally pervasive human 
impacts from increasing per capita resource use and pollution, especially since 1950 
(Steffen et al., 2015). The global impact of local emissions of GHGs necessarily means that 
national socio-economic decisions being made now which affect GHG emissions have 
global influence, with multi-millennial effects from decisions to enable or prevent CO₂ 
emissions.  
Early global systems analysis, exploring ‘limits to growth’ through relatively simple global 
models computer calibrated to historic data, indicated some scenarios of consumption, 
population and pollution that could result in economic and environmental system failure 
during the 21st century (Meadows et al., 1972). Historical data since 1972 appears to show 
some basis for saying that global trends have been following the higher risk pathways of the 
unsustainable scenarios (Turner, 2014, 2008) and though the degree of such validation is 
disputed, the need to take such risk assessments seriously is not (Castro, 2012; see also 
response by Turner, 2013).  
The scientifically-based, though tentative, proposal of ten “tightly coupled” planetary 
biophysical limits, defining a “safe operating space for humanity”, suggests global limits are 
becoming clearer (Rockström et al., 2009). Three of these limits have already been 
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exceeded (biodiversity loss, nitrogen cycle and climate change), and serious, increasing 
anthropogenic impacts in the phosphorus cycle, ocean acidification, land use and freshwater 
use are evident. Though Rockström et al. are rightly cautious in defining their criteria, their 
evidence-informed conclusion clearly infers that humanity likely already has limited “freedom 
to pursue long-term social and economic development” and the operating space for 
expansion is rapidly being exhausted. While climate change adaptation opportunities have 
been identified, continued emissions and resultant global warming threaten to exceed limits 
of adaptation in many human and biological systems, especially those that are most directly 
exposed to impacts and/or vulnerable to them (see 16.4 in IPCC AR5 WG2, 2014 see). 
Commensurate mitigation to avoid reaching such limits is therefore strongly advised; but 
Oels (2013) finds that governmental responses are in fact moving in the opposite direction, 
away from consideration of precautionary risk management and toward risk management 
through contingency that prioritises national adaptation and security preparedness for 
‘inevitable’ climate change impacts. National prioritisation of local resilience and avoidance 
of mitigation costs is politically understandable but runs directly contrary to aligning action 
within the Paris Agreement commitments to meeting temperature targets equitably.  
Reviewing international documents and declarations since the 1970s, Gómez-Baggethun 
and Naredo (2015) identify three notable shifts in sustainability policy discourse: from 
analysis identifying economic growth as damaging to the environment to seeing growth as 
a solution to environmental and poverty problems; from a focus on developing top-down 
regulation to an emphasis on bottom-up efforts and market-based mechanisms; and from a 
focus on political delivery to an emphasis on technical details and technocratic interactions.  
Gómez-Baggethun and Naredo conclude that forty years have been wasted by obscuring 
the earlier, wide acknowledgement of likely biophysical limits and ecological vulnerabilities, 
thereby avoiding or deflecting discussion of distributional equity within those post-growth 
limits, in and between nations and across generations.  
In this Chapter, literature relevant to decision-making in national and regional climate 
mitigation policy is further discussed in the context of climate impact risks and climate policy 
uncertainty. 
5.2 Limits, risk and uncertainty in climate policy decision-making 
As in all other public policy areas, decisions on climate mitigation policy must be made within 
current political and socioeconomic limits with regard to risk and uncertainty. Climate system 
response to past and future emissions and related uncertainties are briefly set out in the 
IPCC AR5 WG1 SPM (2013). The IPCC AR5 Working Group II report  (2014), though 
primarily focused on impacts and adaptation, adopts a risk assessment framework 
throughout that is also applicable and relevant to mitigation decision-making.  Key risk 
assessment terms are defined in IPCC WG2 (2014, see Background Box SPM.2), including 
hazard, exposure, vulnerability, impacts, risk, transformation and resilience, see IPCC WG2 
Figure 1.1. Choices of climate change response policies benefit from integrated risk and 
uncertainty assessment (see full discussion of literature in Ch. 3 IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014).  
Climate policy decisions and judgments regarding risks and uncertainties have ethical, 
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economic and social implications that involve questions of justice and value, responsibility, 
governance and distribution – concepts discussed in (see full discussion of literature in Ch. 
3 IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Defining the risk of climate impacts as an outcome of climate hazards (due to 
natural variability and anthropogenic climate change), exposure due to geographic 
location and vulnerability due to socioeconomic situation and choices. Reproduced from 
Figure SPM.1 (IPCC AR5 WG2, 2014). 
Physical climate modelling using complex and simplified climate models, which feed into 
integrated assessment modelling, can provide quantitative projections of climate change, 
including indications of regional and global temperature change and precipitation. Collins et 
al. (2012) discuss trade-offs between model complexity and computational burden, and 
identify methods being used to improve projections including running ensembles of many 
simulations, Bayesian frameworks to combine model outputs, and comparing model outputs 
against past real-world data (hindcasting) to establish possible causal factors and eliminate 
others. 
The term ‘uncertainty’ has different meanings depending on context.  Scientifically, 
‘uncertainty’ often refers to a confidence interval, defined by error bar limits or a probability 
density function, within which the actual value of a quantity is known to lie with confidence 
for a given methodology. The confidence range, the level of mathematical precision, can 
then be given within error bars that define the remaining uncertainty.  By contrast, in public 
discourse ‘uncertainty’ often refers simply to situations of incomplete knowledge or 
disagreement, without necessarily implying any quantitative measure of degree of 
confidence (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, p. 155).   
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The IPCC WG2 framework above is usefully extended by Stirling (2007) and Hallegate et 
al. (2012). Hallegate et al. define risk and two kinds of uncertainty that must be faced in 
decision-making and scenario analysis. Knightian risk can be quantified on the basis of 
known probabilities describing hazard, risk and exposure as shown in the framework 
described by IPCC WG2. Epistemic uncertainty is possible due to due to inadequate models, 
parameter choices and weighting, and data, all of which are potentially reducible with 
increased knowledge, as well as unavoidable aleatory uncertainty that cannot be quantified 
due to chaotic dynamic behaviour in a complex system. The term deep uncertainty is used 
to describe aleatory uncertainty when many alternative, plausible outcomes are possible 
with unknown relative likelihoods or even relative ranking (2012). There may also be 
ambiguity, differing analytical world-views and diverging definitions of ‘successful’ aims 
(Kwakkel et al., 2010). Decision-making will inevitably adapt to circumstances over time, 
and realised outcomes will be contingent on the actual pathway of events that occurs.   
Discussing risk and precaution in scientific advice to policy making based on a survey of risk 
literature, Stirling (2007) gives a useful characterisation of four possible states of incomplete 
knowledge. “Risk” is a state of knowledge where probabilities of occurrence and the extent 
of outcome can be well described (equivalent to Knightian risk, as above), a situation that is 
amenable to standard, rigorous risk assessment methods. “Uncertainty”, equivalent to 
Hallegate et al.’s aleatory uncertainty, is a state where a type of outcome can be well 
described but not the probability of occurrence; this is often the case in complex, open 
systems. “Ambiguity” or epistemic uncertainty occurs when the probabilities of occurrence 
may be reasonably well understood but the meaning or importance of impact outcomes may 
be contested between cultural groups, academic disciplines or ethical belief systems. Where 
unexpected conditions, surprises or shocks seem possible, involving both uncertainty and 
ambiguity, decisions may need to be made under what is termed a state of ignorance, 
equivalent to Hallegate’s definition of deep uncertainty. Stirling (2007) sets out these 
distinctions and gives corresponding sets of methods and approaches applicable to each 
state of knowledge, as shown in Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4.  
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Figure 5.2: Contrasting states of incomplete knowledge, with schematic examples. 
Reproduced from Stirling (2007). 
 
Figure 5.3 Identifying methodological responses to different forms of incertitude. 
Reproduced from Stirling (2007). 
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Figure 5.4: A framework for articulating precaution and risk assessment. Reproduced from 
Stirling (2007). 
If there is a serious and unambiguous threat then the framework offered by Stirling (2007) 
suggests that a presumption of prevention is the correct response resulting in immediate 
restrictive management measures that can only be relaxed if there is a societal consensus 
on reasons not to exercise such a precautionary principle16. In the global and long-term 
context of anthropogenic global warming the UNFCCC process and the Paris Agreement 
have acknowledged the serious and unambiguous global threat from continued emissions 
and the need for immediate restrictive management. At this large scale, the scientific advice 
– as summarised in the IPCC “Reasons for Concern” relative to future cumulative emissions 
– has provided a risk assessment of the long-term probabilities politically accepted as a 
serious and unambiguous threat, indicating the need for “presumption of prevention” (Stirling 
2007, see Figure 5.4). Problematically, the decision-making ‘policy landscape’ for climate 
mitigation policy at near-term decadal, cultural, and regional or national scales is subject to 
far more scientific uncertainty and socioeconomic ambiguity, creating local doubts about the 
 
                                            
16 United Nations 1992 PRINCIPLE 15: “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary 
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats 
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” 
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extent, speed and equitability of response needed, despite the global scale assessment and 
agreement requiring urgent and sustained action at scale. 
When decisions to act or not to act are subject to deep uncertainty, ambiguity or ignorance, 
and may result in serious outcomes (as in many decisions relating to climate change policy), 
some type of appraisal or deliberative process is also required. Standard risk assessment 
alone is insufficient because it requires some quantitative estimate of probabilities of hazard 
impact occurrence so a risk assessment in the context of uncertainty and ignorance is 
needed, likely with a parallel deliberative process to address ambiguity (Stirling 2007). 
Scenarios of varying qualitative and quantitative complexity are used to describe and 
explore alternative futures under such conditions of deep uncertainty (Lempert, 2002). 
Particular decision pathways may be judged according to their robustness, their ability to 
perform well over time across a range of different futures (Lempert, 2002, p. 7310). 
Robustness metrics and thresholds based on the optimistic or pessimistic attitude of the 
decision-maker have been proposed (e.g. maximin, maximax, optimism-pessimism rule, 
and minimax regret) but the uncertainty and potential for change in attitude also needs to be 
included in risk assessments under deep uncertainty (Giuliani and Castelletti, 2016). Robust 
Decision Making (RDM) and similar methods aim to search the ‘decision space’ for 
alternative decision pathways and actions (often with computational methods examining 
large data-sets), use exploratory modelling to sample and describe different futures, 
establish measures of robustness to system stresses, and identify key factors affecting 
robustness that can be monitored in future or prioritised in sensitivity analysis (Herman et 
al., 2015; Quinn et al., 2017, p. 126). Robust decision approaches, such as RDM, exchange 
emphasis on optimum pathways for lower sensitivity to uncertainties and more precautionary 
action (Lempert and Collins, 2007).  
Good practice in scenario modelling demands that all parameters and their uncertainties are 
clearly identified giving both quantitative and qualitative indicators of confidence or lack of 
it, aiming for transparency and simplified interrogation of model results (Spiegelhalter and 
Riesch, 2011). Policy analysts, scientists and scenario modellers are advised to: 
“Communicate the estimates with humility, communicate the uncertainty with confidence” 
(Spiegelhalter and Riesch, 2011). This is because nuanced or unwelcome advice with 
significant attached uncertainties may not be what decision-makers want to hear so the 
temptation for the analyst to do otherwise, e.g., emphasising more welcome advice and 
limiting mention of caveats, needs to be consciously and deliberately avoided. Stirling (2007 
p. 311) notes that reductive, science-based approaches to risk and modelling giving 
optimised pathways are most of all evident in energy policy yet energy literature itself shows 
far greater variability. If science points to significant risks of system failure, as with climate 
science, there is a danger that scientists and policy advisors can tend toward “erring on the 
side of least drama” in biasing policy advice toward suggesting less worrying outcomes than 
their projections actual properly suggest (Brysse et al., 2013).  
The strong advice from climate science regarding the likely impacts of continued emissions 
is highly-policy relevant, strong evidence of a serious and unambiguous threat, yet on the 
whole the UNFCCC process including the Paris Agreement shows national decision-makers 
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treating it more in terms of uncertainty and ambiguity. Actually delivering societal decisions 
that in fact result in cutting whole-economy emissions may indeed be a “super wicked 
problem” (Lazarus, 2008), but re-stabilizing global climate can also be defined as a 
physically simple problem: one of cutting annual net anthropogenic increase in radiative 
forcing to zero through some combination of policies possibly including large reductions in 
gross emissions and, possibly, negative emissions to balance a much lower level of 
continuing gross emissions (Knutti and Rogelj, 2015). This potential confusion for decision-
makers, researchers and policy advisors can too easily obscure the basic reality that limiting 
climate change to well below 2ºC physically requires rapid reductions in gross global 
emissions, no matter how difficult or ‘wicked’ such reductions may be to achieve socially, 
economically or politically (and even if negative emissions deliver at some significant scale). 
Acknowledging decision making under ignorance, the existence of plausible and potentially 
catastrophic climate change impacts on global systems (Giang, 2016), only adds to the 
overwhelming economic and social imperative for precautionary action to address climate 
change (Heal and Millner, 2014). Parliamentary democracies in particular will likely require 
strong cross-party commitment to coherent climate mitigation policy that integrates global 
risks to enable the multi-level and whole-economy governance necessary to deliver 
sustained decarbonisation (Rietig and Laing, 2017).  
5.3 Economic risks in climate policy choices: costs of action and 
inaction 
5.3.1 Mitigation costs: contested economics 
Based on Working Group 3 conclusions, the IPCC’s AR5 Synthesis Report (Pachauri et al., 
2014) states that mitigation costs increase with delayed mitigation and also if mitigation 
technologies (including negative emissions technologies) turn out to have only limited 
availability (for either technical or cost reasons).  Increasing temperatures due to global 
warming accelerate economic damages that may weaken the resilience of socioeconomic 
systems or push them to failure.  Without assuming negative emissions most integrated 
assessment models can limit projected warming to well below 2ºC only by very rapid 
decarbonisation beginning immediately, involving deep, rapid and effectively permanent 
cuts in fossil fuel use (and probable early use of CCS on fossil fuel emissions), ensuring that 
any residual anthropogenic gross CO₂ emissions fall below reliable, ongoing, primarily 
natural, removal.   
Nonetheless, the Working Group 3 assessment, as summarised in Figure SPM.13, finds 
that global mitigation costs are easily “affordable” in the technical sense that the (modelled) 
reduction in annualised GDP growth rate growth rate would be very small if action begins 
now (as compared to a reference scenario where it is assumed that GDP growth would 
otherwise continue unimpeded, at least to the end of the analysis window – typically c. 2100). 
For example, WG3 presents an estimate that a baseline growth rate in world GDP of 2% yr-
1 need only be reduced by an average of 0.06 percentage points (to 1.94% yr-1) over the 
period to 2100. Chapter 6 in Working Group 3 (p. 2) suggests corresponding absolute 
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reductions in global GDP of 4% in 2030, 6% in 2050 and 11% in 2100 (relative to what GDP 
would “otherwise” be estimated to be in each of those years).   
The extraordinary, if not implausible, precision of the IPCC estimate and its associated 
confidence range, even in the face of deep uncertainty even about the reference case (BAU) 
and an extremely high likelihood of non-optimal and structural discontinuities, invites 
critique. Trainer (2017) finds the evidence given by Working Group 3 to support low 
mitigation investment costs is very weak, and shows evidence that the costs of achieving 
the renewable energy requirements would in fact be very high in absolute GDP terms by 
2100. Although it has been suggested that a clean energy transition might be faster than the 
past relatively slow transformations in energy infrastructure (Roberts, 2016), Trainer argues 
that the only two viable policy options are for an enormous commitment to nuclear energy 
or a recognition that greatly reduced energy consumption levels are required by current high-
consumers. Energy transitions need to be compared on a consistent basis, especially noting 
that increasing the deployment rate (a flow) of a low-carbon technology, from a low base, 
may be relatively rapid but this, in itself, is not the same as taking a large share of the existing 
system (a stock), which has typically taken much longer (Grubler et al., 2016). Far greater 
efforts are advised to enable better institutions and governance to encourage investment 
based on reliable and transparent regulation with or without carbon pricing (Grubler et al., 
2016). In ‘second-best’ scenarios of non-optimal policies (carbon lock-in and low sensitivity 
to carbon pricing), Iyer et al. (2015) use an IAM to assess investment decisions in global 
electricity generation showing that costs are higher, and industrialised nations need to 
mitigate more, than in developing nations.  
If the Paris Agreement temperature WB2C target is to be meaningful then it will be up to 
nation states and regional blocs to cooperate in delivering the necessary action to achieve 
rapid and substantive reductions in net emissions. But as Spash (2016) points out, the Paris 
Agreement can also be read as signifying a “commitment to sustained industrial growth, risk 
management over disaster prevention, and future inventions and technology as saviour”. 
Likewise, Northrop (2017), using Kaya decomposition of past and projected global 
emissions, strongly disputes optimism that technological innovation in energy intensity and 
decarbonising energy can effectively absolutely decouple economic growth from total 
emissions (as contrasted with the ~1.94% yr-1, compounded over 80+ years, suggested by 
WG3 as still compatible with absolute decarbonisation for a 2C temperature limit). The 
analysis finds required decarbonisation rates  to meet the “well below 2ºC” goal are far in 
excess of those generally being contemplated, and therefore, like Anderson and Bows 
(2012), finds that fossil fuel-based global economic growth in the near-term (at least) is 
incompatible with achieving climate stabilisation. In an analysis of achieving the Durban 2ºC 
climate goal (UNFCCC, 2011), Jarvis et al (2012) show that society would now need to 
respond to global mean temperature change at a rate about ~50 times faster than the 
historical rate of renewable energy roll-out after 1990.  Continuing global energy 
consumption growth at the historic rate would therefore require a decarbonisation (emission 
intensity reduction) rate of 13% yr-1, far in excess of the historic 0.6% yr-1 decarbonisation 
rate. This implies that it may be necessary to countenance radical changes in the long-
standing climate-energy-society feedback that has underpinned economic growth for the 
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past 150 years, or else face escalating climate-triggered socio-ecological disruptions that 
will force radical, unplanned, changes in any case.  
As noted in Chapter 2.2, using the I=PAT decomposition of emissions policy measures, 
Alcott (2010) notes that economic system emissions are a function of the dynamic system 
feedbacks between population, affluence and technology. Limiting or capping emission 
(‘left-side’ strategies), by enforcing a limit to pollution impact such as a carbon quota aligned 
with “well below 2ºC”, would give investment and societal certainty. This, in turn, could drive 
cost-effective and societally-effective bottom-up responses from government and other 
relevant societal actors, via explicit “right-side”, total impact-limiting measures and policies 
(or otherwise), but crucially doing so while preventing or limiting system level rebound 
(2010). Otherwise, particularly in the higher emitting nations, relying on “right-side” 
measures exclusively has serious implications for typical government and sectoral activity-
based policies aiming to limit consumption on a sufficiency basis or increase energy 
efficiency. Such efforts are commonly claimed to cut emissions but have been repeatedly 
found to fall far short of realising the levels of system decarbonisation needed to align with 
effective climate stabilisation (Brockway et al., 2017; Herring and Roy, 2007). As Jarvis et 
al. (2012) point out, at the global level, large improvements in energy efficiency have not in 
fact led to absolutely limited or reduced emissions, as consumption per capita in particular, 
and also population, have increased in parallel. It is a reasonable conjecture that these 
nullifying effects have been, in part at least, due to the cost and energy savings from 
efficiencies that have then become available to be spent on additional activities and 
investments that ultimately lead to more emissions. A strong ‘top-down’, societal 
commitment to a regional or national GHG (or carbon) quota enables more robust decision-
making including assessment of as-yet unproven possibilities including the extent of 
negative emissions to be invested in, planned, rolled out or achieved over time, so that these 
and other options can be stated within nationally determined contributions in future climate 
policy. 
5.3.2 Stranded assets: unburnable carbon and early retirement of infrastructure 
The absolute limit to the amount of carbon that can reach the atmosphere if global warming 
is to be limited to WB2C means that a very large proportion of the world’s known reserves 
of fossil fuels will need to remain underground, unburned, except insofar as their 
corresponding CO₂ emissions could be prevented from adding to anthropogenic warming 
(e.g., via carbon capture and storage, NETs, or geoengineering). Unburnable carbon’, the 
descriptive term for this reality, originated in a 2011 report by the not-for-profit financial think 
tank Carbon Tracker  (2011; see also Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2013), with a rapid increase 
in the term’s usage thereafter (Hendrick et al., 2016, p. Fig. 1). Using a TIMES integrated 
assessment model, McGlade and Ekins (2015) give estimates indicating the proportions and 
geographic distribution of coal, oil and gas that would need to remain unused from 2010 to 
2050, based on a global carbon quota for a greater than 66% chance of limiting global 
warming to 2ºC. The results imply that, to be commensurate with a political commitment to 
avoiding 2ºC warming, over 80% of known coal reserves and all Arctic oil should be 
classified as unburnable, and therefore these, together with the associated global fleets of 
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fossil fuel marine transport (Sharmina et al., 2017) and fossil fuelled infrastructure, are 
potentially ‘stranded assets’ that may not be accounted by nations or corporations as 
investments that will result in future profitable production. Similarly, new capital investments 
in long-lived, new and existing fossil fuel electricity generating plants may also be stranded 
assets based on the ‘emissions commitment’ implied by their future working life relative to 
the global carbon budget (Davis et al., 2010). ‘Commitment accounting’ of future emissions 
due to infrastructure reveals the cumulative carbon commitment of fossil fuel energy 
infrastructure and shows nominally ‘committed emissions’ (absent future asset stranding) 
rising by 4% yr-1, reaching 307 GtCO₂ (range 192-432 GtCO₂) in 2012 alone (Davis and 
Socolow, 2014).  
The increasing supply and use of natural gas is often advocated as a lower carbon ‘bridge 
fuel’ from carbon to renewables. However, natural gas (primarily methane, CH₄) is 75% 
carbon by mass and its CO₂ emissions per unit energy, while less than coal or oil, and are 
still high. Additionally, CH₄ if released (unoxidised) to atmosphere is a potent greenhouse 
gas in its own right. Based on published leakage rate data, Hendrick et al. (2016) find that 
as much as 59-81% of global natural gas reserves should be properly regarded as  
unburnable carbon due to the potential loss of ‘unleakable’ methane (i.e., over and above 
the CO₂ emission commitment associated with combustion). Zhang et al. (2014) find that 
natural gas power plants with substantial methane leakage can cause more near-term global 
warming than a coal-fuelled power plant producing the same power output; though the 
natural gas plant would contribute significantly less persistent warming over the long term. 
Thus, although natural gas has a long-term CO₂ climate benefit compared to coal, ongoing 
system leakage of methane greatly reduces that benefit and this is compounded by the 
resultant delay in introducing near-zero carbon technologies, potentially by more than 24 
years, due to coal-to-gas system change (Zhang et al., 2016). A WB2C pathway for 
electricity generation with continued large-scale fossil use, whether coal or gas, likely 
requires CCS to abate emissions. In stark contrast new, unabated, coal- and gas-fired 
electricity generation projects are in fact still being built out and actively planned, globally. 
The estimate by Davis and Socolow shows that the remaining carbon commitment of already 
existing fossil fuelled electricity infrastructure alone (most of it in middle and high-income 
nations) represents about 40% of the remaining WB2C global carbon quota. Pfeiffer et al. 
(2016) find that even with a relatively large 50% chance of 2ºC emissions carbon quota 
(significantly exceeding the Paris Agreement constraints), and even if all other sectors follow 
a pro rata decarbonisation pathway, then, given already committed emissions, after 2017, 
no new unabated fossil fuel electricity generating plants can be built (except in the very 
limited case of early replacement of the highest emissions plant by newer, relatively lower 
emission plant). By compiling a database of global electrical power generation and 
establishing a sustainability indicator for analysis, Farfan and Breyer (2017) estimate that 
zero GHG emissions may be required to meet a 2ºC target, leading to 300GW of stranded 
coal-fired electricity generator assets, including those already commissioned from 2014 
onwards. Therefore, state-owned and private, existing and planned, electricity generation 
will need to anticipate asset stranding in their continuing investment decision-making (2017). 
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The Bank of England is making the need for climate change risk assessment clear, 
particularly with regard to the insurance industry and in the avoidance of asset stranding to 
support an orderly market transition to a low carbon economy (Bank of England, 2017).  
By integrating global or national committed emissions – from existing and planned 
infrastructure, other policy commitments affecting heating and transport, timelines for 
negative emissions delivery, and from extractable known fossil fuel reserves – CO₂ 
commitment accounting could constitute a powerful policy analysis method enabling 
comparison of the committed emissions budget with the global carbon budget and national 
carbon quotas for alternative policy pathways. In particular, it could make explicit, at a much 
earlier stage of policy adoption, other implicit commitments to asset stranding (premature 
plant retirement) and/or to required deployment (at uncertain or unknown cost) of negative 
emissions technologies. This can inform policy and the public as to whether whole-economy 
choices are scientifically aligned with equitably achieving the Paris temperature targets or 
not, and thus whether infrastructure should be built or not – requiring significant changes 
from traditional views of long-term planning. The zero-sum nature of carbon budgets (with 
or without negative emissions) means that there must inevitably be difficult social and 
political choices concerning the sectoral shares of committed emissions and the 
infrastructure in electricity generation, heating and transport that can be built. This may also 
involve investment and delivery of negative emissions depending on the net emissions 
pathway chosen by individual nations (Fuss et al., 2013). 
Unfortunately, it appears that, in international finance, where capital allocation is still 
seriously misaligned with Paris Agreement climate action (Diaz-Rainey et al., 2017), 
institutional investors are currently blind to stranded asset risk because their investment 
decision chain is benchmarked against market volatility and the behaviour of other major 
investors (Silver, 2017).  From the standpoint of a finance system insider, Silver suggests 
that significant changes in financial investment theory and finance industry regulation will be 
needed to avoid stranded asset losses and (correspondingly) to prevent excess emissions 
(Silver, 2017). Similarly, investment assessment of monopoly regulation and disruptive 
discontinuity (due to competition, regulatory change or other impacts) shows that significant 
eventual damage to shareholder wealth, to consumers, and to societal welfare may occur 
due to stranded assets; and that, even though these losses are very difficult to estimate, 
asset holders, investors, and insurers should plan ahead to avoid or mitigate asset stranding 
potential (Simshauser, 2017).  
The asset impairment risk implications of exceeding the planetary boundaries, as identified 
by Rockström et al. (2009) and those due to changing technology and social expectations, 
are discussed by Linnenluecke et al. (2015) based on existing international accounting 
standards for asset impairment. Direct climate change impacts due to weather extremes are 
found to be an asset impairment problem already for one mineral and mining corporation. 
Both the production of pollution and consequent pollution impacts have serious potential to 
cause asset value reductions. Such effects are likely to be increasingly subject to market 
evaluation, regulatory scrutiny, academic assessment and public judgement, so businesses 
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are advised to plan now for a rapid low-carbon transition or else face potentially serious 
regulatory and reputational damage (2015). 
5.3.3 Decision-making in a ‘second-best’ policy landscape 
Standard modelling approaches commonly used to advise policy-makers typically depend 
on optimising outcomes assuming a single rational decision-maker with perfect foresight 
operating in a ‘first best’ ‘policy landscape’ that is highly responsive to carbon pricing and 
without path dependent lock-in effects. These are not the reality for decision-makers so 
modelling is increasingly being adapted to look at ‘second-best’ policy landscapes with 
significant institutional and policy lock-ins and where there are many agents making myopic 
decisions focused on the short-term with varying degrees of sensitivity to regulation and 
carbon pricing. Also, as discussed in Chapter 4, small adjustments in economic model or 
technical inputs, or imposing different constraints, can result in very large differences in 
pathway recommendations.  Global IAM and regional/national ESOM modelling is 
responding to this challenge by adapting models to incorporate second-best policy 
landscapes.  For the IAMs producing scenarios for IPCC assessment the framework of 
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) gives a sets of quantified parameters as drivers 
for model scenarios within ideal and second-best futures. 
In national energy modelling, Strachan and Usher (2012) identify issues in the UK energy 
system, both internal (in implementation and in behavioural change) and external (in 
resource access and technology development) that combine to make current climate goals 
unfeasible unless these issues are addressed. By performing a sensitivity analysis with UK 
MED, a MARKAL variant, costs are “manageable” for first-best and second-best 90% CO₂ 
reduction by 2050 scenarios if there is no delay in implementation starting in 2010, but costs 
rapidly become “prohibitive” if emission reductions are delayed even to 2018, and occur 
more quickly in second-best policy cases. Strachan and Usher say modellers should give 
clear criteria of mitigation scenario failure (that they currently lack), suggesting these include: 
failure to find an optimal solution; some measure of ‘excessive cost’; and dependence on 
highly uncertain mitigation options such as the second-best issues they identify.  Using 
BLUE, a system dynamic simulation model, Li (2017) projects scenarios of second-best 
climate policy in the UK to assess the robustness of ESOM least-cost modelling.  Market 
heterogeneity (with different sectoral actors) is introduced whereby all sectors may be 
strongly sensitive to high carbon price in the uniform, ‘Idealised Policy’ landscape, or else 
actors may act with very different carbon price sensitivities in a ‘Dysfunctional Policy” 
landscape (as is typically seen in reality). ‘Non-rational’ behaviour is introduced by varying 
the hurdle rate (per cent discount rate) for Government and individual behaviour in decision-
making, between a “Cost-Optimal Decisions” case, where individuals as well as Government 
use the lower social discount rate in their decisions, ranging to the real-world situation where 
individuals and companies typically evaluate decisions on a much higher discount rate than 
Government. The results indicate that “[policy] actors behaving badly”, and failure to align 
economic incentives for individuals with the societal climate action imperative, produces a 
far slower, far more costly and higher cumulative carbon transition that may fall well short of 
the stated policy  goals. The realistic, simple assumption that the policy landscape is messy 
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– subject to different sectoral interests and individual agents who behave myopically 
according to current circumstances – is enough to produce ‘least cost’ energy system 
pathways that are entirely at odds with ESOM outputs assuming a single actor with perfect 
foresight and idealised decision-making.  
As Li concludes, this “second-best policy” energy system modelling shows that pure 
notional-cost optimising models may have some useful role in informing climate-energy 
economic policy, but they are far from sufficient. Overcoming policy landscape lock-ins (path 
dependency involving government, institutions and vested interests) and setting a whole-
society investment pathway are likely to be pivotal if anything like an optimal and “least cost” 
pathway is to be followed while still robustly delivering on stated, long term, goals. 
5.3.4 Dependence on economic growth: mitigation strategy or added risk?  
Public debate and policy targets often prioritise a need for continued economic growth or 
green growth (based on low carbon energy and energy efficient consumption, and taken to 
be therefore consistent with climate and all other wider sustainability constraints) as 
essential to social welfare and technological development to achieve climate goals.  
However, strong coupling between global energy use and economic output (despite 
continuing increases in energy efficiency) persists, and there is increasing evidence that 
sustained, progressive, decoupling of energy and carbon emissions from output, as 
measured by global GDP, is far more difficult than presumed, especially at a global scale. 
Economics has increasingly focussed on an often highly contested debate between (at least) 
three distinct groups: proponents of green growth, those advocating a steady state economy 
(at some level of energy use), and an increasing literature suggesting that degrowth in 
wealthier economies (while adequately protecting, or even enhancing, societal well-being), 
will be necessary at least in the near- to medium-term, to enable the speed and scale of 
reductions in fossil fuel use and carbon emissions now needed.   
Some have argued that use of the specific word “degrowth”, with its potentially negative 
connotations may itself be unhelpful in advancing a wider debate about economic 
alternatives to GDP growth, so that focusing on human welfare and, in public 
communication, on stable prosperity or a “good life” may be more conducive to furthering 
understanding (Drews and Antal, 2016). Others strongly disagree, proposing that ‘degrowth’ 
is an essential concept to focus attention on the need for equitable economic contraction by 
the wealthy nations in response to global limits on climate pollution and resource extraction 
(D’Alisa et al., 2014).  In an evaluation of economic literature, Jakob and Edenhofer (2014) 
argue that both green growth and degrowth are popular concepts that are often misleading 
because social welfare (overall societal wellbeing) rather than growth (the “end” rather than 
the “means”) should be the point of an economic system. As measuring welfare can be 
difficult, Jakob and Edenhofer recommend a transparent, ‘welfare diagnostic’ process of 
public deliberation to assess what a society values, with the physical and social sciences 
contributing to this deliberative democracy by focusing on clear communication of 
assumptions, uncertainties and carefully describing areas which require value judgments. 
Similarly, van den Bergh (van den Bergh, 2017) points out that a GDP-focus is not consistent 
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with the welfare emphasis that is the basis of modern micro- and macroeconomics including 
growth theory. Therefore, van den Bergh suggests nations accept an ‘agrowth’ strategy that 
is indifferent to growth, even if zero or negative, and instead prioritises essential 
distributional welfare including spending on climate policies, which contribute to medium- 
and long-term welfare. An agrowth strategy does not exclude green growth -- if it proves 
feasible and welfare maximising, and rebound effects can be adequately controlled (Antal 
and van den Bergh, 2014).  
Limiting global scale, macroeconomic rebound, which leads to more emissions due to the 
savings from mitigation being spent on additional emissions-generating activities, may 
require trade tariffs on carbon intensive goods. Bergh (2017) discusses why controlling such 
rebound is important to meeting the Paris Agreement temperature goals and how 
implementation of  revenue-recycling offsets by ‘climate club’ groups of cooperating nations 
(see Stua, 2017) and carbon tariffs on trade could be made politically possible – and thereby 
increasing pressure on “free-rider” nations who are not decarbonising at an equitable rate. 
Current trade barriers and trade rules facilitate carbon intensive production and discriminate 
against needed economic development in current absolutely impoverished nations, 
requiring trade concessions and consumption reduction by the global North, but the political 
prospects for such change remain poor (Iqbal and Pierson, 2015). To break this impasse, 
and stressing the need for fast and effective global decision-making, Grasso and Roberts 
(2014) propose a political compromise based on a combination of action by the major 
economies (responsible for 80% of global emissions), consumption-based carbon 
accounting, burden-sharing based on capacity and responsibility, and integration with the 
UNFCCC – a proposal only very partially echoed by the Paris Agreement. To enable fairness 
in this framework each of the major economies would both lose and gain but: “By so doing, 
all countries will gain a liveable future, the core principle of national and human security” 
(2014).  
5.3.5 Economic costs of inadequate climate mitigation policy 
The costs of mitigation inaction are often systematically avoided in benefit cost analysis 
IAMs by neglecting uncertainties (Butler et al., 2014), non-precautionary damage estimates 
and strongly present-day biased value judgements embedded in discount rate assumptions 
(Ackerman et al., 2009; Scrieciu et al., 2013). Similarly, evidence from cost effectiveness 
IAMs and energy system optimisation modelling compellingly shows that least cost delivery 
of sufficient decarbonisation to meet Paris levels of ambition requires significant and then 
ongoing action that starts without delay (Luderer et al., 2013). This is the economic 
consequence of the physical reality of a limited global carbon budget that is being rapidly 
exhausted, particularly by nations, corporate entities and individuals with high annual 
emissions (Gignac and Matthews, 2015; Raupach et al., 2007). National claims to act at 
‘least cost’ in aligning action with the Paris Agreement by definition accept the essential 
cost-effectiveness assumption that the agreement temperature goals must be met and 
actually achieved (See 2.5.4.1 IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, p. 171).  
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Comparing past CEA and ESOM modelling with actual data for the time period since that 
modelling occurred, including emissions, costs and investments, might be an effective 
method of estimating the costs of recent inaction and enable discussion of the lock-in effects 
that presumably resulted in a second-best outcome with higher economic costs and reduced 
societal well-being. A similar method of comparison of modelled versus actual policy 
outcomes might be possible regarding equitable emissions mitigation modelling. 
Existing capital investment in infrastructure represents a financial commitment to future CO₂ 
emissions that can be represented by the carbon intensity of capital in mass of CO₂ USD-1. 
In addition to early mitigation effort, AR5 2ºC scenarios require a very low carbon intensity 
of capital by 2050 of 33 to 77 gCO₂ USD-1, compared to about 360 gCO₂ USD-1 today; and 
due to the lifespan of carbon intensive capital, every year of delay in beginning rapid 
decarbonisation makes future effort more difficult by decreasing the CO₂ intensity required 
of new production by 20 to 50 gCO₂ USD-1 yr-1 (Rozenberg et al., 2015). 
The reasons for national and corporate inaction on climate change are not well covered in 
the literature. In a study of firms, that may well be applicable to institutions generally, 
Slawinski et al. (2017) show that failure to reduce absolute greenhouse gas emissions, as 
needed for sufficient and effective mitigation (see Table 5.1, reproduced below) is due to 
uncertainty avoidance and short-termism that is mutually reinforcing across individual, 
organisational and institutional levels.  
Table 5.1 Explaining organisational inaction on climate change in terms of corporate 
mitigation measures and the need of absolute reductions in emissions. Reproduced from 
Slawinski et al. (2017). 
 
Individually, a present-time perspective lowers tolerance for uncertainty and leads to only 
incremental changes that do not add up to absolute or commensurate emission reductions. 
Organisationally, standard management practices’ emphasis on decision-making leads to a 
focus on short-term financial returns rather than long-term investments that results in 
decarbonisation. Institutionally, dependence on ‘market logic’, ideologically stating that 
mitigation efforts are only valid if they are profitable, and avoiding (or perhaps increasing) 
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regulatory uncertainty, also enable climate change mitigation inaction (2017). These levels 
negatively interact to create a “vicious circle of organizational inaction” such that although 
professing proactive intentions their absolute emissions are increasing (2017).  
A stronger understanding of what is required – absolute emissions reduction – needs to be 
integrated into all of these behavioural levels at all levels of carbon governance; but above 
all, stringent and stable regulations are needed to set the rules within which behaviours are 
socially licenced. However, such regulation is opposed to the framework of behaviours in 
firms identified by Slawinski et al., therefore inertial resistance may be expected that will 
need to be overcome by a stronger framing of the imperative for absolute emission 
reductions. Howlett et al. (Howlett et al., 2015) examine the persistence of policy failures 
and ineffective decision-making in governments is due to risk-averse politics, inertia in 
governance and inadequate understandings of risk and uncertainty in decision-making. 
5.4 Climate system uncertainty and mitigation risk 
The most immediate climate risk to human systems is in those geographical areas exposed 
to large changes relative to past experience. Frame et al. (2017) identify areas where large 
fractions of the world’s population would benefit greatly, even within the next few decades, 
from effective mitigation of emissions that will limit global warming and delay climate change 
enabling cumulative benefits from reduced exposure and improved food security.  Without 
stringent mitigation, hitherto unknown local climates will rapidly emerge in the next decades 
that might well be avoidable or delayed  (Challinor et al., 2017). To at least enable more 
time for adaptation, climate risks will inevitably have to be addressed by all nations, across 
borders and governance scales, ideally acting in concert (Challinor et al., 2017). 
A core uncertainty in our understanding of climate change, affecting socioeconomic analysis 
and political opinion on climate mitigation, is the amount and rate of response of the natural 
system to the human-caused emissions of CO₂ and short-lived climate pollutants.  Knutti et 
al. (2017) gives a comprehensive ‘state of the art’ review of all climate science estimates to 
date of equilibrium climate sensitivity and transient climate response (TCR), metrics that 
cannot be measured directly. As observed warming in the recent record constrains TCR 
estimates this value is more relevant to predicted near-term warming and therefore more 
informative to near-term policy. Even more policy relevant is the transient climate response 
to cumulative carbon emissions (TCRE), in the range of 0.8 °C to 2.5 °C per 1,000 GtC 
(3,670 GtCO₂), that describes the approximately linear relation between cumulative CO₂ 
emissions and global mean surface temperature rise.  Knutti et al. find there is little evidence 
from climate system physics or observations to suggest that climate sensitivity is lower than 
current estimates and “to keep warming to within 2°C, future CO₂ emissions have to remain 
strongly limited, irrespective of climate sensitivity being at the high or low end.” Therefore, 
Knutti et al. (2017) conclude climate sensitivity is of minimal mitigation near-term policy 
importance compared to the far more important and greater uncertainty relating to actual 
future emissions resulting from human and political socioeconomic decisions being made 
now and in the near-term.  
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Non-CO₂ emissions also need to be reduced but doing so does little to change the urgency 
of planned CO₂ mitigation (Rogelj et al., 2014b).  Knutti et al. recommend that economic 
modelling or impact studies use the overall central range  for ECS and TCR combined with 
an understanding of the physical constraints that are likely to narrow the range estimates 
(Stevens et al., 2016). From a precautionary perspective though, given the likelihood of 
escalating and possibly highly damaging impacts using the entire range of estimates 
equates to a requirement to use a value that is higher than the mean value (Lewandowsky 
et al., 2014b). 
5.5 Socio-political inertia and mitigation risk 
‘First-best’ policies based on uniform carbon prices and optimal notional-cost pathways may 
ignore the behavioural features of institutions (including government departments and 
agencies), companies and individuals, therefore Gazheli et al. (2015) set out a framework 
based on literature concerning social interaction, learning and bounded rationality. 
Recommendations to policy-makers are made toward fostering transition despite likely 
opposition from vested interest groups and “allied behavioural anomalies such as non-
rational resistance to change”. Research by Rickards et al. (2014) shows that senior 
decision makers in multi-national corporations and Western governments have a “deep 
propensity for inaction” on climate policy due to pressure within their narrow perspectives to 
deliver on near-term concerns, including peer-reputation, financial status and professional 
relationships. Rickards et al. conclude that a multi-frontal approach is vital to enabling 
change toward supporting essential delivery of climate mitigation. Addressing these 
behavioural barriers will likely require both sustained, external “outside track” pressure, 
through pointing out the dangers of inaction (stranded assets, revealed biases, potential loss 
of social license), and direct, “inside track” persuasion through the generation and 
communication of legitimate alternatives that are not being considered (Rickards et al., 
2014). A “middle out” approach of shareholder activism and voter or public service user 
feedback can also push change in otherwise recalcitrant institutions. Focusing on the UK, 
based on documentary analysis and interviews with central political actors, Gillard and Lock 
(2016) find that the cross-party, high salience support for the Climate Change Act of 2008 
has faltered from a focus on climate policy efficacy into contradictory claims stressing 
economic efficiency but often not delivering it. 
Overcoming lock-in effects is difficult. Alcott (2010) finds that enforcing a limit to pollution 
impact, such as through an explicitly defined national carbon quota, ideally equitably aligned 
with “well below 2ºC”, would give investment and societal certainty. This, in turn, could drive 
effective bottom-up responses from government and other relevant societal actors while 
confronting lock-ins immediately and limiting rebound. Comparable though to a wartime or 
other “national emergency” situation, such a policy would require wide societal 
understanding of the overwhelming imperative to begin and sustain deep decarbonisation; 
a societal understanding that, moreover, would have to be extraordinarily robust in the face 
of pro-active (and typically covert) attack from powerful actors vested in the status quo. 
Particularly in the higher emitting nations, the clear need for such drastic measures, as 
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indicated by climate science and equity assessments, has serious implications for typical 
government and sectoral activity-based policies aiming to limit consumption on a sufficiency 
basis or increase energy efficiency. Such efforts are commonly claimed to cut emissions but 
have been repeatedly found to fall far short of realising the levels of system decarbonisation 
needed to align with large ongoing cuts in total emissions (Brockway et al., 2017; Herring 
and Roy, 2007). As Jarvis et al. (2012) point out, at the global level, large increases in energy 
efficiency have not limited emissions, as consumption per capita in particular, and also 
population, have increased in part at least due to the cost and energy savings from 
efficiencies that have then become available to be spent on additional activities and 
investments that ultimately lead to  more emissions.  
Policies with seemingly very high near-term mitigation costs may be ‘fragile’ in the face of 
public opinion and adverse political decisions. Otto et al. (2015) recommend anti-fragile 
policies for climate mitigation, akin to adaptive management techniques, that could be based 
on explicitly indexed risks that governments are more likely to respect, are more easily 
communicated and are more able to evolve over time. However, useful as the Paris-aligned 
suggestions made by Otto et al. maybe – indexed emission reductions, high and rising 
carbon taxes, or an indexed sequestration mandate on all fossil fuel extractors – all of them 
seem likely result in the same requirement on high emitters to cut emissions fast, starting 
without delay, and possibly ramp up negative emissions investment and delivery too. These 
are sensible suggestions but they are do not appear particularly anti-fragile given the evident 
political resistance to applying them. 
Maier et al. (2016) provides a wide-ranging multidisciplinary overview of the use of multiple 
alternative scenarios of plausible futures in producing assessments given deep uncertainty 
for which “best guess” or optimal pathways may be inappropriate or misleading. Three types 
of scenario modelling are: predictive, answering ‘what if?’ questions and projecting trends; 
exploratory scenarios, which answer the question, “what will happen” or “what could 
happen”; and normative scenarios, which are directed toward achieving a specific target 
future, whether transformational or preserving existing features. In exploratory or long time-
period scenarios the ability to model rapid responses to shocks and feedbacks between 
processes becomes more important because understanding overall system behaviour is 
more valuable to decision-makers than detailed pathway choices (2016). When the degree 
of uncertainty and the degree of flexibility are low, or a long implementation time is possible 
relative to the rate of change, then a relatively static approach with a single, fixed strategy 
is possible (2016). At the other end of the spectrum of solution approaches is adaptive 
management with multiple, flexible strategies when decision time is short, flexibility is 
possible or uncertainty is high. Maier et al. (2016)  recommend that modellers use relevant 
qualitative information, particularly on political, societal and investment decision-making to 
improve the ‘real world’ applicability of scenarios and narratives.  
With multiple references, Trutnevyte (2016) first discusses why the perfect foresight, least-
cost, energy system optimisation models (ESOMs) and optimising simulation models that 
commonly inform IPCC AR5 and national policy-making worldwide have been widely 
criticised for systematic biases due to assumptions that are value laden, fragile or narrowly 
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based. Trutnevyte uses a specially developed ESOM to produce ‘near-optimal’ scenarios, 
meeting a cost threshold a set amount above the optimal scenario result, for ex-post 
modelling of the UK electricity system’s transition from 1990 to 2014.  Cost optimisation 
failed to project the real-world outcomes, and costs were 9-23% lower than the projected 
least-cost. Trutnevyte concludes that ESOMs gloss over uncertainties such that there is only 
a very small chance of such modelling selecting a scenario that matches real-world transition 
and so recommends use of the bounding analysis (Casman et al., 1999) and envelope of 
predictability approaches using multiple modelling types and examining different scales of 
dynamic complexity, creatively tested against and learning from historical data (Cornell et 
al., 2010).  
5.6 Decision-making issues regarding NETs in climate mitigation policy  
Aligning national and regional (for example, EU) decarbonisation pathways with the 
equitable achievement of the Paris temperature goals will be very difficult unless a clear and 
commensurate plan of action is set out (Rockström et al., 2017). Climate mitigation policy 
decision-making therefore has to be based on whole-economy action that adds up to a 
steadily reducing annual net emission totals, by some combination of rapid gross emissions 
reduction and commitments to carbon dioxide removals. National decisions have global 
economic consequences from both mitigation action and inaction, affecting energy use, food 
production and investments in high or low carbon technology (Muratori et al., 2016). As long 
as the cumulative future emissions commitment of current and projected policies is clearly 
inadequate to deliver Paris-aligned mitigation then significant delivery of negative emissions 
is tacitly being assumed (Anderson, 2015). Therefore, the IPCC AR5 model scenario runs, 
largely based on continued economic growth and increasing, though less carbon intensive, 
energy use, rely on presumed deployment of substantial amounts of negative emissions, 
particularly from BECCS (Peters, 2016; Ricci and Selosse, 2013). One survey of expert 
assessment finds that IAM assumptions for CCS are realistic, but for BECCS the 
assumptions for biological productivity, technical capability and governance allowing a high 
rate and large extent of BECCS deployment are unrealistically optimistic (Vaughan and 
Gough, 2016). The AR5 Database 2ºC scenarios, developed by IAMs reliant on simplified 
carbon-cycle models calibrated against ESMs, often accept significant radiative forcing 
and/or temperature overshoot that is anticipated to be later reversed through large-scale 
deployment of NETs. However, Jones et al. (2016) find that the Earth system behaviour is 
highly pathway-dependent, responding to rates of system change and CO₂ concentration 
rather than to the timing and amount of NETs deployed. Future overshoot scenarios will 
need to account for carbon-cycle feedbacks that might limit the effectiveness of NETs in 
reducing atmCO₂, thereby increasing the required amount of negative emissions. 
Peters and Geden (2017) examine the output from four integrated assessment models used 
in the IPCC assessment to project energy use and CO₂ emissions. The ‘cost-optimal’ 
pathways show significant amounts of BECCS deployment even before 2050 and much 
more afterward to 2100. The median outcome for the EU is cumulative BECCS storage of 
7.5 GtCO₂ by 2050, the equivalent of two years of current emissions, and 50 GtCO₂ stored 
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by 2100. This would be in addition to substantial CCS applied to conventional fossil fuel 
usage. Peters and Geden suggest three key policy areas to push political and national 
engagement with carbon dioxide removal if it is to be part of Paris-aligned climate policy: 
• Update national and regional emission reduction pledges: countries already need 
to begin negotiating equitable sharing of negative emissions and outlining the 
amounts of CO₂ removals that might be achieved. 
• Enable an internationally coherent system of negative emissions accounting with 
dependable measurement, reporting and verification, to create trust in and 
incentives for carbon dioxide removal. 
• Ensure national and regional policies push international policy forward in these 
first two areas and incentivise research aiming for rapid domestic delivery of 
negative emissions at scale including CCS.  
Comparing ‘techno-paradigm’ S-curves of successful technology development – from early 
market competition, through rapid uptake by society, and slowing when market saturated – 
Zheng and Wu (2014) suggest the likely progress of CCS technology requires government 
backing and policy support. For CCS to be a significant part of a low carbon transition, 
planning policy needs to target very early CCS delivery at significant scale. If any substantive 
mitigation contribution is expected from negative emissions technologies, then CCS is likely 
to be an essential enabling technology without which a very large share of nuclear and 
variable renewables is likely needed to supply sufficient low carbon energy (Selosse and 
Ricci, 2014). Nonetheless, mitigation policy still needs to reduce ongoing and substantial 
whole-economy emissions rapidly to hedge against the possibilities that CCS in particular, 
and negative emissions in general, may not deliver at scale (Larkin et al., 2017).  
Bhave et al. (2017) summarise outcomes from the Techno-Economic Study of Biomass to 
Power with CO₂ capture (TESBiC) project that performs a technology review, assessing 
Technology Readiness Level and includes pilot plant visit details and data for the four 
BECCS plants in operation to date, mostly capturing CO₂ from ethanol production. BECCS 
is currently uncompetitive compared to unabated (FF or bioenergy) electricity generation 
due to high capital and operating costs; changing this would require addressing the 
worldwide lack of specific financial subsidies and/or introducing favourable carbon 
accounting rules for negative emissions that would incentivise BECCS development. 
Modelling BECCS technology alternatives for typical 50 MWe and 250 MWe plant scales, the 
most techno-economically beneficial options were co-firing biomass with coal and bio-mass 
with integrated gasification combined cycle; the least efficient were bio-oxy and bio-amine 
technologies. Relative to an unabated equivalent, capital investment costs were 45% to 
130% higher, maintenance costs increased by 4% to 160%, and a net energy penalty of 6% 
to 15% (2017). Modelling toward deployment of BECCS at scale by 2050, Bhave et al. find 
that economic cost, feedstock sustainability and regulatory barriers are more significant than 
generating plant technical infrastructure feasibility. However, Bhave et al. are only examining 
generating plant efficiency and cost including carbon capture, so these conclusions do not 
extend to the limited progress to date toward large scale geological storage development 
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and the political reality that future deployment will significantly depend on public acceptance 
of the need for CCS (Aminu et al., 2017). 
Sanchez and Callaway (2016) provides one of the few studies of practical BECCS design 
issues and uses a spatially-explicit model based on data for biomass supply and 
transportation to look at optimising economies of scale. Bioenergy facilities are likely to be 
more economically viable the larger they are, but feedstock needs to be delivered from larger 
distances as facility size grows and near-by feedstock likely increases in price as a result. 
Modelling biomass supply and transportation costs for the US State of Illinois, Sanchez and 
Callaway find that larger scale BECCS power plants are favoured and the optimal scale is 
not sensitive to location in the State.  However, this may not be true for areas with limited 
road infrastructure or where biomass supply is not located near to geologic sites suitable for 
CO₂ storage. That is, these findings are likely to be highly specific to local and regional 
circumstances. 
The research discussed here illustrates the scale and timeline of investment now required 
to be devoted to BECCS or other NETs in the near-term if they are to be realistically and 
practically considered as mitigation measures in the long-term. 
5.6.1 Land carbon sequestration decision making 
Dooley and Gupta (2017) find that reliance on a balance between sources and sinks in the 
Paris Agreement (based in part on the assumption of large scale negative emissions in 
modelled projections) has high potential for serious political conflicts over land, especially 
as the responsibility for land based sinks and sequestration remains to be negotiated. Equity 
as well as technical feasibility and reversibility will need to be addressed (Canadell and 
Schulze, 2014; Hansis et al., 2015). In Europe, forest sequestration efficiency is only likely 
to be enhanced in 25% of cases and the possibility of forestry turning from a sink into a net 
carbon source is sufficient to change the merit order of alternatives for decision-makers 
(Valade et al., 2017). 
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5.7 Chapter Conclusions: Decision-making in mitigation policy 
If taken seriously and considered in the expert context given by the IPCC assessment, the 
Paris Agreement provides clear guidance to national decision-makers in developed nations: 
a very rapid reduction in global CO₂ emissions needs to begin now, without delay, reaching 
net zero soon after 2050; and, developed nations must lead with economy-wide reductions 
in emissions. The Paris Agreement reiterated the need for precautionary decision-making 
to face an unambiguous threat due to accumulating CO₂ emissions and increasing flows of 
non-CO₂ climate pollutants. Local emissions due to human consumption of energy and land 
are resulting in a ‘top-down’ Earth climate system response that will last for many centuries 
and can only escalate unless net CO₂ emissions go to zero quickly. In this physical sense 
climate change is a ‘simple’ problem; that is, stopping fossil fuel extraction, sooner or later, 
is necessary to “solve” the problem. The ‘wicked problem’ is entirely human and societal, 
the need to turn around a global techno-economic system that is built around fossil fuel use 
and the rapidly depleting time in which to do so. The 2x2 matrix of risk, uncertainty, 
ambiguity, ignorance (Stirling, 2007) gives a useful framework for policy decision-makers to 
identify types of “incertitude” and the appropriate types of responses and analyses. Adaptive 
governance responses (reacting to events) as favoured by ‘robust decision making’ methods 
to deal with uncertainty and ambiguity can only be successful if decision-makers also work 
within the precautionary context of the Paris Agreement acceptance of serious and 
escalating Knightian risk (due to increasing atmCO₂) that is greatly magnified by the 
plausible existential systemic risks hidden by deep uncertainty, or ignorance, that, 
nonetheless, cannot be ignored (Convery and Wagner, 2015; Weitzman, 2009). 
Decision makers, even, and possibly especially, national and local ones, need to realise that 
the very long-term and global impact of anthropogenic emissions causing ongoing global 
energy imbalance and resulting climate change is unlike any other problem faced by 
humanity.  Paris target-aligned collective action at local, national and regional levels 
demands actions that really do add up to permanent mitigation at the global level and over 
the very long-term with some high degree of certainty, otherwise the emissions and cost 
savings are too easily lost (Holz et al., 2017). That can only happen if emissions governance 
within Paris target aligned carbon budgets restricts rebound effects and free-riding. This 
means that every governance level needs to be limiting and reducing its own domestic 
emissions and also using all diplomatic means to ensure that others do not waste efforts 
(Price, 2015).  
In this sense, action by national decision-makers needs to be “middle up”, pushing both 
domestically and internationally to systemically address the overriding top-down effect due 
to the physics of our climate system, a dual obligation that extends to equity and climate 
justice in meeting the Paris Agreement (Holz et al., 2017, p. 15). Economic and societal 
resilience within Paris-aligned pathways requires early action to divert from existing GHG-
intensive policies so that potential for employment losses, stranded assets and potential 
sudden economic shocks is minimised. Climate justice also requires decision-makers to 
recognise that climate mitigation to meet the WB2C target is a zero sum game within the 
associated WB2C carbon budget range: every tonne of CO₂ used locally or in the near-term 
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is one that others cannot use in future – unless there is a serious national commitment to 
definitely achieving substantial negative emissions to extend the budget (Peters et al., 
2015).  
So far, nations, particularly richer nations, have failed to take difficult decisions even though 
delay makes future action ever more difficult. Continued GHG intensive economic growth 
itself threatens climate action unless economy-wide emissions fall year-on-year. The recent 
apparent levelling off in global CO₂ emissions would need to turn quickly into rapid emissions 
reduction through the coordinated and collective decisions and governance choices at local, 
national and regional levels.  
Decisions looking toward achieving a nett-zero CO₂ emissions society by 2050 will need a 
context of public understanding of the level of action needed so that decisions are supported. 
In nations with high per capita or high total emissions decision-makers will need to make 
difficult choices (such as demand reduction) without delay (Anderson et al., 2015). The 
WB2C target means climate mitigation policy is a near-term problem, each year of continued 
high emissions takes another large bite out of a nation’s equitable share of the remaining 
WB2C global carbon budget. In climate change mitigation policy, the most limited resource 
is now time. However difficult, effective decisions are needed to take a very different path to 
ensure a low carbon transition starts immediately to achieve substantial and sustained 
reduction in gross emissions with very limited dependence on negative emissions. 
  
124 
 
6 Governance, mechanisms and accounting for low carbon 
transition, including options for NETs and bioenergy 
Summary 
• Effective governance is essential to enable sustained climate change mitigation and 
prevent rebound effects (free riding on past efforts or misreporting CDR).  
• Policy dependence on carbon dioxide removal (CDR) by NETs requires policy 
statements committing to well defined and quantified investment time-steps in 
research, institutional design, legal enabling, and pilot project delivery.  
• Developing NETs at large scales sufficient to prolong fossil fuel use demands near-
term global coordination to allocate responsibility, drive investment and enable 
reliable monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of CDR.  
• Regulation of absolute carbon emissions and uniform or global carbon taxes continue 
to be strongly resisted by many actors in global, regional and national governance 
though they are key mitigation measures in almost all research.  
• Carbon markets and market-based carbon pricing (flexible mechanisms) are 
increasingly used globally, but their effectiveness in achieving verifiable mitigation is 
strongly contested. 
• Carbon accounting is often contested or questionable.  
• Unabated BE use is generally being incorrectly accounted as carbon neutral in the 
energy sector, even though bioenergy may have significant nett CO₂ emissions 
depending on crop rotation time, land use and combustion efficiency. Strictly enforced 
sustainability criteria would be needed to ensure carbon neutrality but these are 
mostly absent.  
• In current EU policy only fossil CO₂ capture would be credited in CCS; bioenergy CO₂ 
is accounted exclusively in the land sector, so capture and storage on use cannot 
attract additional credit. Policy change is therefore needed to credit (incentivise) 
BECCS relative to unabated BE use. 
• Land carbon storage accounts for 20-25% of Paris NDC decarbonisation pledges to 
2030 yet land carbon accounting has very large uncertainties and profound 
implications for societies, land use and equity. 
• If the Paris limit is to be met and NETs are needed then CO₂ storage in geologic 
formations is an essential backstop technology for CDR, otherwise land carbon 
storage (subject to reversal) has little long-term value. 
• Strong internationally coordinated MRV protocols are essential for NETs. For some 
NETs such as soil carbon sequestration, the cost of MRV necessary to verify and 
assure additionality may be excessive.  
• Developing effective NETs at the speed and scale necessary for a WB2C carbon 
budget, even allowing transient overshoot, may have profound social, environmental 
and economic implications that need to be thoroughly considered in mitigation policy 
and weighed against the risks of inaction and other mitigation actions. 
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6.1 Governance issues for climate change mitigation, including NETs 
If NETS are to play a significant role in low carbon transitions aligned with “well below 2ºC” 
(WB2C) decarbonisation and within the associated global carbon budget, then international 
cooperation and coherent governance will be needed to drive forward agreements, including 
regulatory, pricing and market instruments that emphasise global mitigation achievement 
(IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, p. Ch. 13). Developing NETs to ease mitigation pathways will 
require global negotiations, international coordination of carbon removal and storage 
accounting and national commitments to allocate and monitor responsibility for investment 
and delivery of negative emissions (Peters and Geden, 2017). Mechanisms including border 
carbon instruments may be needed to account for traded carbon – the emissions embodied 
in extracted fossil fuel and in goods and services – that accounts for large fractions of global 
emissions (Peters et al., 2012); although a decarbonised global energy system aligned with 
the Paris Agreement may, in itself, significantly reduce energy related shipping by 2050 
(Sharmina et al., 2017).  If climate action is addressed ambitiously and backed up by some 
level of enforcement, the defined Paris temperature target potentially reduces the incentives 
for nations to delay action on the basis of less clear targets (Gerlagh and Michielsen, 2015). 
Large amounts of global finance and investment will need to be scaled up in both developing 
and developed nations, particularly directed toward overcoming barriers to deploying 
mitigation measures (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, p. Ch. 16). Some international and national 
mechanisms for meeting greenhouse gas mitigation targets will need to be updated as they 
currently do not account for negative emissions so financial incentives are lacking for both 
public and private investment (Bhave et al., 2017, p. 488). Carbon governance is strongly 
tied to energy planning and the reality of outcomes. Analysing European energy policy, 
Szulecki and Westphal (2014) describe “five cardinal sins” in EU energy governance 
primarily due to failing to address tensions between national self-interest and EU solidarity, 
and inadequate attention to energy security and climate concerns, particularly due to a short-
term focus at the expense of long-term effectiveness. Contrary to widespread mainstream 
economic criticism of the interaction between renewable energy targets and the ETS, del 
Río (2017) argues that multidisciplinary economic theory favours the combination, 
particularly to enable long-term policy goals, provided other coordination policies are in 
place, such as dedicated RES-E support in addition to a carbon price. 
The core driver for carbon governance is the level and clarity of carbon quota committed to 
(and reliably achievable) by any particular basket of planned policies. If that commitment is 
vague then governance is likely to be vague. A CO₂ emission pathway over time to zero nett 
emissions within a fixed carbon quota needs to add up and show the planned sectoral gross 
emissions and dependence (if any) on negative emissions. Any dependence on land use 
carbon sinks or bioenergy requires stringent carbon accounting and strong MMV to ensure 
additionality. Trans-boundary transfers of emissions (“carbon leakage”) appears to 
significantly compound the difficulties of MMV, with quite asymmetrical motivations, 
incentives and interests for the parties to such transfers. 
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6.2 Governance of land carbon sequestration 
Estimates of future bioenergy resource and land carbon sequestration assessments are 
dependent on data that has large uncertainties and on divergent modelling assumptions of 
future food and bioenergy demand, land use productivity (based on technology and 
environmental constraints), residue and waste availability, economic growth, population and 
diet (Slade et al., 2014). Surveying 90 studies of biomass potential, Slade et al. finds they 
are: systematically biased toward optimistic scenarios by focusing on sustainable pathways 
and avoiding examination of unsustainable paths; and difficult to compare due to a large 
range of inconsistent assumptions and the use of poorly defined terms. Effective regulatory 
governance within defined legal frameworks, with monitoring and verification to give 
sustainability assurance, and investment in learning by doing to gather evidence (to resolve 
current bioenergy emissions controversy), are essential to environmentally responsible 
bioenergy production and energy CO₂ mitigation (Slade et al., 2014). In a systematic 
literature review, Stechemesser and Guenther (2012) find the term ‘carbon accounting’ has 
differing definitions across different disciplines and governance scales, being directed 
toward different purposes, both monetary and non-monetary. To aid comparability 
Stechemesser and Guenther (2012) give an operational definition17 of carbon accounting 
for use by researchers, policymakers and business, which could be extended to include 
climate impacts. In social and environmental accounting, particularly as used by business 
organisations, carbon accounting has been compliance and inventory based but Ascui 
(2014) advocates a stronger focus on interdisciplinary efforts to extend carbon accounting 
toward climate responsibility and informing societal choices more widely. 
Similarly, Fuss et al. (2014a) shows the need for consistency in science and policy narratives 
toward developing NETs, and identifies risks in mitigation dependence on future negative 
emissions given large uncertainties in: biomass supply and carbon storage; the Earth 
system carbon cycle response from land and ocean sinks; cost estimates that vary greatly 
among NETs and other mitigation options; and the complexity of policy and institutional 
change requiring global frameworks of monitoring, regulations, instruments and pricing, all 
of which may meet significant political and cultural resistance. Nonetheless, Lomax et al. 
(2015) argue that the escalating risk of severe climate impacts and the inadequate progress 
in cutting gross emissions mean that there are also large risks in delaying policy 
engagement with NETs. Therefore: policy planning and medium-term funding needs to 
include but not depend on NETs options; negative emissions need to be fully integrated into 
emissions accounting mechanisms; and explicit policy for near-term investment is needed 
for pilot projects aimed at rapid scaling up of BECCS and other NETs in order to “learn by 
doing”. Due to their differences in mitigation quality, permanent CO₂ storage in geologic 
 
                                            
17 Carbon accounting definition by Stechemesser and Guenther (2012, p. 36): “carbon accounting 
comprises the recognition, the non-monetary and monetary evaluation and the monitoring of 
greenhouse gas emissions on all levels of the value chain and the recognition, evaluation and 
monitoring of the effects of these emissions on the carbon cycle of ecosystems”. 
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reservoirs, and impermanent CO₂ storage by terrestrial sequestration in forests and soils, 
which is vulnerable to future disturbance and to climate impacts, are not equivalent (IPCC 
AR5 WG1, 2013, p. Ch. 6.5). Therefore, permanent and temporary carbon stocks and sinks 
will need to be carefully distinguished in policy mechanisms to account for the differences in 
mitigation effectiveness.  
Grassi et al. (2017) show that land use and especially forests supply a quarter of the 
decarbonisation pledged by UNFCCC nations in the submitted Paris Agreement NDCs, 
globally reducing from 1990-2010 gross land use emissions of 1.3 ± 1.1 GtCO₂e yr-1 by 
mitigation efforts to  a net sink of -1.1 ± 0.5 GtCO₂e yr-1 by 2030. For such pledges to have 
any credibility, given a current discrepancy of about 3 GtCO₂e yr-1 between scientific studies 
and country estimates, there is an urgent need for far more rigorous monitoring and 
verification, greater data transparency, and increased common understanding of what 
actually can be considered an ‘anthropogenic sink’ (2017).  
Another study similarly finds the NDCs expect a 20% contribution from the LULUCF sector 
(mostly from a small set of countries) despite very significant data uncertainties and “a lack 
of technical know-how and capacity on issues that will ensure the additionality and 
environmental integrity of LULUCF measures” (Forsell et al., 2016). Beyond the need for 
rapid decarbonisation in Paris-aligned pathways, policy and IAM dependence on land sinks 
and increased biological production for energy has profound political, economic, land use 
and equity implications for the working of mechanisms developed to deliver negative 
emissions and BECCS (Dooley and Gupta, 2017).  
6.3 Low carbon transition governance: social and civic mechanisms  
Following a low carbon transition pathway to zero nett CO₂ emissions within a WB2C global 
carbon budget will require societal efforts including mechanisms, instruments and 
behavioural change that add up to the scientific Earth system requirement to ensure 
“substantial and sustained reductions in GHG emissions” to limit climate change (IPCC AR5 
WG1, 2013, p. 19). Governance, involving multiple actors and networks across society as 
well as government, and political economy (the societal balance of government, corporate 
interests and civil society), are “critical determinants” in climate mitigation, equity and 
sustainable development outcomes (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, p. 297). In particular, low 
carbon transition governance will involve: respecting biophysical planetary limits; assessing 
complex intergenerational impacts; acknowledging that effective responses may require a 
fundamental restructuring of economic and social systems; and a need for strongly coherent 
national and international efforts to address multiple issues including climate change (IPCC 
AR5 WG3, 2014, pp. 297–298). As this WG3 assessment points out, political controversy is 
inevitable in climate governance because key actors at all scales have different views of 
burden sharing, and therefore “the pertinent policies are highly contentious given the 
combination of factors at play, prominent among which are finance, politics, ineffective 
institutions, and vested interests”.  
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To enable focused discussion of different types of governance, Midttun (2005) gives a 
simplified model of governance (see Figure 6.1) with three core societal actors -– civil 
society, government and industry – that relate through broad “exchange arenas”: denoted 
as, political, regulatory and commercial. Viewing different governance forms in this model: 
a welfare state political economy emphasises political exchange between civil society and 
government, whereas neo-liberal political economy emphasises commercial exchange 
between industry and civil society. 
  
 
Figure 6.1: A simplified model of societal governance with three core societal actors and 
exchange ‘arenas’ between them. Reproduced from Midttun (2005) 
 
Carbon governance can include multi-stakeholder initiatives involving non-government and 
government actors – industry groups, business entities and environmental and 
developmental NGOs – creating legal and voluntary frameworks aiming to achieve climate 
mitigation. However, power and capacity imbalances can limit the effectiveness of such 
initiatives. For example, Moog et al. (2015) present a case study of the Forest Stewardship 
Council, which established new standards for forest and forest products but has failed to 
substantially change forestry practices or reduce tropical deforestation. 
Without wide political and citizen support for stringent climate policy and/or rising carbon 
taxes, mitigation mechanisms are unlikely to be durable or effective. In a survey of citizens 
in British Columbia, Canada, respondents had little awareness of climate policy types but 
were more likely to express support for regulations (such as energy efficiency or zero-carbon 
electricity) rather than supporting a carbon tax (Rhodes et al., 2014). Citizen knowledge of 
climate policy, even with more information on projected policy effectiveness, did not translate 
into greater support for it. Rhodes et al. conclude that regulations may be more acceptable 
than carbon taxation, and trusted key influencers in a community may well have more impact 
in advancing carbon mitigation than simply providing “more” information. 
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6.4 Regulatory mechanisms in a low carbon transition 
Dependable policy commitment to decarbonisation regulation lowers required carbon prices 
in economic models for low carbon transition. Section 2.6.5 in IPCC WG3 gives a full 
discussion of a range of risks and uncertainties choosing and designing the many types of 
policy instruments focussing on interventions targeting emissions through carbon taxes and 
regulation, and on those promoting Research, Development, Deployment and Diffusion, 
RDD&D (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, p. 184). Setting an enforced cap or price floor on emissions 
can stabilise finance and investment expectations. In stimulating RDD&D in new 
technologies, the use of a feed-in tariff system to reduce investment risks and give 
assurances as in Germany has been found to outperform quota-type systems, as used in 
the UK, based on incentivising investment and limiting rises in energy costs (IPCC AR5 
WG3, 2014, p. 184). Uncertainties in policy instruments undermined investor confidence 
when they are not well designed: allowance trading markets and renewables quotas can 
dampen investment, in contrast to subsidies and feed-in tariffs that can overheat markets 
while wasting public money, i.e., tacitly “non-cost-optimal” means toward achieving stated 
policy targets (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, p. 184). However, the IPCC assessment here seems 
more focused on the effectiveness in increasing the market penetration of low carbon 
technology as opposed to assessing policy achievement in mitigation aiming to reduce 
absolute emissions. 
Hildén et al. (2014) examine formal and independent climate policy evaluation in the EU 
finding that formal policy and evaluations, even though narrowly focused on aggregate 
emissions targets, are often in themselves highly political and “many actors in the EU have 
preferred to keep evaluators on a tight leash” (2014). Barriers to evaluation identified include 
limited data access and transparency, lack of resources and capacity within governance 
networks (including NGOs) to carry out mitigation evaluation, and political resistance to 
systematic monitoring and evaluation that would allow accurate ex ante and ex post 
assessments (2014). 
Rather than emphasising emission permits or a carbon tax, Allen et al. (Allen et al., 2009) 
suggest a more effective global framework (still based on limiting total future cumulative 
emissions) would be to make a legally binding obligation on fossil fuel extractors to deliver 
carbon dioxide removal commensurate with extraction. In this proposal, the fossil fuel 
industry (including state actors where relevant) is required to be responsible for avoiding all 
climate pollution resulting from their extraction, a potentially far simpler and enforceable 
regulatory requirement than global governance of carbon taxes or trade. Nonetheless, as 
the authors admit, the resistance from extractors would be significant, and regressive 
inequities within and between nations resulting from increased energy costs would need to 
be balanced by other distributive economic policy. 
Lower national compliance levels under the Kyoto Protocol were strongly correlated with 
higher consumption per capita suggesting that achieving sufficient GHG mitigation may 
involve reduced consumption. This finding is prima facie in conflict with the common political 
(and often citizen) voiced preference for continuing economic growth (as also included in 
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the Sustainable Development Goals) — unless rapid, absolute, decoupling of consumption 
from climate pollution proves possible (Harris and Lee, 2017).  
Climate change policy and governance decisions are often subject to sustained under-
reaction by governments (possibly motivated by blame-avoidance) due to the relative 
invisibility – or intermittent visibility – of climate change concerns, coupled with the relative 
ease of avoiding climate action compared to other public policy priorities (Howlett and 
Kemmerling, 2017). This means that inaction and limited symbolic measures are possible 
for governments unless focusing events or sustained political pressure make blame 
unavoidable, in which case credit claiming impulses can prevail (Leong and Howlett, 2017). 
Leading up to the Climate Change Act (2008) in the UK, a combination of factors – cross-
party attention focused on leadership, a long-term agenda set by the public and civic actors, 
and the publication of the Stern Review – enabled a credit claiming environment that led to 
adoption of five-yearly, interim carbon budgets overseen by a somewhat independent 
Committee on Climate Change (Gillard et al., 2017). However, surveying UK policy makers 
and documents since 2008, Gillard et al. find contradictory political pressures shifting 
between claims of decarbonising efficacy and economic efficiency have led to increasingly 
incoherent climate change policy, undermining UK climate policy ambition.  
Carbon intensity of fuels or GHG intensity of products or sectors are often stated as a basis 
for standards or targets in climate policy. Examining the LCA methodologies underpinning 
fuel carbon intensity standards in California, Oregon, British Columbia and the EU, Plevin et 
al. (2017) conclude that such standards are “inevitably subjective and unverifiable” and 
therefore unreliable in promoting technologies beneficial to emissions reduction. Plevin et 
al. suggest a more effective alternative to intensity drivers are national and regional 
regulatory caps on total sector GHGs, including biogenic CO₂, particularly in transport and 
agriculture, and ratcheting caps down over time; or “less desirably”, imposing a carbon tax.  
Given the climate mitigation requirement to limit absolute future emissions, avoiding 
complex modelling and attributional or consequential LCAs that are ill-suited to enabling 
reliable mitigation outcomes makes sense. Focusing efforts on policy commitments that add 
up to meeting whole-economy and sectoral emission caps may well be more reliable climate 
policy. 
6.5 Carbon pricing for climate change mitigation 
A universally applied and then escalating global carbon price is a key assumption in the 
modelled cost effectiveness scenario runs detailed in the AR5 Scenario Database and in 
the IPCC’s assessment (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, p. Ch. 7). Despite this assumed significance 
for climate policy, the IPCC WG3 assessment (2014 see see Ch. 13 to 16) is surprisingly 
limited in detailing current international mechanisms for coordinated carbon pricing (via a 
tax or through emissions trading) and international finance measures (redistributing 
revenues from high emitters to fund mitigation in poorer nations). Assessing national and 
sub-national policies and instruments, Chapter 15 provides the most detailed sections on 
economic instruments (taxes, subsidies and emissions trading), regulatory approaches and 
government provision of public goods. Economic growth theory (assuming ideal conditions 
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of foresight, rapid change and information) indicates that cost effective mitigation requires 
an economy-wide and market-based focus on cutting absolute emissions. However, the 
IPCC acknowledges that sector-specific policies are more commonly used, especially due 
to strong sectoral policy networks within nations that undermine the priority attaching to cost-
effective climate policy.  Path dependent political feasibility is given as a reason for the loose 
and non-binding caps in existing cap-and-trade systems that have limited mitigation 
effectiveness. Carbon taxes have been implemented in some countries enabling some local 
relative decoupling, but usually differential values are applied between sectors for reasons 
of political feasibility rather than mitigation efficacy, again reducing mitigation cost-
effectiveness (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, p. Ch. 7). Government commitments to climate policy, 
finance mechanisms and regulatory trajectories (such as emission caps and price floors and 
ceilings) increase investment confidence and ease societal low-carbon behavioural 
transitions. Civil society stakeholders including independent media and NGOs are seen as 
having a major role in raising public awareness by using technical and scientific 
understanding in advocacy and monitoring, thereby enhancing accountability – ideally 
encouraged by an inclusive approach across climate policy governance (IPCC AR5 WG3, 
2014, p. Ch. 7). NGOs have had a significant role in assessing the NDCs up to CoP21 in 
Paris and this is expected to continue in the Paris Agreement’s pledge and review system 
(Jacquet and Jamieson, 2016, p. 645). 
Applying a rising and uniform carbon fee is often advocated in climate economics to 
maximise social welfare at least cost, by driving adoption of low carbon energy supply and 
consumption of low carbon goods and services and limit rebound effects, while also raising 
revenue that may be used to reduce other taxes (Baranzini et al., 2017). Nationally, 
subsidies are often used to support early-stage mitigation technologies but can be far 
costlier than a carbon fee to achieve the same mitigation (Baranzini et al., 2017). Contrary 
to this dominant view, based on evidence from the US, Jenkins (2014) details political 
economy constraints on economically optimal, “first-best” carbon pricing including: the 
opposition of incumbent vested interests, holding either principal agent powers or potentially 
stranded assets; and citizens having a low “willingness-to-pay” for decarbonisation 
measures. Therefore, a mix of “second-best” regulatory policies may in fact be optimal in 
practical reality to drive mitigation effectiveness. These may include direct procurement of 
emissions abatement (as in a clean energy plan), linking long-term climate damages to 
immediate co-benefits (as in controlling air pollution), and leading, and responding to, 
changes in public understanding with adaptive policy design to ratchet up decarbonisation 
measures (2014).   
At present carbon prices globally are effectively very low and, in the short term, raising them 
will bring in revenue. However, if mitigation policy is ultimately successful in reaching near-
zero emissions globally then revenues will again reach near-zero so there is a trade-off in 
future policy between welfare-maximising and revenue-maximising incentives (Wang et al., 
2017). Using the DICE BCA IAM, Wang et al. therefore conclude that revenue-raising from 
carbon taxes may be a useful incentive in the short to medium term but climate mitigation 
policy will also require regulation and policy measures to limit emissions, otherwise in the 
long-term very high carbon taxes rates will be needed theoretically even as carbon tax 
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revenues go to zero with decreasing and even negative emissions. This conclusion is greatly 
magnified by inspecting the cumulative emissions under the curves in Wang et al. (Wang et 
al., 2017), see Figure 6.2, indicating about 3000 GtCO₂ to be emitted over the next 100 
years under the "welfare maximising" curve (until net zero CO₂ emissions by 2120), and 
more than 10,000 GtCO₂ to be emitted under "revenue maximising" policies, with emissions 
still at an extremely high level thereafter at 50 GtCO₂ yr-1. Given the WB2C global carbon 
budget is likely less than 1000 GtCO₂, even the notionally “welfare maximising” curve 
appears to be incompatible with the Paris temperature goals, and reliant on extraordinary 
amounts of CDR from NETs of over 40 GtCO₂ yr-1. Again, as in other similar analyses, this 
output seems to point to a wide gulf between the DICE model damage function and the best 
available science accepted by the UNFCCC Parties in the Paris Agreement. As discussed 
in Chapter 4.2, the damage functions used in DICE and other BCA IAMs are very poorly 
defined and highly questionable – when modelled for “revenue maximisation”, global climate 
damage in 2200 is estimated as only 5.2% of GDP, despite using up enough fossil fuel 
carbon to result in 6ºC warming (based on Fig. SPM.10 IPCC AR5 WG1, 2013), a warming 
level and velocity of change that many scientists would consider catastrophic in impacts on 
human and natural systems as well as likely passing numerous known tipping points. 
Abating trillions of tonnes of CO₂ to avoid the impacts of emitting seems implausible. 
Therefore, for policy planning and governance decisions, economic analyses based on 
DICE appear to be of schematic value at best for policy planning. As indicated by the 
acceptance of the science in the Paris Agreement, a far more precautionary, risk-based 
approach would seem necessary even within economic analysis (Heal and Millner, 2014).  
 
Figure 6.2: Reproduced from Figure 1(a) and (b) of Wang et al. (2017): "Results as 
calculated by the DICE-2013R model under the welfare-maximizing, revenue-
maximizing and zero-carbon-tax cases: (a) optimized carbon price paths in 2005 US 
dollars. (The green area illustrates where increased carbon price would increase 
carbon-tax revenue. The blue area shows where decreasing carbon price would 
increase carbon-tax revenue.) (b) CO₂-equivalent emissions to the atmosphere,” 
 
Using WITCH, an unusual IAM with a game-theoretic structure to optimise global, low 
carbon transitions, minimising future notional cost, Carraro et al. (2012) explore investment 
needs and distribution by region and sector over time. As also shown by Wang et al. above, 
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carbon tax revenues peak and then decline (forming a “carbon Laffer” curve), at least for 
scenarios meeting 460 ppm and 500 ppm atmCO₂ levels by 2100 (approximately equivalent 
to 2.5ºC warming above pre-industrial, see Figure 12.43 IPCC AR5 WG1, 2013; Zickfeld et 
al., 2013).  
 
Figure 6.3: Revenues from carbon taxes in OECD economies in absolute value (a) and 
as a fraction of GDP (b). Reproduced from Figure 10 of Carraro et al. (2012). 
In the 460 ppm scenario carbon revenues become negative in the developed world regions 
after 2050 (see Figure 6.3, left, ‘Cap-and-Trade') to subsidise negative emissions from 
facilities combining biomass with integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) coal with 
carbon capture and storage. Carraro et al. (2012) makes the important point that, even in a 
tax-based policy that would usually exclude direct subsidies, subsidised CDR is found to be 
welfare enhancing because CO₂ is a stock pollutant, therefore a cost effectiveness 
framework requires that the atmospheric CO₂ stock must be kept below the scenario target 
limit. However, increases in taxes or reduced public expenditures are needed to fund 
continuing CDR. In this “riskless environment” cost estimates undervalue the investments 
and difficulties in managing a real transition to a global power sector involving large amounts 
of CCS, bioenergy, nuclear and wind power (Carraro et al. 2012). 
Also using the WITCH IAM, Favero et al. (2017) examines the global use of forests to store 
carbon, including active afforestation and reforestation (AR), and/or to supply woody 
biomass to BECCS electricity generation. Ignoring potential direct climate change effects 
(albedo decrease due to conifer planting and fire and beetle losses due to warming), the 
least notional-cost pathway is to use both forest storage and BECCS, with forest carbon 
storage dominating while carbon prices are low, tending toward larger trees and mature 
forest land use, and BECCS takes over as carbon prices rise increasing plantation forestry. 
Given the 14.5 GtCO₂ yr-1 in removals by AR and BECCS over the 2020–2100 period, the 
RCP2.6 2050 and 2100 carbon prices of US$200 tCO₂-1 seem remarkably low, perhaps 
implausibly so, compared to other global modelling. 
On regional cooperation IPCC (2014, p. 1087) note that, even with its deep integration, the 
EU has only had very limited success achieving mitigation objectives using market-based 
carbon pricing. The EU ETS has provided a functioning cap and trade system but has not 
driven mitigation, because it has yielded only a very modest carbon price to date, below €10 
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tCO₂-1 – explained by excessive free credits to incumbent polluters, the financial crisis and 
incoherence with energy efficiency and renewable policies. One interpretation then is that 
the financial crisis "co-incidentally" delivered a lot of unanticipated mitigation, so that the 
mitigation "left" for the ETS to achieve was relatively trivial. Strictly speaking, the ETS did 
exactly (and only) what was asked of it, that is, to ensure that a specific level of mitigation is 
achieved, and do so at the least overall "societal cost". The ETS was not designed to take 
the opportunity to ratchet up mitigation ambition (by dynamically tightening the emissions 
cap, in the face of the low realised carbon price), so the deeper questions regarding the ETS 
are the EU’s governance arrangements around it, specifically the collective political will of 
the EU Member States to deliver additional emission reductions even in adverse economic 
circumstances. Given the necessity for UNFCCC Parties to ratchet up ambition to meet a 
WB2C carbon budget, carbon pricing and emission caps likely need to be designed to 
ensure that “free-riders” do not take advantage of short-term system mitigation gains due to 
economic downturns or due to the mitigation efforts of others. 
6.6 Accounting for differences in carbon sequestration permanence 
The AR5 report on mitigation (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014) briefly mentions the issue of 
sequestration permanence, noting “[t]he properties of potential carbon storage reservoirs 
are also critically important, as limits to reservoir capacity and longevity will constrain the 
quantity and permanence of CO₂ storage” (p. 489), and notes the problems of non-
permanence (reversibility) and saturation in land carbon stocks in forestry and soils (Section 
11.3.2). Unfortunately, there appears to be insufficient WG3 assessment of past literature 
relating to the consequent importance of pricing and accounting for carbon sequestration 
non-permanence in mitigation policy (possibly because relatively few papers on this topic 
were published after AR4 and up to the AR5 cut-off date). Nonetheless, as the available 
research does make clear, it is critical for effective mechanisms to provide assurance that 
mitigation is additional to what would have occurred without the specific intervention, and 
account for any re-emission of CO₂ from carbon sequestration reservoirs, whether from land 
sinks or geological storage. 
Focusing on soil carbon sequestration (SCS) science and policy, Thamo and Pannell (2016) 
find potentially perverse outcomes mean that policymakers have three choices: 
• ensure extremely rigorous monitoring and verification of additionality and 
sequestration (necessitating high transaction costs);  
• simplify the scheme resulting in lower costs but inefficient and unreliable mitigation;  
• Or, as the study concludes, accept the balance of evidence that policy reliance on 
SCS-attributed mitigation is an ill-advised, cost-ineffective and unreliable approach, 
especially as there are very strong land management reasons (soil fertility and water 
retention) to act to store carbon in soil in any case without the need for additional 
incentives.  
 
Assessing potential adjustment of SCS for permanence, leakage, and additionality Murray 
et al. (2007) find limited empirical evidence of lost sequestration but agree that large 
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sequestration discounts (losses of economic value due to carbon loss) are possible, though 
the relatively low opportunity cost of SCS may still make the sequestration worthwhile. 
However, Murray et al. (2007) do not seem to consider fully the potentially very high 
transaction costs of stringent MMV that is likely needed to guarantee reliable sequestration.  
Protecting ‘set-aside’ forest areas from harvest and land-use conversion using incentive 
payments potentially increases carbon stock permanence (and adds biodiversity and other 
co-benefits). Based on economic analysis, more flexible programmes, crediting both set-
aside areas and additional carbon stock on other lands, are far less susceptible to ‘leakage’ 
effects than programmes solely crediting set-aside (Sun and Sohngen, 2009). Using perfect-
foresight, optimisation modelling of stylised, future carbon markets in the US, Haim et al. 
(2014) assess the permanence of afforested agricultural land (and its sequestered carbon) 
assuming 30 USD tCO₂-1 and 50 USD tCO₂-1 carbon prices, finding that Midwest regions 
continue largely unharvested through 2060, but large areas of Southern regions, which have 
shorter forestry rotation times, are harvested and returned to agricultural use.  
All carbon mitigation options (even in geological storage) are potentially temporary relative 
to the millennial scale influence of atmospheric CO₂. Herzog et al. (2003) defines 
‘sequestration effectiveness’ as “the ratio of the benefit gained from temporary storage 
compared to the benefit gained if the storage was [literally] permanent”. Using a basic, 
theoretical economic analysis to examine deep ocean CO₂ sequestration of differing 
duration, Herzog et al. find that excessive use of non-permanent reservoirs is equivalent to 
burning excess fossil fuels, inequitably passing on the costs to future generations. For low 
discount rates approaching zero, if carbon prices rise at near the discount rate, then 
sequestration effectiveness also approaches zero unless an effective ‘backstop’ technology 
such as CCS is available – providing CDR at a high but dependable cost (2003). Herzog 
reject the ‘ton-year accounting’ approach for temporary storage (based on the 100 year 
GWP100 metric period) as lacking any economic or scientific rationale. A more scientific and 
economically logical accounting assesses emissions and removals as separate events, and 
sequestration removals as a permanent liability for the owner, which require a best-estimate 
of the expected price path given the sequestration effectiveness of the CDR. For a fixed 
global carbon budget of future cumulative emissions (as in emission pathways aligned with 
the Paris Agreement), even with a very slow rate of leakage, temporary sequestration 
options have little value compared to permanent (geological) storage (2003). This theoretical 
finding would seem to rule out land carbon sequestration (in forest and soils) in particular as 
a useful mitigation option unless whole-economy mitigation (globally as well as nationally) 
is achieving deep decarbonisation in line with a WB2C target.  
To develop sequestration incentives that account for potential loss of sequestered carbon, 
Marland et al. (2001) reject the asymmetry in emissions and removals in ton-year accounting 
(like Herzog et al.), and develop a liability-based framework of emitters offsetting the debits 
for their emissions by renting credits from the owner of the sequestered carbon, based on 
continuous ownership and responsibility for the sequestered carbon (transferrable through 
sale). An alternative, though again similar proposal is for a system of 5 year ‘expiring credits’ 
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based on “clear and strict” rules, again dependent on strong MMV, to enable proof of 
sequestration validity (Maréchal and Hecq, 2006).  
For land carbon storage alternatives of forest management and agricultural tillage, Kim et 
al. (2008) find that sequestration payments may require a non-permanence discount of 50% 
(valued at 50% of the carbon price) – due to the ease of re-emission – and these “offsets” 
may well be worthless if carbon prices escalate at or near the discount rate because rising 
price result in rising ‘buyback’ liability costs for the sequestration owner and high payments 
to carbon stock owners to maintain stored carbon. Agreeing with Herzog et al. (2003), only 
a dependable backstop technology (like CCS) to provide very-near permanent storage 
enables land-carbon sequestration to be worthwhile even in the near- to medium-term. 
In summary, particularly in land-based NETs, carbon pricing needs to account explicitly for 
non-permanence in sequestration, and define the reliability and costs of backstop 
technologies including BECCS and DACCS. The IPCC AR5 Working Groups Guidance Note 
for Lead Authors states: 
… low-probability outcomes can have significant impacts, particularly when 
characterized by large magnitude, long persistence, broad prevalence, and/or 
irreversibility.  (Mastrandrea et al., 2010) 
Non-permanence of carbon sequestration is dependent on the type of carbon storage but, 
particularly in the case of terrestrial carbon stores, can have a high probability of reversibility 
with significant magnitude of persistent climate effect. Given the policy focus on land 
sequestration as opposed to geological storage (CCS), the apparent lack of recent attention 
to this issue for carbon storage of all types is concerning and needs further assessment. 
6.7 Market mechanisms for climate mitigation 
International carbon markets and international emissions trading theoretically minimise 
mitigation cost by directing funds to the most efficient and cost-effective interventions. Using 
a CEA IAM, Hof et al. (2017) find that allowing emission trading would be about half as costly 
for the more sustainable SSP1 assumption than for the SSP3 assumptions of fast expanding 
population, weak economic growth, and high inequality. In this socioeconomic modelling, 
emission trading with a uniform carbon price greatly reduces global costs for the NDCs – by 
more than half for the unconditional NDCs and by less than half for the conditional NDCs 
(2017). It is much more expensive to meet 1.5ºC or 2ºC pathways by 2030 (twice and 5 to 
6 times as high, respectively) than to meet the conditional NDCs but this effort is now 
required if the Paris temperature goals are to be met (2017). The flexible mechanisms 
developed under the Kyoto Protocol, including the Clean Development Mechanism, have 
supported its economic viability but their environmental and decarbonisation effectiveness 
is contested (IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014, p. Ch. 13.13). Despite sixteen compliance carbon 
markets in operation around the world, and more planned, Pearse and Böhm (2014) 
emphatically argue that carbon markets are a very poor climate policy choice. Ten 
theoretical and empirical criticisms that undermine the standard economic rationale are 
described including: ineffectiveness, fraudulent credits, lack of additionality, evasion of 
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responsibility by richer nations, acting as a fossil fuel subsidy, supporting regressive carbon 
taxation, and endorsing a highly contested view that natural capital such as forests can be 
priced. The EU ETS is given as one example of carbon markets as an obstacle to effective 
mitigation by forming a political barrier and an evasionary compliance mechanism through 
buying carbon credits of sometimes dubious value from brokers and speculators in markets 
that can obstruct and delay other more meaningful domestic action to enable 
decarbonisation, such as actions to ensure energy transition. Spash (2010) similarly 
concludes that theoretical claims of the mitigation cost effectiveness of carbon trading are 
heavily undermined by strong uncertainty and high complexity which perpetuate path 
dependant control and profit-taking that distract and detract from necessary system and 
behavioural change in nations.  
Futures contracts are a market instrument that could enable polluters to buy units of CDR 
at a fixed price per tonne of CO₂ and allows trading of such contracts as mitigation prices 
change, but there may be a large potential for market failure unless the long-term security 
on CO₂ storage can be guaranteed by sovereign states, perhaps by issuing state-backed 
futures for land and geological carbon sequestration (Coffman and Lockley, 2017). From a 
social research perspective, Leijonhufvud and Fitts (2015) suggest an optimistic view that 
capital markets may be a key in addressing climate change, if pressure from long-term 
investors and the divestment movement can result in risk management reflecting climate 
and other long-term risks, reform of investment reporting standards, and much stronger 
regulatory oversight of the finance and investment industry. However, analysis by Strand 
(2016) suggests that a nation with future expectation of climate finance payments for 
mitigation or binding climate treaty regulation then has an economic incentive to deliberately 
increase near-term emissions and maintain them at a high level, thereby increasing the likely 
level of future payments and boosting apparent difficulty and cost of mitigation. Shielding 
high emitters from near-term costs is similarly prone to failure unless very clear baselines 
and pathways are specified as early as possible (Leijonhufvud and Fitts, 2015). This finding, 
illustrating the near-term advantages to actors gaming carbon management systems, is 
clearly at odds with the reality of much climate policy, for example the sector-specific 
privileges and credits given to sectors and higher polluters in the EU ETS and by rules in 
individual EU Member States. Furthermore, Leijonhufvud and Fitts (2015) find that economic 
analysis suggests that likely inertia in the ability to adjust energy emissions downward, due 
to infrastructural carbon commitment, implies a need for significant national carbon taxation 
in addition to climate finance to drive sufficient mitigation. 
6.8 Accounting for biogenic carbon in bioenergy and negative 
emissions policy: problems and solutions 
Negative emissions make it notionally allowable for cumulative CO₂ emissions to exceed 
the nett global carbon budget, with a (temporary) overshoot of atmospheric CO₂ 
concentration targets (Vuuren et al., 2013); but carbon accounting needs to accurately 
account for the subsequent removals required to correct this overshoot.  BECCS is 
particularly important in AR5 Database 2ºC IAM scenarios as it provides both energy and 
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negative emissions (Fuss et al., 2014a). In IEA-funded research, Zakkour et al. (2014) 
examine the ability of current GHG accounting frameworks to record and incentivise 
negative emissions from BECCS. Current GHG accounting rules include: UNFCCC 
inventories for developed Parties, based on the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National 
Greenhouse Gas Inventories; project-based schemes such as those in the Kyoto Protocol’s 
CDM; regional carbon market rules as in the EU ETS; and product-based schemes including 
market portfolio carbon emission standards. In cap-and-trade schemes where emission 
rights are ‘surrendered’, usually on an annual basis, baseline mechanisms do not usually 
enable credits to be generated for below zero emissions, unlike project-based schemes that 
can theoretically recognise negative emissions based on actual emissions and removals 
(Zakkour et al. 2014).  
 
 
Figure 6.4: Negative emissions accounting in cap-and-trade compared to project-based 
schemes. Reproduced from Zakkour et al. 2014. 
 
In the EU ETS and other cap-and-trade schemes, the ‘compliance entity’ is usually a single 
facility within the whole international scheme, making this kind of framework unsuitable for 
pooling negative emissions or CCS removals across multiple facilities or for use in meeting 
national targets (Zakkour et al. 2014). Therefore, in the EU ETS currently, only CO₂ captured 
from burning fossil fuel in a facility and then permanently (geologically) stored may be 
deducted from its gross inventory emissions (see Figure 6.4). CO₂ emissions from 
installations burning biomass exclusively, whether unabated (nett positive) or subject to 
carbon capture and storage (BECCS, potentially nett negative), are specifically excluded 
from accounting in the ETS. Even if biomass were co-fired with coal in a single CCS facility, 
then only a nominal “fossil-fuel-derived” portion of the captured and stored CO₂ could be 
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accounted as deduction from gross inventory emissions (therefore yielding an absolute 
minimum nett emissions level of zero, rather than negative). This approach in the EU ETS 
is not accidental, but by design: once a decision was taken that, in principle, all biogenic 
carbon fluxes should be accounted already, and exclusively, in the LULUCF accounting 
domain, then any accounting in the energy-combustion-CCS domain would lead inevitably 
to double counting (whether nett positive or negative within any particular facility or system 
boundary).  
Further demonstrating the effect of current EU rules on BECCS accounting, a report looking 
a UK policy roadmaps for the UK CCC (Berg et al., 2017) states that: 
The economics of GGR [Greenhouse Gas Removal] options are typically 
assessed on the basis of costs per tonne CO₂ removed from the 
atmosphere. Here it is important to distinguish between costs per tonne of 
CO₂ mitigated and per tonne of CO₂ removed to account for the carbon-
negative properties of GGR options. When discussing remuneration for 
GGR, this removed CO₂ is often the part that is likely to be ﬁnanced as it 
represents the additional beneﬁt compared to traditional carbon abatement 
measures. This is illustrated in the example of BECCS power co-ﬁring, 
where one share of the CO₂ removed by CCS is of fossil origin and another 
is biogenic. Only the latter may count as GGR after supply chain emissions 
have been accounted for and this should thus also be reﬂected in the 
removal costs. (Berg et al., 2017) 
It is notable that both the IEA and UK Climate Change Committee documents implicitly 
accept the policy-defined carbon neutrality of biomass energy without substantive reference 
to the abundant literature challenging the reliability of this accounting assumption, 
specifically the reliance on often weak accounting rules governing carbon monitoring in the 
extremely complex, and often poorly accounted land use sector, with high uncertainties in 
sources, sinks and carbon stocks (Colomb et al., 2013).  
Forestry modelling assumptions frequently allow inaccurate carbon accounting, failing to 
include a reference scenario accounting for carbon stock increases in the absence of 
bioenergy harvest (Searchinger et al., 2009; Ter-Mikaelian et al., 2015). The simplistic 
carbon neutrality assumption for bioenergy also ignores systemic feedbacks, land use 
history and feedstock types resulting in potentially major errors in carbon accounting 
(Haberl, 2013). Searchinger et al. (2017) examines studies that estimate large potential for 
future bioenergy from land use, detailing ways in which they count carbon removals but fail 
to account for costs including opportunity costs that can appear to  overwhelmingly favour 
solar PV energy production on land rather than bioenergy. However, this generally ignores 
the fundamental lack of interchangeability between biomass that provides dispatchable 
energy and variable renewable forms of energy that are not dispatchable. In proper 
accounting of biomass Searchinger et al. state: 
Like any other offset, an offset by plant growth can only exist if and to the 
extent the plant growth is “additional” to the growth that would occur 
anyway. Counting existing plant growth as an offset counts the same 
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carbon twice … Bioenergy can only reduce GHGs through plant growth if 
total plant growth increases globally while also factoring in any releases of 
stored carbon. (Searchinger et al., 2017, p. 435) 
A 2013 European Commission technical report gives a thorough overview of carbon 
accounting of forest bioenergy (Agostini et al., 2013) pointing out that carbon emissions from 
bioenergy are treated as carbon neutral in the energy domain, being reported only as ‘below 
the line’ memo items in national inventories to avoid double-counting as the emissions are 
assumed to be already accounted for in reporting of harvest data under the land use domain. 
However, if longer-rotation stemwood is used then it takes more time for new growth to 
replenish the lost carbon, which can lead to nett carbon emissions within that period, 
complexity that may not be fully captured by land use accounting. Woody biomass also emits 
more CO₂ per unit of energy produced than fossil fuels and greater emissions for biomass 
also occur due to fuel collection, transport, processing and storage (Agostini et al., 2013). 
All of these factors have implications for carbon accounting in both climate and energy policy 
governance. Policy should also note that unless biomass is being reserved for large scale 
BECCS to enable negative emissions, policy supportive of woody biomass for energy may 
increase resultant global warming relative to fossil fuel use, reduce carbon stocks and 
increase energy costs. A key conclusion states:  
From the studies analysed it emerges that in order to assess the climate change 
mitigation potential of forest bioenergy pathways, the assumption of biogenic carbon 
neutrality is not valid under policy relevant time horizons (in particular for dedicated 
harvest of stemwood for bioenergy only) if carbon stock changes in the forest are not 
accounted for. (Agostini et al., 2013, p. 18) 
6.9  Mitigation policy additionality in bioenergy production 
Bioenergy production may be ‘renewable’ in the sense of potential regrowth, and also 
resulting in CO₂ sequestration flows, but that does not necessarily equate to increasing 
overall carbon stocks to effect climate mitigation, or guarantee stable environmental impacts 
in avoiding other pollution or land degradation (Searchinger et al., 2017, p. 435). Therefore 
no assumption of ‘sustainability’ can be made unless specific accounting is applied to each 
sustainability claim (Haberl et al., 2012). UNFCCC rules for reporting of land use and energy 
emissions are only valid at the global scale and can break down when bioenergy resources 
are traded between nations or if sub-global rules do not treat energy and land-use with equal 
significance (Searchinger et al., 2017, p. 435). For example, if trees are harvested in the 
USA and exported as wood pellets to be burned for energy in the EU, the EU ETS 
assumption of carbon neutrality can only be valid if US land use accounting is sufficiently 
detailed and dependable, a finding, as in Miner et al. (2014), that is strongly contested by 
US NGOs (NRDC, 2015) and scientists (Agostini et al., 2017).  
Moreover, Searchinger et al. (2017) examines an intercomparison of 15 IAMs and energy 
models, finding serious double-counting errors in regard to biomass-related removals and 
emissions in half of them, and highly optimistic and idealised outcomes in the others. A 
tonne of CO₂ sequestered by CCS has the same effect on atmospheric concentration 
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regardless of whether the CO₂ is from burning fossil fuel or biomass. Further, biomass has 
lower energy and is not so easily transported as fossil fuel to a location near geological 
storage for CO₂, therefore CCS for fossil fuel use should arguably be prioritised over use in 
BECCS (Searchinger et al., 2017, p. 443). The relevance to governance here is that 
Searchinger et al. conclude that IAM scenarios with large amounts of BECCS necessarily 
depend on strong (and, by implication, internationally co-ordinated) government regulation 
of land use to maintain and increase land carbon stocks, and interventions to find “surplus” 
land for afforestation, often by implicit taxation of ruminant, particularly beef, GHG emissions 
to free up land at least notional-cost. Contrary to the IEA and CDP18, Searchinger et al. 
suggest that even if large-scale BECCS may at some point provide aggregate GHG benefits 
relative to accessing the same energy from fossil fuels (also with CCS), this requires difficult 
conditions to be met in general: surplus agricultural land (to avoid competition with food 
production), high yields and prior, or simultaneous, elimination, of all fossil fuel emissions. 
One strand of published research suggest that a short-term biogenic carbon pulse of 
warming due to a permanent increase in bioenergy use is worthwhile based on a longer-
term mitigation plan up to 2050 (Lamers and Junginger, 2013), but this appears to be 
contrary to the current timescale for strong actions (required already up to 2050) to meet the 
WB2C target. Lamers and Junginger also claim that forest bioenergy, such as that imported 
as wood pellets from the US, is primarily residue based with a “marginal” (though increasing) 
role for roundwood. This view appears to be contradicted by photographic evidence 
submitted to courts and government by scientists and NGOs showing very large amounts of 
roundwood directed to wood pellet use, and significant deforestation, due to harvesting in 
the south-east US (Agostini et al., 2017). 
Land based NETS including afforestation/reforestation, biochar and soil carbon 
sequestration depend on land carbon sinks and, like BECCS, depend on biological 
productivity, therefore  integrated land use strategies to achieve increased carbon 
sequestration require accurate carbon accounting and governance that fully reflect complex 
sink dynamics and respect the likely need for increased harvesting of net primary production 
(Canadell and Schulze, 2014). A reliance on land sinks may also be risky as observations, 
in line with modelling, now suggest the natural land sink may be beginning a long-term 
weakening, as nutrient limitations reduce the CO₂ fertilisation effect, thereby amplifying 
global warming itself, and the effects of heat and drought due to warming (Peñuelas et al. 
2017). 
A literature review by Gren and Aklilu (2016) of economic policy design for support of forest 
carbon sequestration (capture and permanent storage) compares theoretical policy with 
practice. The review describes measures to address the uncertainty and differences in forest 
carbon sequestration due to heterogeneity of land and management conditions, the difficulty 
in monitoring impermanence over time (due to tree harvesting and natural disturbances such 
 
                                            
18 Carbon Disclosure Project: https://www.cdp.net/  
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as fires and storms), and the problem of determining additionality (ensuring that projects 
receiving carbon credits for increasing carbon stock, or other carbon-stock-equivalent 
processes, would not have occurred without the credits). Ideally carbon prices would need 
to be uniformly applied to address heterogeneity in land types. Stringent mitigation policy 
(“hard” emission caps) would then drive demand for ‘offsets’ from polluters, regulators would 
become responsible for certifying information, and landowners would be responsible for 
guaranteeing forest carbon permanence. In practice, payments for monitoring and verifying 
sequestration, and additionality-confirmation costs, are on a per-project basis, and 
permanence is credited in some countries on the basis of buffer credits to landowners. In 
the EU ETS there is a relatively low supply of domestically produced traded forest carbon 
credits because they are reserved by Member States for national allocations (p. 130). In the 
proposed 2030 EU Effort Sharing Regulation, quantified allowances (“flexibilities”) for forest 
credits may be allowed in LULUCF carbon accounting: a significant change from the practice 
under the 2020 Effort Sharing Directive, which did not recognise such credits. 
Examining the political economy of biofuel policies, mechanisms and governance in the US, 
Brazil and the EU, Oliveira et al. (2017) find that they originate in energy security and 
economic concerns, driven particularly by larger corporate interests in concert with 
government, resulting in state subsidies, fuel-blending mandates and tax credits that benefit 
these producers. As a result, even for second- and third-generation biofuels, these policies 
tend to “backfire” (in terms of aggregate social, political climate outcomes) by focusing on 
technical and legal framing, and actually result in negative environmental and social 
consequences (2017). 
Mander et al. (2017) gives a full listing of IAMs’ use of key BECCS-related assumptions 
including details regarding bioenergy potential, CCS capability, BECCS cost, policy supports 
and bioenergy as a percentage of primary energy, making clear the daunting level of system 
integration needed to deliver effective CO₂ removal through BECCS, linking up the full 
biomass supply chain with energy transformation (typically, electricity generation) and CCS. 
As Mander et al. also points out, the political and socio-economic (broadly, governance) 
assumptions are no less challenging for practical BECCS deployment: bioenergy potential 
is based on land-use estimates, biomass sustainability criteria, population, diet and global 
energy demand; global participation in decarbonisation is assumed with effective 
international carbon pricing; and a global governance system is required to enable the 
BECCS supply chain and enforce reliable carbon accounting and verification of the putative 
negative emissions. 
Including a BAU land use scenario of tropical deforestation that they argue the IPCC 
underestimates, Mahowald et al. (2017) find the climate system response to cumulative land 
use emissions may be twice that for non-land use processes because of the effect of fossil 
aerosols (negative forcing) versus methane and nitrous oxide from land use.  This results in 
1ºC of anthropogenic global warming by 2100 from land use and land cover change alone, 
even without further fossil fuel emissions, requiring urgent, globally coordinated policies 
(including dietary change and reversal of deforestation) to reduce emissions if the Paris limit 
of keeping warming well below 2ºC over pre-industrial is to be avoided. 
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6.10 Mechanisms addressing emissions embodied in trade 
Under UNFCCC accounting rules emissions are inventoried by each party (nation state or 
regional bloc) on a territorial basis and mitigation targets in Nationally Determined 
Contributions then relate to reducing such domestic/territorial emissions. As mitigation 
policies and production costs vary between nations there may be incentives for “carbon 
leakage”: production of goods and services may migrate to a country with lower production 
costs (possibly based on weaker regulations, including climate policies) potentially causing 
emissions to rise overall (the apparent emission reduction in one territory “leaks” into higher 
emissions from another). Border carbon adjustments (BCAs), levying duties relative to 
embodied carbon, have been proposed as a possible remedy but Sakai and Barrett (2016) 
argue that this would be a complicated, ineffective and expensive corrective policy relative 
to carbon priced ‘offset’ policies such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). That 
said, the CDM has itself been subject to strong criticism due to non-additionality and over-
claiming of emission reductions (Carbon Market Watch, 2013; DG CLIMA, 2017; Pearse 
and Böhm, 2014). There is no common agreement in research literature on good border 
carbon adjustment design to ensure effective and enforceable emissions reduction.  
Rocchi, et al. (2018) undertake an economic analysis using World Input Output Database 
(WIOD) trade data to examine an alternative carbon border tax (CBT) approach, based on 
emissions avoided at a product level, taking international prices and differential carbon 
prices into account in line with current World Trade Organisation practice. A CBT based on 
product-level emissions is, in principle, simpler than a border carbon adjustment based on 
embodied carbon as it only needs national data on emission factors by technology. The 
goods most affected by an avoided emissions CBT would be energy-intensive ones, with 
high carbon content, and high monetary value electronic products. Rocchi et al. conclude 
that an avoided emissions CBT would allow essential international coordination of carbon 
pricing between countries that is currently missing from the nationally focussed NDC model 
of the Paris Agreement. Introducing a CBT might potentially face obstacles under the current 
WTO legal framework, which is explicitly directed at lowering trade barriers and liberalising 
world trade. However, Weber (2015, p. 417) suggests that in the light of recent WTO cases, 
which have been based on broader interpretation of the rules, including “exhaustion of 
natural resources” and health protection, non-retrospective border trade mechanisms such 
as CBT may be legally achievable within current WTO rules — if there were broad 
international political will to do so. 
6.11  Chapter Conclusions on governance and mechanisms:   
Governance choices overall are constrained by physical limits first, and political choices 
second, a fact that can too easily be lost in policy discussions. The physical sciences are 
pointing to biophysical global boundaries, some of which are already being breached, with 
societal and economic consequences requiring some combination of governance that 
enables planning, investment and results to limit future impacts. Carbon (CO₂) governance 
toward a temperature target requires achievement of a path to zero net emissions within a 
stated total carbon budget aligned with the target. The Paris Agreement temperature targets 
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scientifically imply ‘total avoidance budget’ ranges for any selected probability of avoiding 
1.5ºC or “well below” 2ºC. Although there is no global authority and therefore no integrated 
approach to global climate governance, we can say that, whatever actual governance 
coordination does take place, the Paris Agreement implies agreement that international 
efforts do need to add up “to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by 
sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century, on 
the basis of equity”; and to do so in a manner consistent with the stated temperature goals. 
Therefore, given the need to meet a zero-sum (and rapidly depleting) global carbon budget, 
climate action will depend on Parties presenting their understanding of what this means for 
themselves, how it adds up internationally, and rapidly achieving real results within their own 
separate jurisdictions; including negative emissions investment and delivery if that is part of 
any given Party’s plan. Explicit and strengthened accounting mechanisms to address 
international trade, and emissions from international shipping and aviation (currently 
excluded from the formal Paris Agreement scope), will be needed in addition to the current 
focus on single-nation territorial emissions. 
This chapter has shown that the large uncertainties in land use carbon accounting, nationally 
and internationally, undermine generic or simplistic claims of carbon neutrality for bioenergy 
from biomass, biofuels and biogas. Moreover, science showing that the warming effect of 
biogenic CO₂ emissions is akin to short-lived climate forcings like methane (Cherubini et al., 
2014) implies that, even under a speculative assumption that bioenergy related removals 
can be made additional to existing biogenic flows, a choice to use  increased amounts of 
unabated bioenergy has significant 20 to 40 year warming effects that are important in a 2ºC 
climate action context of limited time for action (Allen et al., 2016).   
In the EU ETS and other cap-and-trade emissions control mechanisms, the current inability 
to account accurately and reliably for putative negative emissions is a serious impediment 
to developing government- or commercially-funded BECCS. One possible remedy, 
supported by research, is to change the accounting so that all energy CO₂ is accounted at 
the “smokestack” (wherever the CO₂ is produced). This would allow emission factors (such 
as those calculated for bioenergy) to be appropriately accounted and all of the 
combustion/oxidisation emissions (nett of any captured CO₂ delivered to reliable, permanent 
storage) appropriately accounted for within the energy sector.  Future land use sequestration 
to retrieve the same amount of CO₂ is far more uncertain, but potentially could be given 
certified sequestration factors according to land use and the quality of carbon stewardship 
but only on the basis of provably containing accurately monitored carbon stocks. In a 
reformed ETS, revenues from levying the ETS price on all CO₂ emissions, including from 
bioenergy, could then be used to reward/incentivise landowners and/or providers of 
geological storage services, according to the sequestration factor, and, crucially, for 
maintaining an increased stock of carbon storage (subject to reliable monitoring, verification 
and ongoing maintenance of biogenic carbon stocks). Accounting for bioenergy in this way 
(Haberl et al. 2012) could also incentivise negative emissions in BECCS through net energy-
biomass accounting to include both biogenic (soil and biomass carbon) and geological 
carbon storage.  
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Progressing bioenergy systems towards negative emissions may increase potential savings 
through replacement of fossil fuels with BECCS in a recast European ETS and Renewable 
Energy Directive aligned with achieving the Paris Agreement mitigation objectives. 
Landowners would then have additional economic choices between forms of conventional, 
but GHG-intensive, agriculture, which might incur GHG taxes, and carbon sequestration and 
storage in forestry biomass and soils, and/or growing dedicated energy crops enabling 
lower-carbon energy (if unabated) or carbon-negative energy (with BECCS). In the specific 
case of Ireland, such choices for land use, combined with sustainability criteria, may offer 
an opportunity to maintain the viability of the rural economy in an increasingly likely future 
of market prices that will incur regulations or taxes based on nett GHG emissions. 
The striking lack of IPCC assessment and national policies looking at non-permanence of 
land-based (biomass and soil) carbon sequestration, requires attention. Research literature 
shows that non-permanent sequestration without a backstop technology like geological 
storage (CCS) is of limited value. To be of properly effective, stringent Measurement, 
Monitoring and Verification (MMV) is needed for land use carbon accounting to test 
additionality and to monitor carbon fluxes, land use change and forestry harvests. Although 
land use carbon sequestration in soils and trees has relatively low opportunity costs, the 
level of MMV required is likely to have high transaction costs and the co-requirement for 
CCS as a backstop technology effectively adds to the actual opportunity cost. For soils in 
particular, given the clear separate benefits of soil improvement, the effort to ensure 
additionality for claimed carbon sequestration, the danger of future disturbance leading to 
carbon losses, and the need to perform the required level of MMV, militates against soil 
carbon as a reliable or cost-effective element of sequestration planning and policy. For 
forestry, the necessary increase in MMV might be less costly but costs similarly add up. 
If credits are to be allowed for negative emissions (on land or geologically) then 
sequestration removals need to be treated as a permanent liability for the carbon storage 
owner with a best-estimate required for expected price path matching the effectiveness of 
the CDR’s sequestration through time. This is essential so that the owners of the liability 
(including governments) and any potential buyers or insurers have sufficient information for 
due diligence. The value of the sequestration can then be properly accounted in meeting 
emissions budgets and in receiving payments from emitters. 
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7 Ireland's Emission Profile, Projections and Policy 
Summary 
• Total Irish GHG emissions in 2016 were 61.1 MtCO₂e, of which energy and process 
emissions were 39.9 MtCO₂. Ireland has a large proportion of non-CO₂ emissions 
including 18.6 MtCO₂e of methane and nitrous oxide, particularly from a ruminant 
livestock-dominated agriculture sector. 
• Ireland’s emission accounting is reported by the EPA in the annual National Inventory 
Report and Common Reporting Format data tables. 
• Recent history shows that Ireland’s emissions are strongly correlated with economic 
trends. 
• Based on existing policies, and economic growth outpacing improvements in carbon 
intensity, emissions are projected to rise to 2035 in both ‘With Existing Measures’ 
(WEM) and ‘With Additional Measures’ (WAM) scenarios. 
• Electricity generation, transport, manufacturing and industrial emissions are 
projected to rise by over 20% to 2035. Agriculture, residential and commercial 
emissions are projected to flat line at 2015 levels to 2050. 
• Assessed nett land use emissions in 2015 for all GHGs were 4.2 MtCO₂e including 
emissions of 5.9 MtCO₂e from grassland, 2.6 MtCO₂e from wetlands and nett 
removals of 4.3 MtCO₂e due to forests. Nett CO₂-only emissions from land use were 
3.7 MtCO₂. 
• Ireland’s Kyoto first period target was an allowed increase in whole-economy 
emissions of 13% relative to 1990 for average 2008 to 2012 emissions. The target 
was met (largely due to the economic downturn over this period).  
• The EU 2020 and proposed 2030 targets, relative to 2005, separately cover 
aggregate sectors for the Emissions Trading Scheme, ETS (an EU wide target) and 
non-ETS emissions (legally binding national targets). 
• The 2014 National Policy Position (NPP) states mitigation objectives of an 80% 
reduction relative to 1990 for energy CO₂ emissions and “an approach to carbon 
neutrality in the agriculture and land-use sector, including forestry”.  A (tacit) policy of 
little or no mitigation in the agriculture sector implies an expectation of 
correspondingly larger reductions in energy and process CO₂ emissions, potentially 
becoming nett negative. 
• Low carbon transitions in modelling or suggested by policy analysis generally use 
linear or piece-wise linear pathways to meet these end-point targets, thereby tacitly 
increasing the fractional year-on-year effort over time. 
• Ireland participates in the Paris Agreement process via the EU-wide NDC. Current 
Irish policies, falling short of EU commitments, are not aligned with this NDC; 
furthermore (and more seriously) the current NDCs collectively fall far short of 
meeting the Paris temperature goals. Good faith participation in the Paris Agreement 
process implies radically more stringent reductions in nett emissions (incorporating 
use of NETs or otherwise) at both EU and member state levels. 
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7.1 Introduction 
Ireland’s GHG emissions are higher than the EU28 average with an unusual emissions 
profile compared to other EU member states. Transport CO₂ emissions are high and overall 
GHGs are much higher than average per capita non-CO₂ gases particularly due to methane 
and nitrous oxide emissions from agriculture (including over 7 million beef and dairy cattle). 
In 2016, total annual GHG emissions of 61.1 MtCO₂e comprised: approximately 39.3 MtCO₂ 
emissions from energy use and industrial processes;  19.6 MtCO₂e from agriculture, 
particularly due to methane and nitrous oxide emissions from ruminants and fertiliser use; 
1.3 MtCO₂e from F-gases; and 0.9 MtCO₂e from waste (EPA, 2017a, pp. 1990–2016). In 
2015, nett CO₂-only land use emissions were 3.7 MtCO₂. As shown in Figure 7.1 (EU EEA, 
2017), per capita emissions by greenhouse gas  and compared to the EU28 average were: 
carbon dioxide 8.26 tCO₂ (EU28: 6.87 tCO₂); methane 2.85 tCO₂e (EU28: 0.90 tCO₂e); 
nitrous oxide 1.52 tCO₂e (EU28: 0.46 tCO₂e); and fluorinated gases 0.26 (EU28: 0.23 
tCO₂e).  
 
Figure 7.1: EU28 Emissions per capita by country and greenhouse gas. Reproduced 
from (EU EEA, 2017) 
Ireland’s recent CO₂ emissions are placed in a global context in Figure 7.2, showing the 
stronger effect of economic growth and downturn in Ireland compared to other OECD 
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nations. Emissions increased rapidly from 1995 to 2008, and fell dramatically following the 
global financial crisis.  The relatively stable per capita emissions of OECD nations and the 
recent increase in non-OECD nations, evidences the difficulty for all nations in reaching nett 
zero CO₂ to meet climate targets, but especially for OECD nations with high existing per 
capita emissions. 
 
Figure 7.2: Ireland's per capita CO₂-only emissions, 1990 to 2013, compared with global 
data (sourced from Global Carbon Project, 2016). Territorial emissions are as reported to 
the UNFCCC; consumption emissions account for total CO₂ nett of imports and exports; 
and GDP Global CI (carbon intensity) shows group or national per capita in terms of GDP 
multiplied by the average carbon intensity of global GDP giving an indicative measure for 
global comparison. 
This chapter gives a more detailed description of Ireland’s emissions (based on EPA 
inventories and annual updates); examines Irish and European climate policy to mitigate 
GHG emissions; summarises published modelling and analysis of the mitigation potential 
for Ireland and its sectors; and briefly describes Ireland’s projected emissions, and planned 
mitigation policy under the 2017 National Mitigation Plan (DCCAE, 2017a). The concluding 
focus, on policy goals relative to Ireland’s past and projected cumulative emissions, provides 
a basis for Chapter 8, which estimates carbon quotas that could guide Paris-aligned 
mitigation policy. Chapter 9 will cover the literature on the potential in Ireland to deliver NETs 
to assist in closing the mitigation gap that may need to be filled by delivery of CDR by NETs, 
in addition to achieving other deep decarbonisation measures. 
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7.2 Ireland’s Emissions Profile and Accounting 
7.2.1 EPA Emissions Inventory Accounting 
The Environmental Protection Agency is responsible for Ireland’s emissions accounting by 
producing an in-depth National Inventory Report (NIR) and Common Reporting Format 
(CRF) data for the annual monitoring submissions to the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. This 
accounting also provides the basis for additional reporting to the EU Greenhouse Gas 
Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) that is available online from the European 
Environment Agency19, along with other environmental data sets (EEA, 2017). The NIR is 
usually published in May and covers emissions up to the year-but-one prior to publication: 
so the EPA’s 2017 NIR covers emissions from 1990 to 2015 inclusive (EPA, 2017b). All 
annual NIRs, supporting CRF spreadsheets and summaries are available online from the 
EPA website20. 
A basic provisional summary is provided earlier than the NIR release, usually in November 
of the year prior to the final Report’s publication, including a comparison of Ireland’s 
emissions and particularly detailing progress relative to applicable EU targets. As discussed 
further in the next section, EU emissions are assigned between: the EU’s Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS), covering facilities such as power plants with large emissions, and non-ETS 
emissions that are intended to be reduced through member state actions according to 
national targets set out by EU Directives and Regulations. 1990 is the base year for 
UNFCCC emissions and the EU’s Nationally Determined Contributions. However, the base 
year for EU ETS and non-ETS policy is 2005 when the ETS system was formally initiated. 
Both of these base years are therefore referenced in EU targets and in the EPA’s provisional 
summaries. 
Each NIR is produced in line with the UNFCCC detailed reporting and quality assurance 
requirements, and provides complete coverage of domestic GHG emissions (carbon 
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and F-gases) and Ireland’s Kyoto Protocol LULUCF 
inventory. Indirect GHG emissions are recorded in the inventory, including nitrogen oxides 
(NOX), carbon monoxide (CO), volatile organic compounds (VOC) and sulphur dioxide 
(SO2). As discussed in Chapter 1, UNFCCC reporting continues to use a potentially 
misleading GHG equivalence factors, with global warming potential values from IPCC AR4 
(EPA, 2017c, p. 10). The updated AR5 GWP100 factor for one tonne of methane has 
increased from 25 to 34 tCO₂e. If the updated value is incorporated into future UNFCCC 
accounting, and GWP100 continues to be used, this would raise Ireland’s reported recent 
and projected annual national, and agriculture sector, emissions by 3-5 MtCO₂e yr-1. 
Sectoral overviews and trends are described in detail in the NIR for energy emissions 
(energy industries including public electricity, manufacturing and transport), industrial 
 
                                            
19  http://www.eionet.europa.eu/  
20 http://www.epa.ie/climate/emissionsinventoriesandprojections/nationalemissionsinventories/  
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processes (including cement and lime, chemicals and metal production), agriculture 
(particularly methane from ruminant enteric fermentation and manure; and nitrous oxide 
from fertiliser use and livestock manures), land-use, land-use change, forestry and waste. 
Emissions due to international aviation and shipping (collectively known as ‘bunkers’), and 
biomass combustion (mainly due to co-firing in Ireland’s three peat burning power plants), 
are recorded as “memo items” in national reporting. These ‘below the line’ items do not count 
toward domestic emissions under current UNFCCC rules, but they are significant when 
totalled globally and all three are currently projected to rise rapidly in future. 
Transport and Energy Industries (mainly electricity generation), each about 12 MtCO₂ yr-1, 
are the largest CO₂ emitting sectors with other significant energy CO₂ sectors being 
residential heating (6 MtCO₂ yr-1), manufacturing (4 MtCO₂ yr-1), industry (including cement 
process emissions) and heating commercial buildings. Ireland’s reported emissions profile 
is unusual relative to other EU countries in having a particularly substantial contribution from 
non-CO₂ GHGs, especially methane and nitrous oxide due to significant emissions from 
ruminant agriculture based on rearing cattle and sheep for beef, dairy and sheep meat. 
Ireland has 5.6 million beef cattle and 1.3 million dairy cattle (Table 3.3A EPA, 2017b, p. 
514). This has significant implications for Ireland’s climate mitigation options, including non-
agricultural emissions within non-ETS accounting, because mitigation options for ruminant 
emissions are biophysically very limited21; therefore it is unlikely that substantial reductions 
in total emissions will occur unless production of milk, beef and sheep meat is capped or 
reduced, likely requiring reduced herd numbers (Donnellan et al., 2013). 
Consumption emissions (including domestic emissions plus embodied emissions in imports, 
minus embodied emissions in exports) are not reported in the NIR nor in other EPA 
reporting, as UNFCCC and Kyoto are designed to depend only on domestic (territorial) 
emissions. However, consumption emissions estimates for most countries globally, Ireland 
included, for years since 1990 are available from the Global Carbon Atlas (2016). 
Land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) is reported within six top-level categories 
of managed land area, each divided between lands still in the same use as before 1990 and 
lands that have changed use since 1990. This accounting enables changes in land-use 
since 1990 to be tracked and reported according to UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol rules.  
Estimates of annual net source and sink flows (emissions and removals) from land are 
reported in up to five carbon pools (stocks) for each land category: above-ground biomass, 
below-ground biomass, dead organic matter (litter and dead wood) and soils (EPA, 2017b, 
pp. 193–195). Combustion emissions from peat extracted for electricity production and 
 
                                            
21 An analogous argument (“mitigation options are limited”) is used explicitly in the discussion of 
aviation, in particular; and, somewhat less explicitly, for “heavy”, non-rail, surface transport (buses, 
trucks). In all cases, the view based on physical climate science is that a requirement for reduction 
in absolute emission levels should be included in the suite of mitigation policy options to be 
considered – possibly implying a need for modal shift and/or an absolute and sustained contraction 
in total GHG intensive activities. 
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residential use is accounted under energy and residential respectively in the NIR. However, 
emissions due to horticultural peat extraction (EPA, 2017b, p. 315, carbon loss estimated at 
over 1.7 MtC in 2016, equivalent to 6.2 MtCO2), and arising from peatlands drained prior to 
1990, do not have to be reported. 
Projected emissions are usually published at about the same time as the NIR. The EPA 
emission projections to 2035 are estimated based on modelling and data provided by 
government departments and advisory agencies (including the Economic and Social 
Research Institute for economic data, SEAI for energy and Teagasc for agriculture). As in 
other EU Member States, two projections are supplied by the EPA for different levels of 
policy ambition: “With Existing Measures” (WEM), based on the achievement of current 
primary mitigation policies, and “With Additional Measures” (WAM), based on the 
achievement of identified additional mitigation policy measures that could further reduce 
national emissions (EPA, 2017b, p. 315). Significant interacting assumptions regarding 
future economic growth, energy mix and sectoral policy inputs (such as mode share in 
transport and herd size in agriculture) must be made to project future emissions based on 
current factors and past experience. Actual emissions and achieve mitigation are greatly 
affected by changes in economic performance and in the effectiveness of policy delivery. 
The trends in national and sectoral emissions detailed in the following sub-sections are as 
reported in Ireland’s National Inventory Report 2017: Greenhouse Gas Emissions 1990-
2015  (EPA, 2017b).  Data are available on the EPA website from this reporting and from 
the EPA 2017 GHG Emission Projections Report (EPA, 2017c).  The NIR’s emissions 
accounting is based on the IPCC’s 2006 Guidelines and the non-CO₂ GHGs are expressed 
in “CO₂ equivalent” (CO₂e) terms on the basis of the GWP100 metrics in IPCC AR4. 
7.2.2 Trends in National Emissions 
The main trends in Ireland’s past, recorded total emissions (shown in Figure 7.3) strongly 
reflect economic and structural trends. From 1990 to 2002 the economy grew strongly and 
emissions rose rapidly.  
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Figure 7.3: EPA data (chart generated from EPA data EPA, 2017a) and in EPA reporting 
to (EEA, 2017) showing Ireland’s total annual emissions (past as recorded and future 
projected ‘With Existing Measures’ and ‘With Additional Measures’).  Green line shows 
Kyoto first period target level for 2008-2012. Green dots show indicative EU emission 
targets for Irish emissions of 20%, 40% and 80% below 1990 by 2020, 2030 and 2050 
respectively. 
From 2002 to 2008, cuts in EU subsidies and the EU milk quota steadily reduced agricultural 
emissions and a sudden, prolonged flat-lining of exports, see Figure 7.4, stabilised 
emissions to 2008. Then the Irish banking collapse and global economic downturn caused 
Ireland’s emissions to fall rapidly by an average 5% yr-1 to 2011.  Emissions then stabilised 
up to 2014 with emissions beginning to rise again thereafter due to economic recovery and 
export-focused policy measures, particularly in agri-food production expansion for exports 
driven by government-backed industry policy. Irish climate policy does not appear to have 
acted as a determining constraint on overall emissions at any point (as compared to the 
effect of wider economic conditions). EU policy in constraining farm production after 1998 
does appear to have reduced agricultural emissions noticeably. EPA model projections to 
2035 (see Figure 7.5) appear to echo historic emissions trends, implying that – absent a 
significant change in societal/political priorities – national emissions will not be effectively 
constrained by existing or proposed decarbonisation policies. 
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Figure 7.4: Ireland exports in € thousands, CSO data (chart by, Trading Economics, 
2017) 
In 2015, NIR national emissions were 59.9 MtCO₂e, 6.7% greater than 1990 emissions but 
15.8% below peak emissions of 71.1 MtCO₂e in 2001 (EPA, 2017b, p. 24). The GHG-
specific proportions of CO₂e emissions in 2015 were: CO₂ 64%, CH₄ 23%, N₂O 12%, and 
F-gases 2%. Sectoral emissions, as proportions of the national total, were Energy (including 
electricity, buildings, transport and industry) 61%, Agriculture 32%, Industry 5% and Waste 
1.6%. Uncertainty levels are reported in the EPA 2017 Inventory in Table 1.12 with and 
without LULUCF. The overall uncertainty in the absolute inventory total is estimated to be 
10%, mainly due to uncertainties in estimating agricultural and soil emissions; the CO₂ 
emissions from energy data, being based on fossil fuel consumption data, are generally 
more accurate and reliable. 
 
Figure 7.5 Comparison of recorded and projected Non-ETS data with Ireland’s 2013-
2020 pathway of reductions and with the proposed EU ESD pathway to 2030, with and 
without the proposed offsets in ETS and land-use (generated from EPA, 2017c). The 
effect of the economic crisis after 2008 is apparent. As projected emissions are expected 
to flat-line so no absolute mitigation of emissions is anticipated given current and 
proposed policies. 
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As of 2017, the EPA project that Ireland’s emissions will increase rapidly with continuing 
economic growth, and national non-ETS emissions will likely be only 4-6% below 2005 by 
2020 (EPA, 2017d), compared to the agreed EU target of a 20% reduction (EU Commission, 
2017a). By 2020, transport emissions are projected to grow by 10-12% (1.2-1.4 MtCO₂e) 
and agriculture by a further 4- 5% (0.8-1.0 MtCO₂e) relative to 2015. Non-ETS emissions 
(see Figure 7.5), are expected to do no better than flat-line until 2035 and are likely to grow, 
thus staying well in excess of EU targets (depending on their final definition). In the ETS 
sector EU policy targets an EU-wide 21% cut in emissions relative to 2005, and 43% by 
2030 (EU Commission, 2017a, 2017b). As shown in Figure 7.6, Ireland’s ETS CO₂ 
emissions fell dramatically following the 2008 economic crisis (25% below 2005 levels in 
2015), although ETS emissions are projected to exceed the overall EU-aligned pathway if 
no additional policies are implemented. Economic and export implications of Brexit do not 
appear to have been accounted for yet in these projections, and Brexit could impact 
emissions across some or all sectors.  
 
Figure 7.6: Chart generated from EPA data (EPA, 2017c, p. 15) comparing recorded and 
projected ETS data with the linear EU ETS target decarbonisation pathway (as set for all 
of Europe collectively). 
7.2.3 Trends in Sectoral Emissions 
Ireland’s past recorded and projected future sectoral emissions are shown in Figure 7.7. 
Transport emissions increased very rapidly from 5.1 MtCO₂ in 1990 to 14.4 MtCO₂ in 2007, 
a rise of 180%. Transport emissions dropped back to 10.8 MtCO₂ with the economic 
recession but are now rising rapidly again. Energy industries emissions are dominated by 
electricity generation which increased rapidly with economic growth to 2002, thereafter 
falling similarly rapidly with the increased use of natural gas and renewables, reducing the 
amount of coal and peat-fuelled electricity generation. Comparing 2015 to 1990 in 
percentage of generation: gas rose from 27% to 42%, renewables were up from 2% to 17%, 
while coal use fell from 40% to 25%, and peat from 20% to 12% (see Fig, 17 and Table 7 
SEAI, 2016a). Overall, the primary fuel input to electricity generation rose by 71% to a 2001 
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high of 5,237 ktoe. In 2015, electricity generation consumed 4,500 ktoe of fuel and energy 
industries emissions jumped 5.4% due to a large (19.4%) rise in coal use for electricity 
generation at Moneypoint power station. 
 
Figure 7.7: Chart generated from EPA data (EPA, 2017a) showing Ireland’s sectoral 
annual emissions (past as recorded and future projected With Existing Measures).  For 
clarity F-gases and non-electricity energy industry are omitted. F-gases: 0.04 MtCO₂e in 
1990; 1.14 MtCO₂e in 2015 and projected to be 0.7 MtCO₂e in 2035. Non-electricity 
energy (petro-refining, solid fuel making and fugitive emissions) averages 0.5 MtCO₂e yr-
1, steady over the period. 
Agriculture has the largest CO₂e emissions of any sector (primarily due to methane and 
nitrous oxide emissions associated with cattle for beef and dairy production). The sector’s 
emissions rose to a peak in 1998 and then fell steadily, apparently as a side-effect of 
changes in the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy breaking the linkage between production 
and supports, and as a result of the milk quota limit on dairy production. In 2015, agriculture 
was 33% of total emissions and 44% of non-ETS emissions. Irish dairy production has been 
particularly targeted for expansion under government-endorsed policies, Food Harvest 2020 
and Food Wise 2025, leading to a rapid, ongoing rise in dairy sector methane emissions 
(Figure 7.8). Nitrous oxide emissions are also rising rapidly with increasing livestock 
numbers as a result of these policies.  
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Figure 7.8: Irish dairy industry trends since 1990, indexed to 1990=100. Data from EPA 
(2017b). 
Economic growth and recession appear to have been important drivers of some emission 
trends in Ireland. Most notably emissions in transport and F-gases continue to be highly 
correlated with both rising and falling per capita GDP22. But other sectors’ trends, shown in 
Figure 7.9, are not so strongly attuned, presumably due to a variety of other factors including: 
changes in the structure of the economy toward financial and other services, reduced herd 
numbers in agriculture (until recently) and increased penetration of natural gas23 and 
renewables in electricity generation. A further potential confounding factor during this period 
is the commissioning of the East-West electricity interconnector which has a varying nett 
emissions effect dependent on the amount of nett electricity imported (or exported) and the 
associated territorial transfer of emissions reporting. 
 
                                            
22 Using per capita GDP here  attempts to normalise  underlying population change. 
23 There is a hard limit to achievable reduction from increased gas: namely, once higher intensity 
sources (coal, peat) are taken or driven off the system. Beyond that, increased gas consumption will 
always mean increased emissions (unless gas is then combined with CCS ). 
157 
 
 
Figure 7.9 Generated correlations of 'Irish sectoral emissions to per capita GDP' showing 
correlation coefficients from 1990 up to each year to 2014; charted to indicate degree of 
coupling with economic cycle. Sectors not shown show no strong correlation with GDP per 
capita over time. 
Annual net LULUCF emissions are shown in Figure 7.10, showing that Ireland’s LULUCF 
emissions in 2015 constitute a net source of 4.3 MtCO₂e: Grasslands (5.9 MtCO₂e) and 
Wetlands (2.6 MtCO₂e) are the significant land-use sources (due to drainage of organic 
soils); and Forestland (-3.6 MtCO₂e) is the significant land-use sink. CO₂ is the major gas in 
LULUCF emissions and removals, with non-CO₂ gases (methane and nitrous oxide) playing 
only a small part (see Table 6.2, EPA, 2017b). Trends since 1990 show a reduction in total 
net LULUCF emissions highly correlate with Forestland planting and timber growth (EPA, 
2017b, p. 80). A decrease of 1.2 MtCO₂e in Grassland emissions has been substantially 
negated by an increase of 1.0 MtCO₂e in emissions from Wetlands. 
 
Figure 7.10: Irish LULUCF nett national and sectoral source and sink emissions by land 
category. (Data from Table 6.2 in EPA, 2017a) Sector codes per UNFCCC accounting. 
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7.3 Ireland and EU policy for mitigating GHG emissions 1990 to 2020 
7.3.1 Ireland and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Ireland signed the UNFCCC on 5 June 1992, ratified it on 20 April 1994 and it entered into 
force on the 19th July 1994. In 2000, Ireland published a first National Climate Change 
Strategy (DECLG, 2000) proposing quantified indicative reductions totalling 15.4 MtCO₂e 
yr-1 across all sectors compared to baseline projections to 2010. No binding commitments 
to emission reduction were made until the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC (adopted in 
September 1997, entering into force on 16 February 2005) committing developed nations 
including the EU to achieving specific ‘top-down’ reductions of domestic emissions 
(UNFCCC, 1997).  The related first commitment period was then set for January 2008 to 
December 2012. As noted in Chapter 2, the second Kyoto commitment period (identified in 
the Doha amendment of 2012) never formally entered into force, though the EU 2020 
emissions target period is still based on it.  
7.3.2 The Kyoto Protocol first period 2008-2012 
In participating in the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, Ireland is both a Party in its own 
right, and one of the EU member states that form the EU bloc that is also a Party. The global 
risks and IPCC “reasons for concern”, and the EU consideration of the 2ºC limit in 1996 
(reaffirmed in 2004/5) as a simplified basis for global and Irish policy to avoid “dangerous 
anthropogenic interference”, are recounted by McElwain and Sweeney (2006).  Conducted 
within the UNFCCC but as a separate agreement among developed nations, the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol was the first international commitment made by Ireland and the EU to actually 
reduce emissions overall. These so-called “Annex-1” Nations were required to limit 
emissions to below a cumulative target for the period 2008-2012, although ‘flexible 
mechanisms’ (international credits for mitigation elsewhere) could be bought to ensure 
compliance if the target was breached. Within the EU burden sharing to meet the Kyoto 
targets, Ireland, to support its economic development, was allowed to increase annual 
emissions by 13% for the period 2008 to 2012 relative to 1990, but had already reached this 
level by 1997 when the Protocol was signed.  National emissions continued to rise rapidly 
until 2002. 
In response to Kyoto, Ireland set out the National Climate Change Strategy (DECLG, 2000) 
detailing cross-sectoral market-based carbon taxation and trading options. It also specified 
sectoral measures: in energy, an intent to cease coal use at Moneypoint; in transport, modal 
shift measures supporting public transport and fuel efficiency; in agriculture, a reduction in 
methane emissions equivalent to 10% reduction in livestock numbers; and in forestry, full 
achievement of the planting target. Overall reductions of 15.4 MtCO₂e yr-1 relative to a 
reference baseline were targeted. In 2007, the renewed National Climate Change Strategy 
(DEHLG, 2007) stated that Irish emissions were 25% above 1990 levels (with an economy 
150% larger) so it was likely that Ireland would need to buy compliance for exceeding the  
Kyoto cumulative target 314 MtCO₂e (62.8 Mt yr-1) for 2008-2012. However, due to the 
banking and financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath, national emissions dropped rapidly 
such that Ireland met its cumulative Kyoto target, with the 17.0 MtCO₂e of forest sinks 
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(allowed under Kyoto accounting) cancelling out the 16.2 MtCO₂ emissions in excess of the 
target (Duffy, 2013). Note that this Kyoto accounting carbon sink is for net annual 
sequestration from Afforestation, Reforestation and Deforestation (Kyoto Protocol Article 3, 
Paragraph 3, see EPA, 2017b, p. 29), which differs from the net Forestland CO₂e removals 
shown in Figure 7.10, that also includes forest management of existing woodlands. 
7.3.3 The Kyoto Protocol second period: the EU 2020 targets 
O’Reilly et al. (2012) details the development of the European Union 2020 targets as part of 
the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, and describes the EU 2050 Roadmap 
laying out a longer-term European perspective on decarbonisation towards 2050 across 
different sectors. This research also outlines the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), the EU 
market mechanism to decarbonise major industrial emission sources over time, and the 
Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) of 2009 (European Union, 2009), the EU policy to reduce 
non-ETS emissions through individual targets in each Member State.  Noting that the EU’s 
2020 reduction target is not in line with a 2ºC goal, O’Reilly et al. (2012) suggest an increase 
in ambition to a 30% reduction by 2020 would be aligned with achieving a 2ºC pathway 
though the exact basis for this claimed alignment is not elaborated. The EU’s Effort Sharing 
Decision specifying that “the overall global annual mean surface temperature increase 
should not exceed 2°C above pre-industrial levels” did include a conditional offer by the EU 
to reduce emissions by 30% by 2020 relative to 1990, provided that other developed 
countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and that economically 
more advanced developing countries commit themselves to contributing adequately 
according to their responsibilities and capabilities (European Union, 2009).  However, this 
offer was not taken up by other relevant countries. 
Due to the economic crisis of 2008 and the recession years thereafter, Ireland began the 
second Kyoto period with national emissions well below its targeted linear pathway of 
decreasing non-ETS emissions over the 2013 to 2020 period, under the EU’s burden-
sharing agreement for the Kyoto second period. However, Irish non-ETS emissions have 
steadily increased again since, due to economic recovery and renewed growth (not 
differentiated or constrained by relative emissions impact, hence not even relatively 
decoupled from growth), and also through more specific, policy-directed, growth in 
agriculture, such that annual emissions will likely exceed the target pathway already for 2017 
(EPA, 2017a). Cumulatively Ireland is currently projected to exceed its 2013-2020 ESD 
target by 12-14 MtCO₂e (EPA, 2017e, p. 5). 
7.3.4 Ireland and EU Climate Policy Developments Since 2012 
7.3.4.1 Ireland’s National Policy Position 
Announced in April 2014, alongside the heads of a draft climate bill, the Irish government 
published a Climate Action and Low-Carbon Development National Policy Position (DECLG, 
2014). This National Policy Position (NPP) states two separate quantitative mitigation 
objectives (for 2050) as characterising the intended “low-carbon transition”: 
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The low-carbon road mapping process will be guided by a long-term vision 
of low-carbon transition based on – 
• an aggregate reduction in carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions of at least 
80% (compared to 1990 levels) by 2050 across the electricity 
generation, built environment and transport sectors; and   
• In parallel, an approach to carbon neutrality in the agriculture and 
land-use sector, including forestry, which does not compromise 
capacity for sustainable food production. (DECLG, 2014) 
No quantitative indication of a proposed emissions pathway toward the 2050 end-point 
target is given within the NPP (so additional assumptions are needed to infer a specific 
cumulative carbon quota associated with these objectives). The document does mention the 
wider context of Irish policy being within the EU objective of reducing GHGs by 80-95% by 
2050 compared to 1990, This refers to the EU Roadmap that indicates overall EU emission 
reductions of 80% or more by 2050, based on significant measures in agriculture (-42% to -
49%) and transport (-54% to -58%), and  much greater percentage reductions in electricity 
generation (-93% to -99%), residential (-88% to -91%) and industry (-83% to -88%) (Chiodi 
et al., 2013b). The NPP outlines a separation between energy and agricultural emissions 
that cuts across the EU policy target separation between ETS and non-ETS emissions. The 
NPP’s aggregate energy sector, targeting an 80% reduction relative to 1990, includes 
electricity generation (an ETS sector) as well as ‘built environment’, presumably emissions 
due to heating residential and commercial buildings, and transport (both currently almost 
entirely non-ETS sectors). Electrifying transport and heating sectors would automatically 
move their accounting into the ETS under current emission accounting rules, so there is a 
certain logic in the NPP (which extends to 2050) in not distinguishing between ETS and non-
ETS. 
Apparently omitted from this aggregate NPP energy sector are some non-ETS energy and 
industry CO₂ emissions from manufacturing, and non-CO₂ from waste and F-gases – 
possibly representing up to around 4 MtCO₂e of reported emissions in 2015. It is unclear 
whether this omission has some policy significance, or was merely for simplicity of exposition 
(with an implication that these other sectors would be subject to comparable reduction 
targets). 
In the NPP, agriculture is given separate status in Irish policy, whereas in EU policy the 
sector is within the national responsibility to reduce non-ETS emissions in line with the EU’s 
agreed burden sharing for the EU2020 and 2030 targets. This presumably reflects the much 
larger role of agricultural emissions in Ireland (33% of total emissions) compared to other 
EU members states. Agriculture’s “approach to carbon neutrality” in the NPP appears to 
assume that forestry sinks, in particular, can be used as an offset to continued agricultural 
emissions, equated in CO₂e terms: specifically, offsetting methane from ruminants with the 
CO₂ sink in growing woodland. Other land-use source emissions from Grasslands and 
Wetlands can be ignored under current UNFCCC and Kyoto accounting if nations opt to do 
so, as Ireland has done (peatlands cut-away before 1990 are also excluded from land-use 
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change accounting). Despite the agriculture sector’s separate treatment within Irish policy, 
the sector still lies within the non-ETS sector in meeting EU effort-sharing targets, together 
with the transport and heating sectors, and waste and F-gases. In EU accounting then, any 
failure to mitigate absolute emissions from agriculture will need to be compensated by 
correspondingly larger CO₂e reductions in Ireland’s other non-ETS sectors, or else 
compliance costs will become payable for local climate action policy target shortfalls. 
7.3.4.2 The EU’s (Intended) Nationally Determined Contribution 
In March 2015, in advance of the UNFCCC CoP21, the EU submitted its Intended Nationally 
Determined Contribution (INDC) as its decarbonisation pledge (European Commission, 
2015).  On the GWP100 metric basis, the EU commitment “to a binding target of an at least 
a collective 40% domestic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 
1990, to be fulfilled jointly” is declared to be a “significant progression” beyond the EU’s 2020 
targets and in line with an 80-95% reduction in emissions by 2050 compared to 1990. EU 
ETS emissions are to decrease by 43% by 2030 compared to 2005, and EU non-ETS by 
30%. In the EU’s NDC pledge, average per capita emissions in the EU are projected to fall 
to around 6 tCO₂e by 2050, compared to about 12 tCO₂e per capita in 1990.  
7.3.4.3 Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act (2015) 
Ireland’s Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act (Oireachtas, 2015) became law 
on 10th December 2015 directing the submission of a “National Mitigation Plan (NMP) by 
10th June 2017 to be revised at intervals of no longer than 5 years thereafter. The NMP is to 
specify measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions toward meeting the National 
Transition Objective (NTO), which is defined, in Article 3(1), as “the transition to a low 
carbon, climate resilient and environmentally sustainable economy by the end of the year 
2050”. No specific quantitative targets are enshrined in the Act. The Government must 
“endeavour” to meet the objective, ensuring that measures are “cost effective” and can be 
seen as “having regard to”: government climate policy (presumably meaning the NPP in the 
first instance though, as simply a cabinet decision, this can presumably be arbitrarily 
modified at any time, as the then Government may determine), mitigation commitments 
made by the EU or in relation to the UNFCCC, and “climate justice” (no further definition is 
given). The Act requires the Government to take into account existing State obligations 
arising from its membership of the EU or under any international climate change agreement 
ratified by Ireland. The Act also set up an independent Climate Change Advisory Council 
(CCAC) to review, advise and report periodically on both climate change mitigation and 
adaptation. The CCAC produced its First Report in December 2015, summarising scientific 
understanding, global, EU and national policy responses (including the Paris Agreement, 
EU targets and the National Policy Position) and steps toward mitigation and adaptation 
(CCAC, 2016). Although not explicitly stated in the Act, the CCAC have equate the NPP’s 
quantitative mitigation targets (quoted above) with what they term the National Mitigation 
Objective, and take this to be prescriptive for the formulation of the National Mitigation 
Plan(s), required under the Act. 
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7.3.4.4 The National Mitigation Plan (July 2017) 
The National Mitigation Plan, or NMP (DCCAE, 2017a), states that Ireland’s contribution to 
the Paris Agreement will be through the EU’s NDC, committing to an EU-wide 40% reduction 
in GHG emissions by 2030 relative to 1990, and notes that the EU’s NDC will need to 
increase in ambition over time (p.11). Under the 2009 EU Effort Sharing Decision, Ireland 
has a non-ETS target of a 20% reduction by 2020 (relative to 2005) but may only achieve 
4% to 6% compared to 2005, despite beginning the 2013-2020 period with emissions well 
below the target pathway due to the economic crisis of 2008-2012. Under the currently 
proposed 2017 Effort Sharing Regulation Ireland’s non-ETS target is -30% but the proposed 
‘flexibilities’ from the land-use sector (5.6%) and potential transfers in credits from the ETS 
sector (4%) which may possibly reduce Ireland’s effective 2030 non-ETS target to just 20.4% 
below 2005. The NMP is based on the National Policy Position and indicatively shows a 
linear path of annual reductions of 0.75 MtCO₂ yr-1 from 2015 to 2050 in the NPP aggregate 
sector of electricity generation, built environment and transport (Figure 2.1 in NMP, 2017). 
The NMP is based on the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act and the 2015 
Energy White Paper with an economic objective explicitly stated, though the possible related 
total emissions in the Plan are not clear: 
[the NMP] policy will contribute to reductions in Ireland’s greenhouse gas 
emissions and enhancement of sinks in a manner that achieves the 
optimum benefits at least cost. (DCCAE 2017, 15) 
However, as shown in the projected emissions to 2020 and 2035 (Figures 2.5 and 2.1 in 
NMP, 2017) Ireland’s emissions are on a trajectory of increasing emissions that appears 
contrary to this declared aim. Toward the 2020 non-ETS target, the likely cumulative shortfall 
in emissions reductions is 13.7 MtCO₂ (Table 2.1 in NMP, 2017), and to between 89 and 
113 MtCO₂e in possible shortfall in non-ETS CO₂e quota (Table 2.2 in NMP, 2017)). Two 
supporting reports for the NMP explore transition pathway scenarios for Ireland, Low Carbon 
Energy Roadmaps for Ireland (ESRI et al., 2013) and Energy Modelling to Inform the 
National Mitigation Plan (Curtin et al., 2017). In an “NMP scenario”, non-ETS energy 
emissions fall 23 MtCO₂ yr-1 in 2020 to 17 MtCO₂ yr-1 in 2030 (Curtin et al., 2017, p. 22) .   
A further feasibility study of CO₂ geological storage reservoirs to begin by 2022 is proposed, 
but CCS is said to be dependent on commercial viability based on a sufficiently high ETS 
price, which would seem to indicate CCS is only being considered in the longer term beyond 
2030 (Curtin et al., 2017, pp. 36, 49, 159). Bioenergy is noted as possibly being “the 
dominant energy source by 2050, with significant implications for land use and energy 
security” (p. 22), for heating and transport more than electrical generation (p. 42).  BECCS 
is not mentioned in the NMP.  Use of forest based biomass (FBB) bioenergy is projected to 
double from 15 PJ in 2020 to 29 PJ in 2035 (p. 134) with €132.5 million to be spent on 
afforestation to bridge a forecast gap in FBB supply by 2020 (p. 146). By 2019 reviews of 
the future of the coal-fired Moneypoint electricity generating plant and the peat-fired plants 
are to be completed. Energy storage is referenced as a research subject but no specific 
projects are mentioned. In transport, which has rapidly escalating emissions, biofuels are 
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advocated as a major part of emissions reduction given the EU RED specification of 10% 
renewable energy in transport by 2020 (p. 95).  
The NMP follows the NPP’s “approach to carbon neutrality in the agriculture and land-use 
sector, including forestry” for Ireland’s growing agricultural sector methane and nitrous oxide 
emissions – particularly due to increased livestock production resulting from industry and 
government expansion policies. Mitigation in this aggregate sector is anticipated from the 
forest sector “equivalent to 20-22% of agricultural emissions on an annual basis” (p. 123). 
Although soil carbon management is mentioned and a long list of other measures for 
agriculture is given, no other quantified estimate of absolute emissions reductions is 
mentioned.  
7.3.4.5 Literature Critiquing Ireland’s Climate Policy 
As briefly summarised below, literature relating to Ireland’s climate change policy to date 
generally points to its weak potential for limiting national or sectoral emissions and the EPA 
finds little sign of decoupling emissions from economic growth24 and points particularly to 
concern over future emissions increases in transport, agriculture and electricity generation 
(EPA, 2016). As described previously, the agricultural sector from 2000-2009 was achieving 
absolute and relative decoupling of emissions in primarily due to efficiencies being realised, 
due to the EU milk quota cap, reducing the dairy herd size yet maintaining production, and 
by the delinking of EU subsidies from food production. 
Torney (2017) examines the slow development of Irish climate legislation since the initial 
National Climate Change Strategy in 2000. Torney finds the progress toward an Irish climate 
Act to be an example of limited policy diffusion from the UK following the UK Climate Change 
Act of 2008, affected by limited commitment from political parties and subject to strong 
counter-lobbying from business and farming groups. Progress was further slowed by the 
economic and banking crisis and the international political failure to produce a new global 
climate agreement at the UNFCCC CoP at Copenhagen in 2009.  Little (2017), examines 
climate change policy in the context of Ireland’s leading political parties finding that only 
when the goal of seeking office has aligned with opportunities to progress climate policy 
have party policies changed.  However, intra-party co-operation has been limited, local 
politics has a considerable role and some topics have typically been ruled out of discussion, 
for example: 
Political consensus has also put some climate policy questions – 
specifically, the question of growing agricultural production and developing 
new markets for meat and dairy produce – outside the realm of ‘reasonable 
politics’ (interview 9).  (Little, 2017, p. 215) 
 
                                            
24 Another relevant policy framing would be to measure the decoupling of domestic emissions from 
overall economic activity, not just economic growth since it is activities (production and consumption) 
that result in emissions. 
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Interim and final reports to the Department of the Taoiseach by the Secretariat of the 
National Economic and Social Council (NESC-Sec, 2012a, 2012b) outlining the “climate 
change challenge” claim to reframe it as a process of evolutionary institutional learning and 
bottom-up effort within society, going “beyond compliance”. However, Kirby (2013) points 
out that such ‘policy optimism’ is strongly at odds with the scientific reality of limits to 
emissions in line with temperature targets. Limits strongly imply the need for strict targets 
and monitoring to meet them, as well as strong societal effort both top-down and bottom-up, 
which challenges the existing political economy of Irish governance that is left uncritiqued 
by the NESC-Secretariat. Price (2015) also points to the need for governance within carbon 
limits, without which efficiency savings by local agents (local authorities, businesses, farms 
or individuals) may be wasted due to rebound effects (more emissions spent on other 
activities as a result of cash savings being spent by themselves or others free-riding on good 
efforts). Looking at Ireland climate change mitigation options, O’Reilly et al. (2012) suggest 
a rapid shift to investment in low or zero carbon technologies “is required by 2015” to avoid 
escalating costs toward a ‘GHG neutral Ireland by 2050’. Also recommended are carbon-
pricing in non-ETS sectors, private sector engagement and learning projects to better inform 
policy-makers, arguing that the global demand for climate solutions will create economic 
opportunities for job creation and ‘green growth’ (albeit this still arguably understates the 
scale of the challenge of decoupling even such “green” economic growth from continued 
emissions growth, given the potential for systemic rebound effects).  In contrast, Morgan 
(2017) is more critical of the existing economic and media barriers to addressing 
sustainability and climate change, finding that “deep systemic issues” are dominant factors, 
particularly: 
The “elephant in the room” of neoliberalism needs to be named as a major 
obstacle to facilitating individual and societal responses to sustainability. As 
long as individuals are treated as consumers or commodities, their role in 
society will reflect this. Likewise, as long as society is treated as a means 
to an economic end, the behaviours that follow will encourage such 
arrangements.  (Morgan, 2017, p. 42) 
As noted in interviews by Torney (2017, p. 260), and as inferred by the CCAC, the Irish Act’s 
note to “have regard to” “government climate policy” appears to be a reference to the 
National  Policy Position’s two driving objectives and is being taken by the CCAC and others 
to mean Ireland’s core mitigation policy. However, McMullin and Price (2017) – noting the 
problems inherent in assuming negative emissions, accounting differently for different GHG 
gases, and in the inconsistent treatment of sinks – urge the CCAC to consider the NPP’s 
implicit incoherence, both between the two specified drivers themselves and with the various 
EU end-date objectives to 2050. The incompatibility of both the NPP and the EU targets with 
the Paris Agreement’s temperature goals (especially the need to increase ambition beyond 
that undertaken in the pre-Paris INDCS, no later than 2023) is also noted. The scientific and 
moral need for Irish policy to specify a Paris-aligned cumulative limit on total future CO₂ 
emissions (as a share of the remaining global carbon budget), or an equivalent CO₂ 
emissions rate pathway over time, is identified as critical if Irish climate policy is, in good 
165 
 
faith, to “have regard to” the Paris Agreement – albeit this legal phrasing has little strength 
in law (is almost certainly not justiciable). 
7.4 Available Modelling and Analysis of Ireland’s Mitigation Potential 
7.4.1 Mitigation Options Considered in Modelling 
O’Reilly et al. (2012) mention (citing Resigner et al., 2012)  the need for significant levels of 
net negative emissions globally after 2050 in 450 ppm stabilisation scenarios. As previously 
noted in Chapter 1.8, scenario analysis indicates that investment in NETs and CCS would 
need to be followed by actual achievement of negative emissions as soon as 2030 and 
ramping up annual carbon reduction removal thereafter (van Vuuren et al., 2016). Chiodi et 
al. (2013b) find that an 80% whole-economy emissions reduction by 2050 compared to 1990 
is technically achievable in Ireland, provided agriculture can achieve a 50% reduction in its 
emissions, otherwise negative emissions are also required to achieve that end point. 
Existing modelling is based on domestic measures to supply low carbon energy and efforts 
toward achieving demand-side efficiency improvement and achieving demand reduction. 
Another alternative to local mitigation may be through Irish or EU funding of emission 
reduction elsewhere (outside the Irish territorial jurisdiction). In principle, given the global 
mitigation constraint, that may only represent a mechanism for temporary deferral, rather 
than long term avoidance, of progressively deeper local mitigation (i.e., only while additional, 
relatively less expensive, mitigation options are still available in other jurisdictions, over and 
above their own accepted, “equitable”, contributions). However, if negative emissions 
technologies could be deployed at sufficient speed and scale, at sufficiently low cost, and if 
that service were traded internationally, then that might open a longer-term possibility for 
continued “purchase” of additional extra-territorial mitigation in preference to deeper local 
mitigation, according to the differential costs of such technology deployment in different 
jurisdictions.  
7.4.2 The Irish TIMES Model 
Based on the widely used MARKAL/TIMES modelling, Irish TIMES is a detailed (partial 
equilibrium) energy-systems optimisation model specific to Ireland, developed at University 
College Cork with the assistance of EPA Research funding (Chiodi et al., 2013b). Ó 
Gallachóir et al. (2012) describes the model and its use to optimise energy  supply for the 
Irish economy at least (notional, estimated) cost, under varying assumptions and exogenous 
constraints (including GHG emissions constraints).  Optimising for interactions between all 
energy system sectors enables assessment of alternative technology choices, energy mix 
and GHG emissions for different policy scenarios, according to the availability and estimated 
costs of different technology options.  Results are strongly dependent on the assumptions 
of future economic activities (rates of economic growth or otherwise) and capital and 
operating costs (including future fuel prices) that drive the model.  In general, for UCC’s Irish 
TIMES modelling to 2050, economic growth is assumed to be constant at 1.69% yr-1 and 
total final energy consumption varies between 0.37% yr-1 growth in a reference scenario and 
0.16% and 0.23% yr-1 reduction in decarbonisation scenarios to show relative decoupling 
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between economic activity and emissions ( Chiodi et al., 2013b). Policy and agent 
‘landscape’ effects (the inertia of business-as-usual and entrenched interests, see Li and 
Strachan, 2016) are not well represented in TIMES modelling so the focus is on technology 
choices assuming perfect knowledge and rapid response (see Chapter 7 regarding 
modelling types). As a validity check of the power (electricity) sector results from Irish TIMES 
the model is ‘soft linked’25 (Martinsen, 2011) to the PLEXOS software, developed by the 
Commission for Energy Regulation, that models Ireland’s gas and electricity system (Deane 
et al., 2013) with high time resolution. Key model input components to Irish TIMES are 
energy service demands, fuel and resource supplies and costs, policy scenarios and 
technologies and their costs (Chiodi et al., 2013b,). There is no elastic demand module so 
Irish TIMES cannot respond to emission constraints by reducing final demand, only through 
increasing energy efficiency (reducing primary requirement) or changing technology (Chiodi 
et al., 2013b). 
Initial results based on meeting alternative energy CO₂ reduction targets for 2050 highlighted 
major challenges for Ireland in meeting the EU’s 2050 Roadmap target of an 80-95% 
reduction in emissions compared to 1990 (Ó Gallachóir et al., 2012).  In particular, if 
agriculture cannot achieve an 80% reduction then even a ~50% reduction in Irish agricultural 
emissions (as assumed by the EU Roadmap) would require a 95% reduction in energy 
emissions. Least-cost results for meeting Ireland’s 2020 targets (under the EU ESD, the 
Renewable Energy Directive and longer-term emission targets) suggest a greater emphasis 
is now needed on investment in renewable heat and transport relative to wind generated 
electricity26. However, this analysis does assume the EU policy position that biomass energy 
is carbon neutral whereas there is strong scientific critique that makes that position highly 
questionable. 
Papers giving further results from Irish TIMES modelling look at: 
• The impact of meeting Ireland’s 2020 non-ETS target (Chiodi et al., 2013a).  This 
suggests that the target is “far from cost optimal” for Ireland if a low mitigation 
potential in the agricultural sector is assumed That is, it suggests that, on the margin, 
some significant 2020 Irish non-ETS mitigation could be achieved at lower cost in 
other EU member states (over and above first meeting their own non-ETS mitigation 
obligations); and that, therefore, it should be cheaper for Ireland to purchase such 
non-ETS mitigation “credits” from other member states rather than implementing it 
domestically. It is argued that, as long as the total EU-wide non-ETS target is indeed 
 
                                            
25 Soft-linking or informal linking means that the models are run iteratively and the information 
transfer between the models is carried out by the user. The soft-link facilitates the use of 
comprehensive models, as the complexity and running time generally is manageable. 
26 While the 2020 ESD emissions target and the RES renewable penetration target obviously interact 
in complex ways, from a strict climate point of view – as opposed to a political/economic point of 
view – achievement of the RES target is not relevant in itself; only the absolute emissions outcome 
is ultimately relevant. 
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achieved, then this would be the most “economically efficient” outcome. Note that 
flexibility for such bi-lateral or multi-lateral transfers, in the interests of maximising 
EU-wide cost-effectiveness, were explicitly anticipated and indeed encouraged in the 
provisions of the 2020 Effort Sharing Directive (article 10): but will still represent 
tangible charges on the Irish exchequer (rather than on the polluting activities 
themselves). 
• Bioenergy’s role in least notional cost mitigation scenarios up to 2050 (Chiodi et al., 
2015a).  This finds that bioenergy could meet half of Ireland’s energy needs by 2050; 
but constraints due to imposition of sustainability criteria and/or reliance on domestic 
resources would greatly increase energy costs in 2050, the more expensive 
scenarios then requiring natural gas CCS and variable renewable electricity (wind, 
solar and ocean) sources to produce hydrogen, and increased end-use efficiency. 
Constraints on domestic Miscanthus production are identified and the difficulty of 
reconciling beef and dairy industry growth with a low GHG economy is stressed. 
• Czyrnek-Delêtre et al. (2016) assess the possible impact of direct and indirect land-
use change (D/I-LUC) emissions on biofuel usage and costs in Ireland up to 2050. 
They find a potential decrease of 30% in bioenergy availability and marginal 
abatement costs increasing by 68% if conservative ILUC emissions are included.  
Domestic biomass energy crops, such as Miscanthus, willow and oilseed rape, are 
assumed to cause ILUC on the basis that they would displace existing cropland; 
however, the study apparently did not allow for displacing grassland (and thereby 
ruminant emissions) on the basis that grassland conversion to arable is restricted to 
a limited conversion rate under current EU CAP rules. 
• Total GHG emission reductions in Ireland of 80-95% by 2050 in line with the EU 2050 
Roadmap (Chiodi et al., 2013b). This finds that the Irish energy system would have 
to deliver a “127%” emission reduction to meet a whole-economy GHG reduction of 
80% if agricultural emissions stay at the same level as those likely in 2020; that is, 
would have to achieve nett negative emissions (presumed to be via domestic BECCS 
or international emissions trading) within the energy sector at 27% of the 1990 level 
(i.e., c. 8 MtCO₂ yr-1), to be sustained indefinitely.  Even with a 50% cut in agricultural 
emissions by 2050, there would still be a requirement for a 95% cut in energy 
emissions27. 
7.4.3 Other energy modelling of Irish mitigation pathways 
Making numerous substantial assumptions, such as large scale district heating and large 
scale hydrogen use in transport, Connolly et al. (2011) use EnergyPLAN (an energy system 
analysis tool) to make a preliminary outline of three different 100% “renewable” (not 
 
                                            
27 Though not stated in this study, achieving some level of negative emissions would also go some 
way to enabling and assisting in policies requiring such nett energy decarbonisation even short of 
100%. 
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necessarily “low-” or zero-emissions) energy systems for Ireland, focused on biomass, 
hydrogen, or variable renewable electricity.  The modelling only looks at resource and 
technical constraints and does not consider economic cost, business case or other (non-
climate) impacts. In another study EnergyPLAN was used to assess the short-term 
maximum potential wind-energy (annual average) penetration of about 30% in the Irish 
electricity system up to 2020 (Connolly et al., 2011).  For context,  the Irish TIMES model 
(based on Eirgrid analysis) allows an instantaneous maximum of 70% variable renewable 
energy (Chiodi et al., 2013b,), and Connolly quotes research by Meibom et al. that found 
wind penetration of 42% annual average electricity is feasible in Ireland (Connolly et al., 
2011,). 
The Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland (SEAI) undertakes national energy modelling 
and reporting that also produces inputs to EPA emission projections (see annual “Energy in 
Ireland” reports SEAI, 2016a). The SEAI energy projection modelling is linked to an ESRI 
economic model primarily toward assessing future energy supply needs, costs and sources, 
with emission factors to show energy CO₂. However, analysis showing scenarios and energy 
projections that would align Ireland’s energy sector and its emissions with Paris-target 
climate action is missing. Particularly stressing bioenergy development,, recent SEAI 
modelling publications cover progress toward energy targets on emissions and renewable 
energy penetration (2016b), a macroeconomic analysis of bioenergy use to 2020 (2015a), 
achieving Ireland’s EU 2020 renewable heat target (2015b), biogas costs (2017) and energy 
efficiency (2016c). 
7.4.4 FAPRI and MACC Modelling for Agriculture 
Teagasc uses Ireland-specific FAPRI-modelling, a partial equilibrium economic model for 
Ireland’s agricultural sector, to look at agricultural economics, emissions and mitigation 
costs. Donnellan et al. (2013) find that any reduction of Ireland’s national emissions is likely 
to require agricultural sector emission reductions but Ireland’s Food Harvest 2020 policies 
do not address this constraint. Eliminating Ireland’s entire suckler herd would still fail to 
reduce the sector’s emissions by 20%, and a reduction as low as 10% is characterised as 
“likely to be politically unfeasible” (Donnellan et al., 2014), making the difficult choices in 
aligning sectoral and climate policy explicit. 
Teagasc has also undertaken modelling combining Life Cycle Analysis and the IPCC 
methodology to assess potential GHG mitigation in Irish agriculture (Teagasc, 2012). These 
findings show that mitigation of 2.5 MtCO₂e yr-1 could be feasibly achieved by 2020 relative 
to their projected reference scenario. Of this, only 1.1 MtCO₂e yr-1 could be credited to 
agriculture in EU and UNFCCC reporting; the remainder would arise largely from increases 
in biofuel and bioenergy crop cultivation, which would be accounted as displacing fuel 
consumption emissions in electricity generation and transport, rather than as mitigating 
agriculture sector emissions.  
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7.5 Ireland’s Projected Emissions and proposed decarbonisation 
pathways 
7.5.1 Possible policy emissions pathway from O’Reilly et al. 2012 
The EPA report by O’Reilly et al. (2012) outlines a potential mitigation scenario for Ireland 
to 2050 based on the EU 2050 Roadmap assumptions and Irish TIMES energy modelling 
(Ó Gallachóir et al., 2012) as illustrated in Figure 7.11. Energy CO₂ emissions fall to about 
5% of 1990 levels and agriculture emissions are assumed to fall by 49%. However, total 
CO₂e emissions only fall by 78% by 2050, compared to the EU 2050 Roadmap objective of 
80 to 95% because of the “limited reduction by agriculture”.  
The pathway illustrated by O’Reilly et al. (2012) suggests an approximate 70% reduction in 
total annual energy emissions (including electricity generation, transport, residential heating 
and industry) between 2020 and 2030. Cumulative energy CO₂ emissions shown by the 
pathway total approximately 600 MtCO₂. 
 
Figure 7.11: Potential emissions in Ireland 1990-2050 (Reproduced from O’Reilly (2012)) 
 
7.5.2 Pathways from Ó Gallachóir et al. (2012) 
Ó Gallachóir et al. (2012) use the Irish TIMES Model to develop energy and energy-related 
CO₂ emissions scenarios to 2050, based on ESRI-generated macro-economic modelling. In 
addition to a reference scenario, three scenarios are developed (see Figure 7.12), starting 
in 2015, are based on the policy assumption that agriculture does not meet an 80% reduction 
by 2050 compared with 1990. The CO₂-127 scenario, assuming that agriculture flatlines 
emissions at 2020 levels, requires a 127% reduction in energy CO₂ emissions. As previously 
discussed, based on the equivalent results from (Chiodi et al., 2013b), this would require an 
energy system that would deliver negative emissions (CO₂ removal) of 8 MtCO₂ yr-1 by 2050, 
based on BECCS deployment or otherwise. The CO₂-95 scenario, assuming a 50% 
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reduction in agricultural emissions in line with the EU 2050 Roadmap, still requires a 95% 
reduction in energy CO₂ by 2050. The third scenario, CO₂-80, assumes an 80% reduction 
only in the energy sector. 
 
Figure 7.12: Mitigation scenarios to 2050 generated using the Irish TIMES Model to 
develop energy and energy-related CO₂ emissions scenarios, based on ESRI-generated 
macro-economic modelling. Reproduced from Ó Gallachóir (2012). 
7.5.3 Pathway from EPA representation of the National Policy Position  
Figure 7.13 shows an EPA presentation of the Irish National Policy Position aggregate 
sector of electricity generation, built environment and transport (EGBET) with combined 
2015 emissions of 30.4 MtCO₂. Without additional policies, the aggregate sector is projected 
to increase as shown, rising to 32.9 MtCO₂ by 2035, rather than showing any 
decarbonisation.  
In Ireland’s current National Policy Position only an end-point mitigation target is specified, 
a reduction of annual energy CO₂ emissions in 2050 by 80% relative to the 1990 level. 
However, the climate impact (radiative forcing) Ireland is responsible for critically depends 
on the actual emission pathway taken from now until 2050, which determines the cumulative 
CO₂ emissions over the period. For different (increasingly difficult) theoretical mitigation start 
points of 1990, 2015 and 2035 the linear pathways presented by the EPA in Figure 7.13 are 
characterised by quite different cumulative CO₂ emission: ~900 MtCO₂, ~1400 MtCO₂, and 
~1700 MtCO₂, respectively for the period from 1990 to 2050. So although these pathways 
all meet the same end point constraint, they represent very different contributions to climate 
impacts. Note that, as this aggregate sector does not include some industrial CO₂ emissions, 
these totals cannot, in any case, be directly compared directly with other possible CO₂-only 
pathways. 
171 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.13: Representation of the Irish National Policy Position with annotations of 
alternative linear pathways shown from 1990, 2015 and 2035 (Reproduced from EPA 
2017c). 
 
7.5.4 Pathway and implied Cumulative CO₂ emissions from Climate Change 
Advisory Council reports 2016 and 2017 
Figure 7.14 shows a possible CO₂ decarbonisation pathway from the CCAC First Report 
(2016) annotated with associated cumulative carbon quotas. Not shown is the quota of 1330 
MtCO₂ if CO₂ emissions continued at the 2015 level of 38.2 MtCO₂. The dark green line is 
a linear pathway to meet a reduction in CO₂ emissions to 80% below 1990 levels as per the 
National Policy Position. The light green line is a linear pathway for non-CO₂ emissions from 
agriculture to about 50% of 1990 levels as per the EU Roadmap.  
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Figure 7.14: Irish GHG emissions 1990 to 2050 (without LULUCF), annotated for this 
chapter discussion with carbon quotas for the CO₂ pathway indicated with an added non-
CO₂ pathway (2016). 
The Climate Change Advisory Council Periodic Review 2017 (CCAC, 2017), shows an 
“illustrative linear pathway” from 38.4 MtCO₂ in 2015 toward zero CO₂ emissions in about 
2058 (see Figure 7.15). The CCAC state: 
Future reductions, of over 2% yr-1, similar to the rate experienced during the 
recession, will be required to achieve the low-carbon transition to 2050. 
Reductions on this scale will need to come from policy for sustainable 
economic development in combination with effective national climate policy. 
(CCAC, 2017, p. 13) 
The pathway shown in Figure 7.15 represents a constant annual absolute reduction rate of 
~0.9 MtCO₂ yr-1, equating to an annual fractional reduction rate starting at 2.4% yr-1. The 
cumulative 2015-2058 carbon quota under the “illustrative linear pathway” (red line) to zero 
nett emissions in 2058 is approximately 810 MtCO₂. The cumulative carbon quota 
commitment of the baseline projections shown 2015-2035 (blue line) is also about 810 
MtCO₂, exhausting the same quota 15 years earlier. The total implied illustrative future 
cumulative CO₂-only carbon quota is ~860 MtCO₂ based on the pathway being aligned with 
going to zero by about 2060. 
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Figure 7.15: Emissions of carbon dioxide in Ireland from 1990 to 2015 and projections 
from 2016 to 2035 with an illustrative linear pathway for achievement of the low-carbon 
transition to 2050 (2017). Data source: EPA National Emissions Inventory 2017 and 
Ireland’s GHG Projections 2016-2035. 
7.6 Chapter Conclusions: Ireland's Emissions, Projections and Policy  
Ireland has higher than average EU per capita CO₂ and per capita GHG emissions with an 
unusual national emission profile, which includes significant non-CO₂ emissions from 
agriculture. Irish emission rate changes have been strongly correlated with economic cycles 
indicating that climate policy to date has not been a strong factor in limiting or reducing 
emissions. Based on existing and proposed (additional) policies, projected economic growth 
therefore also results in projections of increasing emissions. In marked contrast, advisory 
research and policy advisors propose linear and piece-wise linear decarbonisation pathways 
that would therefore require climate mitigation policies that do in fact realise early, economy-
wide, reductions in absolute emissions. Whether sustained decarbonisation in Ireland can 
be achieved without constraining economic activity will likely depend on the coherence and 
long-term effectiveness of near-term political decisions, economic policies and forward-
looking planning. This would likely require serious emission constraints in public and 
corporate governance, economic and financial planning, and across Irish society to be 
rapidly redirected away from fossil fuel use and toward decarbonisation within a limit to 
future total emissions, possibly assisted by NETs. 
The next two chapters aim to assist policy understanding of effective planning for the 
necessary low-carbon (or, more likely, “negative carbon”) transition. By estimating a national 
cumulative CO₂ quota, Chapter 8 examines the potential cumulative CO₂ emissions 
constraints of aligning national mitigation policy with Paris Agreement commitments. Finally, 
Chapter 9 examines NETs and enabling capabilities for NETs that might be most appropriate 
for Ireland and provides a preliminary, technical estimate of cumulative and annual national 
NETs capacity.  
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8 Ireland’s carbon quota for the low carbon transition  
Summary 
• An accepted global carbon budget range for allowable CO₂-only emissions from 2015 
onward to limit global warming to “well below 2ºC” is 590-1240 GtCO₂ (mid-point 
915 GtCO₂) based on a 66% chance of success (Rogelj et al., 2016c). For the 
immediate purposes of this chapter we will generally use the central estimate of 
915 GtCO₂. 
• The average global reduction rate for any carbon budget rises whenever annual 
emissions fail to meet the required rate. The average, annual reduction rate for the 
above budget range would have been 3% yr-1 to 6% yr-1 globally, starting in 2016; but 
the required rate is rapidly becoming unfeasible on any managed basis, unless 
peaking and urgent, sustained mitigation begins very quickly; and likely requires 
negative emissions to also be enabled at scale in any case. 
• Four allocation methods are used to estimate Ireland’s carbon quota (share of the 
remaining global carbon budget) using differing weightings of inertia and equity. 
• One additional method, allocating a “fair share” mitigation effort to Ireland by 
calculating a notional equitable pathway, based on responsibility and capacity, is also 
included in this chapter to inform a deeper understanding of quota equity. 
• As of the end of 2017, a remaining “pure-inertia” CO₂ quota for Ireland (assuming 
commensurate action on non-CO₂ forcings) is estimated at about 900 MtCO₂.  
• An Irish “pure-equity” quota is estimated at about 500 MtCO₂ as of the end of 2017. 
• As “per capita quotas” – dividing by national population for comparison with other 
nations – these estimates become ~188 tCO₂ per capita for inertia and ~104 tCO₂ 
per capita for equity.  
• In terms of exponential mitigation pathways, which approximate constant fractional 
additional reduction effort each year and thus minimise the maximum annual 
fractional reduction over the full pathway, reduction rates are in excess of 4.5% yr-1 
for inertia and in excess of 8% yr-1 for equity. 
• Ireland’s current projected rises in emission based on current policies indicate an 
emissions commitment to 2050 in excess of triple the estimated equity quota, 
implying tacit commitment either to substantial NETs delivered at large scale 
(domestically or internationally traded) or else inadequate and/or inequitable national 
mitigation policy relative to the Paris commitments. 
• Unless the availability of very large amounts of NETs (and corresponding policy risk) 
are assumed, plausible stringent mitigation pathways for Ireland aligned with Paris 
targets now require urgent, substantial and ongoing, near-term reductions in annual 
emissions.  
• At this small nation-state scale, assuming the availability of even moderate levels of 
negative emissions potential by 2050 is found to significantly ease long-term 
maintenance of a balance between emissions and removals. 
 
175 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter estimates Ireland’s remaining CO₂ carbon quota relevant to aligning climate 
mitigation policy with the Paris Agreement temperature targets, “in accordance with best 
available science” and undertaking “rapid reductions” in emissions “on the basis of equity” 
(Articles 2, 3 and 4, UNFCCC, 2015). 
Here we use the term global carbon budget to mean the available remaining global CO₂ 
emissions, accounting for non-CO₂ radiative forcing (RF) that will limit global warming to a 
specified temperature target with a defined probability. As discussed in Chapter 1, the Paris 
Agreement target of “well below 2ºC” (WB2C) is widely interpreted as a greater than 66% 
chance of limiting to 2ºC (though this interpretation is also contested). Based on the 
modelling values reported in the AR5 Synthesis, Rogelj et al. (Rogelj et al., 2016c) 
recommend UNFCCC policy analysis use a global carbon budget range of 590-1240 GtCO₂ 
(mid-point 915 GtCO₂), from 2015 onward, for a greater than 66% chance of limiting global 
warming to 2ºC28. This CO₂ budget range allows for the projected radiative effect of non-
CO₂ emissions in WB2C scenarios29. Although reducing non-CO₂ emissions limits peak 
warming, limiting multi-century warming commitment primarily requires urgent, substantial 
and sustained CO₂ reductions (Pierrehumbert, 2014). 
The term carbon quota is used here to mean a national or regional share of the global carbon 
budget, as determined by use of a chosen burden-sharing method30. The global carbon 
budget mid-point of Rogelj et al. (2016c) of 915 GtCO₂ from 2015 onward is used as the 
basis for the carbon quota estimates calculated for this chapter; though it is clearly arguable 
that precaution, as well as the Paris commitment to “pursuing efforts” toward a lower 
temperature goal of 1.5 ºC, would mandate adopting instead the lower limit of this range 
 
                                            
28 See Table 2.2 of the IPCC AR5 Synthesis Report. The Rogelj et al. (2016) mid-value global carbon 
budget of 915 GtCO₂, from 2015 onward, is based on simple climate models that include non-CO₂ 
forcings. Also in Table 2.2, more complex models give a budget of 1000 GtCO₂ remaining after 2011, 
which equates to a mid-value of ~840 GtCO₂ remaining after 2015 once the ~165 GtCO₂ emitted in 
2012-2015 is subtracted. 
29 See definitions of three different types of global carbon budget in Rogelj et al. (2016b, p. 247). 
Note that a “CO₂-only” global carbon budget in some climate modelling contexts refers to a 
theoretical case where CO₂ is the only GHG. This is the most robust metric for committed global 
warming but, in reality non-CO₂ forcings must be accounted for in limiting to a peak temperature 
(IPCC AR5 WG1, 2013, p. 1113; Rogelj et al., 2015a). As the Rogelj et al. (2016c) budget range 
does account for an assumed level of future non-CO₂ warming (unlike such “CO₂-only” budgets), the 
derived national CO₂-only quotas in this chapter’s analysis also allows for non-CO₂. Nonetheless, 
as numerical quotas, they refer strictly to CO₂ and not to a wider basket of climate pollutants. 
30 No such global burden-sharing formula has yet been agreed among the UNFCCC Parties but 
scientific interpretation of the Paris Agreement implies that some form of burden sharing likely needs 
to be achieved if global warming is to be limited to “well below 2ºC”. 
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(590GtCO₂) as a properly prudent basis for planning required action (unless and until more 
precise prediction becomes possible). 
A national carbon quota defines a remaining cumulative nett total of CO₂ emissions that 
could include gross removals as well as total future gross emissions. Burden shares may be 
based on: resource sharing or on cost-sharing (Ch. 3, IPCC AR5 WG3, 2014). The 
remaining ‘resource’ of the WB2C budget, can be allocated based on the current national 
share of total global emissions (inertia), GDP, or population (equity) (Raupach et al., 2014). 
Equity quotas may be further adjusted by quantifying the ‘historical CO₂ emissions debt’ of 
different nations, the amount by which a nation’s fossil fuel and cement emissions are in 
excess of their corresponding per capita share (Matthews, 2015). In effort-sharing 
assessments, mitigation cost is shared in proportion to allocating the remaining global 
carbon budget based on responsibility, often based on historic emissions, and capacity, 
often related to wealth, especially wealth per capita above a threshold level (Holz et al., 
2017).  
8.1.1 Using an exponential decarbonisation pathway RRexp as a baseline 
Different alternative emission pathways (EPs) are possible to meet the same estimated 
quota. As a first, useful approximation, a constant fractional reduction rate RRexp can be 
seen as representing "constant mitigation effort", corresponding to a certain quota of 
cumulative emissions (see Figure 8.1). This is the basis for the quota and rate estimates in 
this chapter. For policy analysis and discussion, it is then useful to compare equitable quota-
RRexp combinations with those for projected EPs based on current policy, and with mitigation 
pathways proposed by recent research. Importantly, the shape of an EP, reflecting the 
annual emissions over a period, determines the cumulative emissions (Price, 2015). Even if 
an end-period target such as 80% decarbonisation by 2050 is theoretically achieved by 
notional, rapid reductions late in the mitigation period, cumulative emissions over the period 
may still be very large due to high emissions early in the mitigation period. Earlier emissions 
reductions (the "low hanging fruit"), relative to a large base, are likely to be easier to achieve 
than later reductions relative to an already much contracted base. An exponential mitigation 
pathway is therefore a useful reference basis for analysis and comparison. Given 
a "minimum-maximum" fractional reduction rate (“mitigation effort”) criterion (for any given 
starting level and quota constraint), the exponential pathway gives the unique “optimum”.  
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Figure 8.1:  Example of an exponential mitigation pathway, reducing at the required rate 
RRexp corresponding to a finite cumulative CO₂ quota, which is the area under the curve. 
8.1.2 Deriving average global RRexp for the WB2C global carbon budget 
Based on the IPCC AR5 Synthesis carbon budgets, Rogelj et al. (2016b, p. 251) recommend 
UNFCCC policy analysis use a range of 590-1240 GtCO₂ for the remaining CO₂-only global 
carbon budget quota from 2015. This range has already been used as a basis for national 
quota policy analysis, for example Pye et al. (2017) for the UK. 
Global fossil fuel and cement emissions in 2015 were 35.8 GtCO₂. Land use emissions vary 
but average ~4.5 GtCO₂ over the past decade. Calculating the average RRexp required as 
of 2015 is straightforward: dividing the 2015 gross CO₂ emission rate of ~41 GtCO₂ yr-1 by 
the low, mid and high values of the Rogelj et al. WB2C range of 590 GtCO₂, 915 GtCO₂, 
1240 GtCO₂ gives global RRexp of 6.9% yr-1, 4.5% yr-1 and 3.3% yr-1, respectively.  
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Figure 8.2: Required global average CO₂ fossil fuel and cement emission reduction rates 
assuming a varying reduction starting point from 1970 to 2040. This is based on the 
method of Figure 1 in Stocker (2013), but uses the WB2C carbon quota range values 
from Rogelj et al. (2016) and actual recorded past emissions. Past year on year 
variations in global fossil fuel emissions cause unevenness up to 2015. To show a 
scenario of ‘flat-lining emissions’, the curves as shown after 2015 result from annual 
emissions projected to continue at 2015 level until the reduction start year. 
The results of repeating this calculation over time are shown in Figure 8.2 (for fossil fuel and 
cement emissions only) with required mitigation rates both in the past, based on recorded 
emissions up to 2015, and in future, as if global emissions ‘flat-lined’ at 36 GtCO₂ yr-1 
(RRexp = 0% yr-1) in the interim, until exponential mitigation begins. To meet the WB2C 
carbon budget in 1970 would have only required annual emission reductions of less than 
1% yr-1 for fossil fuel and cement emissions. As of 2015 the average, global decarbonisation 
rates required were already 3% yr-1 to 6% yr-1. Every year at, or close to, the currently high 
emissions level very rapidly increases the RRexp. As shown, the 2% yr-1 to 5% yr-1 
decarbonisation rate required around 2008 was briefly met due to the global financial crisis. 
This figure graphically shows the critical requirement to act with all possible urgency to meet 
such average global rates if mitigation action is to be aligned with the Paris temperature 
targets31. Relaxing the temperature target decreases the RRexp required now, but delay in 
 
                                            
31 Adding land use emissions to the curves in Figure 8.2 increases the year to year fluctuations and 
on average reduces the available time on the curves by about two years. The same analysis 
performed for a 2.5ºC carbon budget (from Table 2.2 in the IPCC, 2014 Synthesis Report) only 
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achieving the relevant rate rapidly escalates it. Even for the three-times larger, global carbon 
budget range for a 50% chance of 3ºC (Table 2.2, Synthesis Report IPCC, 2014), the 
required average global decarbonisation rate is already between 1% yr-1 and 2% yr-1. 
Flatlining emissions in 2016 from 2015, at 36.2 GtCO₂, and rising in 2017 to about 36.8 tCO₂ 
(Quéré et al., 2017), further increased the rate needed and the difficulty of limiting warming 
to 2ºC. 
8.1.3 National carbon quotas as a basis for climate policy 
As a nation’s contribution to sustained (millennial scale) global warming is directly related to 
its cumulative CO₂ emissions, estimating a remaining national CO₂ quota assists policy-
makers to assess alternative economy-wide emission pathways aligned with a WB2C 
budget. Inevitably, political and societal decision-making and planning, within and between 
nations, is needed to allocate a national carbon quota among the different energy, process 
and land use sectors so that challenging emission pathways can be met. But, aligning near-
term societal choices globally and locally with the physics of the climate system response to 
CO₂ emissions will be required if global warming is to be limited effectively. Of course, 
achieving an equitable, national decarbonisation pathway in any single country will not be 
effective in meeting the global temperature goals unless other nations likewise achieve 
commensurate reductions (Robiou du Pont et al., 2016), possibly based on agreed quota 
sharing principles beyond carbon markets.  
The WB2C global budget constraint implies a need for rapid ‘contraction and convergence’ 
(Meyer, 1999) of all nations’ emissions to a very low per capita level close to zero nett 
CO₂ yr-1. For a WB2C budget, the need for all nations to limit future emissions quickly means 
that the option to buy part of other nations’ carbon quotas is likely to be very limited. 
Sustained and substantial domestic emission reductions and increasing rates of carbon 
dioxide removal (CDR) using NETs (a service which may, however, be traded 
internationally, at least in principle) are therefore the major mitigation options.  
Analyses to date have generally focused on assumed “top down” multilateral management 
of the global carbon quota (see Chapter 2). Only a few nation-specific analyses are available 
showing “bottom up” equitable WB2C carbon quotas or emission pathways. Donner and 
Zickfield (2016) generate CO₂-only logistic-function emission pathways for Canada’s carbon 
quota for different probabilities of limiting warming to less than 1.5ºC, 2ºC and 3ºC. At its 
current CO₂ emissions rate, Canada will have exhausted its equity quota for a 50% chance 
of limiting to 1.5ºC by the end of 2018, and by 2026 for a 66% chance of 2ºC. Pye et al. 
(2017) re-examine UK emission pathways to align UK climate mitigation policy within inertia 
and equity allocations of the Rogelj et al. carbon budget range. Decarbonisation rates for 
WB2C policy of -11% yr-1, -4% yr-1 and -2% yr-1 are found for the smallest equity quota to 
 
                                            
allows an additional 17 years of flatlining emissions relative to the wb2C curves before the rates 
shown are similarly required to meet the higher 2.5ºC target budget. 
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the largest inertia quota, respectively. However, achieving these nett pathways is argued to 
require CO₂ removals equivalent to approximately 250%, 100% and 30% of the respective 
nett quotas. At the sub-national level, Anderson, Stoddard, and Schrage (2017) have 
recently estimated an equitable WB2C carbon quota for the Swedish Municipality of Järfälla 
to align local mitigation planning with the Paris Agreement. 
8.1.4 Deriving a national carbon quota from the global carbon budget 
This chapter focuses on estimating a WB2C CO₂ quota for Ireland, using a variety of 
proposed allocation principles. The resulting quotas will be put in the context of current and 
projected Irish emissions and used to discuss implications for Irish climate mitigation policy, 
and the potential role of CDR/NETs. Possible CO₂ quota estimates are calculated using 
burden-sharing principles as discussed in Chapter 2 for multilateral management of the 
WB2C global carbon budget. As detailed further in the next section, the methods used are: 
M1. Global exponential reduction rates 
M2. Raupach et al. (2014)  
M3. Regensburg Model (Sargl et al., 2016b) 
M4. Rockström et al. (2017)  
M5. Climate Equity Reference Framework, CERF (Athanasiou and Kartha, 2014)  
 
Methods M1-M4 are resource-sharing quotas, aiming to equitably allocate the remaining 
global carbon budget among all nations based on the current, historic or projected share of 
emissions, GDP or population. ‘Grandfathering’ allocations according to current national 
share of global emissions (termed inertia), or by current share of global GDP, are regarded 
as less equitable than equity sharing because they generally give a greater share of the 
remaining budget to nations that have already benefitted most from fossil fuel use. Method 5 
allocates the global carbon budget based on responsibility and capacity using the “fair share” 
methodology of Athanasiou and Kartha (2014) 
For Ireland, Glynn (2017a, 2017b)32 has presented a  preliminary economic analysis based 
on the WB2C global carbon budget and an equity quota. The carbon quota given is 766 
MtCO₂ from 2015, based on the Rogelj et al. (2016c) global carbon budget range and 
Ireland’s proportionate population share of the global population. At the current rate of CO₂ 
emissions from fossil fuel and cement, Ireland would exhaust all of this quota by 2035. Land 
use CO₂ emissions are omitted from this analysis and equivalent exponential reduction rates 
are not stated. Glynn clearly illustrates the need for substantial near-term reductions if such 
a quota is to be met. Delaying mitigation leads to more difficult economic choices, steeper 
carbon price rises and higher overall mitigation costs.  
 
                                            
32 Presentation at the ESRI and a blogpost, both in 2017, summarising research toward a 
forthcoming journal article. 
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Estimates of nett CO₂-only carbon quotas include all gross CO₂ emissions – from fossil fuel 
use, industrial processes and land use; and all CO₂ removals – into forestry and soils, or 
potentially into more permanent and less reversible geologic reservoir storage, via other 
NETs yet to be developed in Ireland (such as BECCS and DACCS). Ireland’s nett CO₂ 
emissions in 2015 were 42.1 MtCO₂, including 38.4 MtCO₂ from fossil fuel and 3.7 MtCO₂ 
from land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF)33 (EPA, 2017b). Current climate 
mitigation policy in Ireland seeks to offset gross emissions of methane and nitrous oxide, 
mostly from agriculture, against land use CO₂ removals by forestry and soils. However, the  
different physical climate effects of CO₂ relative to non-CO₂ emissions mean that the shorter-
lived GHGs in particular (such as methane and F-gases) and the intermediate case of N₂O 
are best treated in a separate policy “basket” to CO₂ (Smith et al., 2012; Solomon et al., 
2013a). Also, the Rogelj et al. carbon budget range only includes CO₂. Therefore, in this 
chapter only CO₂ emissions and removals are considered in regard to the carbon quota 
estimates for Ireland. However, additional radiative forcing due to high or increasing annual 
non-CO₂ (methane and nitrous oxide) emissions would imply a lower CO₂ quota for Ireland. 
The Rogelj et al. (2016) mid-point global carbon budget value of 915 GtCO₂ remaining nett 
cumulative emissions is taken as the basis for the headline Irish quota estimates in this 
chapter, though quota estimates corresponding to the low and high points of the Rogelj 
range are also reported in some of the results. 
8.2 Methods  
This section outlines and reviews five methods used to estimate Ireland’s remaining CO₂ 
quota aligned with mitigation action meeting a WB2C nett global carbon budget (with or 
without a contribution of CDR/negative emissions from NETs).  
8.2.1 M1: Average global exponential reduction rates RRexp  
As detailed below, an upper limit inertia CO₂ quota range can be obtained directly by 
allocating the quota based on relative global and Irish emissions in the reference year of 
2015. Using the Rogelj et al. (2016c) range, these rates can then be applied to Ireland’s 
current emissions to determine inertia quotas. As Ireland’s per capita CO₂ emissions are 
higher than the global average the resulting inertia quota can be expected to be higher than 
would be equitable. An equity quota estimate can be derived based on a comparative ‘what 
if’ assumption of Ireland’s population having annual per capita emissions at the average 
global rate. 
Dividing Ireland’s current emissions by the average global WB2C RRexp values gives a 
simple method to estimate a range of inertia quotas for Ireland. 
 
                                            
33 This does not include 1.7 MtC (6.2 MtCO₂) in peatland carbon losses due to extraction of 
horticultural peat (Figure 6.51, EPA, 2017b), which are not accounted in national emissions.  
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To obtain an equity quota range, an equitable equivalent of total CO₂ for Ireland is calculated 
by multiplying Ireland’s total population by average global per capita emissions. Given 
41 GtCO₂ yr-1 global emissions in 2015 (including the approximate land use CO₂) and 
dividing by global population of 7.3 billion gives global per capita emissions of 5.6 tCO₂34. 
Multiplying this value by Ireland’s population of 4.7 million (2015 UN estimate) gives a 
measure of Irish ‘equitable equivalent’ emissions, equal to 26.4 MtCO₂ for 2015. Dividing 
Ireland’s actual 2015 CO₂ emissions of 42.1 MtCO₂ by the calculated equity quotas then 
gives the sustained RRexp equity values required by Ireland, corresponding to the low, mid 
and high values for the Rogelj et al. global carbon budget range. 
8.2.2 M2: From Raupach et al. (2014) 
In the methodology adopted by Raupach et al., the global carbon quota is shared according 
to: inertia, based on preserving or locking in the current (inequitable) per capita share of total 
annual emissions; or equity, based on per cent share of global population; or some 
intermediate blend between the two.  
Raupach et al. define a linear interpolation or blending between pure equity and pure initial 
sharing, characterised by a “sharing index” w. This then ranges from pure inertia, with w = 
0, to pure equity, with w =1. Raupach et al. suggest that an intermediate blend (such as w 
= 0.5) gives some balance between decarbonisation feasibility for already developed nations 
and development needs for developing nations35.  
8.2.3 M3: Regensburg Model 
As discussed in Ch. 2.5, the Regensburg model aims to enable contraction and 
convergence, bringing all countries to an equal per capita emissions level by a stated future 
year and within a global carbon budget with all nations’ annual emissions proceeding nearly 
linearly toward the target36. The detailed Regensburg Model spreadsheet tool has been 
updated as of December 2016 and good documentation is provided for its use (Sargl et al., 
2016b). To enable alternative scenarios, global parameters can be user-defined – such as 
convergence year, global negative emissions budget, initial reduction rates etc. The 
 
                                            
34 As this equitable equivalent 2015 emissions depends on the global and Irish population numbers, 
alternative scenarios could also be based on different future population numbers. Raupach et al. use 
a value of 9 billion people as a mid-range future global population value. 
35 This approach can be critically assessed against the rationales of correcting ‘equity’ even more 
equitably for historic credits and debits (Gignac and Matthews, 2015), or for historic responsibility for 
warming and capacity to pay for mitigation (Holz et al., 2017), that would further reduce equity quota 
estimates. 
36 Ascribing linear pathways to wealthy nations is relatively inequitable but, as with the blended 
allocation of Raupach et al., this is excused on grounds of political and economic feasibility in effort 
sharing. 
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Regensburg Model tool can output alternative emission pathways for any specified nation 
to compare with existing policy and to assist in suggesting mitigation policy options. 
The tool’s starting global base data for carbon budget and pathway calculations has a 2020-
2100 global carbon quota of 554 GtCO₂ (excluding LULUCF), based on the AR5 WG1 >66% 
2ºC 1010 GtCO₂ budget remaining after 2011, and a convergence level for all nations of 
0.25 tCO₂ per cap by 2100. For use of this method here, the calculation was adjusted to use 
the Rogelj et al. global carbon budget range from 2015. 
8.2.4 M4: Rockström et al. 2017 
Rockström et al. (2017) state, “alarming inconsistencies remain between science-based 
targets and national commitments”. To make Paris mitigation goals a reality, and to give 
some leeway in the global carbon budget if negative emissions at scale do not become 
available, a guideline (exponential) decarbonisation RRexp of halving anthropogenic CO₂ 
emissions every decade, or about -6.7% yr-1, is proposed for all UNFCCC Parties and all 
sectors. Land use and agriculture emissions would need to show commensurate mitigation 
of non-CO₂ GHG emissions, for example, through dietary change (away from intrinsically 
higher GHG foods, particularly those based on ruminant livestock) and cutting food waste. 
By 2050, on this decadal halving pathway, annual CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel, industrial 
processes and land use would fall over three decades to 12.5% (= 1/23 = 1/8) of 2020 
emissions. In this method, land use emissions are assumed to fall to zero by 2050. 
8.2.5 M5: Climate Equity Reference Framework 
In contrast to the resource-sharing methods of M1-M4, using the Climate Equity Reference 
Framework (CERF) methodology (see earlier discussion in Chapter 2, section 2.6.3), a 
country’s global mitigation requirement (its mitigation allocation) based on responsibility and 
capacity, is then subtracted from a “no policy” baseline of annual emissions (Holz et al., 
2017). This gives an allocation emissions pathway for sharing mitigation costs. While the 
tool output is in the form of pathways (to 2030) rather than cumulative quotas, in general, 
nations with high responsibility and capacity show pathways quickly going below zero, 
indicative of large negative quotas that are far greater than their own likely domestic 
mitigation potential. They would need to somehow fund additional, compensating, mitigation 
in poorer developing nations by ensuring low carbon development, thereby avoiding their 
currently-projected equitable shares of future emissions. For poorer nations, the 
corresponding “dual obligation” would to accept that their development must be low carbon 
and to implement maximal mitigation efforts to preserve land carbon and/or to facilitate CDR. 
The CERF web tool addresses non-CO₂ as well as CO₂ emissions so carbon quotas and 
emission pathways are in CO₂e, but, as shown in Figure 8.5 below for Ireland, CO₂-only 
emissions and allocation values can be extracted for regional groups and individual 
countries allowing limited comparison with CO₂-only approaches. Based on the mitigation 
and equity user options, the calculator provides global, regional or national reports of fair 
share emission paths and estimated costs per tCO₂ for mitigation and adaptation up to 2030. 
Detailed regional reports are produced and summary data for individual countries is shown. 
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However, the 2030 horizon makes the calculator of limited use for longer term quota 
comparisons.  
8.2.6 An Irish CO₂ quota in the context of possible emission pathways. 
The estimated CO₂ quota outputs are compared to six emission pathway scenarios for 
Ireland, which were previously discussed in Chapter 7. 
• WEM assumes the emission commitment of the EPA’s “With Existing Measures” 
pathway for 2015 to 2035, taking its cumulative CO₂ as the basis for an average-
exponential rate of increase to and beyond 2035. 
• WAM likewise assumes the emission commitment of the EPA’s “With Additional 
Measures” pathway for 2015 to 2035. 
• FLAT assumes CO₂ fossil fuel, process and land use emissions are immediately flat-
lined at the 2015 level (strictly already superseded, based on provisional inventory 
for 2016).  
• CCAC assumes the ‘illustrative linear pathway’ presented by CACC (2017).  
• CO₂-80 emissions pathway to meet an 80% reduction by 2050 compared to 1990 as 
detailed in Ó Gallachóir et al. (2012). 
• CO₂-95 emissions pathway to meet a 95% reduction by 2050 compared to 1990, also 
as detailed in Ó Gallachóir et al. (2012). 
For comparison with the quotas, land use emissions are assumed to remain at the 2015 
level of 3.7 MtCO₂ yr-1 for the WEM, WAM and FLAT scenarios, which have growing or 
flatlining emissions. In the three mitigation scenarios, land use emissions are assumed to 
reduce at the same rate as the average exponential rate for the scenarios. 
8.3 Results: Estimating an Irish CO₂ quota  
The Rogelj et al. (2016) WB2C global carbon budget is as remaining from 2015 onward, so 
the estimated quotas given below are also as remaining from this date. Therefore, for quota 
from subsequent years, the results from each method need to be adjusted for global and 
national CO₂ emissions since 2015. Since Ireland’s share of global emissions is unlikely to 
change significantly over a short period, subtracting emissions for years following 2015 can 
give an estimate of the remaining quota values for more recent years. 
Quota values and RRexp corresponding to the mid-range WB2C global carbon budget are 
shown in the Table 8.2 summary and in Figure 8.6 to compare with other results and EP 
cumulative emissions. Quota and pathway fractions for 2015-2050 and 2050-2100 are also 
reported in Table 8.2 to inform the policy outlook for nett emissions for each method up to 
and after 2050. 
8.3.1 M1  
Ireland’s inertia CO₂ quota from this method is 940 MtCO₂ corresponding to an RRexp of 
4.5% yr-1.  Ireland’s equity CO₂ quota from this method is 590 MtCO₂ corresponding to an 
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RRexp of 7.1% yr-1. Table 8.1 details the calculated inertia and equity WB2C quota and RRexp 
values. 
 
Table 8.1 Quota and RRexp results derived from the WB2C global carbon budget and 
from current global and national emissions. 
 
 
8.3.2 M2 (Raupach et al. method) 
Ireland’s inertia CO₂ quota from this method is 980 MtCO₂ corresponding to an RRexp of 
4.3% yr-1. Ireland’s equity CO₂ quota from this method is 560 MtCO₂ corresponding to an 
RRexp of 7.5% yr-1. Ireland’s blended CO₂ quota from this method is 770 MtCO₂ 
corresponding to an RRexp of 5.5% yr-1. 
8.3.3 M3 (Regensburg method) 
The Irish CO₂ quota from this method is 610 MtCO₂ (see Figure 8.6), corresponding to an 
RRexp of 6.7% yr-1. 
The Figure 8.3 charts and tables show the Regensburg model output for Ireland for four 
scenarios: one with a constant annual reduction rate (here shown to be 6.0% yr-1 after 2019) 
and three with a starting annual reduction rate of 3.5%, escalating thereafter in slightly 
differing ways. The continuous annual RRexp of 6.0% does not include land use emissions, 
but it does not require negative emissions. However the latter three scenarios do require 
negative emissions from 2055 onwards, with 2020-2100 cumulative gross emission quotas 
about 8% larger than the 427 MtCO₂ for the exponentially declining 6% constant RR 
scenario. Cumulative emissions are added for 2016-2019 emissions and land-use to give 
the nett quota from 2015. 
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Figure 8.3: Regensburg model output for Ireland: CO₂-only pathways for different emission 
scenarios. Bottom bar chart shows relative percent change in 2030 (blue) and in 2050 
(red) compared to 1990 (left) and 2010 (right). 
8.3.4 M4 (from Rockström et al.)  
Ireland’s CO₂ nett quota from this method is 700 MtCO₂ (Figure 8.4, right), but this includes 
330 MtCO₂ in removals by NETs, so total gross emissions are 1030 MtCO₂ (see Figure 1.7). 
Land use emissions decline to near-zero by 2050 and are offset by negative emissions 
increasing to about 5 MtCO₂ yr-1 by 2050. From 2050 onward, continuing gross emissions 
of 5 MtCO₂ are balanced by CO₂ removals, implying zero additional quota after 2050. 
Although the Rockström exponential decarbonisation rate is 6.7% for fossil fuel and process 
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emissions, the assumed contribution of NETs reduces the RRexp needed to 6.0% for 
comparison with other methods.  
A direct application of this pathway formulation to Ireland is shown in Figure 8.4, left (tacitly 
assuming a “pure inertia” sharing principle). This assumes constant annual (nett) CO₂ 
emissions at the 2015 level up to 2020 (to smooth the transition from increasing to 
decreasing emissions) and then exponential reduction, halving every decade (6.7% yr-1). On 
this pathway, annual gross fossil and process emissions decrease from 38.4 MtCO₂ to about 
5 MtCO₂ by 2050, and land use emissions decline to near zero.  In the meantime, additional 
negative emissions ramp up to 5 MtCO₂ by 2050, so that removals equal gross emissions.  
 
 
Figure 8.4: illustrating a CO₂-only emissions pathway for Ireland as per the method of 
Rockström et al. Chart to left shows Ireland’s annual fossil fuel and land use emissions to 
2050, assuming flatline from 2015 to 2020, and then reducing by 50% every decade 
thereafter (annual RR = 6.7%). Negative emissions technologies (gross removals) ramp up 
to exactly equal gross emissions by 2050.  Chart to right shows the corresponding 
cumulative emissions. 
8.3.5 M5 Climate Equity Reference Framework 
In Figure 8.5, the CERF “no policy” baseline projection corresponds closely to the 2017 EPA 
“With Existing Measures” projections of Ireland’s emissions. The CERF calculated annual 
allocation for Ireland reduces by 3.6 MtCO₂ yr-1 reaching zero by 2027 and becoming 
negative thereafter. The difference between the no policy baseline projection and CERF 
mitigation allocation gives an indication of the responsibility and capacity level of Ireland for 
global mitigation cost. The increasing divergence between Ireland’s “no policy” and 
mitigation allocation equates to a cumulative mitigation deficit for Ireland of 47 MtCO₂ by 
2020 and 430 MtCO₂ by 2030, the latter being equivalent to over 11 years of current annual 
CO₂ emissions from fossil fuels and cement.  
In Figure 8.5, the gross CO₂ emissions for Ireland’s CERF allocation is about 270 MtCO₂ 
until the mitigation the pathway goes below zero in 2027. As the CERF data does not extend 
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after 2030 and though strongly negative, no ultimate, finite, nett emissions quota can be 
determined using this method. Therefore, as recorded in Table 8.2, this method cannot give 
a CO₂ quota directly comparable with the M1-4 quota estimates. 
 
 
Figure 8.5: Ireland CO₂-only (without LULUCF CO₂) mitigation allocation (extracted from 
CERF country report data) excluding emissions based on trade, based on responsibility for 
cumulative emissions since 1990 and with capacity threshold at 7500 USD per capita. 
8.4 Comparison of Ireland’s national CO₂ quota estimates 
The indicative values for Ireland’s remaining CO₂ carbon quota from the various methods 
are collated in Table 8.1 and compared in Figure 8.6. The corresponding RRexp values are 
charted in Figure 8.7.  
Inertia estimates from M1 and M2 are 940 and 980 MtCO₂, from 2015, with RRexp of about 
4.5% and 4.3%. The nett inertia estimate from M4 is only 700 MtCO₂ but this requires 
ramping up negative emissions to 5 MtCO₂ by 2050 and sustaining this level of removals 
thereafter. Gross emissions for M4 are 1030 MtCO₂. At current emissions rates of about 44 
MtCO₂ including LULUCF, Ireland would exhaust even the largest estimated inertia quota 
by about 2038. 
Equity estimates range from 560 to 590 MtCO₂ with RRexp of about 7% yr-1. At current 
emissions rates of about 44 MtCO₂, including LULUCF, Ireland would exhaust such an 
equity quota by about 2028.  Based on the average equity estimate, Figure 8.8 indicatively 
shows the CO₂ exponential-average pathways proceeding until the average equity quota is 
exhausted after which the plotted pathways drop immediately to zero. 
The M5 quota value of gross emissions 270 MtCO₂ is not directly comparable to the other 
nett estimates as the CERF data only extends to 2030 and the cumulative total of future 
CO₂ removals is not clear. Nonetheless, the CERF method indicates how a regard for 
responsibility and capacity can be formulated and would substantially reduce (or eliminate) 
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any “remaining” positive quota for wealthier nations with high past and present per capita 
emissions.   
Even up to 2050 only, the cumulative emissions of 1430-1760 MtCO₂ for the WEM, WAM 
and FLAT EPs are much larger than the entire nett inertia and equity quotas, by over 500 
MtCO₂ and 1000 MtCO₂ respectively. The proposed mitigation pathway carbon quota values 
implied by the CCAC, CO₂-80 and CO₂-95 pathways lie between the values for the inertia 
and equity estimates.  
 
Table 8.2: Collated estimates of Ireland’s remaining nett carbon quota and cumulative 
emissions under different pathway scenarios, with equivalent exponential reduction rate. 
All estimates based on mid-value WB2C 915 GtCO₂e global carbon budget from 2015 
onward. For pathways, emissions before and after 2050 are stated as per the source. 
Quota/Pathway 
used for given estimate 
RRexp 2015  
to 2050 
2050 
to 2100 
Quota  
M1 (Inertia) 4.5% 720 160 
M1 (Equity) 7.1% 450 100 
M2 (Inertia) 4.3% 780 190 
M2 (Equity) 7.5% 530 30 
M2 (Blend) 5.5% 670 100 
Glynn (2017)  5.5% 670 100 
M3 6.7% 520 50 
M3 (NETs) 7.0% 555 -45 
M4 (-5 MtCO₂ yr-1 NETS by 2050) 6.0% 700 0 
M5 
Not 
Comparable 
– – 
Pathway 
WEM  1.1% [growth] 1760 3500 
WAM 0.6% [growth] 1620 2860 
FLAT (flat line at 42.1 MtCO₂) 0% 1430 2110 
CCAC 4.5% 780 30 
CO₂-80 4.6% 600 60 
 CO₂-95 6.3% 670 0 
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Figure 8.6 Comparison of Irish CO₂ nett quota estimates, methods M1-M4. 
 
 
Figure 8.7: Average annual reduction rates required for Irish carbon quota estimates, 
EPA projections and proposed decarbonisation pathway scenarios. Grey: Reduction 
rates required for Irish CO₂ quota estimates. 
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Figure 8.8: Ireland CO₂ exponential-average pathways until the average equity quota is 
exhausted. 
8.5 Limitations of methods and results 
All of the methods used here can provide only indicative values for Ireland’s carbon quota. 
They are all based on burden-sharing principles that embody ethical values and choices. 
Meeting the quotas would rely on national and international political and societal action to 
limit future global emissions within the remaining WB2C global carbon budget.  
The large (±35%) range for the Rogelj et al. (2016) WB2C global carbon budget also applies 
to all of the given national quota estimates. Assuming the global carbon budget is higher 
than the mid-value given (and therefore that the national carbon quota is larger than 
estimated above), would not be prudent, given the inherent additional risks (and implied 
costs) of such an assumption; indeed, both the precautionary principle and the Paris 
Agreement commitment to “pursuing efforts” toward a lower temperature goal of 1.5 ºC 
would rather mandate adopting the lowest limit of the global budget range as the basis for 
Paris-aligned action.  
8.6 Discussion 
8.6.1 Discussion of results and relevant literature 
The Paris Agreement embodies a commitment to aligning national climate mitigation policy 
with limiting future emissions within a WB2C global carbon budget (Schleussner et al., 
2016). The results derived for this chapter are only approximate estimates, and are 
necessarily value-laden. Nonetheless comparing these quota values with the current 
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projected and proposed pathways can point toward the scale and urgency of policy ambition 
now required to align mitigation action with Paris Agreement commitments. The nett quota 
estimates in Figure 8.6 suggest that Ireland’s remaining mid-range equity quota from 2015 
onward is about 590 MtCO₂, corresponding to a reduction rate of about 7% yr-1. In fact, Irish 
CO₂ emissions increased by 3.8% in 2016, relative to 2015, to 39.9 MtCO₂, reducing 
Ireland’s estimated carbon quota and increasing the corresponding required 
decarbonisation rate. Accounting for the likely global and national emissions in 2016 and 
2017, the remaining mid-value equity quota as of the end of 2017 is likely reduced by about 
85-90 MtCO₂ to about 500 MtCO₂, with the RRexp already increasing from about 7.1% yr-1 
to 8.5% yr-1. Even the estimated inertia quotas for Ireland are less than 1000 MtCO₂, far less 
than the 1430 MtCO₂ to 2050 (and far more being emitted cumulatively beyond 2050) for a 
scenario flatlining CO₂ emissions at the 2015 level.  
The EPA’s WEM and WAM pathways to 2035, based on sustained economic growth, with 
limited emissions decoupling from that growth, project annual energy and process emissions 
continuing to rise above current levels and, extended to 2050, exceed a likely equity quota 
by more than 1000 MtCO₂. In contrast, all of the equity quota and RRexp combinations 
indicate that nett Irish CO₂ emissions need to be close to zero by 2050. If substantive 
removals can be achieved by NETs in Ireland then ongoing gross emissions after 2050 level 
might be balanced to give nett zero emissions, especially if energy emissions have been 
brought as near as possible to zero carbon by sustained mitigation action. 
Using M5 (Climate Equity Reference Framework), which takes responsibility and capacity 
into account, does not provide a nett quota to compare with other methods, as the large 
amount of indicated negative emissions after 2030 is not quantified. Nevertheless, it is 
included in this chapter to note that this methodology arrives at a very different view of an 
equitable allocation to the ‘equity’ quotas arrived at on the basis of global population share. 
In the CERF example examined, Ireland’s “fair share” pathway reduces at 3.6 MtCO₂ yr-1 
from current levels, falls below zero in 2027, and continues at this rate into deeply negative 
allocation values through and beyond 2030. In this methodology, the gap opening between 
the actual and allocated emission gauges a nation’s immediate and escalating responsibility 
for the global climate mitigation effort to meet a temperature target. 
The high decarbonisation rates required for the estimated equity quotas agree with the 5% 
to 14% range given by Larkin (2017, p. Table 1) for the maximum sustained annual rate 
needed for nations and regions with high per capita emissions. Policy dependence on 
negative emissions technologies to deliver the high levels of CDR postulated in many of the 
AR5 IAM global mitigation scenarios inequitably risks a failure to deliver negative emissions 
at significant scale in future (Larkin, 2017). Although Larkin et al. (2017) focus on groupings 
of the largest national emitters (the 25 nations responsible for over 80% of global CO₂ 
emissions), Ireland has higher per capita CO₂ and CO₂e emissions than many of the nations 
included. IAM modelled global energy decarbonisation scenarios for the WB2C budget 
range are also high, indicating average nett decarbonisation rates of 4.5% yr-1 to 8% yr-1. 
Any easing of the challenge of simply reducing gross emissions at such a rate would depend 
on the scale and timing of negative emissions that are actually successfully deployed (van 
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Vuuren et al., 2016). Mitigation policy falling short of such challenging nett decarbonisation 
rates, corresponding to the CO₂ quota estimates for Ireland, is (explicitly or implicitly) 
incorporating a rising reliance on NETs deployment that implies a tacit commitment to deliver 
large cumulative amounts of CDR in the future with very high confidence, thereby potentially 
accepting moral hazard by inequitably transferring significant risk of failure to future decades 
and populations (Anderson and Peters, 2016). The economic analysis for Ireland outlined 
by Glynn (2017), based on a WB2C equity quota, and suggests that delaying substantive 
near-term decarbonisation becomes progressively less cost-effective by increasingly limiting 
options to less cost-efficient pathways. Immediate policy measures to reach and sustain the 
already required RRexp would evidently be far more cost-effective. The urgency and scale of 
WB2C mitigation action demanded by physical reality, risk assessment and economic logic 
contrast strongly with the commonly preferred policy approach of only gradually increasing 
effort over time (Luderer et al., 2016; Robiou du Pont et al., 2016). 
8.6.2 Policy relevance of results 
Ireland’s current National Policy Position, the basis for the National Mitigation Plan, only 
explicitly specifies an end-point target, of 80% reduction relative to 1990 levels in 2050, for 
energy CO₂ emissions among the aggregate sector of electricity generation, built 
environment and transport (EGBET). An exponential path of sustained fractional effort to 
meet this target would already require annual reductions of 5% yr-1. However, no pathway 
or quota to 2050 is specified by the NPP and near-term emissions are increasing rapidly, 
especially in transport and electricity generation, suggesting that only limited reductions in 
cumulative CO₂ emissions might be achieved (even if the end point target could still be met) 
unless strong management of climate pollution is enabled in the near-term. Globally, very 
early peaking in total emissions is the common factor in stringent mitigation scenarios and 
IAM scenarios “require a massive scale up of low carbon technologies” by 2050, which can 
be reduced in scale by reductions in energy demand  (van Vuuren et al., 2016).  
The increased radiative forcing due to increasing agricultural emissions (increasing by 
10.2% from 2011 to 2016) suggest the Irish CO₂ quota should properly be assessed as 
lower than the estimates given here due to the additional warming effect of higher annual 
rates of methane emission – as non-CO₂ emissions significantly affect the relation of 
resultant warming to cumulative CO₂ emissions (van Vuuren et al., 2016). The NMP 
indicates that forestry might only enable CO₂ removals amounting to a fifth of agricultural 
CO₂e emissions in 2050, assuming UNFCCC equivalence factors (DCCAE, 2017a, p. 123). 
Within the EU accounting (separating ETS and non-ETS emissions), limited reductions in 
agricultural emissions by 2050 imply that energy and process emissions may need to be 
reduced by more than 100%, requiring negative emissions (domestically or on some 
currently hypothetical basis of future CDR trading) to compensate for ongoing gross 
agriculture CO₂-equivalent emissions (Chiodi et al., 2015a, 2007).  
Following the logic of Peters, Andrew, and Friedlingstein (2015), Ireland’s projected 
emissions based on current policy could be seen as an implicit, highly inequitable claim on 
the WB2C global carbon budget. This may be arguably be in conflict with the legally specified 
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“regard” for climate justice (Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act, Art. 3(2c), 
Oireachtas, 2015). A continuing divergence between emissions and target commitments 
may be seen as a lack of ambition unless there is a plausible commitment to achieving 
capacity or responsibility for carbon capture and storage and negative emissions to remove 
the excess emitted CO₂ in future (Peters et al., 2017; Peters and Geden, 2017). Even on 
average, emissions need to peak globally by 2020 and fall thereafter, or commit to ensuring 
negative emissions at large scale, starting well before 2040, for plausible WB2C pathways 
with stringent mitigation (van Vuuren et al., 2016).  
In the immediate term (for at least the next decade) climate mitigation needs to be achieved 
almost entirely by substantial reductions in annual gross CO₂ emissions, prioritising 
reductions in fossil fuel use, to align policy with even a small chance of limiting to 2ºC (Bauer 
et al., 2016). Only as and when scalable CO₂ removals with high storage permanence (i.e., 
geological storage), are progressively demonstrated, with reliable performance verification 
and cost projections, could prospective further contributions of such removals be realistically 
incorporated in ongoing assessment of conformance to any individual county’s nett WB2C 
CO₂ quota (Larkin et al., 2017). In any case, any policy reliant on NETs needs to realistically 
assess the risks of non-delivery of negative emissions in future due to technical and 
biophysical limits, ecological and societal impacts, or ultimately ineffective mitigation if land-
stored carbon becomes subject to reversal (Dooley and Kartha, 2017). Risk management 
within a WB2C carbon quota requires precautionary planning to achieve early and deep 
decarbonisation while making clear assessments of potential for and limits to national policy 
dependence on negative emissions (Geden and Löschel, 2017). 
As well as indicating an equitable quota to guide future economy-wide policy, a revised 
National Mitigation Plan would usefully supply a timeline for when initial estimates of 
negative emissions at significant scale could be integrated into policy, enabling investment 
and delivery timelines for ongoing negative emissions technology research and 
development. As the climate impact of Ireland critically depends on the emission pathway 
taken from now until 2050, the (currently non-statutory) National Policy Position might best 
be revised to explicitly specify a maximum CO₂ quota as the “National Mitigation Objective” 
(NMO), identified by the CCAC (2016). Equivalently, the NMO could specify a reference 
functional form for a nett emissions decarbonisation pathway (linear, exponential or 
otherwise) which, together with start and end/horizon points, allows effective determination 
of the intended CO₂ quota commitment. In effect, this would represent Ireland’s explicit 
policy quota claim on the WB2C global carbon budget. 
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8.7 Conclusion 
• A range of possible Irish carbon quotas (from 2015) aligned with meeting a WB2C 
target are estimated using four different methods. From the start of 2018, the 
remaining equity quota for Ireland (subtracting estimated 2016 and 2017 emissions) 
is about 500 MtCO₂ for energy, cement and land use emissions. Comparable inertia 
quotas are of the order of 900 MtCO₂. 
• Current emission projections average growth of 0.6% yr-1 to 1.1% yr-1, and in 2016, 
Ireland’s CO₂ emissions (excluding LULUCF) rose by about 3.8%. In contrast, an 
equivalent exponential emissions reduction rate of about 8% yr-1 would be needed 
from 2018 to stay within the estimated WB2C equity quota.  
• The indicative CCAC linear emission path, proposed by the Climate Change Advisory 
Council (2017), and the CO₂-80 and CO₂-95 pathways (Ó Gallachóir et al., 2012) 
imply nett CO₂ quotas and decarbonisation rates between the estimated inertia and 
equity pathways.  
• In Ireland, the growing gap between the reality of rising CO₂ (and non-CO₂) emissions 
and the Paris Agreement implied requirement for plausible, decarbonisation pathway 
aligned with a WB2C global carbon budget, already suggests a tacit, potentially high-
risk, policy reliance on negative emissions. 
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9 Potential for NETs Deployment in Ireland: A Preliminary 
Assessment 
Summary 
• Few national-scale assessments of NETs are available to apply global research to 
assess negative emissions potential in meeting decarbonisation targets. 
• NETs experience to date in Ireland has focused on afforestation (AF), with limited 
dedicated bioenergy (BE) crop cultivation or enhanced soil carbon sequestration.  
• While BE crop cultivation with unabated combustion/oxidation and fossil fuel carbon 
capture and storage (FFCCS) cannot achieve nett CDR in themselves, they do 
provide critical enabling capabilities for potential future CDR processes. 
• Miscanthus and willow coppice planting for BE have high potential in Ireland, and 
have been subsidised, but lack clear long term commitment, reducing confidence. 
• Indirect land use change (ILUC) can have a significant emissions impact on the 
lifecycle assessment of BE, potentially negating much or all supposed climate benefit; 
especially without CCS (i.e. outside currently theoretical BECCS pathways). 
• Currently assessed practical offshore capacity for geological carbon storage in Irish 
national territory is ~455 MtCO₂. Most is in the nearly-exhausted Kinsale natural gas 
field, with a capacity of ~330 MtCO₂ (if suitable, and kept available for CCS). 
• Irish soils hold a large standing stock of carbon but soil carbon sequestration (SCS) 
appears unlikely to achieve nett negative emissions even within the land use sector. 
Existing soil carbon is currently being lost, requiring arrest by ecological restoration. 
Relying on large scale enhancement of SCS as a key climate mitigation tool may be 
ill-advised given accounting (MMV) difficulties and inherent SCS reversibility. 
• Ideally (from a climate mitigation perspective), indigenous bioenergy resources might 
best feed BECCS pathways; but current policy incentivises investment in smaller 
scale BE heating plants conflicting with future BECCS integration (and risking early 
stranding of subsidised assets). 
• NETs options in Ireland have very different potentials, limitations, benefits and costs 
(see Table 9.2). Long term strategic commitment, but with flexible response to 
demonstrated performance, is therefore needed for strategic NETs development. 
• Applying the simple NETs model of Smith et al. (2016) to Ireland, a preliminary 
technical assessment indicates potential cumulative CDR of c. 400 MtCO₂ to 2100.   
• A possible initial NETs strategy is: maximise AF in the near-term while supporting the 
development of BECCS infrastructure so that AF harvest biomass can be allocated 
to this pathway as biogenic carbon stocks saturate.  
• Direct Air Carbon with CCS (DACCS) and Enhanced Weathering (EW) will be feasible 
only when (or if) sufficiently low carbon input energy supplies become available. 
• In the immediate term, mitigation policy should continue to focus on rapid, deep, 
reductions in gross GHG emissions, at rates well above current stated policy ambition 
(and far in excess of current Irish policy delivery). This will be most effective through 
mutually reinforcing actions at national, EU and global levels. 
197 
 
9.1 Introduction 
As presented in the previous chapters, the international research on NETs has been growing 
rapidly, especially since 2005. For example, Minx et al. (2017) found 2900 studies published 
on NETs from 1991 to 2016, with the rate of publications increasing dramatically. They found 
the research to be characterised by a focus on particular candidate technologies with few 
integrated analyses. Publications range in scope from reviewing potential, assessing 
feasibility and technological maturity and discussing deployment opportunities. Some of the 
literature addresses the deployment of specific, relatively mature, NET options at a local 
case study scale, where  opportunities are being actively realised (Gale et al., 2011; 
Mathisen et al., 2011; Matter et al., 2016). 
It has been argued that ungrounded optimism in NETs potential could result in delayed 
reductions in gross CO₂ emissions, with consequent high-risk of overshoot of global 
temperature targets (Vaughan and Gough, 2016). Hence it is important that the realistic 
potential of NETs be carefully assessed in every context where it is considered. The 
literature has identified a gap between general assessments of feasibility and potential and 
the specific local case studies (Fuss et al., 2016). The downscaling of NETs research to a 
nationally relevant context is a vital next step in progressing its deployment. An outline study 
of this sort has recently been presented for the UK (Smith et al., 2016). This chapter will 
similarly present a preliminary assessment of NETs potential in Ireland, as an example of a 
small developed island nation at the very early stages of considering scalable NETs 
deployment. The chapter aims to integrate the global NETs literature with the relevant 
national research to provide an assessment that reflects the specific national context of 
practical, social and economic opportunities and constraints. 
Ireland has undertaken multiple interacting commitments to greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction, through its National Policy Position (DECLG, 2014), its participation in EU co-
ordinated climate action directives, regulations and decisions, and its ratification of the Paris 
Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015). Of these, the Paris Agreement temperature goals now 
represent the overarching constraints that all parties have committed to respect. Parties 
submitted statements of their separate, voluntary, Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs) in advance of the adoption of the Paris Agreement. Now formalised 
as NDCs under the Agreement, these have been assessed for their collective mitigation 
adequacy. Multiple assessments find that they are currently inadequate to the achievement 
of the temperature goals (Anderson et al. 2015; Schleussner et al. 2016, Rogelj, den Elzen 
et al. 2016; Knopf et al. 2017). It is in this context that national commitments must now be 
reassessed. In particular, as discussed in Chapter 8 above, based on the Agreement, 
Ireland now has a finite remaining quota of further nett CO₂ that it can emit (on the basis of 
science and equity). It is the possibility that gross emissions of CO₂ either already have, or 
shortly will, exceed Ireland’s remaining quota that raises the question of how much gross 
CO₂ removals Ireland can feasibly achieve, quickly enough, to “re-balance” its nett quota 
(i.e. clear its tacit “sovereign carbon debt”). Within the spirit of the Agreement, any remaining 
shortfall will have to be made up either by purchasing unused carbon quota from other 
parties, or purchasing the required CO₂ removal services. 
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A first, high level, way of classifying potential NETs approaches is according to the targeted 
carbon storage mechanism: either biogenic (soil organic carbon or standing biomass) or 
geological (most typically assumed to be by pumping CO₂, under pressure, into suitable 
porous rock formations, sealed below non-porous strata). While both can contribute in the 
short (decadal) term, concerns over saturation and permanence of biogenic storage 
(particularly in the face of ongoing climate disruption) mean that it is best viewed as only a 
temporary or transitional measure. Ultimately, only return of carbon to secure geological 
storage can be relied on to adequately counteract the accumulated effects of transferring 
carbon from geological stocks of fossil fuels to the atmosphere. Thus, any programme of 
carbon dioxide removal targeting biogenic storage must also be accompanied by a 
“backstop” of carbon transfer to geological storage, though this is not explicitly reflected in 
current UNFCCC mechanisms or accounting. 
A second, high level classification is according to the mechanism for initial removal of CO₂ 
from atmosphere. Again, there are two main possibilities: either biogenic (via photosynthesis 
in plants) or technological (primarily in the form of what is called “direct air capture” or DAC). 
Table 9.1 below presents the particular NETs technologies that will be considered further in 
this chapter, together with their respective classifications of both CO₂ removal from 
atmosphere, and carbon storage (whether as CO₂ or in some other form). 
Table 9.1: NETs classification 
NET Removal Storage 
Enhanced Soil Carbon 
Sequestration (SCS) 
Biogenic Biogenic 
Biochar Biogenic Biogenic 
Afforestation Biogenic Biogenic 
Enhanced weathering Technological Geological 
Bioenergy with Carbon 
Capture and Storage 
(BECCS) 
Biogenic Geological 
Direct Air (Carbon) Capture 
with Storage (DACCS) 
Technological Geological 
 
There is extensive prior experience in Ireland with afforestation, and more limited experience 
with bioenergy crop cultivation, and with enhancement of soil carbon sequestration (via the 
use of biochar or otherwise). There is no existing experience with either Direct Air Capture 
(DAC) of CO₂ or Carbon Capture and Storage (whether in mitigating emissions from 
conventional fossil fuel combustion – FFCCS – or in conjunction with bioenergy, BECCS, 
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direct air capture, DACCS). BECCS and DACCS would interact directly with the overall 
energy system: BECCS could contribute nett energy, whereas DACCS would require 
additional energy consumption. With the exception of DACCS, all the NETs mentioned in 
Table 9.1 would interact very substantially with domestic land use and agricultural practices; 
in some cases competing with existing land use (bioenergy crops, afforestation) and in other 
cases potentially being complementary to, or co-existing with, existing use (enhanced soil 
carbon sequestration, enhanced weathering). 
The following sections will draw from international and national research to provide an 
account of soil carbon storage and the potential for enhanced soil sequestration in Ireland, 
discuss the Irish context for biochar applications and for enhanced weathering, detail the 
GHG profiles and socioeconomic context for afforestation and bioenergy crops in Ireland 
and assess the status and potential of CCS in Ireland, including FFCCS, BECCS and 
DACCS. 
9.2 Enabling Capabilities 
We first consider the status of two enabling capabilities: while, in themselves, neither of 
these can achieve nett removal of CO₂ from atmosphere, there are essential components 
for certain NET approaches considered subsequently. 
9.2.1 Dedicated Bioenergy Crop Cultivation (BE) 
In general, cultivation of plants and use for bioenergy production may contribute to overall 
GHG mitigation in several distinct ways: 
• Displacement of higher GHG land use practices (e.g., ruminant animal farming) 
• Contribution to enhancement of soil carbon sequestration 
• Displacement of fossil fuel energy sources (presumed to be of higher CO₂ emissions 
intensity) 
• Combination with CO₂ capture (pre- or post-combustion) and geological storage to 
achieve a CO₂ nett negative energy pathway (BECCS) 
In this section we specifically consider issues involved in the cultivation of “dedicated” 
bioenergy crops in Ireland. By this we mean perennial or short rotation crops, cultivated and 
harvested solely for bioenergy use. On a lifecycle assessment basis such cultivation may 
have comparatively low emissions intensity, i.e., low nett GHG emissions per unit of useful 
energy output, but will certainly not achieve zero or negative nett emissions in itself. The 
combination of BE with CCS (BECCS) to achieve nett negative emissions will be considered 
subsequently. Note that while forestry can also be harvested for bioenergy use, it has 
multiple other uses, and, in certain circumstances, can achieve nett negative emissions in 
its own right. Afforestation will therefore be considered separately, both as a potential NET 
in itself, and as a potential alternative bioenergy component in BECCS deployment. 
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9.2.1.1 GHG LCA for BE Displacement of Fossil Fuels 
The direct GHG mitigation potential of bioenergy crops, by fossil fuel displacement, is a 
contentious issue. There are many components of bioenergy cultivation and processing 
systems that emit GHGs. Life Cycle Assessments (LCA) seek to measure the net emissions 
of bioenergy crops by identifying all the sources and sink components in the full life cycle of 
a crop within a single-farm or national system. In general this may necessarily include non-
CO₂ GHGs. While overall effects are commonly aggregated using a “CO₂-equivalence” 
methodology (GWP-100 or otherwise), in the context of assessing potential for nett negative 
CO₂ it would arguably be better to maintain separate accounting of each GHG. In any case, 
CO₂, in particular, released from the supply chain should be fully quantified and must not 
exceed the amount captured and stored in the original plant cultivation if there is to be any 
CO₂ mitigation benefit to fossil fuel substitution (Mac Dowell and Fajardy, 2017). 
(Mohan, 2016) highlights the general need for life cycle accounting assessment of all 
proposed bioenergy production systems. However, it also important to note that LCA 
analysis can be problematic in detailed interpretation and application. For example, (Plevin 
et al., 2014) argue that “because of several simplifications inherent in  ALCA [Attributional 
LCA], the method, in fact, is not predictive of real-world impacts on climate change, and 
hence the usual quantitative interpretation of ALCA results is not valid”. 
A particular challenge in LCA assessment of bioenergy systems is the characterisation of 
indirect land use change (ILUC), which may represent a significant emissions impact. If 
indirect land use change emissions are judged to be high, e.g., 130gCO₂ MJ-1 (468 g kWh-1) 
for LUC emission factors of Irish Miscanthus or Willow biomass, based on estimates by 
(Tonini et al., 2012), then the nett CO₂ mitigation by direct fossil fuel displacement may be 
modest at best; or at worst, may actually increase total CO₂ emissions. (Czyrnek-Delêtre et 
al., 2016) evaluate potential evolution of the Irish energy system to 2050, under specific CO₂ 
mitigation constraint and minimisation of overall notional-cost. They find that, if LUC 
emissions are assessed as relatively high (but still less overall than from fossil fuel use), 
then the projected bioenergy share might fall by 30%, and would be accompanied by an 
increase in notional marginal CO₂ abatement cost of 68%. 
Apart from LUC, additional sources of local non-CO₂ GHG emissions in bioenergy 
production come from fertiliser inputs (Dieterich et al., 2008). Miscanthus and SRWC 
cultivation in Ireland are estimated to respectively emit 1.9 kg ha-1 yr-1 and 1.2 kg ha-1 yr-1 of 
N₂O, accounting for 68% of Miscanthus’ net emissions (Styles and Jones, 2007a). 
Cultivation and harvest (Styles and Jones, 2007a), processing – pelleting Miscanthus 
requires much more energy than briquetting   (Murphy et al., 2013) – and transport also emit 
significant GHGs. Nonetheless, (Dondini et al., 2009) suggest that heat energy production 
from Miscanthus and SRWC systems could achieve ‘better than carbon neutral’ emissions, 
in the long term, when grown on tillage land. 
Overall then, net GHG emission reductions from bioenergy crop cultivation varies in general, 
dependant on the chosen crop, the displaced land use and displaced fuel. Miscanthus and 
SRWC systems generally have significantly lower GHG emissions than sugar beet or grass 
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systems. LCAs have found that fuel-chain emissions (exclusive of indirect land use effects) 
for willow and Miscanthus are significantly lower than conventional use of  gas, oil and 
electric heat (Styles and Jones, 2008a),  and of  peat and coal (Styles and Jones, 2008b). 
Fuel-chain emission reductions range from  c. 7.7 tCO₂ ha−1y−1 (willow displaced grassland 
and gas) to c. 34 tCO₂ ha−1y−1 (Miscanthus displaced set-aside and electric heat) (Styles 
and Jones, 2008a). 
Continued work to refine and improve lifecycle analysis of bioenergy systems in Ireland 
remains an important research priority to inform future BE policy. 
9.2.1.2 BE Enhancement of Soil Carbon Sequestration (SCS) 
In Ireland, bioenergy crops could play an additional role in climate mitigation by enhancing 
soil carbon sequestration (SCS) on cultivated lands. While disturbance and vegetation 
removal when land use is changed to bioenergy crops initially releases CO₂ from the soil, 
this may be counterbalanced by the sequestration of CO₂ if the bioenergy crop is allowed to 
mature. In Ireland 90% of agricultural land is currently in grassland (generally supporting 
ruminant livestock farming systems) and Miscanthus, a perennial rhizomatous grass (PRG), 
is a leading candidate bioenergy crop.  Donnelly et al. (2011) found that immediate land use 
change emissions from grassland to Miscanthus are indeed progressively counterbalanced 
by soil carbon sequestration, with environmental co-benefits of improved water, air, soil 
fertility and biodiversity, provided that the crop is allowed to become established and mature. 
Zimmermann, Dondini, & Jones (2013) emphasise the need for long-term commitment to 
bioenergy systems, calculating that it takes over 14 years for the labile soil carbon initially 
sequestered by Miscanthus in Ireland to stabilise into a more permanent form. Dondini et al. 
(2009) found that converting arable land to Miscanthus plantations could store up to c. 
11 tCO₂ ha-1yr-1. However, soil carbon does generally saturate in time, and the potential 
contribution of bioenergy crops to Ireland’s soil carbon stock depends on the crop yield and 
initial soil carbon level (relative to saturation).  Careful restrictions in management and 
agricultural practices would help establish bioenergy systems with annual sequestration and 
long-term mitigation potential (to maximize soil carbon permanence). In principle, the climate 
mitigation benefit of maintaining enhanced soil carbon stocks in this way could be explicitly 
incentivised. However any such incentivisation would have to accommodate the (likely 
substantial) costs of detailed monitoring and verification; with continuing monitoring required 
indefinitely even after soil carbon reaches saturation. 
9.2.1.3 Current Irish Bioenergy Policy Framework 
Policies for bioenergy crops in Ireland are characterised by ‘a complex mix of incentives and 
restrictions’ (Smyth et al. 2010). Prior to a National “Food Harvest 2020” policy and removal 
of the EU milk quota, EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms decoupling production 
and support had resulted in destocking across Irish livestock agriculture, which created 
opportunities for introducing new bioenergy crops (Styles and Jones, 2008a). EU supports 
also provide €45 ha-1 of set aside land used for industry, which can be claimed by growing 
bioenergy crops. However, the CAP has also placed limits on the conversion of permanent 
grasslands to other uses. Most recently, the 2013 CAP reform imposed a maximum change 
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of 5% in the ratio of permanent grassland to other uses, relative to the situation prior to this 
reform (DAFM, 2015, p. 42). Such restrictions have been motivated explicitly by a presumed 
relative carbon sequestration benefit of permanent grassland (EU, 2013 preamble, p 42); 
though this appears to pre-empt detailed analysis of specific use changes. With 90% of Irish 
agriculture land being classified as permanent grassland, such limits have been identified 
as significantly constraining the land potentially available for dedicated bioenergy crops 
(Smyth et al., 2010). 
Separately, the EU has also introduced sustainability criteria that require that biofuel used 
in transport, and bioliquids more generally, must effect progressively higher CO₂ emissions 
reduction compared to the fossil fuel displaced. This must reach at least a 60% reduction by 
2020 (albeit, exclusive of ILUC effects). EU rules also require that BE production does not 
use land of high biodiversity value (including peatland) and that “due consideration” is given 
to any impacts on food production. 
A national policy target to replace 30% of peat consumption in electricity generation with 
biomass from 2007-2015 was published in March 2007, but appears to have been 
substantially achieved in only one of the three peat-fired plants (Egan, 2015; Moran, 2015). 
The expectation appears to be that the same total cumulative amount of peat will ultimately 
be extracted and burned (just over a somewhat longer period); thus, the direct cumulative 
nett transfer of carbon from the (territorial) peat stock to atmospheric CO₂ will be unchanged. 
Indeed, it may be argued that this co-firing, by providing access to additional subsidies for 
such plants (in support of the EU Renewable Energy Directive), actually extended their 
economic life in a manner contrary to the intentions of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. 
Just over 1.7 MtC was also lost due to extraction of peat in 2016 (EPA 2017c). 
In any case, establishment grants through a national Bioenergy Scheme were made 
available for growing bioenergy crops, resulting in 2414 ha of Miscanthus and 939 ha of 
willow (Walsh et al., 2017). For the 30% co-firing target to be met entirely by indigenous 
biomass, it was estimated that 45,000ha (~1.2% of total land potentially available for all 
agricultural purposes) would have been required (Clancy et al., 2008). In practice, importing 
biomass in pursuit of the national co-firing targets is reported as having resulted in significant 
carbon “leakage” in Ireland’s emissions profile (Murphy and McDonnell, 2017); that is, while 
reported annual territorial emissions were indeed reduced, nett global emissions directly 
attributable to this territorial energy use likely remained the same or potentially increased. 
With annual yields, earlier returns, competitive profit margins and the establishment grant, 
familiarity and confidence in Miscanthus did progressively increase and it became the 
favoured option for those farmers who chose to plant bioenergy crops (Augustenborg et al., 
2012a; Clancy et al., 2012). Then, in 2015, the Bioenergy Scheme stopped supporting 
Miscanthus and only provided support for willow (Walsh et al., 2017). This was reported as 
being due to the lower chloride content in willow, causing less corrosion on power plant 
hardware. Nonetheless it is evident that this relatively sudden cessation of support had a 
negative effect on stakeholder confidence in long term bioenergy crop cultivation. It would 
be essential that future policies explicitly address issues of coherence and confidence in 
stable long-term strategy. 
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Achieving as much as half of Ireland’s total energy demand from bioenergy by 2050 has 
been reported as emerging from least notional-cost modelling of even relatively modest CO₂ 
mitigation scenarios, but, as already noted, constraints on imports and sustainability criteria 
(based on LCA-type analysis of actual, global, emissions impacts from substitution for fossil 
fuels) would greatly reduce this supposed potential (Chiodi et al., 2015a). Ireland’s 
bioenergy industry representative association estimated that a €1.5 billion investment in 
biomass infrastructure and equipment would have been needed from 2011-2020 for 
bioenergy to have contributed as required to meeting the 2020 EU renewable energy 
penetration targets for Ireland (IRBEA, 2012). 
Achieving the recent target of indigenous biomass replacing 30% of peat-firing in electricity 
generation in 2015 was estimated to require prices of €70 and €65 per tonne of willow and 
Miscanthus respectively (Clancy et al., 2012). (SEAI, 2012) bioenergy-supply curves 
suggest that bioenergy crops of Miscanthus and SRWC have the most potential for 
expansion of bioenergy production in Ireland, but would require progressively higher market 
prices (up to 250% increase) to achieve a scenario of maximised energy yields from 2010-
2030 (see Figure 9.1). 
 
 
While low fossil fuel prices have generally rendered bioenergy uncompetitive in the past 
(Rourke et al., 2009), bioenergy production systems are now becoming increasingly 
attractive relative to conventional agriculture in Ireland. According to (SEAI, 2012) SRWC 
and Miscanthus were then offered higher profits than beef production, were similar to renting 
 
Figure 9.1 Estimate of Potential Perennial Energy crop resource 2010-2030 for different 
price scenarios (reproduced from SEAI, 2012) 
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grassland, but less profitable than cereal production. This corroborates the earlier findings 
by (Styles et al., 2008) that, with appropriate supports, bioenergy crops can become 
increasingly viable options. In 2008 Miscanthus had higher gross margins (ha-1 yr-1) than 
willow and was considered competitive with all conventional agriculture except dairy (Styles 
et al., 2008). However the market for Miscanthus is now reduced due to its withdrawal from 
the national Bioenergy Support scheme. 
Trade-offs also exist in Ireland between GHG emissions and energy demand, acidification, 
eutrophication and biodiversity (Bourke et al., 2014; Murphy et al., 2013, 2014a; Stanley and 
Stout, 2013). Future policies should endeavour not to undermine existing policies in these 
areas (Burrascano et al., 2016). 
There are several additional barriers to producing bioenergy crops in Ireland. These include: 
• Cultural attitudes in the agricultural community. Agriculture in Ireland is traditionally 
focused on food production (Doran, 2012). Education level, existence of successors 
(Clancy et al., 2008), farm system and size (Clancy et al., 2011) all influence a 
farmer’s decisions to adopt energy crops. 
• Miscanthus takes two years to establish and willow takes four (Styles and Jones, 
2007b). The longevity of the bioenergy system must be incorporated into policy 
incentives for the mitigation potential and all co-benefits to be achieved. The long 
term commitment required with uncertain market and policy is off-putting (Clancy et 
al., 2009). 
• There is uncertainty for Irish-specific yields and reliability of production (Clancy et al., 
2012, 2009) and uncertain financial benefit, high initial capital investment with long 
payback period and reliance on coordination with the agriculture sector’s long term 
planning to meet demand (Styles and Jones, 2007b). 
 
Healion (2016) found that successful bioenergy production systems in Ireland were 
characterised by a strong focus (commercial or philosophical), international network sharing 
of expertise and technology and financial support. 
9.2.2 Fossil Fuel Carbon Capture and Storage (FFCCS) 
As with dedicated bioenergy cultivation and use, conventional (fossil fuel) carbon capture 
and storage (FFCCS) has the potential to provide energy with CO₂ emissions intensity that 
is substantially lower than existing (unabated) fossil fuel use; but certainly cannot achieve 
zero or nett negative emissions in itself. However, both the capture and storage components 
of FFCCS are potentially applicable in multiple nett negative emissions approaches, and so 
will be presented here in their conventional form first. 
A detailed report in 2008 assesses the potential for FFCCS deployment in Ireland (CSA 
Group, 2008). The maximum potential capacity (total of practical, effective and theoretical 
capacity) estimated for long term geological storage of carbon in Ireland (including territorial 
waters/undersea) is 93 GtCO₂, but there is a large uncertainty range for this figure due to 
the paucity of geological data. The more meaningful figure for practical policy use at this 
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time (pending much more extensive and detailed geological investigation) is the estimate of 
practical capacity only, given as 1505 MtCO₂. However, the great bulk of this (1050 MtCO₂) 
is in the East Irish Sea, in UK territorial waters; accordingly, only ~455 MtCO₂ of practical 
capacity is identified in Irish territory. To put this in context: given 2015 Irish total energy 
system emissions of ~38 MtCO₂ (SEAI, 2016d) this could theoretically accommodate a 
maximum of ~12 years of additional gross fossil energy use (neglecting any growth or 
contraction in primary energy use, supposing that 100% of such additional CO₂ could be 
captured, directly or indirectly, and ignoring upstream, non-territorial, emissions associated 
with fossil fuel extraction, processing and transport). 
Further assessments have been made of the potential for storage in the Clare Basin, directly 
adjacent to the existing large coal-fired electricity generating station at Moneypoint, Co. 
Clare (Farrelly et al., 2010) and in the central Irish Sea (Bentham, 2015). In both cases, the 
conclusions have been discouraging: due to low permeability in the case of the Clare Basin, 
and fragmentation of storage closures and high risk of leakage in the case of the central 
Irish Sea. 
Of the originally identified practical capacity within Irish territory, the Kinsale natural gas field 
is the single largest candidate, with an estimated possible capacity of 330 MtCO₂ (90 MtC), 
and appears as the most likely first suitable storage site, after existing gas extraction is 
exhausted (c. 2020). However, even this site would require an initial commitment of c. €80 
million to be assessed and validated with confidence. 
In Irish policy terms, the current position as articulated in the most recent National Mitigation 
Plan (DCCAE, 2017a) is that CCS deployment in Ireland will be “driven by appropriate 
carbon price signals of a reformed ETS” (EU Emissions Trading System): which suggests 
that, beyond limited “feasibility” studies,  development would be largely left to commercial 
market responses rather than direct state support or intervention. Somewhat in contrast, a 
report from Ireland’s Academy of Engineering (IAE, 2016) cautioned that it would be 
important to properly assess the existing (gas extraction) infrastructure at the Kinsale Head 
site to ensure that it remains suitable for future CCS use “before any final decision is made 
on the decommissioning of the Kinsale facilities”. 
If Ireland does not pursue its indigenous geological carbon storage potential, or if that 
potential proves to be extremely limited, then, in principle, consideration could also be given 
to transport (most likely by shipping) of captured CO₂ to a storage facility offered in another 
jurisdiction. However, detailed legal and business models for such international trading in 
CO₂ storage services have yet to be demonstrated; and full lifecycle accounting (including 
the potential for significant additional transport emissions) would be required to assess the 
overall mitigation effectiveness of such an approach. 
Even with CCS, FF energy and various industrial processes (such as cement production) 
would still be net sources of CO₂, albeit at much lower emission intensity per unit of 
production. As Ireland’s finite CO₂ quota becomes exhausted it will be necessary either to 
discontinue these processes entirely or to fully recapture the ongoing residual (post 
conventional CCS) atmospheric emissions and commit this to permanent storage i.e., 
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negative emissions technologies of some form. Similarly, if mitigation of gross CO₂ emission 
is insufficiently rapid, so that the national CO₂ quota is actually exceeded, then it will become 
necessary to subsequently achieve nett negative CO₂ emission on a complete territorial 
basis, and sustain this sufficiently long, to fully remove this excess. 
9.3 Negative Emission Technology Options 
9.3.1 Enhanced Soil Carbon Sequestration (SCS) 
(Khalil et al., 2013) estimate the national carbon stock currently in Irish soils as 
approximately 2.8GtC (equivalent to c. 10GtCO₂ in atmosphere37). The highest soil carbon 
densities are found in the raised bogs. However, in itself, this gives no indication of the 
potential for enhancing this total stock, or the rate at which such enhancement might be 
achieved (the flow, or sink, potential). Conversely, Tomlinson (2005) highlights the 
importance of protecting this existing soil carbon stock in Ireland, as it is currently either 
being actively being released to atmosphere, or under significant risk of being emitted into 
the atmosphere, due to disturbance by practices such as peatland drainage, peat extraction, 
and wider land use change. But if the existing stock can be stabilised, there may then be 
further potential to add to this stock over time. That said, in general, the carbon stock in any 
given soil is subject to saturation. Accordingly, the potential for increasing the stock depends 
on the current carbon deficit in Irish soils, relative to saturation. Unfortunately, there is a 
paucity of data regarding the maximum stock (saturation) capacity, and corresponding 
existing carbon deficit, of Irish soils. However the grey literature report (RIA, 2016) suggests 
that most Irish soils have a significant carbon deficit. This is based on international findings 
in Europe and other regions with similar climate and soils to Ireland (e.g. New Zealand), 
where (Feng, 2012; Feng et al., 2013) have found most soils to have a saturation deficit. It 
is unclear whether this report correctly summarised (Soussana et al., 2007) or adequately 
addressed the saturation issues noted by (Smith, 2014). A case study for estimating soil 
saturation deficits at a national level has been presented by (McNally et al., 2017) for New 
Zealand, where they modelled the saturation deficit for different soil types under use in 
agriculture. This work might facilitate a similar analysis in Ireland. In principle, such analysis 
could allow targeting of soils with the highest saturation deficit to achieve the most effective 
increases in soil carbon stock. 
However, as against all this, (Thamo and Pannell, 2016) have argued that soil carbon stock 
changes should, in general, be excluded from consideration in overall CO₂ mitigation 
accounting and policies, on the basis of the associated “... challenges, risks and potential 
for perverse outcomes and high transaction costs”. They are not arguing against 
enhancement of soil carbon per se; but, especially in cases where such enhancement may 
already have sufficient motivation for reasons not directly related to climate mitigation, its 
 
                                            
37 For comparison and clarity, CO2 and carbon units are provided where possible, on the basis of 
one mass unit of carbon corresponding (on oxidation) to 3.67 units of CO2. 
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inclusion in climate policy measures “... seems particularly ill-advised.” Similarly, Mackey et 
al (2013) argue strongly against equating enhancement of soil carbon with long-term climate 
mitigation actions. 
Minasny et al. (2017) highlight that relying on soil organic carbon to retain carbon removed 
from the atmosphere should be considered as, at most, only a temporary strategy to buy 
time until other more secure, long-term, (geological) storage technologies are deployed at 
sufficient scale. More generally, Smith (in Banwart et al., 2014, p. 240) makes the important 
point is that:  
The carbon that humans are currently releasing through fossil fuel use has 
been locked up in the geosphere for hundreds of millions of years, and was 
accumulated over many millions of years. Using the biosphere to capture 
this geospheric carbon does not add up — the geospheric carbon released 
is too large for the biosphere to store effectively.  
Notwithstanding these legitimate concerns and limitations, to the extent that there is merit in 
promoting enhancement of soil organic carbon stock this can be achieved through the 
growth of vegetation and resultant addition of carbon to soil through roots and harvest 
residues. How the soil and vegetation are managed and how the harvest is used will 
determine whether that agricultural process is a net source or sink of carbon, to or from the 
atmosphere. 
Several components of conventional agriculture have been identified as having potential to 
add directly to the soil carbon stocks in Ireland. (Minasny et al., 2017), advocating the so-
called “four per mille” ambition for global SCS enhancement (increasing soil carbon stocks 
by 0.4% yr-1 on a sustained basis), suggest that, in the specific case of Ireland, associated 
soil carbon sequestration rates of 0.6, 0.4 and 0.6 tCha−1yr−1 should be “possible” for 
grassland, arable land and forested land, respectively. Based on current land areas in each 
of these categories, that would imply potential target aggregate sequestration rates of c. 2.6 
MtC yr-1 (9.6 MtCO₂yr-1) for grassland (4.3 million ha), c. 0.16 MtC yr-1 (0.59 MtCO₂yr-1) for 
arable land (0.4 million ha) and c. 0.45 MtC yr-1 (1.67 MtCO₂yr-1) for forested land (0.75 
million ha). However, there is little detail on what specific interventions might be necessary 
to achieve these rates, nor how long these rates might be sustained before saturation limits 
are reached. Moreover, there are, of course, also many processes that lead to loss of soil 
organic carbon (for example, peat land drainage), which would be equally important to 
characterise. 
As well as saturation limits, and the potential for soil carbon sequestration to be outweighed 
by gross emissions from other land use practices, other key concerns for any long-term 
reliance on soil carbon storage are the issues of permanence and potential reversibility. This 
is somewhat dependant on the site specific processes of organic carbon stabilisation, i.e., 
soil carbon becoming less susceptible to decomposition through occulation in aggregates 
or formation of organo-mineral complexes (Lawrence-Smith et al., 2015). However, more 
general processes of land use change, soil disturbance, and direct climate change impacts 
(extreme weather, fire etc.), mean that all soil organic carbon must be considered vulnerable 
to unpredictable and relatively rapid loss back to atmospheric CO₂ at any time, and should 
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not be equated with geologically stable carbon stocks (natural fossil fuel deposits, and 
engineered geological CO₂ storage). 
Much further data and research would be required to estimate a full soil organic carbon 
balance (annual change in soil organic carbon stock, positive or negative) for Irish soils. On 
current evidence, it appears that while enhanced soil carbon sequestration might contribute 
significantly to reduce net land use CO₂ emissions, it is unlikely to be sufficient to achieve 
net negative emissions even just within that land use sector (never mind contribute 
substantially to compensating for gross emissions in the energy sector). 
9.3.2 Biochar (BC) 
International literature suggests that biochar (suitably prepared charcoal applied as a soil 
amendment) may have significant negative emissions potential with fewer adverse side-
effects than at least some other NETs due to having a lower impact on land, water use, 
nutrients, albedo, energy requirements and cost (Smith, 2016). In the global context of 
research literature, Minx et al. (2017) identified biochar as one of the largest reported subject 
areas of NETs research; though examination of indices such as Web of Science or Google 
Scholar suggests significantly more focus (to date) on BECCS than biochar. Some 
constraints identified in using biochar include concerns about saturation (relative to 
agricultural use and productivity of soils) and reversibility, reduced air quality, heavy metal 
pollution and site-specific effects (Lorenz and Lal, 2014; Ravi et al., 2016; Verheijen et al., 
2013). The international literature also highlights many potential co-benefits of biochar 
including increased yields (Agegnehu et al., 2016), improved soil quality (Lorenz and Lal 
2014; Subedi et al. 2017; Rasul et al., 2016) and reduced soil emissions of other GHGs 
(Nelissen et al. 2014; Fidel, Laird, & Parkin, 2017; Mukherjee, Lal, & Zimmerman, 2014; 
Nelissen, Saha, Ruysschaert, & Boeckx, 2014; Shen et al., 2014). 
There is little Ireland-specific biochar research, but much of the international research is 
transferable to an Irish context. Biochar has recently been introduced to market in Ireland 
for its fertilisation, disease protection and water retention benefits38 but it does not feature 
strongly in current Irish climate mitigation policy and research. The limited Irish-specific 
research on biochar focuses on its potential to suppress other GHG emissions from soils  
(Augustenborg et al., 2012b; W Kwapinski et al., 2010; Troy et al., 2013) and improving soil 
quality and yields (Troy et al., 2014). 
Improving geographically explicit data of local soil biochar amendment capacity and 
strategically targeting soils with the largest capacity would be the most appropriate way to 
deploy biochar applications in Ireland. This would depend on costs (including monitoring, 
 
                                            
38See, for example: http://www.biocharireland.com/  
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verification and ongoing maintenance of the biochar soil carbon stock39) relative to other 
available mitigation and negative emission strategies. 
Kwapinski, Byrne, et al. (2010) identify multiple potential feedstocks suitable for biochar 
production in Ireland and suggest that the best resources may be manure (dairy, poultry, 
pig) and waste. However, care must be taken to assess and manage alternative feedstock 
uses (e.g., anaerobic digestion), and the risk of incentivisation or lock-in of intrinsically high 
GHG agriculture systems (particularly based on ruminant livestock). Full lifecycle analysis 
should include GHGs emitted during biochar production and any inputs during production 
that may have released GHGs (e.g. fertiliser). Biomass from bioenergy crops can also be 
used to make biochar. This could reduce the life-cycle emissions of bioenergy crop 
production by increasing the amount of carbon transfer to soil sequestration, reduce fertiliser 
and land requirements and suppress soil GHG emissions (Kauffman et al., 2014; Koide et 
al., 2015; Ubando et al., 2014; Z. Wang et al., 2014; Woolf et al., 2014). Conversely, 
however, producing biochar from the bioenergy crop biomass will of course reduce the 
energy output of the yield, creating a trade-off between net GHG emissions and bioenergy 
availability (essentially partitioning the bioenergy yield between CO₂ removal and other 
energy services). Perhaps more importantly, if the target bioenergy use is (or can be) 
integrated with CCS (i.e., a BECCS pathway) then that would appear to displace the role for 
biochar carbon storage per se (given the much greater capacity and permanence of 
geological storage). Biochar may still have a role for its other soil amendment benefits, of 
course, which further complicates this assessment. 
9.3.3 Afforestation (AF) 
The deployment of afforestation in Ireland is already well established and features heavily 
in existing climate change mitigation policy. Ireland currently has the lowest proportion of 
forested land in the EU, but has been expanding its forested area since the foundation of 
the state in 1922 (see Figure 9.2). The following sections will discuss the potential role of 
afforestation as a NET option for Ireland, taking into consideration its GHG profile and 
specific socioeconomic constraints. 
 
 
                                            
39Note that continuing maintenance and monitoring costs must be sustained indefinitely, even after 
soil biochar saturation. 
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Afforestation potentially contributes to carbon storage in two distinct stocks: the tree biomass 
itself and enhanced soil carbon over the afforested land area. The impact of afforestation on 
soil carbon stock depends on many factors, including climate, former land-use, forest age, 
forest type, soil type (clay content), nitrogen deposition and management practices (Bárcena 
et al., 2014; Han et al., 2017). While the soil  stock is initially depleted during afforestation 
due to disturbance and root respiration, it then subsequently increases again as the forest 
develops and matures, resulting in a net uptake of carbon into the soil carbon stock from 
afforestation over time (Byrne and Farrell, 2005; Wellock, 2011). The stability of soil carbon 
added by forestry depends on land management, and the amount of CO₂ sequestered is 
subject to the soil carbon saturation limit, with carbon rich soils such as peatlands having 
much lower additional soil carbon potential (Byrne and Black, 2003). Management should 
focus on minimal disturbance of the soil and stand to minimise soil carbon decomposition 
rates. (Jandl et al., 2007) find that mixed species stands stabilise soil carbon better than 
monoculture stands by reducing decomposition. Future research could usefully investigate 
what combinations of tree species or overall forest ecologies are best at enhancing and 
stabilising soil carbon stocks of afforested lands in specific Irish soil and climate conditions. 
The direct loss of biomass carbon from harvest, and soil carbon from disturbance during 
harvesting, must be fully accounted for in the net GHG profile of afforestation and forestry 
management in Ireland and implications for achieving net negative emissions (for the sector, 
or nationally) considered. (Naudts et al., 2016) caution that restrictions are needed regarding 
minimum stand age, to ensure a net gain of carbon, and harvesting protocols to protect 
stored carbon and ensure its permanence. The full impact of harvesting method (clear-
felling, staggered felling, thinning, etc.) on soil carbon specifically should also be measured 
 
Figure 9.2 Public and Private Afforestation in Ireland (reproduced from Curtin & Arnold, 
2016) 
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in an Irish context, and then managed to optimise the soil carbon stock. Hence complete 
GHG LCAs may be helpful for Irish forestry practices to fully ascertain the net emissions of 
wood production in Ireland. 
(Black and Farrell, 2006) estimate rates of carbon removal from atmosphere by Irish forests 
at c. 1.6-2.4 MtCO₂yr-1 (0.42-0.65 MtCyr-1). However, note that this represents net 
ecosystem productivity only, i.e., excluding harvest. With target afforestation rates of 8000ha 
from 2015-2020, (Muldowney, 2016) reports that forests could remove 3.4-4.4 MtCO₂yr-1 
(0.93-1.2 MtCyr-1). (Black, 2007) estimates that (under current harvest practices) ongoing 
afforestation rates need to be above 10,000ha yr-1 to prevent forestry in Ireland moving from 
a net sink to net source of CO₂ emissions. (COFORD, 2014) and (Byrne, 2010) found 
afforestation needs to be maintained at 15,000 ha yr-1 to maintain a stand age class suitable 
for effective mitigation. 
(Teagasc, 2013) projected that afforestation could achieve a nett sequestration rate of 
4.2 MtCO₂ yr-1 (1.14 MtC-1) in 2030, but, with increased harvest (inter alia due to increasing 
demand for wood fuel) and decreasing afforestation rates, this would fall to 1.6 MtCO₂yr-1 
(0.44 MtCyr-1) by 2050 (see Figure 9.3). (Teagasc, 2017) increased the afforestation target 
to 20,000 ha yr-1 to achieve a proposed nett sink of 5.5 MtCO₂ by 2050 (suggested as a 
potential offset for one quarter of mainly non-CO₂ agricultural emissions). 
Per Figure 9.3, as demand for bioenergy fuel increases (due to policy incentives), timber 
harvest is projected to increase (especially soon after 2030) disrupting the flow of forest 
emissions/removals. The age profile of trees changes due to increased clearfell and 
replanting and reducing afforestation rates. Additional harvesting of residues and stumps 
can also be used to increase yields available for woody biomass energy (Murphy et al., 
2014b) however a trade-off exists here as that would remove the residues that would have 
otherwise become at least partially incorporated into the soil carbon, reducing the 
sequestration potential of that forest. Currently the heaviest CO₂ emissions source (apart 
from actual combustion) is in transport and therefore localised production and use may be 
an important future policy consideration (Murphy et al., 2014b). A complementary strategy 
may be local gasification, upgrade to biomethane and relatively more efficient pipeline 
transport (via the existing natural gas grid). In principle this might also integrate well with 
distributed production of biomethane via anaerobic digestion of non-woody bioenergy 
feedstocks (SEAI, 2017). However, it should be noted that, for maximum mitigation benefit, 
bioenergy use should arguably be combined with CCS (i.e., a form of BECCS) and that 
generally implies use (combustion, gasification or anaerobic digestion) in relatively large, 
centralised plant. This might be facilitated by such a biomethane pathway. As against this, 
it appears that the forthcoming Irish Renewable Heat Incentive may primarily incentivise 
direct biomass combustion in smaller scale heating plants that are unsuitable for CCS 
(DCCAE, 2017b). This would be expected to effectively “lock out” some of Ireland’s negative 
emissions potential, at least for the lifetime of such installations (McMullin, 2017). 
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However, current afforestation rates are falling significantly short of meeting the policy 
targets in any case. (Curtin and Amold, 2016) found that then current plantings were 30% 
below the target for 2016. Ongoing failure to meet afforestation targets (both annual rate 
and cumulatively) will thus result in a significant reduction in the contribution of forests to 
Irish CO₂ removals, as older forests will (at best) approach an equilibrium carbon stock 
(biomass+soil carbon), with new growth balanced by harvesting, after 2030 (Curtin and 
Amold, 2016). Indeed, there is a concern that Ireland’s forest carbon stocks may, in fact, 
decrease overall, particularly if harvest rates for fuelwood increase as projected from 7% of 
roundwood production to the 21% projected for 2030 to 2050 (Teagasc, 2013, p. 39). Such 
increased use of roundwood for fuel may in itself have significant carbon-climate response 
implications, especially depending on rotation time, relative to the timescale urgency of Paris 
target aligned mitigation (Cherubini et al., 2014). 
The reasons for the decline in afforestation rates (despite continuing state funding support) 
are complex. Issues such as the permanent nature of compulsory re-plant forestry, the lack 
of land control and management required, as well as the replacement of traditional practices 
are all relevant to reduced uptake by farmers (IFA, 2016). A debate has also emerged over 
competition for land between conventional farmers and afforestation-incentivised private 
investors (Hubert, 2017). There are additional concerns about the impacts of afforestation 
on biodiversity, especially bird species, and on the environment generally from the mono-
culture blanket forestry currently being deployed under the Afforestation Grant and Premium 
Scheme (Kelly, 2015). 
Agroforestry might be offer a more effective balance in the competition for land between 
livestock, crops and forestry. Practices such as silvopasture could simultaneously share the 
land for grazing and tree planting. While this practice is more favourable for biodiversity and 
Figure 9.3 Projected GHG emissions for forest land (reproduced from Teagasc, 2013). 
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the environment than blanket forestry, there is not enough data to accurately assess its 
climate mitigation potential in an Irish context (Curtin and Amold, 2016). 
Notwithstanding these ongoing challenges, Irish forestry is heavily relied upon in future 
policy scenarios to provide nominally ‘carbon neutral’ (or at least ‘relatively lower carbon’) 
bioenergy to reduce emissions from the Irish energy sector through direct fossil fuel 
displacement (Byrne, 2010; Fitzpatrick, 2016), and/or to compensate for continuing heavy 
non-CO₂ emissions (particularly N₂O and CH₄) from ruminant agriculture. The latter appears 
to be a specific motivation for a proposed 5.6% flexibility in Ireland’s 2030 non-ETS emission 
targets in the EU Commission effort sharing regulation. Currently, ruminant livestock 
numbers are increasing in Ireland, arising from specific policy goals of increasing dairy 
production following the removal of EU milk quotas (Muldowney, 2016). Based on current 
EU accounting (including the GWP-100 CO₂-equivalence methodology), (Curtin and Amold, 
2016) find the afforestation targets in Ireland could be used to either avoid or offset 25% of 
projected overall agricultural sector emissions due to a combination of directly sequestering 
carbon, land use change (from ruminant livestock agriculture to forestry), and displacing 
fossil fuel. 
Some initial barriers in using woody bioenergy in Ireland have been encountered, such as 
increased prices from supply shortages due to increased utilisation incentives, technical and 
chemistry issues with combustion (Walker et al., 2009), and increased air pollution 
(Fitzpatrick, 2016). Despite these issues, demand for bioenergy fuel from wood is growing 
in Ireland and expected to almost double to 3 million m3yr-1 by 2020 (Murphy et al., 2014a). 
This represents c. 11MtCO₂yr-1 (3MtCyr-1) released back to atmosphere from the forest 
biomass stock, based on an assumption of c. 1tCm-3 for woody biomass (Khatib, 2016). 
It is possible that future accounting of energy system emissions will no longer simply count 
woody biomass as carbon neutral at the point of combustion/oxidation, but rather take 
account of some or all of its associated upstream emissions. According to (EC et al., 2014): 
‘Ideally, a model is needed capable of simulating the temporal dynamics of GHG emissions 
and removals for carbon stock changes in the forest (i.e. increase in carbon stock); carbon 
stock changes outside the forest (i.e. increase of the harvested wood products pool), 
material substitution effects and energy substitution effects’. While it still appears possible 
that, with appropriate management, monitoring and verification, bioenergy from indigenous 
EU woody biomass might emit less nett CO₂ on a lifecycle basis (for given energy yield) 
than unabated burning of fossil fuels, the emissions savings in the energy sector for meeting 
EU and UNFCCC targets may be considerably over-estimated in the current ‘carbon neutral 
bioenergy’ calculations. This is particularly so when comparing to the alternative of leaving 
forest standing to preserve the carbon stock rather than returning it to the atmosphere 
(Burrascano et al., 2016; Hudiburg et al., 2011; Kreidenweis et al., 2016). 
At an EU level, the recent report (EASAC, 2017) draws attention to the diverse roles of 
forestry in Europe and highlights the key considerations that need to be addressed for 
effective climate change mitigation. This report discusses the climate impact of forest 
management, the payback time risks in the current bias towards use of forestry products for 
bioenergy and advises careful consideration by the European Commission regarding the 
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role woody biomass can play in meeting the Paris Agreement temperature goals. EASAC 
call for accounting procedures founded in objective science that incentivise maximum 
climate change mitigation, with renewable energy subsidies designed to reflect the true nett 
impact of biomass energy use on atmospheric CO₂ levels (in place of the current, simplistic, 
“carbon neutral” or “zero CO₂ on combustion” methodology). It may be argued that policy 
analysis accounting should also take fully into account the potential adverse impacts of 
woody biomass combustion on air quality, land use conflict etc. 
9.3.4 Bioenergy with CCS (BECCS) 
The basic concept of BECCS is straightforward, as previously explained (Chapter 3, section 
3.4). CO₂ is removed from air during plant growth, with the input of direct solar energy, via 
photosynthesis (whether in bioenergy crops or forestry, and whether the harvest is dedicated 
exclusively for bioenergy production or the energy use is secondary to some other “primary” 
crop use, perhaps only via plant residues or “waste”). While there are many potential 
pathways for exploitation of the consequent bioenergy content with different suitabilities for 
particular bioenergy feedstocks and applications, they all involve re-oxidation of the captured 
carbon and the production of CO₂. However, this regenerated CO₂ stream is potentially 
accessible at relatively high concentration (compared to the very dilute concentration in 
atmosphere) so there is the possibility of relatively efficient capture and then long-term 
sequestration in suitable geological storage. In this way, the process as a whole can move 
CO₂ from atmosphere to geological storage; with the added advantage of yielding usable 
energy output. Capture and storage do, of course, impose energy demands in their own 
right, so the usable nett energy yield will be lower than from unabated use of bioenergy; and 
there are generally other emissions (CO₂ and potentially other GHGs) associated with the 
full BECCS processing chain. So rigorous lifecycle assessment is required of any particular 
proposed BECCS system to establish the quantitative impact on overall GHG loading (and 
corresponding radiative forcing) in the atmosphere. While the details are complex, unless 
there is an unambiguous nett climate benefit (involving sufficient CO₂ removal to outweigh 
all CO₂ re-release and also any associated release of other GHGs) BECCS deployment will 
not constitute an effective negative emissions technology. 
The major potential pathways for indigenous bioenergy feedstock production in Ireland have 
already been reviewed in this chapter (sections 9.2.1, 9.3.3 above) and also the current 
status of (fossil fuel) CCS investigation (section 9.2.2). There appear to be two immediately 
conceivable paths toward early combination of these for BECCS deployment in Ireland: 
• Application of CCS to electricity generation from direct combustion of solid biomass. 
There is some (mixed) experience of such biomass combustion through co-firing with 
peat at one existing electricity station (Edenderry); however, there are significant 
technical limits to the proportion of biomass co-firing, the current indigenous supply 
of suitable (woody) biomass is very limited, and in any case this plant is not suitably 
geographically located with respect to any currently identified geological storage site 
(even if it were technically feasible to retrofit post-combustion CO₂ capture). A 
somewhat more plausible suggestion relates to the potential replacement of a large 
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coal-fired electricity plant (Moneypoint) which will reach end of life in its current 
configuration by c. 2025.  This could conceivably be repowered with a direct biomass 
combustion plant (e.g., on the model of the Drax power station in the UK) but with 
integrated carbon capture. However this would be technically challenging on many 
levels: there is no existing example of such a direct biomass fired CCS plant; it would 
necessarily rely (at least initially) primarily on imported biomass fuel, with significant 
transport emissions, and complex (at best) production emissions profile; and again 
the site is not well geographically located relative to any currently identified 
geological storage site (CSA Group, 2008). 
• Production of biomethane, injected into the natural gas grid which could be used 
directly in existing, high efficiency, combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) electricity 
generating plant, retrofitted with post combustion CO₂ capture. Pipeline transport 
might substantially reduce the energy (and emissions) overhead, compared to 
transport of solid biomass. There are two candidate CCGT plants already suitably 
located relatively close to the proposed Kinsale Head geological storage site. 
Preliminary indications40 suggest that, in the first instance, injection into this site may 
be possible at relatively moderate pressure which could make the initial deployment 
technically simpler and significantly lower cost. While this low-pressure injection 
would likely only be effective for perhaps 30% of the site storage capacity (after which 
much higher-pressure injection would become necessary), such an initial 
development could facilitate an early build-up of strategic national expertise and 
capability. A key attraction of this strategic approach would be that it largely 
decouples the CCS deployment from the BE availability: even while the power plants 
are still burning natural gas, such (FF) CCS would deliver up to 90% end-point 
emissions intensity reduction41; if or when the natural gas can be displaced by 
biomethane, the emissions intensity could be made progressively lower, and 
potentially become negative. However, this overall CO₂ balance would still depend 
critically on the biomethane supply chain. There appears to be significant technical 
scope for indigenous production via Anaerobic Digestion (AD) of feedstocks 
including animal slurries, food waste and conventional grass silage. Dedicated 
Miscanthus use would also be possible, and would likely offer significantly lower 
overall lifecycle GHG emissions than grass (Styles and Jones, 2008b). It would, of 
course, be critically important to avoid perverse incentification or lock-in either of food 
waste supply or slurry production (especially from intrinsically high GHG ruminant 
food production). And while storage and transport of (bio) methane can be relatively 
energetically efficient, it is intrinsically vulnerable to leakage (“fugitive emissions”). 
Because of the comparatively very high warming potential of methane, relatively 
 
                                            
40 Gas Networks Ireland, informal briefing, November 2017. 
41 Albeit such FFCCS would, of course, provide no effective mitigation of the upstream emissions 
associated with extraction, processing or transport of the fuel (Anderson and Broderick, 2017). 
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small absolutely amounts of leakage could fundamentally undermine the overall 
climate benefit achieved. Separately, a significant amount of the CO₂ production in 
an AD based pathway arises at the AD stage: the raw biogas from the digester must, 
in fact, be “upgraded” to biomethane (by separation of CO₂) before injection into the 
natural gas grid. While this separation means there is a relatively pure CO₂ stream 
available at the AD site, these sites are typically anticipated to be relatively small 
scale and geographically distributed (down to the level of a modest cluster of farms). 
While this distributed AD arrangement would minimise energy (and emissions) in 
transport of bulk feedstock, and return of digestate (for on-farm fertilizer use), it also 
means that full integration in a BECCS system would require transport of CO₂ from 
these distributed sites to a central location for incorporation into geological storage. 
The full energy and emissions implications of such CO₂ transport must again be 
included in any assessment of the overall emissions balance. 
While there are, therefore, identifiable potential pathways toward BECCS deployment in 
Ireland, it must be emphasised that they remain very uncertain in technical feasibility, overall 
GHG benefit, and cost. Nonetheless, there is a clear argument that policy should seek at 
the very least to avoid closing off pathways toward such BECCS deployment, and progress 
detailed understanding of the key enabling capabilities, namely verifiably low emissions 
indigenous bioenergy production, and geological CO₂ storage. 
By contrast, much Irish-specific bioenergy policy literature to date has tended instead to 
focus on the potential to “directly” decarbonise heating and/or transport energy use (Browne 
et al., 2011; Goulding and Power, 2013; Murphy, 2015; Murphy and Power, 2009; Singh et 
al., 2010; Smyth et al., 2009; Thamsiriroj and Murphy, 2010). However, in the context of 
achieving negative emissions through BECCS, it is essential that any CO₂ producing step 
in continuing energy use pathways be progressively restricted to contexts where it is 
practical to efficiently capture (and then transport and store). As already mentioned above, 
this would be a specific challenge in AD-biomethane BECCS systems, but might conceivably 
still be feasible, as CO₂ separation is already an intrinsic part of the pathway; whereas such 
capture seems unlikely to ever be at all compatible with direct (end-point) bioenergy use 
either in transport or small to medium scale heating applications. Accordingly, prudent policy 
development, even in the near term, should arguably re-focus on energy system 
interventions in both heating and transport that would avoid continued lock-in of end-point 
CO₂ emissions: this would firstly prioritise efficiency and other demand reduction measures 
(which amplify the impact of all other decarbonisation interventions), and either electrification 
or, in some circumstances, use of hydrogen as an end-point energy carrier (assuming CO₂ 
capture at the site of upstream hydrogen production, where applicable). 
9.3.5 Direct Air Carbon Capture and Storage (DACCS) 
The general principles of DACCS as a negative emissions technology have been presented 
in Chapter 3 (section 3.7). In general, the key attraction of DACCS over other NETs options 
is its minimal intrinsic requirement for dedicated land area; conversely, its key disadvantage 
is the requirement for potentially large energy inputs; inputs which must themselves be 
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extremely low carbon if the system as a whole is to achieve nett CO₂ removal from 
atmosphere. 
In the Irish context, a preliminary requirement for any consideration of DACCS would be 
availability of suitable geological storage. As already discussed, while there is, in principle, 
significant indigenous storage capacity (CSA Group, 2008), none of this has been developed 
to date; and such development is most likely to be in the context of FFCCS initially, with 
possible migration toward BECCS subsequently (provided genuinely nett negative BECCS 
pathways can be developed). But if or when access to geological storage, at significant 
scale, can be proven (either indigenously or through the development of internationally 
traded CO₂ storage services) then the potential for DACCS deployment in Ireland could be 
seriously considered, in parallel with BECCS evaluation. 
In terms of low carbon energy supply, one theoretical scenario would be to integrate DACCS 
with very high penetration of renewable energy sources in the Irish electricity system. In 
principle, this could align well with the relatively abundant indigenous wind energy resource 
in Ireland, both onshore and offshore (SEAI, 2011). If DACCS plant could be designed in 
such a way as to be highly dispatchable, then they might function to stabilise overall grid 
operation, at very high variable renewable penetration, even while consuming primarily, or 
exclusively, very low carbon renewable electricity that would otherwise be curtailed 
(discarded). This does involve large scale over-provisioning of variable renewable 
generation (compared to conventional demand); but (absent radical technical advances in 
electricity storage) that may be implicit in the integration of progressively greater amounts 
of variable renewable generation anyway, and at least it provides a potential material co-
benefit to such over-provision. However: the logical implication is that the DACCS plant 
itself, similar to the renewable generation assets, would run at significantly reduced capacity 
factor (because contingent on variable renewable energy availability) – as compared, for 
example, to supply from a (low carbon) nuclear energy source, where the composite system 
could run at very high capacity factor. But as indigenous nuclear generation is currently 
prohibited in Ireland, the latter is not an accessible scenario here at this time. 
Supplying the energy required by a DACCS plant primarily or exclusively via electricity has 
a technical advantage in that the plant can be flexibly located geographically, and, in 
particular, could be located close to available geological storage sites (to minimise transport 
energy/emissions). Again, because such a (theoretically) dispatchable DACCS plant would 
vary consumption to balance overall renewable supply and demand, it would not necessarily 
impose excessive requirements for additional transmission line capacity (peak load would 
not necessarily increase). However, much detailed investigation would be necessary to 
assess these in-principle possibilities further. 
Of course, suitable business models would be required to enable significant DACCS 
deployment – that would actually provide revenue for CO₂ removal services – though this is 
primarily a socio-political rather than a technical barrier. One obvious early possibility would 
be to target levies or charges on otherwise very difficult to decarbonise activities. Aviation, 
in particular, has few technical options for direct decarbonisation and current proposed 
measures rely heavily on “offsetting” (ICAO, 2016). While such offsetting has been 
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conceived to date in terms of “avoided emissions” in other sectors, this approach has been 
heavily contested (Hyams and Fawcett, 2013). Many of these objections could be overcome 
via the provision of fully dedicated and verified CO₂ removal and storage as a service, such 
as would be theoretically possible via DACCS. Ireland has significant existing economic 
activity arising from international aviation (particularly through financial services for aircraft 
leasing); and thus arguably has a particular interest in seeing the development of 
commensurate decarbonisation actions for aviation. Given this, and given the potential 
availability of relatively cheap, low carbon intensity (but variable) wind energy, there is 
clearly a case for support of pilot scale DACCS development and deployment in Ireland. 
Offsetting, of course, by definition does not achieve nett negative emissions: thus, while it 
might function as a mechanism for early investment in DACCS deployment, full CDR via 
DACCS would ultimately require dedicated economic arrangements that explicitly fund CO₂ 
removal. 
9.3.6 Enhanced Weathering (EW) 
The general principles of EW as a negative emissions technology have been presented in 
Chapter 3 (section 3.8). While EW does involve extensive land use, this does not conflict 
with conventional agriculture (excluding forestry). Accordingly, EW shares with DACCS the 
key attraction of a minimal requirement for dedicated land area. Conversely, its key 
disadvantage is also similar to DACCS, namely the requirement for potentially large energy 
inputs (for rock mining and extraction, transport, and application and spreading); inputs 
which must themselves be extremely low carbon if the system as a whole is to achieve nett 
CO₂ removal from atmosphere. On the other hand, unlike DACCS, EW sequesters carbon 
in an intrinsically stable form (bicarbonate) and so is not contingent on the availability of 
geological storage for CO₂. This distinction also means that EW may involve higher 
transaction overheads in monitoring and verification of ongoing carbon storage compared 
to DACCS. 
Geological surveys have identified outcrops of ultra-basic rock in various locations in the 
Republic of Ireland (Leake, 1986). Additionally, a UK study specifically for EW has identified 
large potential resources in Northern Ireland that may be readily accessible (Renforth, 
2012). Accordingly, the critical barriers to early deployment of EW in Ireland are very low 
carbon energy (in forms suitable for use in EW: primarily in machinery for extraction, 
processing and application, and in transport), and, of course, suitable supports or business 
models to explicitly fund extraction and storage. As with DACCS, the most immediately 
plausible pathway toward very low carbon energy supply in Ireland is in the form of variable 
renewable (wind) electricity: accordingly there is certainly scope to investigate the detailed 
energy requirements in EW processes to demonstrate how they might be addressed from 
such sources. The single most energy intensive step appears to be rock crushing; and again, 
if this could be done in large, fixed, plant, and engineered to be highly dispatchable, it is 
possible that it could positively facilitate high variable renewable electricity penetration; but 
with the corollary that the capacity factor on such plant would be constrained by variable 
energy availability, with correspondingly increased capital and financing costs.   
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In summary, while there is certainly merit in assessing the potential capacity for EW in 
Ireland, and possibly engaging in pilot scale deployment to properly characterise the 
required processes and likely costs, its potential contribution to effective climate mitigation 
remains highly speculative. 
9.4 Modelling the technical capacity of NET options in Ireland 
Previous discussions outline the challenges and limitations of deploying and scaling up 
various NET options in Ireland. Barriers include technical readiness, cost, storage 
permanence, and knowledge gaps in Ireland-specific research. A preliminary qualitative 
summary of these and other considerations for deploying NET options in Ireland is 
presented in Table 9.2. 
 
Table 9.2: A schematic qualitative summary of the main policy relevant considerations for 
utilising NET options in Ireland. * denotes relatively high equivocation and uncertainty in 
the assessment. 
 
The following presents a simplified model that makes an approximate quantitative estimation 
of the technical potential carbon removal and storage capacity of NETs in Ireland, under the 
assumption that the aforementioned limitations, discussed in detail in previous sections, can 
be fully overcome and options then deployed at scale in Ireland (i.e., this analysis does not 
attempt to quantitatively assess the many additional economic, political and social barriers 
to deployment). 
  
SCS Biochar EW Afforestation BECCS CCS DACCS 
Carbon 
removal 
Medium * Medium Medium Medium High High 
Very 
High 
Readiness Very High Very High Medium Very High Medium Low Very Low 
Cost Medium * Medium * Medium Low Medium High 
Very 
High 
Vulnerability to 
re-release 
High High Medium Medium * Low Low Low 
Vulnerability to 
future climate 
change 
Very High High Medium High Medium Very Low Very Low 
Biodiversity 
Risk 
Low Low Medium High * High Low Low 
Energy Penalty Low Medium High Low * Very Low * Medium * 
Very 
High 
Land Pressure Low Medium Low High High Very Low Very Low 
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9.4.1 The Model 
(Smith et al., 2016) present a method to estimate the technical carbon removal capacity of 
various NET options (BECCS, AF, SCS, Biochar, DACCS and EW) under hypothetical land 
area availability scenarios for the UK. 
To apply this model to Ireland, suitable land areas potentially available for relevant NET 
option deployment had to be determined. In choosing an appropriate land area, two main 
resources were considered; the COFORD land classification scheme (COFORD, 2016), and 
the discussions on land area availability for bioenergy by SEAI bioenergy supply curves 
(SEAI, 2012). 
(COFORD, 2016) classifies Irish land into 4 levels. The level most suitable for potential NET 
deployment is level 4: ‘Land most likely to have potential for forest expansion’. This is 
currently made up of farmland (occupied by dairy, cattle, sheep, mixed livestock and tillage) 
with wide and limited usage, not farmed grassland and unenclosed land. For estimating the 
capacity of SCS and EW the same assumption as (Smith et al., 2016) was made, namely 
that these options could be applied to all of the level 4 land (3,750,000 ha). For BECCS, AF 
and Biochar, the chosen maximum value for land area availability was 550,000ha, 
representing 16% of level 4 land in the (COFORD, 2016) classification scheme. This choice 
is informed by the discussion of (SEAI, 2012) on the potential land area available for 
bioenergy crops in Ireland. This identifies that the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
limits conversion of existing permanent grassland to arable (including bioenergy) crops to 
10% (350,000ha) up to 2020. Further, (DAFM, 2015, p. 42) indicates an even more 
restrictive CAP conversion limit of 5%. Beyond 2020, (SEAI, 2012) identify 200,000ha of 
additional pastureland that may be eligible for conversion, subject to CAP reform. We 
therefore adopt the relatively ambitious assumption that 350,000ha of permanent grassland 
could be converted and attributed to a relevant NET option (BECCS, Biochar or AF) up until 
2020, and that post 2020 the additional 200,000ha may become accessible, creating a total 
land area estimate in Ireland of 550,000ha. This land area is also in a similar range to that 
required to achieve an 18% afforestation target by 2050 (510,000ha) according to 
(COFORD, 2016). We suggest that this area therefore represents a realistic baseline land 
use scenario for assessing the NET capacity in Ireland up until 2100. 
Two additional, even more ambitious, ‘high end’ scenarios were also tested to inform the 
current Irish policy direction of pursuing “carbon neutrality” within the agriculture sector. 
These two scenarios allocate 30% of level 4 agricultural land (total of 970,273 ha; ‘high-end-
1’) and 75% of level 4 land that is classified of ‘limited agricultural use’ and ‘not farmed’ (total 
of 1,007,407ha; ‘high-end-2’). 
A final “edge case” scenario was modelled which assumed that bioenergy supply was not 
limited by indigenous capacity (i.e. an unlimited amount could be imported), to estimate how 
much carbon sequestration could hypothetically be achieved via BECCS if the entirety of 
Ireland’s primary energy was electrified and provided by bioenergy. (SEAI, 2016a). Reports 
Irish total primary energy requirement (TPER) in 2015 as 13,889 ktoe (162 TWh). (SEAI, 
2012) estimates that 203,000ha of Miscanthus and SRC will produce c. 1,167 ktoe (16.6 
TWh). On this basis, a hypothetical land area of 2,415,996ha (the majority of which, by 
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definition, would be outside the national territory) was entered into the (Smith et al., 2016) 
model to estimate corresponding carbon removal capacity for this scenario. 
9.4.2 Land use emissions displacement 
Additional calculations, not present in the original model of (Smith et al., 2016), were carried 
out to estimate the reduction of Irish emissions (largely non-CO₂) resulting from the 
displacement of current agricultural practices by deploying NET. The purpose of this 
exercise was to more specifically inform the current policy directive of pursuing efforts 
towards “carbon neutrality” in the agricultural sector, as outlined in the National Mitigation 
Plan (DCCAE, 2017a). To estimate this displacement value, GHG emission values for Irish 
agricultural practices were taken from (Styles and Jones, 2007a). For the three land area 
scenarios it was assumed the NET option was applied equally between all level 4 land use 
categories except tillage for the baseline and high-end-1 scenarios, and 75% of all ‘limited 
agricultural use’ and ‘not farmed’ land for the high-end-2 scenario. 
9.4.3 Cumulative technical capacity of NETs in Ireland to 2050 and 2100 
Additional work was carried out to consider the cumulative amount of carbon removed by 
each NET option if deployed in Ireland first up until 2050, and then extended to 2100. The 
purpose of this exercise was to provide insight on the effect of saturation on time limitations 
for NET options such as SCS, biochar and AF, in contrast to the much higher storage (and 
therefore longer term sustained removal) capacities of BECCS and DACCS (see previous 
sections with discussions on soil saturation limits and geological storage capacity for CCS 
in Ireland). This addresses the issue of NET options like AF, Biochar and SCS being 
technically available to scale up to full potential now, but as an emissions management 
strategy is time limited and subject to saturation effects. Whereas NET options such as 
BECCS and DACCS are not yet ready to deploy at scale, but are expected to be less limited 
by saturation due to much larger (and more secure) storage capacity. This work estimates 
the cumulative removals achieved by Biochar, SCS and AF under the assumption that Irish 
soils will saturate after c. 20 years. A paucity of data on Irish soil carbon deficits means the 
actual time to saturation cannot currently be estimated with any precision. This value of 20 
years is taken on the basis of guidelines by (IPCC, 2006). This work also assumes that CCS 
storage capacity is not constraining within the given time horizons (i.e., national CCS storage 
capacity will not be fully used by 2100, or if it is, that there will be options to export Irish 
captured CO₂ to be permanently stored elsewhere). It was assumed that all NET options 
were deployed to the full baseline scenario land areas by 2020, with the exception of BECCS 
and DACCS for which the assumed start year was 2035 (anticipating full technological 
readiness by then, implying much earlier full-scale FFCCS deployment, and progressive 
BECCS and DACCS capability build-up through at least pilot and demonstration scale 
deployments well in advance of 2035). 
9.4.4 Results 
The key results can be seen in Table 9.3. Due to the simple nature and limitations of the 
model each NET option is considered individually rather than in combination. In the 
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hypothetical edge case scenario where Ireland’s entire primary energy is supplied by 
BECCS, c. 7.25 MtC (26.6MtCO₂) might be removed annually. As with discussions by (Smith 
et al., 2016), we consider the ‘low’ values of the model output. Of the low NET capacity 
estimates, AF has the highest capacity, followed by BECCS and DACCS, and lowest 
capacities are from SCS, Biochar and EW (Table 9.3, Figure 9.4). Compared to total Irish 
emissions, under the baseline land area scenario, up to 11% of the 2015 emissions might 
be offset by a NET option. If additional land area became available, this proportion could 
technically be as high as 21% (high-end-2 AF scenario, Table 9.3). Biochar and SCS are 
the most economically viable options, with DAC currently estimated as the most expensive 
by several orders of magnitude (Table 9.3). 1-1.7MtC could be displaced per year in 
Ireland’s land use sector by converting existing agricultural land to BECCS, AF or Biochar 
land use (Figure 9.4), equivalent to up to 32% of current Irish annual agricultural emissions 
(high-end-1 scenario, Table 9.3). In both high-end scenarios, the combination of the carbon 
removals possible from AF and the emissions displaced would result in net negative 
emissions in Irish agriculture and land use. For the baseline scenario, maximising AF and 
displacing 16% of current agriculture lowers net emissions by 52% in this sector, still making 
a significant contribution towards the expressed policy goal of “carbon neutrality”. Further 
reductions could be achieved by combining SCS and EW on the remaining agricultural land. 
The cumulative carbon removal capacity of NET options in Ireland, under the baseline land 
area scenario, can be seen in Figure 9.6. These results show the limit on carbon removal 
capacity of AF and Biochar due to soil carbon saturation. Hence, while AF showed the 
highest carbon removal capacity per year (Table 9.2), this annual removal capacity will not 
be available long term to 2100. 
In Chapter 8 a detailed review of the Irish carbon quota and the important considerations 
needed for its estimation and implementation are discussed. Taking the carbon quota for 
Ireland of 770 MtCO₂ from (Glynn, 2017a) provides a context for the cumulative capacities 
of different NET options in Ireland shown in Figure 9.6. The cumulative capacities of NET 
options in Ireland up until 2100 are as high as 400 MtCO₂ (BECCS and DACCS), indicating 
the technical potential to significantly contribute to Ireland’s achievability of a net carbon 
quota of 770MtCO₂ by effectively increasing the gross carbon quota by 52%. Up until 2050, 
550,000 ha of AF could cumulatively remove 137 MtCO₂, increasing Glynn (2017)’s gross 
carbon quota for Ireland by 17%. However, Chapter 8 finds an emissions gap between Irish 
carbon quota estimates and projected cumulative Irish emissions to 2100 in the range of 
2570-4990 MtCO₂. And as seen in Figure 9.6, under a baseline land area scenario NET 
options in Ireland are likely to fall well short of this required capacity implied by current 
emission projections: demonstrating that, even with “anticipatory reliance” on (unproven) 
NETs, deep, near term, reductions in gross emissions are still required. 
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Figure 9.4 Estimates of carbon removal per year in Ireland under different land use 
scenarios: grey: baseline scenario, white: high-end-1, black: high-end-2. 
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Table 9.3: Capacity of NET options in Ireland, based on the model by (Smith et al., 2016), under three land area scenarios for 
BECCS, AF and Biochar (Baseline scenario; 16% of level-4 land, High-end-1; 30% of level 4 agricultural land and High-end-2; 75% 
of level 4 land that was of ‘limited agricultural use’ and ‘not farmed’) and the assumption of all level-4 agricultural land is available 
for SCS and EW. An additional scenario was calculated for BECCS whereby the 2015 primary energy requirement in Ireland was 
supplied by BECCS. *DACCS potential is not constrained by area so impacts assessed at same level of implementation as BECCS. 
 
 
Area applied Carbon Removal Cost Displaced Emissions 
Technology   Low High Low High Low High   
 
Scenario Mha Mt Ce yr-1 
% of 2015 Irish 
Emissions 
€ per tCe yr-1 MtCe yr-1 
% of 2015 Agri 
emissions 
BECCS Base 0.55 1.65 6.6 10.1 40.4 187 749 0.97 17.9 
 High-end-1 0.97 2.911 11.643 17.8 71.3 330 1,322 1.7 31.6 
 High-end-2 1.01 3.022 12.089 18.5 74.0 343 1,372 1.5 28.4 
 All Irish Energy 2.42 7.25 29   823 3291   
AF Base 0.55 1.87 1.87 11.4 11.4 105 174 0.97 17.9 
 High-end-1 0.97 3.299 3.299 20.2 20.2 184 306 1.7 31.6 
 High-end-2 1.01 3.425 3.425 21.0 21.0 191 318 1.5 28.4 
Biochar Base 0.55 0.633 4.125 3.9 25.2 -451 4,257 0.97 17.9 
 High-end-1 0.97 1.116 7.277 6.8 44.5 -796 7,510 1.7 31.6 
 High-end-2 1.01 1.159 7.556 7.1 46.2 -827 7,797 1.5 28.4 
SCS Base 3.75 0.112 3.749 0.7 22.9 -16 129   
DACCS Base * 1.65 6.6 10.1 40.4 2,270 11,806   
EW Base 3.75 0.451 40.9 2.8 250.3 36 207,068   
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Figure 9.5: Carbon equivalent emissions displaced by conversion of agricultural land 
to NET options under three land use scenarios: grey: baseline scenario, white: high-
end-1, black: high-end-2. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.6: Estimated total cumulative CO₂ removal capacity of NET options in 
Ireland, based on the (Smith et al., 2016) model under the land area assumptions of 
the baseline scenario. 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Technology BECCS AR Biochar
M
tC
 e
q
  p
er
 y
e
ar
0
100
200
300
400
BECCS AR SCS Biochar DACCS EW
M
tC
O
2
2050
2100
226 
 
9.4.5 Discussion 
These preliminary findings suggest that Ireland may have potential capacity to remove 
a significant amount of carbon from the atmosphere, even under a baseline land 
allocation scenario of 16% of suitable agricultural land, through deployment of various 
NET options. On a cumulative scale, NET capacity in Ireland up until 2050 and 2100 
may have the potential to significantly increase the achievability of an equitable nett 
Irish carbon quota. Each NET option is considered individually for Ireland. While, in 
principle, a portfolio of multiple NET options could be deployed together, they would 
interact in complex ways, and significantly more sophisticated land allocation 
modelling, compared to the relatively simplistic scenarios presented here, would be 
required to assess this. 
Presently, AF, Biochar and SCS are the most immediately suitable and ready to deploy 
NET options in Ireland (see discussions in previous sections and Table 9.3). Our 
results find that these options might remove 1.87,0.63 and 0.11 MtC yr-1 respectively, 
offsetting up to 11% of Ireland’s current annual emissions.  However each of these 
options rely on biogenic and soil storage of the removed carbon, which is subject to a 
saturation limit and vulnerable to re-release (see previous discussions in Chapters 3 
and 9). So while these results demonstrate significant annual removal capacity in 
Ireland, cumulatively these NET capacities are estimated to be limited to 137, 46 and 
8 MtCO₂ respectively (Figure 9.6). If deployed fully by 2020, this maximum capacity 
could be reached as early as 2050. Despite offering no further capacity, protection and 
management of this vulnerable captured carbon would still require significant 
resources into the indefinite future. 
While technological maturity, cost and national capacity knowledge gaps render 
BECCS and DACCS difficult to deploy in Ireland in the very short term (less than 5 
years), our results find they may also have significant capacity to remove atmospheric 
carbon, up to the equivalent of ~10% of current annual national emissions. These 
options are not limited by the biogenic saturation concerns previously discussed, and 
in principle therefore might allow significant carbon removals post-2050, potentially 
increasing the gross carbon quota for Ireland by 52%. However, the current state of 
readiness and high costs warrant caution and prudence in relying on future availability 
of these technologies. 
In Irish policy terms NETs can be framed as aiding the proposed progression of Irish 
agriculture towards “carbon neutrality” in the first instance; and displacement of current 
high emissions intensity ruminant food production with bioenergy cultivation would 
further support this. Displacing 16% of available agricultural land with AF may achieve 
additional emissions saving, relative to current agriculture, of 1MtC (19% of 2015 
agricultural emissions, if equated on an approximate GWP-100 equivalence basis). 
Two additional ‘high-end’ scenarios indicate a technical potential to go beyond “carbon 
neutrality” and achieve net negative emission within Irish agriculture and land use 
sector, albeit this would also depend on a significant change in future policy direction 
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to remove current restrictions and incentivise much more extensive land conversion 
to forestry and/or bioenergy cultivation for use in BECCS. 
Based on these results, a preferred strategy that emerges for deploying NETs in 
Ireland appears to be to maximise AF, with minimal harvesting, in the immediate term 
(perhaps up until 2035) while supporting the development of BECCS, with the view of 
allocating AF harvest biomass to BECCS when CCS costs are lowered and/or AF 
stocks (land, biomass and soil) have saturated. However, it must be emphasised that 
this would rely on little or no harvest of the accumulating forest biomass during this 
period (for any purpose that could not guarantee the continued long term preservation 
of the captured carbon stock), which would imply fundamental changes in current AF 
support policies. However, if BECCS does not become ready or remains infeasibly 
expensive, the use of AF becomes limited by saturation and unavailability of further 
additional land, after which no further removals can be achieved. Additionally, carbon 
removed by AF is stored biogenically (biomass and soil carbon) which is all vulnerable 
to re-release and will require continued maintenance, monitoring and protection (see 
discussion in previous sections and Chapter 3). Hence, while this work may inform 
policy discussions about the potential capacity for NETs in Ireland, the limitations 
imposed by permanence and saturation render NET options that are immediately 
available (AF, Biochar and SCS) high risk; while technological uncertainty and high 
costs render alternative options (BECCS and DACCS) presently unavailable and high 
risk to depend on future availability. Additionally, Irish NET capacities estimated herein 
fall well short of the implied requirements of the current gap between estimated Irish 
CO₂ quotas and current projected cumulative Irish emissions (see Chapter 8). 
Therefore, while our results indicate that NETs in Ireland may have material carbon 
removal capacity and contribute towards achieving future net emission targets, the 
highest priority and emphasis of Irish climate mitigation actions should be immediate, 
significant, and sustained reductions in gross emissions. 
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9.5 Chapter Conclusions: NETs potential in Irish mitigation policy 
This review applies the growing material on the use of negative emissions in a global 
context to meet specific targets and conditions of a small developed island nation, 
Ireland. It finds the following key conclusions: 
• BECCS and biochar are heavily represented in the global NET literature, but 
both are currently limited in their application in an Irish context particularly  due 
to cost and technological immaturity for CCS, and lack of promotion and uptake 
in Ireland for Biochar 
• Bioenergy crops are largely discussed in relation to BECCS in the NETs 
context. In contrast to CCS in Ireland, bioenergy crop production has been 
substantially proven from a technical perspective and is ready for significant 
potential scaling up. But early BECCS deployment is difficult under the 
aforementioned cost and technical maturity limitations of CCS. Accordingly, 
early, rapid deployment of FFCCS (i.e., on conventional fossil fuel electricity 
generation and on other industrial scale CO₂ sources) is arguably a critical step 
in clarifying the longer term potential for BECCS in Ireland. 
• Afforestation is also relatively mature and already deployed in Ireland. Similar 
concerns to those raised in the international NETs literature are relevant to 
Ireland. Issues to be addressed include carbon leakage from importing woody 
biomass, debate over harvest or preservation of carbon in biomass, and 
competition between different land uses. Pending practical availability of 
BECCS pathways for bioenergy, it is arguable that afforestation should be 
prioritised as a land use over dedicated bioenergy crop cultivation, provided the 
carbon stock is allowed to accumulate, rather than be harvested, for energy or 
other purposes. Fossil fuel use would still, of course, have to be displaced from 
the energy system: but the immediate priority there (in advance of BECCS 
availability) may be absolute demand reduction, through efficiency measures 
and otherwise, and deployment of the lowest emissions intensity alternatives 
that are available, exclusive of bioenergy. In the Irish case this would suggest 
rapid electrification of heating and transport, accompanied by further expansion 
of indigenous wind energy production (onshore and offshore), early deployment 
of FFCCS, and potentially some nuclear energy use (though under current Irish 
legislation that can only be accessed by import over electricity interconnectors 
from other jurisdictions). All of these would require radically stronger policy 
measures to achieve the required scale within the very limited time window 
remaining for effective achievement of the Paris Agreement temperature goals. 
• For both bioenergy crops and afforestation, issues of accurate GHG LCAs and 
long term protection of both biomass and soil carbon stocks, should be a priority 
in relation to their Irish use; this must extend to accurate assessment and 
reporting of processes leading to potential soil carbon loss equally with 
reporting of processes leading to gains. Policy needs to realistically allow for 
the potentially very high, very long term, costs associated with such detailed 
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monitoring, verification, and maintenance of biogenic carbon stocks. 
• Potential for DACCS, while significant in principle, is reliant on significant 
technology advance and cost reduction, large scale geological storage 
development, and perhaps most critically, large scale availability of extremely 
low carbon energy. There may be some medium to long term possibility of 
integration of “dispatchable” DACCS with variable renewable energy sources 
(essentially exploiting wind energy that would otherwise be curtailed, if very 
high wind energy penetrations are pursued); but overall uncertainty over both 
technical feasibility and cost remains very high, and certainly does not provide 
any basis for speculative early overshoot of the national nett carbon quota. 
• Potential for EW currently remains largely theoretical unless and until very low 
carbon energy sources can be identified to dramatically reduce the emissions 
associated with quarrying, processing, transport and application of the required 
rock materials. Potential transaction costs in monitoring, verifying and 
preserving resultant carbon stocks would also have to be carefully considered. 
• In general, we note the need for ambitious short term action, within coherent 
long term policy constraints that are demonstrably commensurate with the scale 
of the climate challenge. In the case of CO₂, this can only prudently be 
anchored in the rigid arithmetic of the remaining, finite and rapidly depleting, 
national nett CO₂ quota. In the case of bioenergy production and use, supply 
chain obstacles arising from existing policies need to be addressed. 
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10. Literature Review: Summary Conclusions 
To meet the agreed Paris temperature goals, global nett CO₂ emissions must fall to 
zero rapidly, in accordance with the scientifically determined remaining cumulative 
CO₂ global carbon budget (and subjecting continuing scientific uncertainty to the 
precautionary principle). This global mitigation effort must be shared on a basis of 
equity and reflecting the wider UN sustainable development goals (SDGs). 
The remaining nett CO₂ equity quota (share of the global budget) for Ireland is small; 
with a reference starting year of 2015, it was likely no more than c. 590MtCO₂ on an 
equity basis, implying a (nett) CO₂ emission pathway rapidly reaching a sustained 
reduction rate of over 7% yr-1. (The rigid physical arithmetic of the CO₂ quota means 
that mitigation delay translates rapidly to much higher mitigation rates in the near 
future.) 
Carbon dioxide removal from atmosphere, coupled with long term storage, is 
technically possible by various pathways (“carbon sinks”), both natural and 
technological: to the extent that existing natural sinks can be strengthened, and new 
(technological) sinks can be created, the quota for remaining gross CO₂ emissions 
might legitimately be increased (and thus the mitigation rate for gross emissions might 
be somewhat eased or delayed relative to the nett rate just cited). 
Of currently identified CO₂ removal and storage approaches, those most likely to be 
of material potential for Ireland are: forestry, soil carbon management (including 
peatlands and biochar), BECCS and DACCS. These vary very significantly in current 
maturity, potential scale, storage permanence, estimated financial costs, wider social 
and environmental impacts, and in degree of confidence in any of these parameters.  
While continuing research and development can be expected to progressively improve 
our understanding of the potential for such CO₂ removal and storage, it would be an 
extremely high-risk policy to base current mitigation action on particular assumptions 
of future gross removals (at significant scale). There is no current basis for assuming 
that large scale future removals will be possible at significantly less cost than for 
directly mitigating gross emissions now; on the contrary, there is significant risk that 
future removals (at scale) will prove either to incur substantially greater societal costs 
or may not prove feasible at all.   
CCS is a component technology for two of the proposed CO₂ removal processes with 
greatest potential scale and permanence (BECCS and DACCS). Conventional CCS 
of fossil fuelled electricity generation or industrial process CO₂ (FFCCS) is much more 
technically mature than either BECCS or DACCS. It could already contribute 
significantly to mitigation of existing gross CO₂ emissions (most especially if combined 
with absolute contraction in energy demand, aggressive complementary exploitation 
of wind energy, and rapid electrification of heating and transport). Absolute reductions 
in fossil fuel use, and diversification of primary energy sources for heat and transport 
(via electrification) would also contribute significantly to energy security and resilience. 
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Accordingly, there would appear to be multiple potential co-benefits to the earliest 
feasible FFCCS deployment. This in turn would fundamentally clarify the potential for 
both BECCS and DACCS. There is therefore a clear Irish national interest in 
progressing FFCCS proactively (rather than passively relying on ETS market prices to 
provide sufficient exogenous market incentive at some unknown and unpredictable 
point in the future). 
To the extent that the indigenous biogenic CO₂ removal capacity (including forestry, 
soil carbon, bioenergy fuels or all types) is necessarily a very constrained resource, 
and that biogenic carbon stores (particularly forestry and soil carbon) are of variable 
and uncertain permanence, it may be prudent to progressively prioritise available 
biogenic capacity for bioenergy production, while prioritising bioenergy use in large 
scale facilities (CHP where practical, otherwise electricity only), where CCS (i.e., 
BECCS) will be feasible. The latter would also have a direct co-benefit in improving air 
quality (relative to small scale and unabated bioenergy use). Absolute increases in 
bioenergy production could potentially also contribute to mitigation of non-CO₂ 
emissions, to the extent that, in at least some situations, such production could 
displace current intrinsically high-GHG agricultural systems, such as dairy and beef 
production. 
Specifically in Ireland, future research priorities include quantifying the indigenous 
bioenergy capacity, particularly under the conditions of future climate change, 
developing robust, physically-grounded, GHG accounting mechanisms through LCAs 
of NETs relevant systems, and modelling feasible deep decarbonisation pathways for 
the Irish energy system with potentially ambitious incorporation of BECCS and/or 
DACCS. 
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